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For a man speaks more or less wisely to the extent that he has become more or less 
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On essaie sans cesse d’inventer un idéal meilleur et plus beau, une vérité plus large. A 
mesure que l’humanité grandit, le Christ se lève. 
 
(People always try to invent a better and more beautiful ideal, a larger truth. But as 
humanity grows, Christ rises above the horizon.)  
—Maurice Blondel, “Letter to Victor Delbos, May 6, 1889”
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Evangelical1 biblical exegesis suffers from a loss of equilibrium. A hallmark of 
evangelical Christianity is faith in the supreme authority of Scripture, often conveyed in 
the phrase sola scriptura. However, this conviction has not prevented a multiplicity of 
interpretations of the Bible, some of which flatly contradict others, and some outlying 
interpretations which clearly part from traditional Christian dogma. In addition, polemics 
over the best interpretation of Scripture has often resulted in deep divisions, even formal 
fragmentation of Christian unity. This dissertation argues that the lack of equipoise across 
evangelical exegesis is due largely to its underdeveloped hermeneutical framework.2 
Specifically, it lacks clear ecclesial support.  
                                                          
1 The term “evangelical” is used variously. Carl Braaten gave one of the simplest and most direct 
definitions of the term when he described it as being “defined by the evangel, the good news of the gospel.” 
Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson, eds., The Catholicity of the Reformation (Grand Rapids, MI: W. B.  
Eerdmans, 1996), 55. In this work, the term will refer to “a large family of churches and enterprises” within 
Protestantism that exhibit a “consistent pattern of convictions and attitudes.” Cf. Mark A. Noll, American 
Evangelical Christianity: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 13–14. These markers include an 
emphasis on personal religious conversion, a reliance on Scripture as ultimate religious authority, an active 
concern for sharing the Christian faith with others, and a theological focus on Christ’s work on the cross. 
Evangelicals regularly worship in various denominations or independent groups. The evangelical indicators 
just listed apply to a wide variety of Christians, including revivalists with hardly any ecclesiology, and 
Reformed theologians, both modern ones and those found at such places as Princeton and Mercersburg 
Seminaries in the nineteenth century. It is understood that some of these groups might prefer other terms 
than “evangelical” to describe themselves. In addition, while recognizing that many forms of 
evangelicalism exists around the globe, this dissertation will focus on American evangelicalism. 
2 In this work, “hermeneutics” refers to the theories, methods, and principles of biblical interpretation, 
while “exegesis” refers to the act of interpretation. In a more colloquial description, hermeneutics refers to 
the rules of the game, and exegesis refers to the actual game played on the field. 
2 
 
Evangelical exegesis of Scripture occurs within an assortment of hermeneutical 
models; however, a recurring theme is present in most of them. Although evangelicals 
disagree among themselves regarding the role of ecclesiology in hermeneutics, most give 
the Catholic Church little deference when it comes to biblical interpretation. To this 
reader, this exclusion is flawed and touches the nerve of the problem. Historically, it has 
contributed to the diminution of nearly any Christian ecclesiology, the secularization of 
Sacred Scripture, and multiple unorthodox interpretations of Scripture.3 Ironically, knee-
jerk antagonism by evangelicals toward anything Catholic unveils premises which 
contradict the very Bible evangelicals attempt to interpret. 
Several evangelicals have recently identified the need for biblical exegesis to return 
to its ecclesial Sitz im Leben. While suffering friendly fire from fellow evangelicals, some 
have even dared to dialogue with the modern Catholic Church. To this author, some of 
these attempts might be heading in a positive direction, but few go far enough. Catholic 
and evangelical dialogue partners often talk over each other, and do not engage the other 
deeply. In addition, other attempts at retrieving the ecclesial Sitz im Leben of biblical 
exegesis simply exhibit inadequate goals. Most of these efforts only want to get back to the 
early days of the Reformation or retrieve influential reformed theologians;4 few attempt to 
openly face the living Catholic Church. 
                                                          
3 Carl Braaten lists two polarized “heresies” which thrive when the “church-relatedness of Scripture” is 
neglected: fundamentalism and historicism. Braaten and Jensen, The Catholicity of the Reformation, 61. 
4 For some recent examples, cf. W. Bradford Littlejohn, The Mercersburg Theology and the Quest for 
Reformed Catholicity (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2009); the entire edition of Theology Today 71, no. 4 
(January 2015); Michael Allen and Scott Swain, Reformed Catholicity: The Promise of Retrieval for 
Theology and Biblical Interpretation (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2015); Carl R. Trueman, The 
Creedal Imperative (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2012). 
3 
This dissertation is written from an evangelical standpoint, and it is directed to an 
evangelical audience. It is specifically focused on how to read Holy Scripture. The author 
was professionally trained and later practiced what is often termed the “historical-
grammatical” method of biblical interpretation. This work initially set out to critique the 
general lack of ecclesiology within that particular hermeneutical method. However, it 
quickly became apparent that a high number of other evangelical hermeneutical models, 
whether liberal or conservative, similarly suffered from a lack of ecclesiology. In 
addition, those evangelical models which thankfully sought to incorporate some 
ecclesiology back into biblical interpretation were forged in inadequate molds. Some 
limited their focus to Protestant or Reformed ecclesial renewal, and held little regard for 
pre-Reformation Catholic ecclesiology. Others submitted the Catholic Church to a 
Hegelian view of history, and limited its validity to a past moment. Still others simply 
advocated a post-liberal democratic model of ecclesiology, which frequently disdained 
hierarchy and nearly any traditional authoritative structure. Many positive aspects were 
discovered in most evangelical hermeneutical models, but nearly all of them remained 
reticent towards engaging the Catholic Church on Catholic terms. This dissertation was 
written to address that deficiency.  
Very few evangelical hermeneutic models seriously engage Catholic thought or 
retrieve the vast quantity of available Catholic documents. The following work hopes to 
remedy that negligence. This work attempts to take Jesuit Jared Wick’s instruction 
seriously: “Theology is first an attentive listening to the testimonies of the word of God 
4 
received in faith, especially the faith of the corporate body of the church.”5 This attempt 
to understand the relation between Church and Bible from inside a Catholic perspective is 
by no means the only approach to biblical exegesis; however, it is an approach which is 
rarely attempted by evangelicals, despite the fact that it is essential. The contention of this 
work is that evangelicals need to develop a more robust ecclesiology, including a direct 
engagement with the modern Catholic Church, if they hope to read Scripture well and see 
the prayer of their Lord fulfilled.6 
 To make its point, this dissertation will investigate the contrasting effects of 
evangelical and Catholic ecclesiologies on biblical interpretation as each group contended 
with modernity. Despite clear distinctions between the challenges faced by evangelicals 
and Catholics, an analysis of the contrasting results is possible, legitimate, and helpful. 
The Catholic Church engaged changing realities on political, social, philosophical, and 
economic fronts which evangelicals never faced. In addition, Catholic intellectual centers 
were based in Europe, not in America.7 Nonetheless, both evangelicals and Catholics 
engaged modern thought in relation to biblical interpretation at intersecting moments. 
Both still needed to address the increasing rationalism in Scripture studies. Both groups 
                                                          
5 Jared Wicks, Doing Theology (New York: Paulist Press, 2009), 31. 
6 John 17:20–22 (ESV). 
7 Catholic identity in early America was still largely influenced by European thought. Early American 
Protestantism, unlike American Catholicism, had already developed much of its own identity in the new 
nation. Protestants comprised the majority of the American population, and although influenced by 
European thought, their theological expressions were distinct. Catholics did not comprise a significant part 
of the American population until the large Irish immigration of the nineteenth century. With the exception 
of Baltimore, few sections of America even had a significant Catholic presence. A large percentage of 
Catholic bishops, such as Baltimore’s John Carroll and Louisville’s Benedict Joseph Flaget, were born and 
educated in Europe. Cf. Thomas W. Spaulding, The Premier See: A History of the Archdiocese of 
Baltimore, 1789-1994. (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1989). 
5 
were concerned that some modern paradigms jeopardized the credibility of external 
revelation, and risked changing what were considered immutable dogmatic truths. 
Further, both sought to maintain Christian unity among their people during internal 
polemics on the pressing issues. Near the center of it all was the question of how to read 
the Bible. In addition, particular evangelicals and Catholics have attempted to dialogue 
over the last few decades.8 Among evangelicals, a renewed interest in the relation 
between Church and Scripture has manifested. This dissertation is relevant because a 
historical basis is vital for any evangelical who hopes to participate in the conversation.  
 The first four chapters of this dissertation will primarily be historical, and the final 
two chapters will chiefly be constructive. This work will begin with an analysis of the 
axiomatic relationship between Church and Scripture prior to the Reformation, and then 
highlight the development of Biblicism9 following the Reformation (chapter one). It will 
then turn its focus to American evangelicalism, primarily in the nineteenth century, and 
consider the various ways evangelical groups addressed the challenges of biblical 
modernity (chapter two).10 From there, it will analyze responses to biblical modernity 
                                                          
8 Cf. Charles W. Colson and Richard John. Neuhaus, Your Word Is Truth: A Project of Evangelicals and 
Catholics Together (Grand Rapids, MI: W. B.  Eerdmans, 2002); Timothy George, “Evangelicals and 
Catholics Together: A New Initiative,” Christianity Today 41, no. 14 (December 8, 1997): 34–35; 
“Evangelicals and Catholics Together: The Christian Mission in the Third Millennium.,” First Things, May 
1994. 
9 The term Biblicism is used differently by various modern authors. In this dissertation, the term signifies 
confidence that  a particular structured Church is not needed to read the Scriptures in their fullness. Such a 
view holds that neither ecclesial authority nor Tradition is necessary for a clear reading of the Bible. This 
dissertation will not wade far into the debates over literal and metaphorical interpretation of select 
passages, or arguments focused on degrees of inerrancy.  
10 This dissertation will occasionally use the term “biblical modernity” or a similar expression. The phrase 
is admittedly broad. Here, “modernity” or “modern era” suggests the historic era beginning around the time 
of the Reformation. However, “biblical modernity” refers to a secular approach to biblical studies which 
specifically developed after the Reformation. It assumes that Church authority, Tradition, spiritual 
6 
from the Catholic Church in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as well as their own 
attempts at renewal (chapters three and four). After the historical analyses of the first four 
chapters, this dissertation will issue a call for evangelicals to reassess their dominant 
hermeneutical models. This will include a brief survey of literature, and a critique of 
recent evangelical efforts at biblical interpretation. It will also argue for particular 
contours needed for a robust reassessment of biblical hermeneutics (chapter five). The 
dissertation will conclude with an attempt to construct theological reasons why critical 
empathy for the Catholic Church is essential for evangelical exegesis, as well as practical 
next steps (chapter six).  
One of the vulnerabilities of this dissertation is its attempt to analyze biblical 
interpretation over long periods of time. The danger with this approach is it risks merely 
surveying trends while neglecting important distinctions between individuals. Despite the 
inherent danger with creating a panoramic view, this author considered it unavoidable at 
times due to significant misconceptions evangelicals exhibit regarding Christian history 
and Catholic theology. Specifically, three dangerous blind spots need attention prior to 
suggesting direction for evangelical hermeneutics. First, evangelicals cannot risk being 
ignorant of the commonly assumed relationship between Church and Scripture prior to 
the Reformation. Second, evangelicals need to be aware of the development of Biblicism 
which has influenced their own hermeneutical models. Third, evangelicals ought to 
become conversant with Catholic teachings which actually confirm certain evangelical 
                                                          
illumination, faith, and even the inspiration of the text are unnecessary to biblical exegesis; indeed, they 
may hinder superior exegetical work.  
7 
convictions. Due to the need to bring attention to these blind spots, surveys will be a 
necessary part of this work. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE STABILIZING ROLE OF ECCLESIOLOGY IN BIBLICAL EXEGESIS, AND 
ITS STEADY DEMISE  
Introduction 
Evangelicals who wish to reassess the foundations of their own hermeneutics 
need to revisit historic Christian assumptions related to biblical exegesis. Specifically, the 
axiomatic relationship between Church and Scripture prior to the Reformation needs to 
be reconsidered. In addition, the development of Biblicism after the Reformation, and its 
effect on biblical modernity should be traced. These examinations will occur in this 
chapter, and can help the evangelical to determine where present day hermeneutic models 
need adjustment. It is critical for this chapter to give significant attention to these 
concerns. Many contemporary evangelicals, regardless if they are more conservative or 
liberal, are simply unaware of the historic rapport between Church, Tradition, and 
biblical interpretation. In addition, some evangelicals still seem unwilling to consider that 
certain remedies for their current complaints might be found in the ecclesiology that was 




The Axiomatic Relationship between Church and Sacred Text 
The Church’s Book  
 The concept of sola scriptura, as popularized by present day Biblicists,1 would 
have been foreign to early Christians. This is because Scripture was the book of the 
Church, and it was produced in her womb. The Church predated the New Testament, and 
the earliest epistles2 were written by people within the Church to already existing 
churches.  
 Prior to the Reformation, Christian exegetes kept the “universal” conviction that 
Scripture contained divine revelation and was therefore the ground of theology.3 On one 
hand, Scripture was inspired by the Holy Spirit; it was the authoritative written word of 
God. Referencing Paul’s statements in Ephesians, Bonaventure said that “theology” is the 
“end of Holy Scripture.” One could not think about theology without thinking of the 
                                                          
1 Evangelicals understand sola scriptura with nuanced differences. The general consensus is that the 
Scripture remains the final arbiter or supreme authority in all Christian theological discussion; no ecclesial 
or private determination can undermine Scripture. This dissertation does not challenge that point. Instead, it 
challenges the Biblicist’s idea of sola scriptura which suggests the Bible can be read well in isolation, 
particularly in a non-ecclesial setting. This work argues that Church, and therefore Tradition, are necessary 
guides to reading Scripture. Cf. Daniel H. Williams, Tradition, Scripture, and Interpretation: A Sourcebook 
of the Ancient Church (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006), 28; and Timothy George, “Toward an 
Evangelical Ecclesiology,” in Catholics and Evangelicals: Do They Share a Common Future? ed. Thomas 
P. Rausch (New York: Paulist Press, 2000), 140. 
2 Currently, 1 Thessalonians is often considered the earliest New Testament text. 
3 Henri De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis: The Four Senses of Scripture, vol. 1. trans. Mark Sebanc (Grand 
Rapids, MI: W. B. Eerdman’s, 1998), 24–25. De Lubac writes, “It was an almost unanimously held 
proposition, right up to the eve of the Reformation, that Scripture contains all of revelation in the sense, at 
least, that we shall be dealing with.” At this point, De Lubac quotes Anselm as saying that Scripture 
constitutes the “grounds for theology.” He further cites Anselm: “There is nothing that we preach with 
profit for the salvation of souls that Sacred Scripture, fertilized as it is by the miraculous action of the Holy 
Spirit, has not made known or does not contain within itself.” For further detail, cf. de Lubac’s first two 
endnotes for this section on p. 289. 
10 
biblical text.4 The Scriptures were “breathed out by God,”5 could not be “broken,”6 and 
were considered “perfect.”7 Those who neglected or abused written revelation did so to 
their own peril.8 On the other hand, most exegetes prior to the Reformation demonstrated 
the assumption that the sacred text needed to be interpreted in the sacred Church. The 
same Spirit which had inspired Scripture had also organized the Church and helped form 
its traditions. Specifically, biblical interpreters often looked to the Church’s bishops, in 
succession with the apostles, to provide authoritative explication of the sacred text. The 
Church’s leadership safeguarded the Scriptures, which were intended to be read within 
the traditions of the Church.9 Despite their distinctions in exegetical method and 
disagreements over interpretation, exegetes appear to have generally worked under these 
assumptions; the organic relationship between the living apostolic Church and the text of 
Scripture was not dramatically disputed among orthodox theologians.10 For Ignatius of 
                                                          
4 Cf. Bonaventure. The Breviloquium trans. José de Vinck (Paterson, NJ: St. Anthony Guild Press, 1962), 1. 
Bonaventure was referencing Ephesians 3:14–19. 
5 2 Timothy 3:16. 
6 John 10:35. 
7 Psalm 19:7. 
8 Cf. 2 Peter 3:16; Revelation 22:18–19. 
9 The intent here is not to romanticize pre-modern scriptural interpretation. The episcopal system was not 
hermetically sealed. Polemics over exegesis often resulted in formal divisions in the Church, and left 
unresolved. Bishops did not always solve problems, and even caused some of them. Instead, the goal here 
is to demonstrate a prevalent assumption in pre-Reformation Christianity that is largely absent in 
contemporary evangelical thinking: the Scriptures are best interpreted in the Church, and safeguarded by its 
ordained leadership.  
10 Although this dissertation is focused on orthodox, not heterodox, reception of the Scriptures, it should be 
noted that several Gnostics critiqued the Church’s orthodox explication of Scriptures. Gnostics had their 
own special form of apostolic tradition, which usually contained a secret key for interpreting both the Old 
and New Testaments, and which had been given orally. The sacred mysteries were passed down from 
Christ after his resurrection, through certain apostles, to those who were initiated into the Gnostic 
mysteries. The mysteries were conveyed by living voice, not written documents. Therefore, only those 
secretly initiated in the mysteries could ever read the Scriptures accurately. According to Clement of 
11 
Antioch, the living deacons were to be respected as “the law of God,” and “no one” was 
to do “anything” “in the church” “without the Bishop’s approval.”11 For Athanasius, the 
“tradition, teaching, and faith of the Catholic Church from the beginning” had been given 
by the Lord,” preached by the “Apostles,” and preserved by the “Fathers.”12 Certainly, 
the inspired Scriptures were “self-sufficient” to proclaim the truth, but God had given 
“blessed teachers” to help elucidate the meaning of the holy text. “The one who reads” 
the “teachers” will “gain some knowledge of the interpretation of the Scriptures.”13 “For 
it is right and meet thus to feel, and to maintain a good conscience toward the Fathers, if 
we be not spurious children, but have received the traditions from them, and the lessons 
of religion at their hands”14 Ecclesial office mattered to Augustine when it came to 
biblical exegesis. He claimed that the authority of the Catholic Church was “inaugurated 
by miracles, nourished by hope, enlarged by love, established by age.” In regards to his 
own perseverance, it was the “succession of priests,” “beginning from the very seat of the 
                                                          
Alexandria, Valentinus claimed to be a student of Theutas, who was claimed to be Paul’s disciple. And 
Basilides claimed that Glaucius, his reputed master, was the secret interpreter of Peter. Cf. Clement of 
Alexandria, Stromateis in The Stromata 7:17 (ANF 2:555). Actually, debates with Gnostics gave cause for 
orthodox interpreters to articulate the need for real apostolic succession. In the same work, The Stromata 
7:17 (ANF 2:545), Clement notices the glaring “absence of the apostles” in Gnostics’ arguments. Without 
apostolic succession, one could not verify orthodox interpretation of Scripture. Cf. Jaroslav Pelikan, The 
Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100–600), vol. 1 of The Christian Tradition: A History of the 
Development of Doctrine (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 91–94.  
11 Ignatius of Antioch, epistula ad Smyrnaeos in “Letters of Ignatius: Smyrnaeans,” in Early Church 
Fathers trans. Cyril C. Richardson (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 8:1–2, 114–115. 
12 Athanasius of Alexandria, epsitulae ad Serapionem, in “Letters to Serapion” in Works on the Spirit: 
Athanasius’s Letters to Serapion on the Holy Spirit, And, Didymus’s On the Holy Spirit, trans. Mark 
DelCogliano, Andrew Radde-Gallwitz and Lewis Ayres, (Yonkers, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 
2011), 1.28.1, p. 96 
13 Athanasius of Alexandria, Contra Gentes, in Against the Heathen, NPNF-2, 4:4.  
14 Athanasius of Alexandria, epistula de synodis Arimini et Seleuciae, 47 in Councils of Ariminum and 
Seleucia, NPNF-2, 4:475.  
12 
Apostle Peter, to whom the Lord, after his resurrection, gave it in charge to feed his 
sheep, down to the present episcopate,” which kept him.15 He asserted that, “For my part, 
I should not believe the gospel except for the authority of the Catholic Church.”16 
Augustine considered it a monstrosity for one to confidently claim to “obey the precepts 
of the gospel” on one hand while decrying the “Catholic Church” on the other hand.17 
Basil of Caesarea affirmed the deity of the Spirit based on “ideas” “held in common;” 
those ideas came from the “Scriptures,” as well as the “unwritten Tradition of the 
Fathers.”18 Basil complained that his opponents “clamor for written proof and reject the 
unwritten testimony of the Fathers as worthless.”19 In response, Basil asked, “Shall we 
cast away the standard of teaching we received?”20 Basil’s Trinitarian theology was 
confirmed by both the text of Scripture and the unwritten Tradition in the life of the 
apostolic Church. While commenting on Paul’s admonition to “stand firm and hold to the 
traditions that you were taught by us, either by our spoken word or by our letter,”21 John 
Chrysostom said, “Hence it is manifest, that they did not deliver all things by Epistle, but 
many things also unwritten, and in like manner both the one and the other are worthy of 
                                                          
15 Augustine, Contra Epistolam Manichaei quam vocant Fundamenti, 4, in Against the Epistle of 
Manichaeus Called Fundamental, NPNF-1, 4:130.  
16 Augustine, Against Manichaeus, 5, NPNF-1, 4:130–131.  
17 Augustine, Contra Faustum Manichaeum, 5:11 in Reply to Faustus the Manichaean, NPNF-1, 4:167. 
18 Basil of Caesarea, liber de Spiritu sancto, in On the Holy Spirit by Basil, trans. David Anderson 
(Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1980), 9:22, 42.  
19 Basil, On the Holy Spirit, 10:25, 46.  
20 Basil, On the Holy Spirit, 10:26, 46.  
21 2 Thessalonians 2:15.  
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credit. Therefore let us think the Tradition of the Church also worthy of credit. It is a 
Tradition, seek no farther.”22 
Ecclesial Christology 
 The prevalent Christocentric interpretation of Scripture in the first centuries of 
Christianity provides evidence that the apostolic Church was assumed to be the necessary 
interpreter of holy Writ. Ancient Christian literature recurrently put Jesus Christ forward 
as the central focus of Scripture and its interpretive key. Although a Christocentric 
reading of Scripture is a postulation of faith on the part of Christians, it is doubtful if it 
could have been so customary without authoritative, ecclesial reading of the biblical 
text.23 A clear partiality towards Jesus of Nazareth exists throughout the New Testament 
and in early Christian literary works. In the first centuries of Christian biblical 
interpretation, the study of Scripture was frequently seen as an examination of Jesus 
Christ. It was Christ, not the written text of Scripture, who provided God’s full unveiling 
of Himself.24 He was the source and summit of revelation and was encountered within all 
the sacred writings. When Jesus chided the Jews for setting false hopes on Moses,25 he 
                                                          
22 John Chrysostom, Homiliae in 2 Thess, 4:2 in Homilies on Thessalonians, NPNF-1, 13:390.  
23 For example, cf. Matthew 2:15’s understanding of Hosea 11:1, “Out of Egypt have I called my Son,” as 
fulfilled in the infancy of Jesus. Purely inductive analysis of the passage in Hosea could not come to 
Matthew’s conclusion. Or, consider the multiple uses of apparently disparate Old Testament texts brought 
together into a single Christian focus in Hebrews 1. Ultimately, a Christocentric lens provided by an 
apostolic believing community was needed to make such interpretations. Faith in a living and present 
Christ was required to “hear” the Scriptures correctly, but it was the Church which instructed that faith.  
24 Cf. Matthew 11:27; John 14:9; 2 Corinthians 4:6; Colossians 2:9; Hebrews 1:1–2. 
25 John 5:45. 
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was moving their attention to himself, the ultimate referent of the text. A “greater” one 
had come among them.26  
Christocentrism unified the biblical text. Despite the diverse literary structure of 
Scripture, exegetes perceived a single heart belonging to the text: the mystery of Christ. 
While most Christian exegetes agreed that the Scriptures existed in “unbroken” and 
“perfect” unity, they also perceived that the sacred text was pointing beyond itself. Christ, 
as the divine, eternal word,27 was the one who gave meaning to the written text.28 Origen 
of Alexandria did not see two words of God, one textual and the other personal, any more 
than he saw two Spirits of God.29 Instead, the one “divine Logos,” which was with God 
in the beginning, was the voice behind all revelation. “The complete Word of God … is 
not a multitude of words. It is a single Word consisting of several ideas, each of which is 
a part of the whole Word.”30 The diverse “words about each doctrine, being like parts in a 
whole or forms in a species” were all “uttered” by the same Logos.31 For most patristic 
authors, the Scriptures were seen as a diverse collection of texts with an overarching 
                                                          
26 Cf. Matthew 12:6; 12:42; Mark 1:7; Luke 11:32; Hebrews 3:3.  
27 John 1:1. 
28 Cf. Matthew 5:17. 
29 Henri De Lubac, History and Spirit: The Understanding of Scripture According to Origen, trans. Anne E. 
Nash (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007), 385. Continuity between the Old Testament Scripture and New 
Testament gospel was essential to early Christian theologians.  
30 Origen, commentarii in Jo. in Origen of Alexandria, Commentary on the Gospel According to John: 
Books 1–10, trans. Ronald E. Heine (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1989), 5:5, 
163. 
31 Origen of Alexandria, Contra Celsum, trans. Henry Chadwick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1980), 5:22, 381.  
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unity; in them, the one God had revealed his only Son.32 For Bernard of Clairvaux, only 
the “Lamb” who had been “slain” could open the book.33  
While affirming the divine inspiration and perfection of Scripture, early 
Christians did not necessarily consider Christianity to be a religion of the book; instead, it 
was a religion of the living Word of God, Jesus Christ. This was because they saw 
revelation to be more than propositional statements or principles about Christ. Instead, 
revelation was the actual unveiling of the living Christ, who engaged the reader of 
Scripture in the living Church. For Christians, the Son of God was the Logos himself; he 
was the one who “revealed” the gospel in “revealing” himself.34 Acceptance of God’s 
personal revelation in Christ led to participation in his life through baptism. Ignatius of 
Antioch, a “man devoted to unity,” directed those who refused to “believe” anything that 
                                                          
32 Cf. Origen, John Vol. 1, 5:5–6, 163–164. Although this work is not focused on the reception of the 
Scriptures by heretics, it is helpful to remember that Gnostics from the second century credited some 
portions of the Old Testament to various divine and demonic powers, while orthodox Christians considered 
all Scriptures as being sourced in God. Cf. Jaroslav Pelikan, The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition 
(100–600), vol. 1, The Christian Tradition, 93. Neither will this dissertation focus on the polemic 
surrounding the development of the biblical canon. Among those within the Church, disagreement certainly 
occurred over the canonicity of some texts, but substantial accord continued concerning the majority of the 
texts. For example, Theodore of Mopsuestia did not consider Canticles as part of the canon because of its 
carnality, but Origen wrote commentaries and homilies on the text with the conviction it was inspired. 
Despite some particular disputes among theologians over which texts Christ unified, the assumption that 
Christ indeed unified the Scripture was predominant.  
33 Revelation 5:6–9. Cf. Bernard’s reference to the Revelation passages in Bernard of Clairvaux, “On the 
Missus Est, Homily II: The Three Commonlings,” in Sermons of St. Bernard on Advent and Christmas: 
Including the Famous Treatise on the Incarnation Called “Missus Est.” (London: R & T Washbourne, 
1909; PDF e-book), 113.  
34 Origen, commentarii in Jo. in Origen of Alexandria, Commentary on the Gospel According to John: 
Books 13–32, trans. Ronald E. Heine (Washington, DC: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1993), 20:1, 205. 
Cf. de Lubac, History and Spirit, 389, where de Lubac says that, for Origen, Christ the Logos is “truly 
incorporated” in the Scripture. The Logos, for Origen, was “not properly” “incarnated” in the text of 
Scripture as he is in the human Jesus; however, in a true way, Christ the Logos still “dwells” in Scripture, 
“not just some idea of him.”  
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they could not find written in the texts35 of Scripture to the living Christ. “To my mind it 
is Jesus Christ who is the original documents. The inviolable archives are his death and 
resurrection and the faith that came by him.”36 The bishop was pushing the people to 
penetrate deeper than the letters on the page, and to seek for more than the original intent 
of a biblical author. The one who reads Scripture aright encounters the hidden presence 
of Christ. Jesus “illumines all the pages of the book in which he dwells.”37 Christian 
orthodoxy should be understood in this Christological light. Right doctrinal belief 
included confession, but transcended it; orthodox faith had its grounding in the living 
person of Jesus Christ, and it was only accessible for those who were willing to “come 
to” the “assembly” of “God.”38 Any list of dogmatic propositions and even Scripture 
itself was ultimately rooted in Christ’s person and discovered in Christ’s Church. 
Orthodoxy was an authoritative interpretation of the text in the light of the disclosure of 
Jesus Christ. Bernard expressed no desire for “a mute and written word traced with dumb 
signs on lifeless parchments, but an Incarnate, living Word.”39  
                                                          
35 For Ignatius, this would have been the Old Testament. 
36 Ignatius, epistula ad Philadelphios, in 8:2, in Cyril Charles Richardson, Early Christian Fathers. (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 110. 
37 De Lubac, History and Spirit, 386 
38 Hebrews 12:23–24. 
39 Bernard of Clairvaux, “On the Missus Est, Homily IV: The Annunciation and the Blessed Virgin’s 
Consent,” in Sermons of St. Bernard on Advent and Christmas, 72. The immediate section reads as Mary’s 
desire and prayer:  
May the Word which was in the beginning with God be made flesh of my flesh according to Thy 
word. May He, I entreat, be made to me, not a spoken word, to pass unheeded, but a word 
conceived that is, clothed in flesh which may remain. May He be to me not only audible to my 
ears, but visible to my eyes, felt by my hands, borne in my arms. Let Him be to me not a mute and 
written word traced with dumb signs on lifeless parchments, but an Incarnate, living Word vividly 
impressed in human form in my chaste womb by the operation of the Holy Ghost.  
Benedict XVI used this section of Bernard to argue that Christianity is not a religion of the book, but a 
religion of Christ the Word of God. (Benedict XVI, “Verbum Domini,” The Vatican, September 30, 2010, 
17 
The tension caused by a Christocentric reading of Scripture demonstrated that it 
was an ecclesial reading, and not exclusively an inductive conclusion. Although Origen 
admitted “we have some ideas in common” with philosophers, he likewise said that the 
truth is known “alone” to those “who have the religion of Jesus.”40 The gospel was 
foolishness to the Greek mind because it lacked wisdom.41 To the Greek, truth 
transcended the changing history of the world; it was permanent, disembodied, and 
ahistorical.42 Christians prompted scandal by claiming that the divine Logos which pre-
existed time43 became human. Suddenly, a historical being was considered the full reality 
of truth! In similar manner, the Christocentric gospel troubled the Jews by its claim of 
fulfillment. The Christians did not claim that Christ brought yet another sign promising a 
beatific future, a sign God’s people could trust in. Instead, Jesus stepped forward as the 
one who fulfilled the promise here and now.44 The assumption that the truth of God was 
perceived in the glorious face of Christ45 was absurd to those outside of the Church, but it 
was consistent with the faith preached in the Church.  
 
 
                                                          
section 7), http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/apost_exhortations/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_exh_20100930_verbum-domini.html.  
40 Origen, Contra Celsum, 3:81, 182. 
41 1 Corinthians 1:18–25. 
42 Zizioulas, Jean. Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church (Crestwood, NY: St. 
Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1985), 68. 
43 Origen, Contra Celsum 8:12, pp. 404–405. 
44 Matthew 5:17. 
45 2 Corinthians 4:4–6 
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Ecclesial Exegesis  
Most biblical interpreters prior to the Reformation assumed that the Church was 
sacramental; it was Christ’s tangible presence in the contemporary world. God’s presence 
among his people made the temple holy.46 This implied that the written gospel, the 
Church’s book, needed to be interpreted within the Church. The Church was subordinate 
to the Trinity just as a house was subordinate to him who dwells in it. God, the Father 
Son and Spirit, resided in his temple, thus making it a holy Church,47 an “institution” 
whereby the world engaged God.48 It was referred to as Christ’s Body,49 and was seen as 
a divine extension of Christ, the Head.50  
Christian salvation involved being united to God through his Son’s earthly body.51 
Most assumed, therefore, that the fullness of Christ’s effective presence52 was located in 
his ecclesial body, the Church. “Outside this House, that is, outside the Church, no one is 
saved.”53 “He can no longer have God as his Father who has not the Church for his 
Mother.”54 To forsake the Church meant a forfeiture of Christ himself, and a return to 
                                                          
46 Cf. 1 Corinthians 6:16–17.  
47 Augustine, The Enchiridion, 56, NPNF-1, 3:255.  
48 Joseph Ratzinger, Benedict XVI, Introduction to Christianity, (London: Burns and Oates, 2004), 341. 
49 Cf., Romans 12:5;1 Corinthians 10:16–17; 12:27; Ephesians 5:29–30. 
50 Cf. 1 Corinthians 12:27; Ephesians 5:23; Colossians 1:18. 
51 Ephesians 2:16. 
52 Cf. J. Patout Burns, SJ, “The Economy of Salvation: Two Patristic Traditions,” Theological Studies 37, 
no. 4 (1976): 598–619, http://theologicalstudies.net/.  
53 Origen, homiliae in Jos. 3:5, in Origen of Alexandria, Homilies on Joshua, trans. Barbara J. Bruce, ed. 
Cynthia White (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2002), 50. 
54 Cyprian, De Unitate Ecclesiae in Cyprian, On the Unity of the Church, 1:6, ANF 5:423. 
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death. As late as the time of the Reformation, Cyprian’s views were still assumed by one 
such as John Calvin. God had gathered his sons into the “bosom” of the Church, the 
“visible church,” which was needed to “beget and increase faith within us.”55 These 
views demonstrate the assumption behind the declaration of the bishops at Nicea. Belief 
in “one holy, catholic, and apostolic church” was part of the Christian confession.  
The first three attributes of the Church all really came down to the fourth.56 The 
question of what united the Church, defined it as catholic, or made it holy was answered 
in what made it apostolic. The Church had been founded upon Christ’s apostles, who 
appointed their own successors. Therefore, an apostolic church was one that was in 
accord with the teachings and hierarchical leadership handed down by the apostles “in 
unbroken succession.”57 This was Irenaeus’ contention against the Gnostics. They had no 
succession, no tradition, no bishops, and no preeminent church founded by actual 
apostles. Conversely, the Christians had “true witness of the tradition of the apostles,” 
which extended to the faithful everywhere.58 The catholicity of the Church, the “universal 
brotherhood,” indicates both the local and universal unity of God’s people.59 It is called 
catholic because “it extends over all the world…and because it teaches universally and 
                                                          
55 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion vol. 2, trans. Ford Lewis Battles (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1960), 4:1:1, 1011–1012.  
56 Cf. Jaroslav Pelikan, Reformation of Church and Dogma (1300–1700), vol. 4 in The Christian Tradition 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 110–126. 
57 Origen, Peri Archon, in Origen of Alexandria, On First Principles, trans. G. W. Butterworth (Gloucester, 
MA: Peter Smith, 1973), 1:1, 2.  
58 Irenaeus, adversus haereses, in Against Heresies 3:3:4, ANF 1:416.  
59 Cyprian, De Unitate Ecclesiae, in On the Unity of the Church 1:12, ANF 5:425.  
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completely one and all the doctrines which ought to come to men’s knowledge.”60 The 
kingdom of heaven is attained when, in this unique church, one receives instruction and 
acts virtuously.61 A local church was identified as catholic when it was in unity with its 
local bishop, and universal unity was the accord among all bishops.62 It included more 
than right doctrinal confession. Actually, reverence to God and the bishops were 
considered indistinguishable.63  
The claim that the Church was the “pillar and buttress of the truth,”64 implied that 
it was also the authoritative medium of the gospel.65 Just as the Incarnation was more 
than an appearance and orthodoxy was more than right thinking, the essence of the 
Church transcended a composition of those who thought correctly or individually 
followed Jesus. It was an organic, mystical Body of Christ, replete with integrated 
spiritual and material realities. Its charismata included the authority to interpret Scripture.  
Through the Incarnation, divine revelation had occurred in visible, historical 
terms; God was manifest in the flesh.66 The interpretation of that revelation likewise 
called for a visible, historical underpinning. The apostolic Church fulfilled that role by 
divine mandate. Analogous to the Incarnate Christ, the apostolic Church was at once 
                                                          
60 Cyril of Jerusalem, catecheses illuminandorum, in Catechetical Lectures 18:23, NPNF-2,7:139–140.  
61 Cyril of Jerusalem, Catechetical Lectures 18:28, NPNF-2, 7:141.  
62 Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 345.  
63 Ignatius, Letters of Ignatius: Smyrnaeans 8:1–9 :2, 115.  
64 1 Timothy 3:15. 
65 Cf. Matthew 18:15–20; 28:20; Acts 10:43–48. In the Acts passage, notice Peter’s presumed authority to 
“command” that baptism be made available to Gentiles. Peter was not inventing a new doctrine of inclusion 
for Gentiles, but was elucidating, in light of the gospel, the fuller meaning of the “prophets.” 
66 1 Timothy 3:16. 
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visible, historical, and spiritual; it was the mystical Body of Christ.67 Christ founded the 
Church on the apostles and commissioned them to disseminate his life and teachings. 
However, he promised to be with the apostles, guiding them in all their activities.68 
Subsequently, apostolic interpretation of Scripture was seen as Christ’s reading of the 
text. The bishops who succeeded the apostles were likewise considered to be gifted by 
Christ’s Spirit to continue the faithful transmission of the gospel. They were charged with 
maintaining the apostolic proliferation of the Word of God, “preserving the tradition of 
the blessed doctrine delivered directly from the apostles.”69  
The conviction that the living Spirit had influenced the formation of the 
hierarchy70 implied the Scripture was to be interpreted in the Church. Both the spiritual 
essence and visible structure of the Christian community were gifts of God’s grace; every 
“ligament” and functioning “part” was sourced in Jesus Christ71 and formed by the 
Spirit.72 The idea of ordained hierarchy was partially based on faith in the Incarnation. At 
Chalcedon, the Church formally declared the faith that two natures were united in 
Christ’s one person. This declaration was consistent with already existing ecclesiology. 
For Ignatius of Antioch, the people needed to “be subject” to the “bishop and the 
                                                          
67 Ephesians 1:23; 5:32. 
68 Matthew 28:20; John 14:15–18; 20:22; Acts 1:8. 
69 Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 1:1, ANF 2:301.  
70 Ephesians 4:11. 
71 Ephesians 4:16.  
72 Cf. 1 Corinthians 12:12–27, where both aspects are in view.  
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presbytery”73 “in this world.”74 The leaders are to be esteemed as gifts according to 
God’s clear determination. The bishops were “appointed the world over”75 according to 
“God’s mind,” and they “reflect the mind of Jesus Christ.”76 For Ignatius, the bishops 
represented the Incarnate Christ. Subjection to the bishop and presbytery created a 
harmonious music of love and Jesus Christ,77 which enabled the Church to speak in unity 
as a choir. The Church was the setting in which the people of God “learned Christ,”78 and 
only those within the Body who were “gifted with the grace of the Spirit”79 were to 
expound its mysteries. Certainly, exceptions existed to bishop-led biblical interpretation 
in the Church,80 but it was generally the bishops in succession with the Apostles, and 
ecumenical councils, who provided the theological parameters for biblical interpretation. 
The relationship between a hierarchical Church and Scripture places Tradition in an 
informative light.  
Tradition and Exegesis 
Early interpreters of Christian Scripture understood the implication of a 
sacramental Church; the Scriptures needed to be interpreted in the Church’s living 
                                                          
73 Ignatius, epistula ad Ephesios, in “Letters of Ignatius: Ephesians,” in Early Church Fathers trans. Cyril 
C. Richardson, 2:2, 88. 
74 Ignatius, “Letters of Ignatius: Ephesians,” in Early Church Fathers 1:3, 88.  
75 Ignatius, “Letters of Ignatius: Ephesians,” in Early Church Fathers 3:2, 88. 
76 Ibid. 
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79 Origen, On First Principles, I: Preface:8, 13–14. 
80 E.g., Origen of Alexandria and Evagrius Ponticus. 
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Tradition. Origen expected the exegete to “approach all the Scripture as one body,” and 
not “break or cut through” the harmony throughout the whole composition.81 He listed 
some of the commonly accepted boundaries for theology as including monotheism and 
the subsequent unity between the testaments, Christology, Pneumatology, rewards and 
punishment, human free will, the general existence of evil spirits, final judgment, and the 
divine inspiration of the biblical texts.82 The only exegesis of Scripture to be believed 
was the one which “in no way conflicts with the tradition of the church and the 
apostles.”83 Even the exegetical “daring”84 of one like Origen nevertheless had to occur 
within the “definite” lines and “unmistakable” rules handed down.85  
 While debates over the correct biblical interpretation of certain passages were 
common, orthodoxy was normally considered the first rule of hermeneutics.86 However, 
orthodoxy required more than the Scriptures. Prior to Origen, Irenaeus had already 
asserted that “we must keep the rule of faith,”87 that which “the elders, the disciples of the 
apostles, have handed down to us.”88 For Irenaeus, the rule handed down by the apostles 
included several articles of faith related to God and humanity, Old Testament preparation 
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83 Origen, On First Principles, 1: Preface: 2, 2. 
84 Origen, On First Principles, 1:7:3, 61.  
85 Origen, On First Principles, I: Preface: 2, 2. 
86 Henri De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis: The Four Senses of Scripture vol. 3, trans. E. M. Macierowski 
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for the New Testament, and salvation wrought by the Son of God.89 For Gregory of 
Nyssa, on one hand the “Holy Scriptures” were “the rule and the measure of every tenet,” 
“the guide of our reasoning.”90 On the other hand, if one doesn’t “draw” “divine 
teaching” from “the stream of faith,” then he will turn the “true water” “of the Hebrews” 
“into blood.”91 Through apostolic Tradition, Gregory’s exegete was expected to draw 
divine truth from the living stream of the Church. These and other interpreters did not 
perceive apostolic Tradition to be constraining; instead, they saw it as a guide toward 
discovering the full truth of sacred revelation in Jesus Christ.  
The Church and its Tradition were understood by Christians to be in unity with 
Scripture, not in opposition to it. “We preserve both the doctrine of the Church of Christ 
and the greatness of God’s promise.”92 Certainly, the texts of the New Testament were 
authoritative, the written, inspired word of God. However, the written texts alone were 
never the floor of Christian faith. Georges Florovsky noted that Ignatius’ reference to 
Christ as the “original documents” demonstrated that the reality of the God-Man Jesus 
Christ and the living experience of his redemption were the grounding of Christian faith. 
However, these authoritative “documents” were known “through the tradition, through 
that which was delivered, through the deposit, which was preserved and handed down.”93 
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Malherbe and Everett Ferguson (New York: Paulist Press, 1978), 69. 
92 Origen, Contra Celsum, 5:22, 281. 
93 Georges Florovsky, The Byzantine Fathers of the Fifth Century, trans. Raymond Miller, ed. Richard S. 
Haugh (Belmont, MA: Notable and Academic, 1987), 48. 
25 
The bishops helped preserve the Tradition, and that is one reason why Ignatius, in nearly 
all of his extant letters, directed the people to be in communion with their local bishops. 
For Ignatius, explication of Scripture necessarily flowed out of immersion in the internal 
life and external form of the Church. Christians were to be “subject to the bishop as to the 
grace of God, and to the presbytery as to the law of Jesus Christ.”94 The one who scorns 
the bishop “that is visible…seeks to defraud the One who is invisible. In such a case he 
must reckon, not with a human being, but with God.”95 For Ignatius, submission to the 
bishop was necessary to preserving the doctrine of Christ. Without the bishops, the 
Tradition would be jeopardized and the Scriptures not understood in their fullness.  
Over time, and often through controversies,96 Scripture and Tradition were 
understood by theologians to be interrelated. Certainly, the Scriptures were the 
authoritative and supreme97 demonstration of the Church’s faith. Nonetheless, they 
required apostolic Tradition to be properly interpreted. For example, when defending the 
doctrine of the deity of the Holy Spirit, Basil used liturgy to assist in his interpretation of 
Scripture. For Basil, any attack on “unwritten customs” would “fatally mutilate the 
Gospel.”98 “It is those never content with accepted ways who despise the old as being 
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96 Cf., for example, the many conflicts involving the Gnostics. 
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stale, constantly welcoming innovation, like worldlings who are always chasing after the 
latest fashion…But as for us, what our Fathers said, we repeat.”99  
Great diversity of thought existed in the post-apostolic period within the churches, 
which naturally developed into debates over biblical interpretation. Many of those who 
professed to believe in Christ held “conflicting opinions not only on small and trivial 
questions but also on some that are great and important.”100 However, although the 
polemics of exegetical controversy were severe and even abusive at times, bishops often 
prevented extreme interpretations perceived to be damaging to the Christian faith. 
Exegetes employed various literary tools in an effort to gain insight to the full 
significance of a sacred event101 recorded in Scripture, but it was the Church’s leadership 
that provided the interpretive understanding of the event. An episcopal ecclesiology 
certainly did not create a straight line of uniform agreement among theologians, but it 
helped prevent radical departures from Christian Tradition. Origen’s reply to Celsus 
shows that the one who independently reads the Scripture does not know how to read it at 
all.102 The enemy of the altar, the rebel, was the one who despised the local bishop and 
priests.103 Heretics were the ones who read the Scripture outside of God’s house. 
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27 
Grammar, history, allegory, and other literary devices were utilized to varying degrees, 
but they were all incapable to govern the entire interpretive process. A methodical system 
could not thoroughly exposit the text. Instead, a spiritual vision conveyed by traditional 
faith was first required to establish valid interpretive boundaries.  
Christianity in its “primitive” days undoubtedly displayed a “vast diffusion of 
local congregations, each living its separate life,”104 and each called a church. However, 
onlookers could also detect a broader, universal consciousness. For Ignatius of Antioch, a 
“common name and hope”105 bound all the people through their bishops. Upon the death 
of Polycarp, the church at Smyrna communicated the news to “the church of God 
sojourning in Philomelium, and to all the congregations of the holy and Catholic Church 
in every place.”106 At the time of his death, Polycarp was reported as praying “for the 
whole Catholic Church throughout the world.”107 The New Testament imagery of a single 
Head unifying the multiple parts of one Body, or a Vine as the single source of various 
branches was indelibly imprinted on the consciousness of the Christian people. The New 
Testament writings themselves express theological diversity, reflective of a variety of 
Christian communities. However, there appears to be an overarching apostolic faith 
operative behind New Testament texts.108 Similarly, the “vast diffusion” of congregations 
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and theological polemics after the apostolic period appears to have largely operated under 
an assumption of universality. Even an exegete like Theodore of Mopsuestia, who did not 
see an allegorical interpretation of the Church in the Song of Songs, saw the Church as a 
sacramental symbol of future life in heaven. The Church made the eschatological reality 
of heaven present in type.109  
Presumed Textual Unity  
Ecclesial faith provided the exegete with the assumption that diverse texts of 
Scripture contained an underlying unity. Although the philosophical foundations of 
biblical interpretation shifted over time, and methods of exegesis differed throughout 
patristic and medieval eras, a “realistic”110 reading persisted. Many exegetes concluded 
that not all biblical accounts were to be taken factually, as a “pure history of events,”111 
but nearly all concurred that the texts were truthful. In the rare moments when the sacred 
text spoke of events that some considered unbelievable and non-factual, such as universal 
creation in six days or an actual garden east of Eden, the conclusion was that the divine 
author was attempting to prompt the reader to a deeper investigation of revelation.112 
Nothing in Scripture was “absurd,” but all was “in accord with God’s character;”113 
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Scripture was the product of neither dishonesty nor naiveté. “It is plain that nothing false 
can ever underlie the literal sense of Holy Writ.”114 The Fathers of the Church might 
contradict each other at times, which was puzzling. However, “a contradiction within 
Scripture was unthinkable.”115  
With the exception of obviously nonliteral passages, biblical revelation was 
assumed to narrate real human history. Christian redemption was not accomplished in the 
imagination, but in factual reality.116 For numerous exegetes, the presumed distance 
between narrative and actual history was short. Scripture’s narrative intersected the entire 
human saga; its sequential events were interpreted as parts of a single world history, 
governed by one God. The storylines portrayed in the Scriptures were assumed to be the 
real history of the world. It “describes all times and periods from the beginning of the 
world until the Day of Judgment.” The Holy Spirit has “given us” the book of Scripture 
to understand the “beauty of the orderly governance” of all creation and times.117 
Scripture revealed world history by recounting “a series of events which have really 
transpired.” Without this revelation, some historic knowledge would not be accessible. 
As Gregory the Great stated in the early Middle Ages, the sacred Scripture “declares a 
mystery, and has the art so to tell the past, that merely by that alone it knows how to 
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announce the future.”118 Holy Writ, from the beginning, could never be reduced to a book 
of myths or simply a “manual of the inner life.”119  
One of the clearest needs for the exegete was the aptitude to distinguish between 
literal and figurative statements in the sacred text. The sacred texts were seen as 
internally consistent, and the greatness of certain Fathers, like Augustine, was found in 
their deep immersion in Scripture and their ability to authentically expound the faith from 
it. Some biblical statements literally meant what they said. Others were figurative and 
signified something else.120 In order to lessen ambiguity, the interpreter needed a firm 
“knowledge of language” and “knowledge of things.”121 Linguistic skills allowed the 
interpreter to understand idioms, identify faulty translations, and comprehend literal 
meanings of words. Examples of “things”122 included the nature of animals, plants, 
numbers, human customs, and other items used as similitudes in Scripture. These tools 
helped the interpreter understand what was originally written, if it was a figurative 
passage, and how it could meaningfully translate to his modern audience. The unity of 
Scripture meant the exegete was free to use clearly “manifest” passages in Scripture to 
help interpret the “obscure” portions. The one illumined the other.123 A capable 
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commentator was justified in this method so long as the derived meaning was “not 
contrary to right faith.”124 Further, a skilled exegete could derive multiple meanings from 
a single passage as long as the interpretation was consistent with clear statements 
expressed elsewhere in the sacred text. God had “generously and abundantly provided” 
that words can be interpreted in various ways.125 Bernard of Clairvaux likened the 
exegete who extracted multiple meanings from a single text to the “valiant” woman in 
Proverbs who produced separate pieces of clothing for her household from a single 
“scanty stock of wool.”126  
All of this worked under the assumption that the authors who “created the 
Scripture” did so through the agency of the Holy Spirit. “Meaning is dependent upon 
truth.”127 The whole Christian truth, alive in the apostolic Church, furnished meaning to 
every individual passage. Since the Scriptures were “inspired by the divine Spirit,” then 
explication of them must harmonize and agree “in all respects.”128 For Augustine, all 
exegetical efforts must submit to “diligent scrutiny” until the simple rule of “charity is 
produced.”129 The goal of hermeneutics must be “love from a pure heart, and a good 
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conscience, and a sincere faith.”130 Within these guideposts, the activity of biblical 
interpretation could flourish.  
Unity between the Literal and Spiritual Meanings 
Allegorical interpretation of Scripture was a prevalent method which sought to 
demonstrate the unity between the Old Testament Scripture and the New Testament 
gospel. However, such interpretation was the articulation of the faith already present in 
the Church.131  
The spiritual interpretation of Scripture was common in the early centuries of 
Christianity, and was used to explicate the rule of faith.132 While not seeking to escape 
from the literal difficulties of the text, spiritual exegesis provided the interpreter with a 
way to articulate the kerygma already in the churches. Allegory served as a gloss of the 
biblical text, a tool that unified the obscure elements inherent in the sacred text and alive 
in the Tradition of the Church. It united the testaments into a single Scripture, and 
articulated the silence existent in the margins of the sacred writings. Solomon’s “kiss” on 
the lips of his bride133 taught the Church what it already knew, that the Incarnation was 
an act of love. The story of Noah reminded the Church what the Apostles had taught 
them, that God had a single source of salvation, set on wooden planks, in which only a 
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few would participate.134 Paul used allegory when he wrote that the “Rock” in the Exodus 
narrative “was Christ.”135 Spiritual interpretation helped bring out Christian truth latent in 
all the Scriptures, the “tacit”136 knowledge of Christ already within the believing 
community.  
Allegory was not a luxury, but was employed to demonstrate the unity of the 
testaments. It was natural for Christianity to identify a deeper meaning of Scripture 
anchored to the literal text. Given the fact of the Incarnation, and even Paul’s use of the 
term “allegory,” it was common for early exegetes to search, although in different 
manners, for the deeper unifying sense of holy Writ. All sought to convey the unity 
between the testaments, the intersection where the New fulfilled the Old without 
destroying it.137 Unlike Marcion, Origen claimed for himself that he did not divide the 
testaments.138 He was able to refute both the attacks of Jews and Gnostics by showing the 
unity of the gospel with Moses. The presumed Christian unity of the testaments was 
bound up with the whole idea of Tradition. This sort of reading of Scripture penetrated 
the faith of the Church and led the reader back to the simplicity of home.139 It is 
questionable if spiritual interpretation of Scripture would have flourished as it did without 
an ecclesial faith already in place.  
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Allegorical reading of the biblical text was a point of contention among 
interpreters of Scripture. However, exegetical conclusions on most sides of allegorical 
debates were frequently within the range of traditional faith due to pre-established 
warrants. Authoritative ecclesiology circumvented a purely mythical interpretation which 
carried little regard for concrete history and facticity. Most Christian allegorists rooted 
their interpretations in biblical history. Yet, authoritative ecclesiology prevented the 
extreme of wooden Biblicism, which refused to see a second level of meaning to the text 
beyond the literal. Those exegetes more disposed to literal, textual studies still admitted 
deeper meaning to the sacred texts. Some individuals at both ends of the polarized debate 
over allegory exceeded established boundaries at times. However, Tradition, 
authoritatively employed by bishops, often helped keep dissimilar theologians within the 
same field of fidelity. One outlying form of allegorical interpretation employed by a 
number of early Christian exegetes gave little or no regard to the literal, historical sense 
of Scripture. The “aim of the exegete” using this method was exclusively “to elicit the 
moral, theological, or mystical meaning which each passage…is presumed to contain.”140 
The literal sense was secondary to the deeper meaning inherent in the story. However, 
this form was not necessarily representative of the bulk of allegorical interpretations. 
Christian allegory141 usually attempted to plant itself more firmly in the literal text and in 
“a biblical view of history.”142 Events and personages of the Old Testament were real, but 
they prefigured or anticipated the events and people of the New Testament. Old 
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Testament passages provided a true account of an event, but they pointed beyond the 
event. The goal of the exegete was to perceive143 the spiritual reality to which the natural 
event pointed.  
Notwithstanding divergent opinions on the nature and role of allegory, most 
interpreters of Scripture assumed a second level of meaning to the biblical text. It is not 
uncommon for contemporary evangelicals to set the Antiochene and Alexandrian 
methods of exegesis in opposition to each other, and claim one method to be more 
susceptible to “heresy” or the other to be more capable to “enter into the Bible.”144 
However, this distinction is often exaggerated. Although some, such as Origen, more 
freely employed allegory, all understood it was a biblical term145 and a “fundamental 
exigency”146 in exposition. This was true in both Antioch and Alexandria. Events of 
history were recorded in Scripture “as examples to us,”147 and their exposition was not 
superfluous because reading the text must be followed by understanding it.  
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Theodore of Mopsuestia often displayed an antipathy towards allegorists “who 
have great zeal for overturning the meaning (sensus) of divine Scriptures and by breaking 
up everything placed there.” His concern was that “they fabricate for themselves certain 
foolish fictions and give their folly the name of allegory.”148 Theodore’s frustration that 
some allegorists were “breaking up” (intercipere)149 the narrative of Scripture, saying that 
“paradise did not exist as paradise nor the serpent as the serpent,” led him to conclude 
that by “breaking up the narrative, they no longer have a narrative.”150 In other words, 
Theodore complained that the allegorists separated select words or parts of Scripture 
from the whole text; they extracted pieces of Scripture, and devised meanings that 
contradicted the entire passage under review. Theodore’s commentaries on Paul’s epistles 
demonstrate that he gave great effort to understanding the logic of the literal text of 
Scripture, and was especially keen to the order and flow of a literary passage. Theodore’s 
overriding concern was that the literal sense would be lost in popular allegory. Exegesis 
must follow the example of the Apostle, “who does not do away with the narrative, nor 
does he get rid of what happened long ago.”151  
Despite Theodore’s aversion to popular allegory, the facts of the text did not 
preclude a spiritual meaning for him; fulfilled prophecies demonstrated that the text can 
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be used beyond its narrative intent.152 Allegory, to Theodore, was a valid exegetical 
method with subsequent moral applicability;153 it was “the comparison made by relating 
events that had already taken place to present circumstances.”154 Allegory did not 
precisely mean the same to Theodore as it did to others, but it still provided him with a 
deep and relevant Christian understanding of the text. 
Theodore may have been justified in his wariness over some less constrained 
interpretations of Scripture. However, it is incorrect to assume, as some commentators 
do, that allegorists generally sought to go “beyond”155 the text or that the literal meaning 
was “really beside the point.”156 Ideally, allegory was not a method of having a text say 
something it did not confess. Instead, while patristic exegetes often sought the spiritual 
meaning of a text behind the literal reality, they did not dismiss the literal text as 
superficial. Christian allegory did not essentially oppose the literal narrative, but was 
used as a tool to unite the entire canon at once.157 The words, events, and people in 
Scripture were shadows of higher realities;158 they spoke of further mysteries.159 The 
literal and historical meaning was a portal to the full meaning of a passage. At times, this 
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unity may have appeared lopsided in some explications of a biblical passage, but that was 
partly because the facts were only the first indication of the significance of the story.160 
The history and human elements of the passage were valuable, but certainly not worth 
studying for their own sake. “We have drawn the thin lines of history; now let us set our 
hand to allegory.”161  
Contrary to some accusations, Origen did not dismiss the literal text in his 
exegesis. Unlike his “brethren” who could only read the account of the Exodus in the 
Greek Septuagint, Origen based his antagonism towards the celebration of 
Quartodecimen on the Hebrew lexicon. The Eucharist could not be a Christian Passover 
for Origen because the original Hebrew definition of the word Passover162 did not suggest 
“suffering” as the Greek Pascha did, but referenced a “crossing over.” Origen based his 
theological understanding of Christ as our Passover163 on the lexical meaning of a word 
located in the Jewish Torah. Biblical exegesis assumed a high degree of unity in its 
labors; for early exegetes, a harmony between the literal text and its deeper meaning 
needed to be maintained. 
The assumed secondary meaning within Scripture led to more than a search for 
doctrinal verities to be believed; it also inspired an emphasis on the moral life of the 
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believer. Jesus Christ and his redemption was the guiding vision of biblical interpretation. 
He was the focus of the entire canon because he unified the complete text,164 and his 
cross was the key to its interpretation. However, when allegorical interpretation did not 
focus on the Redeemer, then it was usually attentive to the redeemed people, the Church. 
Pope Gregory wrote that Sacred Scripture “changes the heart of him that reads it from 
earthly desires to the embracing of things above.”165 Theodore of Mopsuestia, in his 
exposition of Titus, pursued “the pattern of true religion”166 that “must be learned by all, 
so that denying ungodliness and perversity, we may …display our life both chaste and 
pure in all respects.”167 The truthfulness of the biblical narrative made it spiritually 
relevant; exegesis was intended to unite theology and morality. However, this was only 
possible with a pre-existing ecclesial faith. 
Franciscan Nicholas of Lyra’s (d. Paris 1349) distaste for foundationless allegory 
earned him a contemporary title of “foremost exponent of the literal sense.”168 Yet, even 
Nicholas worked under the assumption of a secondary meaning to the biblical text. 
Nicholas devoted much of his labors to biblical exegesis, and created a “revision” of the 
Glossa Ordinaria. He read Hebrew, knew the various Jewish commentators, and was 
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especially familiar with the exegetical works of the famed Rabbi Rashi.169 In the second 
prologue of his Postilla, Nicholas argued that the literal sense of Scripture was the 
foundation for all mystical interpretations. He argued that translations, including the 
Vulgate,170 needed to be corrected by reference to the Hebrew. He was disgusted with 
fanciful allegorical studies of his time if they obscured the literal sense of the text. 
However, although he insisted on an astute literal exegesis, Nicholas maintained the need 
for a mystical exegesis of Scripture. The Scripture, to Nicholas, was as the Book of 
Revelation described it, “written within and on the back.”171 The outside of Scripture 
dealt with the literal sense of the text, but the inside with the mystical or spiritual sense. 
The deeper meanings can be multiplied legitimately, but the literal must remain the 
foundational meaning. A theological interpretation which has no literal basis will collapse 
as a building which “parts company” with its foundation.172 However, the danger of 
interpreting Scripture too “literally” is that it becomes too “fleshly,” and has a certain 
“dishonorable and improper”173 quality about it.174  
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Interpretive Unity through Church Authority 
A formal, ecclesial faith, safeguarded by bishops, helped keep Christian theology 
buoyant. If needed, the Church had the authority to decide on the best interpretation of 
Scripture. Although contemporary evangelicals may not agree with the final 
determinations the Catholic Church made during the Eucharistic controversies, they need 
to appreciate the resilient effect authoritative ecclesiology has had on orthodox theology. 
One example is found in the Eucharistic controversies surrounding Berengar of Tours. 
Although most evangelicals may not agree with the final determination of the Church in 
this dispute, it is helpful to understand the presumed role of the Church in biblical 
polemics. The eleventh-century Eucharistic controversy involving Berengar of Tours 
demonstrated that when dispute arose regarding the reading of Scripture, all sides of the 
debate assumed the role of the Church to maintain unity in faith. The Eucharistic 
controversy was one of the most significant debates in the Middle Ages because of its 
intricate relationship with grace and redemption.175 The debate spanned centuries, raised 
numerous theological issues, and involved multiple individuals in the Church. The 
significance of this dispute reveals underlying assumptions regarding the Church’s 
relationship with the Scripture. 
Berengar of Tours (999–1088) was a renowned scholar and theologian who 
helped revive the tools of dialectic argumentation in the French cathedral schools. 
Berengar brought negative attention to himself by disputing the substance of the 
Eucharist after it had been blessed by the priest. At the heart of the debate was the 
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interpretation of Christ’s words in Scripture, “This is my body.”176 Prior to the eleventh 
century, patristic sources were “vague” in addressing polemics regarding the Eucharist, 
and the same patristic authors were used on both sides of the debates.177 In the 
Augustinian tradition of the day, the difference between any “sacrament” and the “true 
body and blood” was unclear.178 The now familiar term “Transubstantiation” was not 
even coined until decades after Berengar’s death.179 Berengar received his understanding 
of the Eucharist from the Church. However, he used reason, which he considered the 
image of God within humanity,180 and Tradition in an attempt to articulate what seemed 
“vague” to him and others. In the end, his controversy helped the Catholic Church better 
formulate its own position. 
The controversy surrounding Berengar had to do with the real presence and 
change in substance in the Eucharist. Berengar disputed the claim that the bread and wine 
became the “true”181 flesh and blood of Christ at consecration. How could there be two 
bodies of a single Christ, one in heaven and the other on earth?182 Did Paul not claim that 
we no longer know him according to the flesh?183 The general response to Berengar was 
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that just as the earthly body of the resurrected Jesus transcended natural laws, so the 
Eucharistic body could be both in heaven and earth. Berengar was especially antagonistic 
towards the idea that the original substance of the bread and wine was converted or 
destroyed. For Berengar, even if the Eucharist became true flesh and blood, the elements 
remained bread and wine; they did not lose their original nature during consecration.  
Although Berengar used Scripture to argue his position, he did not revert to naked 
Biblicism. He relied on an Augustinian tradition, and employed grammar and logic.184 He 
partially based his dispute on the empirical fact that the physical appearance of the 
elements was not changed. If the physical appearance of the elements was not converted, 
then it was logical to conclude that their substance “survived”185 consecration as well.186 
Berengar made strong appeal to Patristic interpretations of Scripture supporting his 
views, especially Augustine and Ambrose. A sign, according to Augustine, was to inspire 
and lift one’s thoughts to the reality signified; it was not intended to be transformed into 
the actual reality, thereby destroying the sign. How could we chew Christ’s flesh if 
Ambrose taught us that Christ’s glorified flesh was immutable? To make his point, 
Berengar utilized multiple biblical illustrations, patristic passages, liturgy, the canon of 
the Mass, as well as logic.  
Berengar’s opponents, notably Lanfranc of Canterbury and Alberic of Monte 
Cassino, likewise supported their interpretation of Scripture with Tradition and reason. 
They countered with the claim, supported by Ambrose himself, that the Eucharist was the 
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same as the body given to Christ by the Virgin, suggesting Berengar misquoted Milan’s 
Father of the Church.187 In addition, the entire Christian world believed such things. “All 
those who rejoice to be called Christian, glory in the fact that they receive in this 
sacrament the true flesh of Christ and the true blood of Christ, each taken from the 
Virgin.”188 Berengar’s scholarly reputation forced his opponents within the Church to 
develop their own philosophical tools to refute him. They accused Berengar of asserting 
that the Eucharist did not become “true blood and flesh” at all, which denied the very 
words of Scripture. If the bread and wine were not transformed, then the sacrifice of the 
New Testament was not “superior” to the Old Testament, as the letter to the Hebrews 
clearly states.189 They argued that God was not constricted by created nature, but was 
able to change the very substance of anything. Like Berengar, they also brought a 
plethora of biblical texts and other patristic writings to bear on the issue. Ultimately, 
however, Alberic began his letter to Pope Gregory VII, in which he called for a “decisive 
judgment”190 against Berengar, by stating “how contrary” Berengar’s views were “to the 
Catholic faith.”191  
In 1059, Cardinal Humbert of Silva Candida (1015–1061) “extracted from 
Berengar a reluctant assent to a toughly worded confession of belief in physical 
                                                          
187 Pelikan, The Growth of Medieval Theology, 193. 
188 Lanfranc of Canterbury, On the Body and Blood of the Lord, trans. Mark G. Vaillancourt (Washington, 
DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2009), 22:440D–441A, 84.  
189 Cf. Hebrews 8:6. 
190 Radding and Newton, Theology, Rhetoric, and Politics, 83. 
191 Radding and Newton, Theology, Rhetoric, and Politics, 283. 
45 
Eucharistic change.”192 Berengar, fearing for his life, assented to Humbert’s specific 
point that the change that occurs in the bread and wine occurs in the realm of the five 
senses, not just in the mental realm. Soon after this coerced admission, Berengar 
disavowed his assent, claiming that Humbert’s formula was internally inconsistent and 
ultimately unorthodox. Berengar was certainly not a symbolist, as Zurich’s Zwingli 
would be centuries later; he believed in the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist. 
Instead, Berengar’s contention was with the annihilation of the bread and wine.  
After Humbert’s death, debate continued within the Church over what type of 
change occurred at the consecration. After other assents and retractions, Berengar, aware 
of the capital consequences of heresy, finally recanted his views in 1079. Berengar died 
in 1088, angry and bitter at his opponents because he had been personally hurt by the 
pope and councils, and forced to be untrue to himself by recanting. Despite the politics 
involved, claims of false accusations, and personal animosity towards his opponents, 
Berengar neither rejected the Catholic notion of the Church, nor did he leave the Catholic 
Church. Actually, his revival of dialectic reasoning served the Church’s developing 
ability to employ reason and faith in its theological endeavors. Catholic schools 
continued to debate for four centuries if what Berengar signed was really an orthodox 
statement at all.193 Clarity took time; however, the Church and its ordained bishops 
ultimately provided that precise determination. 
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It would be naïve to suggest that the conflicts in the Church were purely 
theological. Most clashes were marked by political, financial, and social interests. 
Nonetheless, the assumed conjunction between the Church and sacred text persisted 
among theologians, in varying degrees, throughout multiple disputes. Augustine’s 
interpretation of Isaiah 7:9, “Unless you believe, you will not understand,” persisted 
throughout the Middle Ages. Faith in the revelation safeguarded in the Church was the 
starting point of theological reason. Faith seeks, but understanding finds and clarifies; 
reason confirms what is often already known and loved. The Church’s faith was 
understood by biblical exegetes to be a resource for reason; it supplied a store for 
rationality. The foundational revelation proclaimed by the Church was meant to be 
logically analyzed; it was not set up as a rival to human reason. This presumption 
persisted from Augustine, through John Scotus Eriugena, Richard of St. Victor, Anselm, 
Abelard, and multiple others in the Church.194  
Disagreement over the interpretation of Scripture was inevitable, but the basic 
idea of the role of an ordained episcopate in the interpretation of Scripture was commonly 
accepted. An apostolic Church did not neatly resolve all tensions; however, its ordained 
hierarchy provided the environment for dispute between theologians while seeking to 
prevent polemics from getting out of control. Church Fathers disagreed, sometimes 
vehemently, regarding the rank given to either the literal or spiritual aspects of Scripture. 
However, all agreed the biblical text contained both aspects. Exegetes who were wary of 
certain biblical commentators still understood the need for an allegorical interpretation if 
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one was to believe in a New Testament. Ideally, bishops would illuminate the boundaries 
of fidelity within which exegesis would occur. Doctrinal ripeness took generations, even 
centuries, to come into maturity.  
The Rise of Biblicism 
Noticeable Flaws within the Church 
 A survey of the development of modern Biblicism will assist evangelicals in 
understanding some of their own milieu. 
Over the centuries, various polemics and troubling affairs in ecclesial life 
contributed to a diminished estimation of the relationship between Scripture and Church.  
Nonetheless, even in the late Middle Ages most Christians, even after the commencement 
of the Reformation, still looked to the Church to interpret its own Book. However, 
various forms of Biblicism began to emerge which increasingly challenged the traditional 
relationship between Church and sacred text. For some, the cold reality that the Church 
was neither “one” nor its leaders “holy” helped undermine the fundamental assumption 
that the Church needed to be the official interpreter of Scripture.  
The “plague,” the “cancer,” of the Great Western Schism risked mass apostasy195 
and confirmed fears that the Church was becoming detached from itself. For Pierre 
Janelle, it was neither the doctrine of the Catholic Church that was to blame, nor was it a 
flawed hierarchical structure. Rather, it was “anarchy.” A good entity was being abused. 
Central power in the Church was lost to national rivalries and provincial councils. Local 
churches were swayed by ambassadors from nearby princes. The Church was fragmented 
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at multiple levels,196 and had gone from “bad to worse.”197 The papacy itself was 
“scarred, deeply troubled, even reeling.”198 Not only had the Great Western Schism and 
other political struggles “undermined” the credibility of the papacy, it had also “made 
ambiguous” who it was to be obeyed. 199 Was it pope or council that held ultimate 
authority? If one gave the nod to the papacy, then which pope?  
The lives of several medieval ecclesiastical leaders countered the assumption that 
the Church was “holy.” Their debauchery damaged the Church’s reputation as the 
authoritative interpreter of Scripture. “Ecclesiastical rogues”200 in high leadership in the 
Catholic Church caused many to reexamine if church leaders could possibly hold the 
keys to God’s kingdom. Despite severe ecclesiastical condemnations to the contrary, 
simony was commonplace. Innocent VIII (1484–1492), strapped for money, created 
unneeded positions in the Curia and sold them to the highest bidder. Alexander VI 
(1492–1503) reputedly sired several children as Cardinal, and more as pope. Other 
Church leaders, such as Dominican Girolamo Savanarola, who preached against the 
abuses of sacred office, were persecuted. Julius II (1503–1513) owed his office to his 
uncle’s nepotism, and was reputedly elected pope with the help of bribes. The first of the 
Medici popes, Leo X (1513–1521), was accused of depleting the papal treasury through 
his extravagant lifestyle. On a local level, the people noticed that their bishops were often 
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absent from their dioceses, not caring for their flocks, and that many cardinals lived in 
luxury. It appeared that everything in the Church was for sale. Even the satire of the day 
referred to gluttonous monks, lecherous friars, and gullible priests.201 In 1514, shortly 
after the death of Pope Julius II, Erasmus of Rotterdam anonymously published Julius 
Exclusus, a satirical narrative of the refusal of Peter to let the recent Pontiff into heaven 
because of his worldliness.202 After similar complaints, more people began to question if 
deference to corrupt leaders was necessary. Apostolic obedience required apostolic 
holiness! Even if the identification of the true successor of Peter became clear, what 
obligation did one have to a wolf wearing sheep’s clothing? The disparity between 
Scripture’s call for holiness and the lives of contemporary ecclesiastical leaders led many 
to doubt the Church’s claim to be the instrument of God’s salvation and interpreter of 
sacred texts. Within this milieu, an authority was sought after that would be free of 
tainted Tradition and corrupt churchmen, a rule that was able to hold fraudulent leaders 
accountable. For some, the text of Scripture fulfilled the necessary role. 
Biblicism in the Early Reformation 
 Biblicism, as it is used in this dissertation, has a long and complex history dating 
back to the Middle Ages. Antecedents of post-Reformation Biblicism can be detected in 
conflicts such as those surrounding the Waldenses and Hussites, as well as in the 
development of philology during the Renaissance. However, for this study, Martin Luther 
and the Protestant Reformation provide definitive moments of its ascendency. During the 
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rise of Biblicism, the role of the Church in biblical interpretation was diminished. 
Luther’s 1518 meeting in Augsburg with Cardinal Cajetan provides a clear entry point for 
noting the rise of modern Biblicism.203 
Luther and Cajetan 
 After Luther issued his ninety-five theses October, 1517, he gained the attention 
of Rome by early 1518. The Augustinian friar had called for reform of the preaching of 
indulgences. Luther viewed the current practice of indulgences as providing false security 
to people and undermining any impetus to live holy lives. Luther thought his criticisms 
were in continuity with the Catholic Tradition and in concert with Scripture and Church 
decrees, but his opponents refuted those assumptions. Albrecht of Brandenburg, 
Archbishop of Mainz and Magdeburg, perceived Luther’s challenges as potentially 
obstructing the lucrative practices of indulgence preaching. Luther, it was feared, might 
seriously undermine Albrecht’s plan, approved by the Curia, to apply half the income 
gained from indulgences to paying off the archbishop’s debt incurred in gaining his 
bishopric. In addition, Luther’s theology of penance appeared to possibly challenge the 
pope’s authority to grant indulgences. Albrecht, under counsel from theologians and 
canonists at the University of Mainz, determined higher intervention was necessary, and 
referred Luther’s complaints to Rome.204  
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 Tommaso de Vio, known as Thomas Cajetan, Cardinal and a reputed theologian 
and administrator, was delegated as papal legate by Pope Leo X to resolve Luther’s case 
with a determination of the friar’s orthodoxy. Luther’s meeting with Cardinal Cajetan in 
Augsburg in October of 1518, marks a decisive point in the Reformer’s developing view 
of the relation of Church and Scripture. Up until August of 1518, young Luther’s view of 
the Catholic Church’s ability to authoritatively issue judgment on doctrinal issues was 
positive.205 Of all churches, Christ preserved “this one church on earth by so great a 
miracle.” “Never in any of its decrees has it parted from the true faith.”206 Although this 
does not amount to perpetual infallibility, it affirms young Luther’s esteem for the 
historic role of the Catholic Church in the interpretation of Scripture. After a survey of 
Luther’s few available works, including his Explanations of the Ninety-five Theses, 
Cajetan did not provide a wholesale condemnation of Luther’s theology as others had 
done.207 Rather, he called for Luther to recant and submit to the Church on just two points 
of error.  
First, in his fifty-eighth thesis, Luther argued that the pope’s basis to grant 
indulgences was merely from the power of the keys; it did not stem from the merits of 
Christ and the saints, which are found within the treasury of the Church. The Catholic 
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Church taught that indulgences, as exemptions from the temporal punishment due to sins 
already forgiven, were granted from the treasury of merits in the Church.208 The pope, 
based on this view, was within his rights to grant these merits back to the people in the 
form of indulgences. For Luther, the pope’s power to “loose” in indulgences was limited 
to the temporal ecclesiastical sphere on earth; the power to “work grace for the inner 
man” could only be the work of the gospel.209 “The true treasure of the church is the most 
holy gospel of the glory and grace of God.”210 Luther’s concern was that the preaching of 
indulgences was replacing the preaching of the gospel, and causing people to trust in 
indulgences for their salvation. 211 According to Luther’s twenty-sixth thesis, the pope’s 
keys gave him no power over souls in Purgatory. Instead, as a pastor, the pope was 
supposed to intercede for those in Purgatory. Similarly, the pope could not grant, via the 
keys, what people were responsible to earn themselves; his authority was limited to the 
ecclesiastical sphere. Luther’s concern with the contemporary indulgence practice was 
that it freed people from the responsibility of doing good works to earn their own merit. 
Luther was not necessarily opposed to the idea of a treasury of merit within the Church, 
but he did not think the pope had sole custody of it. God had given the responsibility of 
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merits to everyone. For Luther, to argue that “the saints had done enough for us” was to 
speak “without proof from the Scriptures, the teachers of the Church, and sound 
reasons.”212 Quoting Paul, Luther argued that “each shall receive his wages according to 
his own labor.”213  
Cajetan argued that Luther, by denying the right of the pope to grant indulgences 
from the treasury of the Church for Christians in Purgatory, had contradicted the sense of 
the Church. “We have not made this up arbitrarily.”214 All the faithful saw indulgences as 
“affecting their debt of temporal punishment to God as well as their obligations to the 
Church.”215 By limiting the pope’s access to the merits of the Church, Luther had 
incorrectly dichotomized two spheres of Christian existence, the one before God and the 
other before the Church.216  
Second, in his seventh thesis, Luther argued that “God does not remit guilt unless 
there is prior remission by the priest.”217 This was considered consistent with Christ’s 
statement, “Whatever you loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.”218 However, in 
explaining his thesis, Luther emphasized the necessity of an attitude of faith when one 
receives absolution from his priest. “The person who is to be absolved must guard 
himself very carefully from any doubt that God has remitted his sins, in order that he 
                                                          
212 Luther, “Thesis 58” in “Explanations of the Ninety-Five Theses,” 222–223. 
213 1 Corinthians 3:8. 
214 Cajetan, Cajetan Responds, 57. 
215 Wicks, Luther's Reform, 167. 
216 Cf. Wicks, Luther's Reform, 167. 
217 Luther, “Thesis 7” in “Explanations of the Ninety-Five Theses,” 98.  
218 Mt. 16:19. 
54 
might find peace of heart.”219 A most certain “persuasion” of faith must be produced in 
the recipient’s heart if forgiveness is to be truly received. For Luther, faith needed to be 
more than a general confidence in the power of the sacrament; it included a specific 
conviction of personal assurance. To receive forgiveness, the penitent must believe that 
Christ’s grace was personally applied. The fruit of receiving the sacrament in faith was 
peace of conscience, consolation, and certitude that one’s sins were forgiven and he was 
in God’s grace.220 “This peace, therefore, is that sweetest power, for which, from the 
depths of our hearts, we ought to give the greatest thanks to God.”221  
Cajetan objected that Luther was introducing a new type of faith, one that insisted 
on certainty as a salvific imperative.222 Again, Cajetan saw Luther’s teaching as contrary 
to the sense of the Church. Residual doubt had always been “deeply woven” into the 
fabric of the life of the Church. Cajetan referred to Job 9:21, “And if my heart is divided, 
my soul will not know it.”223 He also referenced the prayers offered after communion, 
which claim unworthiness and fear of having received the sacrament unworthily, even by 
those who had confessed and been absolved.224 For Cajetan, Luther deemphasized 
contrition. Salvific faith, according to the legate, was never perfect within any Christian 
on earth. Due to the defective nature of humans, one could never have certainty that his 
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contrition was sufficient to attain forgiveness.225 However, for Cajetan the presence of 
faith, even if flawed, made one worthy to receive the grace conferred by the sacrament. 
 Cajetan argued that Luther contradicted the sense of the Church in his two errors. 
Luther argued that the Church had made no binding decree on the subjects he contested. 
More importantly, Luther was convinced the Bible supported his views. At the end of 
their meeting in Augsburg, Cajetan stopped short of declaring Luther’s views to be 
heretical, although he called for correction of the friar’s errors.226 Instead, he privileged 
Luther’s request for a binding decision from the pope on the topic of indulgences. In his 
ninety-five theses, Luther was confident the pope would be disgusted if he only knew the 
true practice of indulgences in Germany. He considered the pope to be a “good pope, but 
a victim of bad advice.” Luther’s appeal to the pope through Cajetan was sent by the friar 
with cautious optimism. He had hoped that his appeal would persuade Leo toward a 
favorable decision.227  
Leo X quickly responded, issuing the bull Cum Postquam on November 9th, 1518. 
The bull clearly declared that the pope through the keys opens heaven to those in 
purgatory and accesses the merits of the Church for indulgences. His authority transcends 
the earthly ecclesiastical sphere. A decision regarding Cajetan’s second charge against 
Luther, namely, that Luther insisted on a positive disposition in the recipient, was 
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temporarily suspended in the bull.228 Luther received a copy of Cum Postquam in early 
1519. Luther rejected the bull, and considered it unbinding because it simply repeated old 
teachings that in themselves were not binding. The entire bull was simply an assertion of 
pontifical authority; it furnished no scriptural arguments, patristic authority, canon law, or 
rational argument. Luther publicly made known his opposition to Cum Postquam in the 
Leipzig debate later in 1519.229 Luther had lost his canonical appeal, and began to prepare 
for excommunication. 
 Events surrounding Luther’s meeting with Cajetan demonstrate a subtle but 
significant shift in the development of Biblicism. In a matter of months, Luther’s posture 
had shifted from a readiness to submit to the Church to a dissent from the Church’s 
formal declaration. In his retrospective Proceedings at Augsburg, written within weeks 
after his meeting with Cajetan, a growing conviction within Luther becomes more 
evident; he was increasingly pitting Scripture against Church and Tradition. “Above all,” 
Luther avowed that he cherished and followed the “holy Roman Church,”230 but he also 
understood that only papal declarations “which are in agreement with Holy Scripture” 
ought to be obeyed.231 Any believer can refute the pope provided he uses “better 
authority or reason” because “the pope is not above but under the Word of God.”232 
Luther considered it to be common knowledge that “the popes are accustomed to doing 
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violence to the Holy Scriptures in their decretals.”233 The “dubious twisting of the words 
of God and falsifying of meaning” within such decretals needs to be set in opposition to 
the “true and proper meaning of Scripture.” The ecclesiastical “jurists” emphasize “their 
traditions, whereas we theologians preserve the purity of Scripture.”234 Luther’s tension 
between Church and Scripture and his gradual movement towards Scripture alone is 
noticeable at this early stage. He loved the Roman Catholic Church. However, he claimed 
to hate those who, in the name of the Church, twisted the gospel. In his letter to Cajetan, 
his “most reverend father in Christ,” Luther referenced Acts 5:29. “As long as these 
Scripture passages stand, I cannot do otherwise, for I know that one must obey God 
rather than men.”235 Increasingly for Luther, God’s directives were primarily found in the 
text of Scripture. The Church was not to be trusted.  
 In July of 1519 Luther debated Johann Eck at Leipzig, further asserting that popes 
and councils might fail, and that Scripture alone is where Christian faith should rest. 
“There is but one thing that we have to believe, namely, what Scripture teaches.”236 
Through the various issues addressed at Leipzig, Luther’s growing Biblicism became 
more obvious. Even at Leipzig, while Luther sought to maintain some divine authority 
for the pope, he did it with circumspection. The Bishop of Rome needed to mend his 
ways; the current idea of divine right of the papacy was repugnant. Luther warned Eck 
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not to join the crowds who too highly extolled the pope. Yet, Eck countered Luther’s 
arguments. The two argued over the interpretations of 1 Corinthians 3, Galatians 1, 
Matthew 16, and other related passages, with Eck claiming support from the Glossa 
Ordinaria. Both Eck and Luther cited Church Fathers to support their arguments, but 
Luther insisted that even if all the Fathers asserted the current understanding of the 
primacy of the pope, they could not overthrow the biblical texts which spoke 
otherwise.237 The direction of Luther’s arguments was increasingly focused on the text of 
Scripture; in the light of certain biblical passages, Luther argued that the Catholic Church 
had exaggerated the understanding of the divine right of the pope. 
Eck labelled Luther a defender of heretics.238 Eck claimed that Luther’s teachings 
were in line with the Hussites, who were condemned at the Council of Constance. Only a 
heathen would disregard the infallibility of such a council! Luther rejoined by claiming 
he was not in opposition to Constance. He tried to distance himself from the Hussite 
heretics, claiming he could not be grouped with the Bohemians.239 He based his defense 
on the biblical text. The Leipzig Debate reveals that Luther increasingly saw Scripture as 
potentially opposed to Church, councils, Tradition, and the papacy. Sole reliance on the 
Bible was progressing in his theology.  
In June, 1520, Leo X issued Exsurge Domini, which directly named Martin 
Luther and threatened him with excommunication if he persisted in the “pernicious 
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poison” of his “errors.” 240 In January of 1521, Pope Leo X issued the bull Decet 
Romanum Pontificem, excommunicating Luther from the Catholic Church. Luther was 
soon called to defend his views in front of Emperor Charles V at Worms. At Worms, 
Luther famously declared his “conscience captive to the Word of God,” and if necessary, 
subsequently opposed to Church and Tradition.  
Luther and Latomus  
During this early phase of the Reformation, one of Luther’s fiercest opponents 
was Jacobus Latomus from Louvain. Latomus specifically attacked Luther’s arguments 
in the Leipzig debate, and his well-known assault on scholastic theology. Luther’s June 
1521 response to Latomus demonstrates his maturing Biblicism. He had moved from one 
who sought to affirm the Catholic Church to an outsider. His security in Scripture alone 
became obvious in his reply to Latomus.  
Luther objected to Latomus’ call for moderation, prayer, and patience because it 
amounted to toleration of the pope. For Luther, it was possible to oppose the Church on 
the basis of Scripture. “It is never right to go against the Word of God even if it means 
setting a man in opposition to the pope.” 241 Latomus censured Luther’s teaching that sin 
remained after baptism, and he used Gregory the Great to support his censure. In 
response, Luther pitted Gregory’s teachings against the “authority of Paul.”242 Latomus 
stated that Luther’s teaching that not every mortal sin needed to be confessed to a priest 
                                                          
240 “Exsurge Domine: Bull of Pope Leo X,” Papal Encyclicals Online, http://www.papalencyclicals.net/. 
241 Martin Luther, Luther's Early Theological Works: A Reply to Latomus, trans. James Atkinson 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1962), 311. 
242 Luther, Reply to Latomus, 317. 
60 
was condemned by council. Luther retorted by asking, “What Scripture supports this 
council?”243 Throughout his long reply to Latomus, Luther repeatedly brings his 
contentions back to the plain reading of sacred text. His palate had rejected the taste of 
biblical faith mingled with human corruptions. “My soul is nauseated at having to eat 
bread baked with human dung.”244 Luther believed he could understand the plain 
Scripture apart from the living Church. He was willing to set himself against ecclesial 
traditions, even those affirmed by saints, because he perceived the Church had set itself 
against the Scripture. “I do not ask myself what Bede says, or what any man says. I ask 
what they ought to say. One must look to God’s Scripture only.”245 Luther, at one point 
of his reply, directly addressed his reader: “At this juncture, dear reader, I entreat thee to 
be a free Christian man. Swear no allegiance to the words of any man. Stand loyally by 
the word of Holy Scripture.”246 Luther’s desire was to study the “pure unadulterated 
Scriptures in all their glory, undefiled by any man, even the saints.”247 As Luther’s 
Biblicism solidified, his criticism of other theologians was increasingly based on their 
alignment with Scripture. He justified his own polemical views by their established 
footing in the Bible. The victor in theological debate was more biblical than his 
opponent; he was not necessarily one who was in favor with the Church.  
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Radical Reformation and Spiritual Exegesis 
After Luther’s excommunication, other forms of Biblicism developed rapidly 
outside the confines of the Catholic Church, and it was not uncommon for them to 
conflict with each other. Protestants in the Radical Reformation felt that Luther had 
neither gone far enough in denouncing the Catholic Church nor in separating Christianity 
from earthly princes. The development of distinct forms of Biblicism can be detected in 
some of their radical responses.  
Through Thomas Müntzer (1489–1525), for example, new evangelical ideas of 
the Reformation progressed without the “support and constraint” of princes.248 At first, 
Müntzer “fully accepted Luther’s Reformation standpoint.”249 However, his support soon 
changed to criticism. While in some ways Müntzer begins “in Luther,”250 he breaks with 
Luther at significant points. For this reason, historians often place Müntzer in the second 
generation of the Reformers. Müntzer concluded that although Luther attacked the 
clerical monopoly on religion through his words, he failed to attack it with deeds.251 
Although the truth had “dawned” on Luther, in the end Luther had abandoned and 
neglected it. Müntzer likened Luther to the malicious raven sent out of Noah’s ark; he 
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began well but did not return with the message of peace.252 Müntzer was disdained by the 
magisterial Reformers, such as Luther and Melanchthon, who both considered him a 
fanatic. 
In regards to biblical exegesis, Müntzer presented an antithesis of Spirit and 
Scripture, the inner and outer Word. 253 For Müntzer, the appeal to Scripture’s authority 
can only satisfy the “invented” faith of learned “scribes.”254 The Bible gives witness to its 
reader, but it does not impart faith. Many of the biblical authors themselves, men full of 
faith, did not have Bibles. For Müntzer, the criterion for determining the validity of the 
“outer” witness of Scripture can only be found in the human heart. Müntzer taught that 
the Holy Spirit provided direct instruction to believers in the form of visions, dreams, and 
“inspired exegesis.”255 The ecstatic utterance from an uneducated “simple” charismatic 
expositor was more authoritative than the carnal exegesis of learned theologians, and it 
certainly surpassed ecclesiastical declarations. For Müntzer, the elect were now 
privileged with direct visitation from God.256 Not only was the true believer liberated 
from the Catholic Church’s oppressive doctrine, but now he could interpret Scripture 
even more accurately than Luther because of the inner Spirit. The lack of ordination or 
education was not an obstacle to exegesis if one had the Spirit. Müntzer’s emphasis on 
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what some have termed an “existential experience” demonstrates that for him, the 
evidence of religious truth was subjective. Faith advanced in experience.257 
Practically, Müntzer’s inner light of the Spirit appeared to undermine the 
supremacy of the objective Scripture. Three of Müntzer’s more radical parishioners in 
Zwickau, all laymen, travelled to Wittenberg in early 1522, during Luther’s absence, and 
convincingly argued against infant baptism. Their interpretive authority was based on the 
Spirit’s guidance in their particular reading of the Bible. These laymen, later called the 
Zwickau Prophets, disturbed Wittenberg and early Protestantism with their inspired 
enthusiasm and new doctrines.  
Müntzer’s spiritual reading of Scripture joined itself to social unrest. He 
interpreted the apocalyptic passages of Scripture in the light of his own day. The wealthy 
German rulers were the reprobates whose destruction was prophesied in the Book of 
Revelation. His followers who struggled against affluent land owners were inspired by 
this exegesis to actually revolt, trusting that Christ would deliver them. As a result, 
thousands of revolting peasants were slaughtered by the German princes during the 
Peasants’ War of 1525. Once the spiritualists had severed their historic relationship with 
not only the Catholic Church, but their own Protestant brethren, they made themselves 
vulnerable to private biblical interpretation. They read the Bible anew to fit their own 
concerns, resulting in a violent application of sacred texts. Luther’s well-known 
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“particularly harsh attitude” towards the peasants was due in part to Müntzer’s key role in 
the rebellion.258 
A similar separatist impulse was found among Anabaptists, specifically those in 
south and central Germany and Austria.259 Some were less violent than Müntzer, but still 
emphasized that the written Word, with all of its paradoxes, could not be interpreted 
without the Holy Spirit.260 Hans Denck (1495–1527) taught that the Holy Spirit directly 
joins the interpreter in the exegetical process. The Scriptures could only be understood, 
and sectarianism, already a noticeable problem within Protestantism, avoided if the Spirit 
directly guided the exegete.261 The Bible is a light, but only a lantern in the darkness. 
More light than Scripture was needed. The biblical interpreter must immediately 
experience the Morning Star arising in his heart prior to fully dispelling the night and 
understanding the Scripture.262 The inner Word of God united with the Holy Spirit and 
enabled the exegete to properly appropriate the text of Scripture.263 The Anabaptists used 
texts such as Luke 12:11, where Jesus promised the Spirit’s immediate help to articulate 
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the faith in crises, to buttress their spiritual hermeneutics. It is noteworthy that the 
inclination for direct spiritual interpretation did not necessarily preclude the Anabaptists 
from group study of sacred Scriptures. Balthasar Hubmeier (1480–1528), for example, 
emphasized the need for agreement, even submission if necessary, to the inspired 
solidarity of the questioning faithful.264 Nonetheless, even in a communal setting, the 
Spirit’s direct affirmation was needed. 
Different Anabaptist theologians, under their new warrant of spiritual authority, 
sought to restore a pristine Christianity. “An Eden in the past” was pursued; the scandal 
of recent times needed to be removed.265 The Scripture alone, free from centuries of 
corrupted Tradition but interpreted by a living spiritual exegesis, provided the design for 
genuine Christianity. The Anabaptists rejected infant baptism and provided a symbolic 
theology of the Lord’s Table; believer’s baptism and memorial communion were 
celebrated. They sharply separated between Church and State. The Church was 
exclusively composed of true believers; those in sin were to be banned from the 
Fellowship. The true believer offered no oath to the carnal government.266 Anabaptists 
frequently criticized Luther and his followers as still beholden to the pope and Tradition, 
and placing their hope in civil magistrates. Through Anabaptist theologians, a noticeable 
modification of Biblicism was occurring within Protestantism, and some near the center 
of the Reformation movement were becoming aware of the challenges. Once the ordained 
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Catholic bishops were removed, the text of Scripture was exalted to a position of 
primacy. However, the objective text was now being trumped by spiritualists who 
claimed to receive direct communication from God regarding the Bible’s interpretation. 
Although one strand of Anabaptism can be traced to Zurich in 1525, Swiss reformer 
Henry Bullinger later traced its visionary and revolutionary roots back to Müntzer’s 
Zwickau, and before that to Satan.267 To this reader, mainline Protestant Reformers were 
possibly beginning to sense the dilemma of interpreting Scripture without ecclesial 
warrant. 
Philology and Zwingli  
Partially in response to the subjective hermeneutics of the spiritualists, both 
Luther and especially Huldrych Zwingli (1484–1531) lay greater emphasis on the ability 
of philology to authoritatively interpret Scripture. During the Renaissance, literary 
scholars lay great stress on the value of philology. It was increasingly assumed that a 
literary text, whether religious or not, had a fixed meaning and that the right tools could 
reveal the original intent of its author. For some, recently developed skills of literary 
analysis provided the biblical scholar with the tools to most accurately determine the 
authenticity and meaning of the sacred texts. Over time, philology was increasingly seen 
by some Protestants as a sort of new Magisterium authoritatively determining the 
meaning of the Bible.268 When applied to biblical hermeneutics, philology could avoid 
                                                          
267 Williams, Radical Reformation, 1292. 
268 Dennis D. Martin, “School of the Prophets: Shepherds and Scholars in New England Puritanism,” 
Historical Reflections V, no. 1 (1978): 48–53.  
67 
ecclesiastical imposition on a text, as well as sidestepping dangerous individualistic 
spiritual interpretations.  
For Zwingli, philology could counter the growing spiritualism within 
Protestantism effectively. The fanatics “have convinced themselves that no one but they 
themselves have the Spirit of God … they have rejected the knowledge and advice of so 
many highly learned wise men.”269 They are “unfit and early-ripe masters who proceed to 
teach what they have never properly learned.” Anabaptist errors became most evident in 
their rejection of infant baptism. These Spiriteuseri were “an evil party” who troubled 
both Lutheran and Reformed communities.270 For Zwingli, the discord spread by the 
spiritualists countered their claim that the God of peace was moving them with the 
prophetic Spirit.271 To Zwingli, “the Anabaptists act rather wrongly when they denigrate 
languages” because linguistic skill is the primary means of probing the depths of God’s 
mysteries. Philology, for Zwingli, was the key to unlocking the mysteries of divine 
revelation. “If we knew Hebrew as well as German, we should be able to fathom the Old 
Testament.”272  
Prophecy, for Zwingli, was preaching a learned exposition of the biblical text, 
especially the Old Testament. It relied on expert skill in Hebrew and Greek. For Zwingli, 
the miraculous gift of tongues mentioned in 1 Corinthians 14 was learned linguistic 
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abilities, in “Hebrew, above all else.”273 The divine gifts of oracle were not expressed in 
unprepared, ecstatic verbiage. Prophets, then, were those who used their philological 
skills to teach and make “known the meaning of Scripture to the entire church.”274 The 
prophetic task of building up the churches275 required the skill of mastering the two 
biblical languages or the three languages of the cross. New Testament prophets “must 
have been well versed in languages,” for their prophetic utterances consisted of properly 
translating the Scriptures from their original Hebrew into Greek.276 This teaching was 
Zwingli’s direct counter to the spiritualists within Protestantism. The learned gift of 
tongues was a divine gift to the Church, but it was not the frenzied unlearned babbling of 
the Anabaptists.  
 Although Luther and John Calvin (1509–1564) did not equate the supernatural 
gifts of tongues with philology, they did affirm the elevated distinction of the objective 
biblical text. The Bible, not the Church or its traditions, was the final authority and the 
sacred dwelling of God,277 and the solution for anarchic spiritualism. Since God’s people 
were corrupt, only Scripture could be regarded as the infallible voice of God.278  
One of the most prominent assumptions behind Protestant exegesis was the 
perspicuity of the biblical text. The technical literary skills of Renaissance scholarship, 
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such as found in Erasmus’ Greek edition of the New Testament, helped the Reformers 
articulate the clear sense of Scripture over against the subtleties of medieval 
scholasticism. To Luther, it was a “wicked, base invention” to suggest a pope had 
ultimate authority to interpret Scripture. “What can the Church settle that the Scripture 
did not settle first?”279 No Church office or Tradition was needed to interpret the sacred 
text because “certainly these words are plain enough,”280 and “as clear as can be.”281 
Luther esteemed the ability of any good Christian “among us” of accurately interpreting 
the Scripture if he has the “true faith, spirit, understanding, word, and mind of Christ.”282 
Luther chided those who claimed that some sacred passages were recondite and others 
plain. Any lack of clarity was the result of the reader’s blindness and dull wits, or 
ecclesiastical obstacles. Even the loftiest mysteries, such as the Trinity or Incarnation of 
Christ, are clearly seen in the literal text.283 For Luther, the sense of the Scriptures was 
immediately available to its reader. It is noteworthy that Luther’s understanding of the 
perspicuity of the text was not synonymous with later critical analyses of the Bible. 
Perspicuity, for Luther, was two-fold. The external perspicuity was accessible to all who 
could make a grammatical analysis of a passage. However, the internal perspicuity was 
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only possible through the Holy Spirit. “The Spirit was needed” for deeper comprehension 
because our hearts are darkened.284  
Like Luther, Calvin was greatly influenced by the Renaissance, having mastered 
classic and modern languages. Calvin, too, advanced the perspicuity of the biblical text, 
although with his own distinctive emphasis. On one hand, Calvin emphasized the 
inspiration of the text; on the other hand, he argued that the reader must be inspired to 
understand the text. 
For Calvin, revelation had a clear pedagogical purpose. A child of the light was “a 
pupil” of Scripture,285 and salvation was something that was to “become known,” 
resulting in a “pure knowledge”286 of God. Reverence and love of God, real piety, were 
the results of “the knowledge of his benefits.”287 Nature certainly was helpful to 
understand the Creator, but human vision remained hazy and “confused.” Holy Scripture 
cleared the person’s understanding; it was analogous to “spectacles” which helped people 
clearly perceive what was blurred due to their own deficiencies.288 The air of mystery 
surrounding expositions of Scripture could be dissipated by careful and logical analyses 
of the text itself. The Bible was perspicuous and unmediated.289 The biblical text divinely 
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authenticated itself,290 while the Church only published the opinions of men. By the 
written Word, God had rendered faith “unambiguous forever.”  
Calvin’s stress on the educational function of Scripture demonstrates that he, too, 
was not a complete Biblicist. Rather, he also focused on the inspiration of the reader.291 
Like Luther, Calvin had little interest in allegory, except where the Scriptures directly 
called for it; the literal sense of the text was the truest sense. However, the literal meaning 
could not be ascertained without spiritual illumination. God himself speaks in the text. 
The same Spirit who spoke through the prophets must “penetrate into our hearts to 
persuade us” of the meaning of the Scriptures.292 When the reader is “illumined,” he 
receives the highest certification of the authenticity of the biblical text.293 For Calvin, the 
need for illumination was not peripheral to exegesis, but provided the necessary intrinsic 
clarity of the sacred text.294 Calvin’s pneumatic reading was based on the assumption that 
the Word and Spirit were inseparably together by “a kind of mutual bond.”295 He sought 
the rich, spiritual meanings “inside the letter” of the text.296 While both Luther and Calvin 
acknowledged the need for the Holy Spirit to understand the text, they were distinct from 
the Anabaptists. They both stressed the necessity of applying learned philology in 
deciding the meaning of the sacred text.  
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Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin negated an inspired Catholic Church with ordained 
bishops, and they located God within the biblical text. They did not intend to denigrate 
the inward testimony of the Spirit in exegesis to a secondary, merely edifying status.297 
They saw the biblical text as more than an historic artifact; they saw Scripture as a life-
giving conduit of the Holy Spirit.298 Nor did they seek to raise the operation of the Spirit 
to the crucial role of biblical arbiter, as they perceived in the Anabaptists.299 However, 
their ongoing repudiation of an ordained Catholic episcopate allowed for conflicting 
developments in the continuing trajectory of Biblicism.  
Conflicting Biblicism in Marburg 
 Despite the agreed upon supremacy of Scripture within Protestantism, there was 
no established mechanism to resolve conflict on significant interpretive issues. 
Protestants often regarded Scripture as the highest authority, but not everyone agreed to 
what it said. Biblicism did not provided harmony among God’s people; neither 
spiritualistic faith nor philology could prevent increased fragmentation between believing 
communities. This is evident in the Eucharistic dispute between Luther and Zwingli at 
Marburg in October, 1529. The two learned Protestant theologians and their respective 
German and Swiss parties met in colloquy at Marburg Castle in an attempt to resolve 
their differences on the Eucharist and possibly unite Protestantism. Those with Luther 
generally maintained a more traditional view of the objective efficacy of the sacraments 
than those who followed Zwingli. 
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Luther had masterfully detailed his theology of the Lord’s Supper in 1528300 in an 
effort to bring clarity to the doctrine. Unlike many later Protestants, Luther taught that 
Christ was really present in the sacrament when it was properly administered and that the 
sacraments “most assuredly” imparted grace when faith was present.301 In an attempt to 
unify Protestantism, Luther and other Wittenberg theologians drafted the seventeen 
Schwabach articles in the summer of 1529, just weeks before Marburg. The tenth 
Schwabach article affirms that “the true body and blood of Christ are truly present in the 
bread and wine.” Zwingli’s theology of the Eucharist denied the real presence, and saw 
the supper as only a memorial of Christ. Two years prior to the Marburg Colloquy, 
Zwingli had criticized Luther for putting “the most important part of salvation in 
physically eating the body of Christ … the gist of salvation in the eating.”302 Why would 
Christ give his real body to be eaten if he also taught that the “flesh profits nothing”?303 
The debate over the Eucharist was in reality a battle over the Bible.304 Luther and 
Zwingli each claimed to be more biblical than the other when the two failed to agree on 
the exegetical interpretation of the Bible.305 Philology did not supply the plain or 
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unambiguous sense of the Scriptures. Prior to the Colloquy, Zwingli accused Luther of 
“championing what is opposed to the authority of Scripture and thrust upon it a meaning 
which this same Scripture cannot admit.”306 During the colloquy, Luther challenged 
Zwingli with a Bible verse, “Prove that ‘This is my body’ is not a body.”307 At the end of 
the Colloquy, the two sides agreed on the first fourteen articles, which included a 
Trinitarian view of God, original sin in humanity, faith as a gift from God, and relations 
to civil authorities. They also agreed that “tradition or human ordinances in spiritual or 
ecclesiastical matters” cannot be allowed to “plainly contradict the word of God.308 The 
plain meaning of Scripture must dominate church teachings and practices. However, they 
could not reach agreement on the fifteenth and final article; the plain meaning eluded 
them. “And, although at this time, we have not reached an agreement as to whether the 
true body and blood of Christ are bodily present in the bread and wine, nevertheless, each 
side should show Christian love to the other side insofar as conscience will permit, and 
both sides should diligently pray to Almighty God that through his Spirit he might 
confirm us in the right understanding.”309 Basically, the two Reformers shook hands and 
agreed to disagree. To this date, the Lutheran and Reformed churches remain at odds on 
Eucharistic theology. As much as philology had prevented imposition of ecclesiastical 
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doctrine and avoided subjective spiritualistic interpretations, it could not provide the 
Reformers with certainty or unity.  
Pietism 
 The growing emphasis on philology throughout the sixteenth century led to what 
some considered to be a dry scholasticism, or Protestant rationalism. True religion was 
reduced to right doctrinal confession derived from an astute analysis of the Bible. The 
fear of some Lutherans was that the deadness of the letter had resumed its dominance 
over the faithful. Emphasis on philology had reduced the need for the Spirit’s unction in 
the reading of the text. Without wishing to follow the excesses of radical reformers, some 
concluded that Lutheranism itself needed reform. 
 Pietism developed as a learned and ecclesiastically-based effort to renew 
Protestantism. It initially sought renewal within the confines of the Lutheran and 
Calvinist churches, without disavowing the need for scholarly handling of the biblical 
text. It emphasized the need for personal piety in the lives of those who held right 
doctrine. It was a devotional movement that perceived itself as the continuation of the 
Reformation, a Bible movement emphasizing holy living which naturally flowed from a 
regenerate heart.310 In response, the Protestant magistrates were critical of pietistic 
emphases within the churches; they feared that social unrest would result from the new 
evangelical fervor promulgated by the movement.  
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 Immediately after affirming the Augsburg Confession, Johann Arndt (1555–1621) 
wrote that “purity of doctrine is of no benefit, when it is not adorned by a holy life.”311 
The Christian needed more than “remission of sins” obtained “through faith;” he needed 
to learn how to live a “holy life.”312 Frankfurt’s Pastor Jakob Spener (1635–1702)313 
inherited from Luther a deep dissatisfaction over the spiritual condition of the people of 
God. He was irritated with the lack of vitality among Protestants, and expressed distaste 
for the rigid confessional nature of Lutheran orthodoxy. In the recent Thirty Years’ War 
and its aftermath, the churches were heavily influenced by local princes. Even the clergy 
“do not really understand and practice true Christianity.”314 Spener’s skepticism towards 
Lutheran hierarchy, bolstered by the infiltration of civil magistrates, formal ceremonies, 
and emphasis on orthodox dogma, led him to protest that another form of papal 
absolutism had developed.315 Luther’s Preface to Romans inspired Spener to insist that 
justification and rebirth need to be experienced, not just believed; orthodoxy is a matter 
of the heart ultimately. For Spener, it was insufficient to know only how to “give answer 
to the errors of the papists, the Reformed, the Anabaptists,” or to be in “doctrinal 
agreement” with external orthodoxy. A true student of Scripture will be carried on “by 
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the practice of piety.”316 One of Spener’s primary methods for reforming the churches 
was a “more extensive”317 use of the Bible by individuals. The Scriptures contain rich 
minerals that can only be mined by pious individual diligence.318 The Scriptures are plain 
enough, but the illuminating light of the Spirit in the life of holiness is needed to interpret 
them.  
 For Spener, the Lutheran Church was the best example of what a visible church 
should be, but it had defects. Spener taught that the true invisible church included 
individual Christians of various creeds, even Roman Catholics.319 Churches, therefore, 
needed to be devotional assemblies with the purpose of inculcating glory to God and 
personal piety. Spener encouraged congregants to regularly meet in smaller, house 
gatherings for Bible study. These smaller groups broke through the political 
encumbrances of rigid church life, and provided direct access to the Bible. Spener’s 
eccesiola in ecclesia was a conventional way to describe piety as the practical function of 
a church engendered at a local, intimate level. He affirmed the need for broader visible 
structure to Christ’s Church, but emphasized what he perceived to be the practical need 
for small groups. Spener warned against the “monopoly of the clergy” and their 
prohibition of the laity to rigorously study the Bible. In response, he called for “diligent 
exercise of the spiritual priesthood.” Every Christian, Spener argued, needs to “offer 
himself” industriously to study the Bible, and with the “grace that is given him to teach 
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others.”320 In general, beyond Spener, Pietism emphasized the need for an individual to 
have the Spirit to understand Scripture. A grasp of history and grammar, often lacking in 
the “spiritual priesthood,” was not always necessary, for a right interpretation could come 
as unction from heaven.321  
 Pietism affected the interpretation of Scripture significantly because it provided a 
new hermeneutic. Rigid dogmatism may have subjected exegetical results to its 
prescribed orthodoxy, but Pietism subjected the very methods of exegesis to new 
standards. The inner motion of the soul influenced how one read the Scripture. Pietistic 
hermeneutics were at once individual and interior in their focus. Pietists were not always 
as “wedded” to the grammar of the text as their confessional opponents,322 but the Bible 
remained the source of their spirituality. Although Spener and others professed fidelity to 
the biblical text and Lutheran confessions, some323 sought to transcend texts in search of 
deeply personal interpretations. The spiritual force of the personal application of 
Scripture was so strong among some that the text’s meaning might transcend anything 
apparent in the particular passage. Pietism did more than elucidate the meaning of the 
grammar of the sacred text; it sought to expand and multiply it. In subsequent centuries, 
this approach to Scripture was to bear significant influence in America. To this reader, 
Spener’s emphasis on churches within a church diminished, possibly unintentionally, the 
value of a sacramental, universal Body, and encouraged local biblical interpretation.  
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Pietism, rooted in Luther’s emphases on individual faith resulting in a 
transformed life, influenced the Enlightenment in distinct ways; four of them are listed 
here. First, Pietism inspired a continued skepticism towards religious orthodoxy. Over 
time, it distinguished the Bible from orthodox doctrine, and sought to study the Scripture 
apart from the dogmatic tradition. Second, it eventually lent focus to the individual 
appropriation of religion without the aid of a structured Church. Third, it emphasized 
practicing the faith over theorizing about it; at times, praxis was preferred over logos. 
Practical ethics were later elevated over universal principles and dogmatic confession. 
Fourth, several of the influential leaders of the Enlightenment were from Pietistic 
families, including Kant and Schleiermacher.  
The True Church 
At the beginning of the Reformation, nearly all Protestants rejected any 
legitimacy to the succession of bishops within the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church 
was apostate and its whole clerical system corrupt; the Spirit had left them. The original 
long-standing assumption that the Catholic Church and its ordained bishops were the 
interpreters of Scripture had ended. However, a sincere effort to identify one’s own 
denomination with the true Church persisted throughout the first century of 
Protestantism.  
The Reformation was initially a debate among Catholics; it was a summons from 
within the Church to reform itself. After leaving the Catholic Church, certain autonomous 
Christian faith communities sprung up that claimed the Bible, not Rome, was their final 
authority. However, despite their antipathy towards Rome, the first reformers were not 
ready to quickly dismiss the idea of a true Church. The ancient idea of one, holy, catholic, 
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apostolic church continued long after the start of the Reformation. Different groups made 
the claim that they were the true Church. In order to support such claims, apostolicity 
often needed to be redefined. Claims to being the true Church were generally based on a 
particular fellowship’s fidelity to the apostolic teaching of the Bible. Two marks of a true 
church were frequently highlighted: faithful preaching of the apostolic gospel and the 
correct celebration of sacraments. The Reformed churches added discipline of its 
members; the Anabaptists added suffering by its members. 
Neither Luther nor Calvin wished to categorically dismiss a visible church with 
ordained clergy. However, because their concerns lay elsewhere, they did not occupy 
themselves with a wide-ranging ecclesiology.324 Instead, both laid emphasis on faith in 
the word of the gospel leading to salvation, as well as other doctrines that immediately 
addressed justification.  
For Luther, the true Church was hidden, living in spirit and inaccessible light. It 
was buried under the errors and sin of the visible, sensible churches.325 Yet, Luther, 
unlike some later Protestants, distinguished between a hidden Church and an invisible 
Church. On one hand, the true Church was concealed; on the other hand, it maintained a 
relationship with the visible Church. It could not be restricted to a particular fellowship, 
but it “must appear in the world…otherwise it can never be found.”326 For Luther, the 
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true Church was hidden but manifested wherever the Word of God was faithfully 
proclaimed and sacraments rightly administered.327 The true Church was where “nothing” 
was preached “except the sure, pure, and one word of God. Where that is missing, we no 
longer have the Church, but the synagogue of the devil.” The Church who listens to the 
words of another gospel is like a wife who listens to another man’s voice in bed; “she is 
certainly a whore.”328  
Of all the Reformers, Calvin possibly had the highest view of the Church. The 
Church is the “Mother” of all Christians, and it is in her “bosom” that God is “pleased to 
gather his sons.” The true Church comprises all of the elect, including those who have 
died in faith. The Church is “visible,” although some members of that visible Church are 
“wild beasts” who will be expunged at the end of time.329 Although Calvin disliked the 
Roman “hierarchy,” he appreciated the historic governance within the Catholic Church as 
necessary, “connected with the maintenance of discipline.”330 However, he did not 
perceive the Catholic Church as essentially a divine structure. He claimed that one cannot 
conclude that the “ancient bishops” intended anything like the current Catholic Church.  
Calvin claimed to look exclusively to the Scriptures to define a true Church. The 
Presbyterian form of government adopted by many Reformed Churches was considered 
by Calvin as the closest model of New Testament ecclesiology.331 He contended that the 
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ancient form of ecclesial governance was “overthrown” by the “tyranny of the 
papacy.”332 The “monstrous abuses,” including simony, covetousness, immorality, and 
intervention of secular princes in the selection of bishops evidenced the failures of 
Rome’s system.333 The true Monarch of the Church, Jesus Christ, and his moral 
commands, were neglected.334 Beyond Luther and Calvin, other Protestants including the 
Anabaptists struggled to identify the true Church.  
A few years prior to Calvin’s death, the Reformed churches’ Belgic Confession335 
declared that there is “one single and catholic universal church,” the gathering of “true 
Christian believers.” This Church is “not confined, bound or limited to a certain place or 
certain persons. But it is spread and dispersed throughout the entire world.”336 The marks 
of this true Church are determined by Scripture: it “engages in the pure preaching of the 
gospel;” it makes use of the “pure administration of the sacraments;” it practices church 
discipline.337 Beyond Luther and Calvin, other Protestants, including the Anabaptists, 
struggled to identify the true Church. 
The Anabaptists appeared to have shifted emphasis from “apostolic” to 
“apostolicity.” They were not concerned with maintaining a tradition of rites and orders. 
Nor did they regard succession of bishops with any significance. Rather, some 
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Anabaptists attempted to create a pristine Church solely based on the New Testament 
text. The devoted Christian could discover plain principles in the Bible alone for 
organizing a Church.338 The world was ending soon, and the Lord was reestablishing his 
true Church. For some Anabaptist revolutionaries, true Christianity could be restored 
through establishing a theocracy by force.339 For the non-revolutionary types, the true 
Church was wherever rightly baptized believers were gathered.340 The Anabaptists’ 
Schleitheim Confession, adopted by the Swiss in 1527, confessed “one body of Christ, 
which is the church of God.” Members of the Church were united by their baptism.341  
Over subsequent centuries, the ongoing fragmentation of Protestants created less 
of an interest in identifying the true Church. If the Church was no longer needed to 
rightly interpret Scripture, then attention was required elsewhere. Over time, the least 
complicated way of addressing ecclesiology was to simply claim that the Church was 
invisible, comprised of genuine individual believers. Increasingly, an organized Church 
was seen as ancillary. It was not essential to the gospel or biblical interpretation. 
The sixteenth-century Reformation gave rise to forms of Biblicism that 
fundamentally challenged the axiomatic relationship between Church and Bible. By 
rejecting the ordained Catholic episcopate, the Reformers and their successors ultimately 
set biblical theology over against Church and Tradition. Through philology, the center of 
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biblical interpretation was found moving towards the university. The spiritualist response 
to this movement also sought to establish itself in the text of the Bible apart from a 
bishop-led Church. At various moments and in assorted degrees, the two emphases 
collided. The effects of Biblicism may not have been apparent to the early Reformers, but 
the outcome of this intellectual shift eventually contributed to the secularization of 
biblical studies, the privatization of faith, and the fragmentation of Christian 
congregations. A perennial opposition between Church and Scripture was promoted 
which would later escalate within American evangelicalism. By the time American 
evangelicals dealt with biblical modernity, Scripture commonly was set against not only 
Church and Tradition, but heartfelt religion as well.  
Enlightenment Demystification 
Long standing assumptions regarding the positive relationship between Church 
and Scripture changed during the Reformation. Nevertheless, an equally severe 
modification advanced during the Enlightenment. Increasingly, the Scriptures were 
analyzed without regard to traditional interpretations. In fact, exegetical analyses 
influenced by faith were increasingly dismissed by some scholars. As the integrity of the 
Bible was scrutinized, some Christians feared that immutable dogmatic truths were being 
changed. Beyond that, the possibility of divine revelation was disputed, which 
fundamentally jeopardized several Christian convictions. To some, not only had the 
Church been shelved, but now the Bible and revelation were disputed; religious faith was 
put aside as an obstacle to biblical exegesis.  
It is essential for present day evangelicals to understand the Enlightenment’s 
effect on some of their own hermeneutical models. A noticeable extension of the 
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Reformation took place in Protestant exegesis during the Enlightenment. On one hand, 
emphases on sola scriptura can be said to have benefitted understanding the text of 
Scripture through scholarly advances. On the other hand, the results of non-ecclesial 
biblical studies appeared to have jeopardized the credibility of external revelation and 
threatened traditional dogmatic faith.  
Various commentators attempt to furnish an explanation of the break between 
faith and modernity related to the Enlightenment. David Bentley Hart, for example, 
argues that an ethos of nihilism became the dominant cultural value since the 
Enlightenment.342 Ultimately, Western culture rejected any idea of truth sourced beyond 
the individual or his world. When the individual was set free from subservience to creeds 
and “religious fantasy,” the locus of liberty was found in a person’s power of choice 
rather than the ends he chose.343 Hart sees the dominant nihilism of the Enlightenment as 
the inevitable consequence of Christianity “leaving” Western Europe. Once Christianity 
was removed from its central location of influence, nothing remained after the 
Enlightenment but “bare will.”344 Brad Gregory points directly to the Reformation. He 
argues that modern open-ended pluralism began with the Reformation’s rejection of the 
Catholic Church. Gregory argues that the Reformers’ departure from Catholicism was 
mostly caused by reaction against perceived “faulty doctrines;”345 the corrupt leadership 
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within the Catholic Church was only a secondary cause of the Reformation. In response 
to Rome’s illegitimate additions to Scripture, the Reformers’ teaching of Sola Scriptura 
called for adherence to a Bible separated from Christian Tradition. However, Protestants 
were unable to reach doctrinal accord via Scripture alone, leading many to look for an 
arbiter more certain than Scripture. For many, universal reason became a surer bet. The 
integrity of the Scriptures was severely disputed, and many became convinced that 
revealed religion was irrational and fueled by fear.346 To Gregory, confidence in a self-
interpreting Bible failed to create doctrinal cohesion among Protestants; it produced 
hyper-pluralism and finally made belief relative. It has ended in “dismal failure.” Michael 
Buckley blames Christians in general for the original hostility between faith and the 
modern world. He argues that many within the Enlightenment were not fundamentally 
opposed to religion; the rise of Deism demonstrates a propensity towards religion in a 
new form, not its abandonment.347 In addition, barely a few relished the label of atheist 
prior to recent times; only a small number wanted to be identified as complete non-
believers.348 Instead of flatly blaming the world for its own unbelief, Buckley argues that 
the Church, specifically the Catholic Church, was part of the problem. As an example, 
theologians presented the nature of Christ, but fell short of casting the “fundamental 
reality of Jesus embodied in human history.”349 The Church’s lack of emphasis on the 
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mystagogy of experience was countered by Deism’s sensitivity to oneself and his 
surroundings.350 Natural religion provided new criteria which was consistent with the real 
world. It critiqued confessional religion, and its conclusions could be made without 
appeal to the Church. A number of people became convinced that natural religion had 
achieved superior religious expressions. Conversely, Christopher Hitchens saw the 
modern development of atheism since the Enlightenment as a “necessary” but 
“insufficient” stage in the development of the human species.351 The Age of 
Enlightenment helped expose “the man-made origins of faith and its reliance upon 
superstition.” “We are very fortunate” to have the thoughts of modern pioneers of 
intellectual liberation such as David Hume.352 However, the advances of the 
Enlightenment are the achievements of a child; the species has much further to develop 
prior to full emancipation. 
Conversation continues over why revealed religion had such a shaky rapport with 
the modern world. This dissertation’s purpose is to simply display that a disruption 
occurred which affected biblical interpretation; it is hesitant to furnish a solitary reason 
for the complex rupture. However, the loss of ecclesiology is put forward to evangelicals 
in this work as part of the problem. To this reader, some Reformers had removed the 
lampstand of the Church “from its place,”353 and “put it under a basket;”354 now, the age-
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old question, “Did God actually say?”355 was revived. Regardless of what created the 
assumption that faith no longer had much to say about biblical interpretation, its impact 
on hermeneutics is noticeable. The move away from the inspiration of the biblical text 
was a step further from Luther’s and other Reformers’ Biblicism. The challenges of the 
Enlightenment left many Christians trying to explain their world without recourse to 
divine governance. People were troubled with honest questions. What level of integrity 
existed in the sacred text, and was revelation even possible? The modern challenges were 
exacerbated by the fact that many of those who disputed Christianity’s cherished beliefs 
were from inside the community of faith. The enemy had infiltrated the camp!  
Although multiple social, economic, and political realities contributed to the 
respective Catholic and Protestant struggles with interpreting Scripture in the light of 
modernity, two broad developments are noteworthy: developments in the natural sciences 
and related developments in epistemology. Progress within these two broad fields of 
knowledge appreciably influenced modern developments in biblical interpretation. 
Scientific Analysis of the Text 
Francis Bacon  
Francis Bacon (1561–1626) exemplifies some of the intellectual advances 
occurring in the natural sciences around the time of the Enlightenment.356 He is important 
to this dissertation because several evangelicals throughout American history, up to the 
present day, have attempted to appropriate aspects of his scientific methods for biblical 
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exegesis. Although Bacon does not exemplify all scientific endeavors that were taking 
place, he does typify some of the most foundational and subsequently influential 
achievements of his time. A growing confidence that the world could be rationally 
analyzed apart from commonly held assumptions if one had the correct scientific tools 
was becoming evident. Bacon perceived that an epistemological shift was needed in order 
for the natural sciences to advance. In time, the “new” logic which he thought was 
needed for science was applied by others to different fields of study, such as scriptural 
interpretation. 
Francis Bacon, in his New Organon, sought to get beyond Aristotelian logic, 
which was based on syllogisms and used inferential logic to draw its conclusions.357 
Bacon sought to investigate the premises that the current Aristotelian science took for 
granted. He critiqued the “common logic” of his day as “harmful” and “not useful” 
because it attempted to solve problems without addressing its own “common notions.”358 
Investigators into the truth of the world had hitherto made their discoveries fit nicely into 
collective presumptions, but had failed to investigate those notions and axioms 
themselves.359 Bacon identified four “illusions” in his day that “block men’s minds” and 
serve as idols. Idols of the Tribe are in human nature, which result in overstating 
observances. People extend their opinion about what they experience, thus distorting 
reality. Idols of the Cave are individual distortions of scientific data. The human mind is 
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analogous to a cave with multiple roaming thoughts and temperaments. During the 
interpretation of data, people shade their findings according to their own dispositions. 
Idols of the Marketplace reflect the common usage of words without considering their 
meanings. The use of unreflective language distorts the data. Idols of the Theatre are false 
ideas that nonetheless are assumed by scholars and believed in by the masses. These are 
false paradigmatic structures that go unquestioned, yet govern popular conclusions.360 
Bacon argued for a deliberate suspension of commonly held assumptions followed by a 
painstaking analysis of raw nature, and limiting conclusions to the results of inductive 
research.  
 After establishing how humanity can remove the clutter in its intellectual cave, 
Bacon sought to link his new epistemology to ethics and religion. Despite Bacon’s 
emphasis on inductive analysis, he was not opposed to revealed religion; he did not 
instruct his moral sage to disregard divine revelation. Instead, Bacon’s investigator 
needed to critically get behind the theological assumptions of the day, scientifically 
analyze the raw facts of revelation, and then inductively come to conclusions.361 In New 
Atlantis, Bacon’s utopian society was built upon those who were astutely “dedicated to 
study the works and creatures of God.” The noble society on the island was named 
“Salomon’s House” or the “College of the Six Days Works.” These names were given to 
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signify the honorable purpose of “finding out the true nature of things, whereby God 
might have the more glory in the workmanship of them.”362 
Bacon’s inductive research significantly influenced others, including Isaac 
Newton. Akin to Bacon’s shift away from sapient understanding to useful knowledge, 
Newton accentuated the need to acutely study efficient causes, or how things worked, in 
order to understand an object. This was a significant shift of emphasis from analyzing 
final causes, or why things do what they do. Newton’s theory of universal gravitation and 
three laws of motion explained in lucid terms how the universe functioned.363 His system 
stimulated the Enlightenment’s conception of nature as an orderly domain governed by 
strict mathematical laws, and it bolstered optimism in human ability to ascertain those 
laws. However, neither did Newton deny the divine source of nature and its laws. He 
wrote several works of theology and believed that the Bible was a revelation from God. 
He was fascinated with biblical prophecy and is well known for predicting the end of the 
world in the twenty-first century. Although Bacon and Newton did not categorically ban 
the idea of God from the study of nature, other scientists did. In time, the growing 
emphasis on inductive scientific research affected biblical interpretation. The biblical text 
was studied on its own just as nature was analyzed. The modern era was removing the 
obstacles purportedly caused by institutional religion and giving direct access to religious 
texts. For some, scientific analysis of Scripture, apart from religious stimulus, became the 
primary way to ascertain the text’s meaning. Hans Frei notes that a noticeable rupture 
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between the biblical text and its presumed historic reference can be detected in the 
seventeenth century, specifically in the work of Jewish philosopher Baruch Spinoza.364 
Baruch Spinoza 
Although Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677) was Jewish, he is important to this study 
on Christian exegesis of Scripture for two reasons. First, his ideas greatly influenced 
Christian biblical studies long after his works were published. Second, Spinoza provides 
an illustration of the increased emphasis on studying the text alone.  
For Spinoza, not only was the synagogue and Church excluded from interpretive 
authority, but traditional faith itself needed to be muted before the text. Like the 
Protestants of his day, with whom he had acquaintance while living in Amsterdam, 
Spinoza taught that in order to “bear unprejudiced witness” to the contents of Scripture, 
one must limit himself to the biblical text. “Our knowledge of Scripture must then be 
looked for in Scripture only.”365 No other principles or data can be utilized to understand 
Scripture other than its own. In order to accomplish such a competent survey, the exegete 
must place the text and its author within their proper historical horizons. This included a 
thorough knowledge of the original languages in which the Scriptures were written and 
their authors spoke, an analysis of each text and the arrangement of its contents, and the 
environment of the author. The milieu of the author included his identity, the occasion for 
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writing, his audience, and how each book came to be accepted as sacred.366 Spinoza laid 
out principles of biblical exegesis that would be fine-tuned over the next two centuries. 
His focus on text alone allowed him to detect internal inconsistencies, identify redactions, 
and raise questions of authorship. His antipathy towards intolerant religious institutions, 
whether Jewish or Christian, allowed him the freedom to gather empirical data from the 
text, not from religious claims he thought were superimposed on the text.  
Spinoza considered his hermeneutic to be analogous to scientific investigations of 
the world. “The method of interpreting Scripture does not widely differ from the method 
of interpreting Nature—in fact, it is almost the same.”367 Spinoza argued that nature 
operated within an orderly, inviolable course as a necessary result of God’s attributes. 
Scripture was a product of nature, and needed to be studied in the same fashion as the 
natural world. Faith-based presumptions, derived from dogmatic assertions, needed to be 
discarded. Spinoza’s hermeneutic was circular to a degree.368 The parts of the biblical 
text were analyzed on a micro level in order to get to an image of the whole; then, the 
larger whole was studied to better understand the parts. The understanding of one 
conditioned the knowledge of the other. If the meaning of a passage was difficult to 
grasp, then history and grammar were employed for assistance. Spinoza’s method, 
aspects of which are present in contemporary evangelicalism, further elevated the role of 
history and grammar in biblical exegesis.  
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For Spinoza, Scripture was not a unique revelation, and a religious assembly was 
not needed to discern its contents. Spinoza asserted that the message of Christian and 
Jewish Scriptures was universal and not dependent on the text; it was discoverable 
outside of the Bible. Actually, the Bible was written to show people that they do not need 
a Bible; they could autonomously get at the content of the message of Scripture, the 
Golden Rule, by investigating their own natures. He based his assertion on an analogy of 
the human being. The Scriptures were a product of human nature. Therefore, God’s 
“Divine Law” was “universal and common to all” because it issued from “universal 
human nature.”369 The knowledge of God’s nature, his provision for creatures, and “true 
moral doctrines,”370 specifically the Golden Rule, were discoverable without a biblical 
text. “The highest power of Scriptural interpretation belongs to every man;”371 therefore, 
the message of Scripture does not require ecclesiastical warrant; it “can be easily 
understood in any language.”372  
For Spinoza, the Scriptures were unreasonably revered by religious leaders who 
wanted to control others. They compelled others to think as they did “under the guise of 
religion.”373 These men only wanted to “hawk their commentaries,” but were afraid of 
being shown their own exegetical errors. Both the churches and the synagogues 
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misunderstood the nature of Scripture. The essence of true religion was to love God and 
neighbor; all else was superfluous. 
 Spinoza’s separation between the literal text and its actual meaning was possibly 
more severe than found among his Protestant acquaintances. For Spinoza, Scripture does 
not explain things by their “natural causes,” but it narrates what appeals to the human 
imagination, especially in the unlearned. The Scriptures aim to excite wonder, and 
eventually lead people to the devotion of loving God and neighbor.374 For Spinoza, it can 
be said that revelation was a good imagination; revelation was not God demonstrating 
what was previously unknowable. Whatever is referred to as miraculous in Scripture is 
written so to stir human passions towards piety, not to relay dogma. Regardless of the 
miraculous claims in a text, what occurred, only “happened naturally.”375 The real subject 
matter of the narratives, for Spinoza, was not the events they narrated, but the religious 
lessons they conveyed. And those lessons were separable from the text! The meaning of 
Scripture did not lie in historic truth376 because history was impotent to “give us the 
knowledge and love of God.”377 After noting internal anomalies within the Pentateuch, 
Spinoza claimed it could not have been written by Moses. The preface to Deuteronomy, 
for example, was written by someone who crossed the Jordan, which Moses never did. 
Phrases such as, “And Moses wrote,” or “And Moses died,” could not have been written 
by the referent. Genesis 22:14 refers to Moriah as “the mount of the LORD;” yet, it did 
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not receive that appellation until after Solomon’s Temple.378 Spinoza was expelled from 
his local Synagogue, and it is generally suspected that his exegetical conclusions were 
partially responsible.  
 After Spinoza, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the divide between the 
subject matter of the sacred text and the narrative itself would become even more 
pronounced.379 A developing tradition was budding, which “combined liberation from 
biblical orthodoxy with a lively sense for the Bible as a valuable source of religious 
insight.”380 A new, fresh approach to Scripture was developing. Some thought that it 
offered opportunities to support traditional dogma. Others were quite contrary in their 
conclusions. 
Hermann Samuel Reimarus 
 As the sciences of literary criticism were developing, Hermann Samuel Reimarus 
(1694–1768) provided one of the more scathing criticisms of Christian Scripture. After 
Reimarus’ death, Gotthold Lessing published Fragmentenstreit;381 others followed with 
additional posthumous fragments, which showed that Reimarus had distanced himself 
from even the most liberal scholarship of his day. Significantly, some of the working 
assumptions of Reimarus were also held by his traditional opponents; on all sides of the 
debate, ecclesiastical interpretations were given little warrant.  
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Reimarus demonstrates a shift towards an increased critical analysis of the 
biblical text, and devaluation of claims of revelation. Reimarus taught that people should 
not rely on revealed religion. For Reimarus, a person could gain sufficient knowledge of 
God and data for ethical living by studying nature. Scripture was not needed. In fact, 
Scripture contained fraud. Reimarus did acknowledge that Jesus “referred men to the true 
and great purpose of any religion …an eternal blessedness;”382 however, for Reimarus, 
these references only conveyed part of the gospel story. Reimarus emphatically denied 
that Jesus came to teach any new mysteries or articles of faith. Like any religious teacher, 
Jesus’ “intention” was “directed toward a change of mind, toward sincere love of God 
and the neighbor.”383 Jesus’ objectives did not include worship of himself as the Son of 
God or a claim of being the cause of spiritual salvation.  
It is noteworthy that Reimarus claimed to base his negative conclusions about the 
Scriptures almost exclusively on the Scriptures and their surrounding history. Reimarus’ 
method was to study the Bible using the Bible.384 By centralizing the text of the Bible in 
his critique, Reimarus demonstrated a negative offshoot of the Reformers’ sola scriptura. 
For example, in order to argue that Jesus was not unique, Reimarus noted that many 
people in the Scriptures who were deemed close to God were similarly called Son, such 
as Solomon. Reimarus analyzed the temptation of Christ, where Satan says, “If you are 
the Son of God…,” and demonstrated that the conditional structure of the sentence 
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suggested the term Son was not unique to Jesus. Reimarus returned to the Pentateuch and 
Psalms from where Jesus responded to Satan, and demonstrated how “sons” are simply 
those loved by God, and nothing more; they were the ones God feeds, protects, and 
warns. The doctrine of Jesus as divine Son, given in the New Testament, represented the 
“new doctrine,” or “doctrinal reconstruction” of the Apostles.385 In other words, the 
apostles deceived their readers. Paul, too, was in on the deception. 
Reimarus’ method of “reading the gospels by itself”386 informed him that Jesus 
never spoke of a suffering savior. History, Reimarus argued, shows no proof that early 
Jews expected anything but a secular deliverance. Jesus, therefore, never intended to 
bring a spiritual salvation, and especially not one through suffering; salvation based on a 
suffering savior was never in Jesus’ mind. Otherwise, the disciples would not have been 
shocked at the death and resurrection of Christ. Instead, the shouts of Hosanna show that 
Jesus expected a secular salvation, a hope which was disappointed in the end. Jesus had 
miscalculated his opportunity, and he also suffered from the demise of the Baptist, whose 
support was desperately needed in the end.387 The entire traditional message of a 
suffering Savior, who is resurrected from the dead, and will return a second time, was 
categorically “invented and false.”388 Again, Reimarus appeals to the text alone to make 
his point. He notices that Matthew’s account of the guards is neglected by the other three 
gospels, the various gospel accounts differ at key points, and the New Testament’s 
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exegesis of the Old is invalid because it inserts meaning into the Old which was not 
meant to be taken as prophecy.  
Reimarus’ treatment of miracles anticipates later critical study in the pursuit of the 
real historical Jesus. For Reimarus, none of the miracles explain away the dubious fraud 
of the Apostles, or their poor exegesis of the Old Testament. Rather, “experienced” 
literary readers should “easily understand” that the miraculous stories covered up “their 
pretended honesty and piety.”389 The Apostles’ fabricated stories are intentionally 
ambiguous and meant to distract from what’s really going on. They are indications of 
falsehood, and are ultimately “useless” at getting at the real story. For this reason, an 
astute student of the historical Jesus will necessarily dismiss accounts of miracles as 
reliable informants. 
 Reimarus’ views were contradictory and even shocking to most scholarship of the 
day. He suggested deliberate dishonesty, not just in the current ecclesiastical leaders in 
Germany, but in the Apostles themselves. However, he claimed to restrict his research to 
the Scripture and its immediate history. His works, several of which were published 
posthumously by Lessing, created a torrent in critical biblical studies that persists to the 
present.390  
 Reimarus’ works received sharp rebuke from many eighteenth-century scholars, 
including Johann Salomo Semler. However, Semler, in his rebuttal of Reimarus, 
employed similar methods as his opponent. Semler argued from the Scripture and reason 
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that the Apostles correctly perceived prophetic messages in Old Testament passages. 
From the teachings of Jesus, it was clear that Jesus spoke of a spiritual salvation. He also 
attacked Reimarus for his poor history, arguing that Jewish Rabbi’s indeed hoped for a 
spiritual salvation from the Messiah.391  
Both the methods of Reimarus and his opponents exhibit developing assumptions 
regarding biblical interpretation: attention must primarily be given to the text itself; one 
must become familiar with the grammar and history behind the text; the true meaning of 
the text might lie separately behind the text; the veracity of the text cannot be assumed 
but must prove itself; accounts of miracles might be cause of suspicion, but never 
elucidation of revelation; the traditional teachers of Christianity may have missed, or hid, 
the point that the ultimate purpose of the Bible is ethical, not dogmatic. Even more 
traditional interpreters, like Semler, similarly gave greater attention to the bare text of the 
Bible. This approach often left the Church outside of the exegetical conversation.  
David Friedrich Strauss  
When David Friedrich Strauss (1808–1874) wrote Das Leben Jesu in 1835, it 
represented an epochal “crisis in theology at which doubts and critical objections of 
centuries as to the credibility of the Bible narratives” had swept away all “orthodox 
apologetics” with “destructive” force.392 The “critical process” culminating in Strauss’s 
text was “latent from the beginning in the lifeblood of Protestantism.” The purification 
process to which the Reformers long before subjected the Catholic Church was now 
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being applied to the biblical text. 393 Specifically, the doctrine of inspiration had 
“restrained” critical research of Scripture up until this interval. However, by the time of 
Strauss several other scholars were already expressing doubts over the integrity of the 
Bible. The significance of Strauss’s work was the “thoroughness” with which he 
critically addressed “every section” of the gospels. In his attempt at purification, he left 
nothing untouched.394 Strauss raised questions in his critical work that he perceived were 
inevitable and necessary. He sought to expose the mythical origins of Christianity, 
something he was convinced had largely been ignored.395  
Strauss entered the tension between two groups and provided “a new mode of 
considering the life of Jesus.”396 On one hand, “naturalists” critiqued the Bible by 
emphasizing the errors of biblical authors. Miracles were a violation of natural laws; 
biblical accounts containing the miraculous should be discarded. Deists and other 
rationalists interpreted the Scripture with the assumption that the essential meaning of the 
text was sourced in reason. The exegete must extract the moral lesson from each story; he 
should not concern himself with faith in the miraculous or the dogmatic claims of the 
text. Often, naturalistic explanations were available behind supposed supernatural 
occurrences. Strauss applauded the rationalists’ rejection of miracles, but chided them for 
“tenaciously” holding onto the history of the accounts.397 Their critique did not go deep 
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enough. On the other hand, the “supernaturalists” asserted the literal and historical 
truthfulness of every story in the Bible, and they expressed little regard for natural laws 
or real history. They were closed-minded, which opened them to exaggeration. They 
responded to the naturalists by insisting that some elements of the faith were given; some 
aspects of the Christian faith needed to be accepted as lying beyond human reason. 
Strauss reproached the supernaturalists because of their uncritical analysis of the Bible. 
Their “exaggerated spirit” was seeking to restore pristine faith “by the aid of a mystical 
philosophy.”398  
Strauss’s response to the tension between naturalists and supernaturalists was a 
new hermeneutic which functioned in a Hegelian structure of thought, and served as a 
mythical interpretation of the gospels. The real Jesus of history needed to be extracted 
from the mythical Christ of faith. Myth, for Strauss, was the presentation of an 
imaginative event in historical terms. For Strauss, the miracles of Scripture never 
occurred, and neither did some of the history. Instead, they were constructive responses 
by a community to its particular needs. While Strauss refused to claim that the entire 
gospel was a myth, he did argue that the entire gospel had mythical elements. In Das 
Leben Jesu, Strauss sought to subject the entire gospel narrative to critical examination in 
order to disentangle the real Jesus of history.  
For Strauss, Christianity and Judaism had central elements which were common 
to all faiths; it was in the particulars that they differed, and the myths were located in 
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those particulars.399 A narrative could be identified as mythical if the “narration is 
irreconcilable with known and universal laws,” or it is inconsistent with itself or related 
narratives.400 Strauss knew that the “assertion that the Bible contains myth … is directly 
opposed to the convictions of the believing Christian.”401 However, he claimed that 
contemporary opposition to his mythical exegesis of Scripture was unnecessary; defiance 
simply revealed “the limitation of the individual to that form of belief in which he has 
been educated.”402 Not only did the miraculous stories in the gospels never actually 
occur, but Jesus was not truly divine. The early Church, even Jesus himself, incorporated 
Jewish messianic ideas to imaginatively create the impression of a divine savior. 
Strauss’s conclusions unsettled many. Unchanging dogma was being jeopardized!  
In his work, Strauss employed a Hegelian dialectical method to get to his 
exegetical conclusions. He examined each biblical pericope in great detail, and then 
expounded traditional ways of interpreting the biblical text, often first giving the views of 
supernaturalists. He then rejoined with the rational explanation of the pericope, listing its 
several supporters and their natural law arguments. He pit one view against another, and 
then sought to resolve the tension with his third way, a mythical interpretative synthesis. 
His exegesis of Luke’s account of the Angel Gabriel announcing the coming birth of the 
Baptist provides an example of his method. First, Strauss reminded his readers of the 
miraculous appearance of Gabriel to old Zacharias, the angel’s prophetic declaration, and 
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Zacharias’s unbelief and subsequent judgment of lost speech. Strauss cited several 
problematic questions scholars had raised about the pericope’s supernatural claims, 
including external and internal inconsistencies with the story.403 Second, Strauss provided 
common rationalistic explanations of the account that fit into natural laws. To Strauss, 
rationalists only “retain two leading facts: the apparition and the dumbness.”404 The 
miraculous apparition is explained by rationalists as another person arriving unexpectedly 
in a poorly lit dusty room of the Temple. The temporal dumbness was due to Zacharias’s 
frail age and the shock of seeing an apparition. Third, Strauss critiques these and several 
other conjectures about what really happened. In presenting his mythical view, Strauss 
rejects the entire history of the annunciation; the only “positive matter of fact” in the 
account is the “impression made by John the Baptist, by virtue of his ministry and his 
relation to Jesus.”405 The adult Baptist impacted the lives of people so profoundly that his 
admirers, in line with classic myth-makers, went back and created imaginative tales about 
his birth. Strauss comprehensively continues this dialectical reasoning throughout the 
entire gospel story. His most unsettling proposition was that Jesus was not divine.  
For Strauss, the accounts of miracles in Jesus’ ministry were not historical, but 
they satisfied Jewish expectations of the coming Messiah.406 The term Son of God was 
interchangeable with Son of Man and Christ; it was a term that pagans often used when 
describing their great heroes. Christians had imaginatively turned it into a unique 
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appellation of Jesus. The author of John’s Gospel displays inconsistency with the 
Synoptic authors by reserving the term for a reference to deity. John’s author is also 
inconsistent with himself by suggesting a distinction of terms that were always 
synonymous. John’s imagination helped create the divine reference in the term.407 Strauss 
detects the mythical nature of the resurrection of Jesus by the inconsistencies between the 
gospels regarding who went to the tomb and when, what was spoken at the tomb, and the 
disappearance and reappearance of the angels.408 The stories were not harmonious as 
supernaturalists claimed. Neither were the multiple attempts of rationalists to explain 
what really happened according to natural law. Strauss reckoned it “correct discernment” 
by his exegete to reject the historicity of the narrative, and “recognize the forms of 
popular Jewish conceptions by which the primitive Christian tradition held it necessary to 
glorify the resurrection of its Messiah; a recognition which at once solves in the most 
simple manner the differences.”409 Christian imagination, sourced in the influence of 
Jesus and Jewish expectations for a Messiah, had created the myth of Jesus’ resurrection. 
Strauss’s attempt to distinguish real history from mythical narrative is seen in his 
apology for Reimarus. Reflecting on eighteenth-century biblical scholarship, Strauss 
argued that while Reimarus and others were admirably critical towards Christianity, they 
were overly harsh in their criticisms. Further, they themselves assumed the historicity of 
biblical accounts; they did not sufficiently diagnose their own assumptions or the 
possibility of mythical constructions. On one hand, they had rightly spotted specific 
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“prejudices” which unjustly favored Christianity and wrongly ruled mankind for 
centuries.410 They correctly identified false assumptions which the churches demanded 
the faithful to accept. On the other hand, they were still beholden to the presupposition 
that history could not be extracted from the narrative. For Reimarus, if a story contained a 
miracle, such as the Law given at Sinai, then it needed to be either accepted or rejected in 
one piece; the miracle could not be separated from the history. This led Reimarus and 
other eighteenth scholars to severely degrade Christianity and claim it was built on 
deception.411 Strauss sought a more “conciliatory” explanation. Christianity was not a 
divine revelation as the churches claimed, but neither was it simply deception. Moses was 
not a miracle worker, but neither was he a charlatan.412 Strauss used his own 
understanding of myth as a hermeneutical tool to resolve the tension. 
Although Strauss’s dialectical work is considered quite flawed by some modern 
standards of biblical criticism, the historical significance of his work is noteworthy for 
evangelicals. In his writings, Strauss captured the “spirit” of his age, the “purifying 
influence” of biblical analysis.413 Using grammar, history, and Hegelian philosophy, he 
refuted the traditional interpretations of Scripture. He complimented rationalists for their 
rejection of divine revelation and their attempts to purify biblical interpretation; but, he 
also repudiated them for not going far enough. For Strauss, the history of the entire Bible 
was largely false, and needed to be explained in a new way. In Strauss, it can be seen that 
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the purification process begun in the Reformation had moved beyond the Church to the 
Bible.  
It appears to this reader that several biblical exegetes followed a trajectory which 
had been partially set in motion by the Reformers. During the Reformation, some 
concluded that apparent corruptions in the Catholic Church completely antiquated an 
ecclesial reading of Scripture. Around the time of the Enlightenment, advanced literary 
skills led others to suggest the Bible itself had elements that were “invented and false.” 
These vociferous critics became obvious targets for the orthodox, but the orthodox often 
used the same approach of sola scriptura to combat their opponents.  
Ironically, Protestants’ intense focus on the text alone appears to have restricted 
their resources. The Reformers’ disdain for ecclesial influence had long kept the Catholic 
Church outside of the game. Then, scholars circumvented interpretations governed by 
faith. In time, particular biblical studies even discounted the text itself. In light of this 
trajectory of contraction, modern evangelicals should give serious consideration to the 
limits of studying the text alone. Further, they should consider the possibility that an 
ecclesial exegesis can be intellectually rigorous, and actually open up the full sense of 
Scripture. 
Epistemological Developments 
In addition to developments in literary analysis, progress in human epistemology 
affected biblical hermeneutics. Honest epistemological questions shook up dogmatism in 
both philosophy and religion. The relationship between faith, knowledge, and the modern 
world needed to be revisited and refined. If one takes Descartes’ Meditations literally, he 
learns that the mathematician locked himself in a room for the purpose of meditating on 
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existence. His object was to discover an absolutely reliable foundation of knowledge to 
refute radical skepticism. Descartes was dissatisfied with the scholastic idea that the 
truthfulness of a proposition was based on sensation. For Descartes, the human senses 
were liable to being deceived. He replaced the uncertain basis of sense knowledge with 
the clear and certain knowledge derived from ideas. Although several critiqued 
Descartes, he helped progress a candid attempt to establish certitude apart from the 
purported dubious system of arid, traditional scholasticism. After Descartes, many 
thinkers began to wonder if faith and revelation even had a meaningful place in the 
processes of human understanding. By the end of the eighteenth century, the point of 
tension had long since moved away from debating if the Catholic Church was still the 
guardian of the truth of the gospel, or even if the Bible was the sole authority of the 
divine voice. Increasing focus was directed towards the human capacity to perceive 
divine verities at all. 414  
Following are three brief examples of epistemological developments during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that significantly influenced biblical hermeneutics: 
rational Deism, the empirical skepticism of Hume, and the attempted synthesis of Kant. 
These three illustrations do not capture all the philosophical developments of the era and 
may neglect equally important advances; however, they sufficiently demonstrate the 
growing assumption that a severe rift existed between faith and human cognition. 
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Significant voices challenged the assumption that the human mind could receive divine 
revelation. This appeared to jeopardize orthodox Christianity’s foundation. The 
predicament for the Christian faithful was worsened by the fact that several constructors 
of the new epistemologies were from within the Christian fold. More than a few of the 
leading Enlightenment thinkers were from Protestant homes. 
Rational Deism  
The supposed universal nature of reason made it appealing as an ultimate criterion 
of religious truth claims. Reason was protected from sensory distortion, thus making its 
conclusions reliable. It was both the source of knowledge and a litmus test for religious 
claims. For the Christian rationalist, reason was a gift from the Creator and ultimately 
could not contradict the revelation of God. Although some Christian rationalists may 
have believed in miracles and prophetic revelation, as well as other truths beyond reason, 
those divine events were not considered conclusive in themselves. It was reason that 
finally verified truth to the human mind. A broad spectrum of people, from confessing 
Christians to near atheists, utilized rational Deism.415 Deists believed in the existence of a 
supreme divinity, one creator God, but rejected Trinitarian faith. They restricted their 
knowledge of God to what human reasoning determined. The natural world was likened 
to a complex watch, and order in the universe posited God as a watchmaker. However, 
the specific description of that watchmaker was not readily available. 
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Critical differences between Deism and traditional Christianity surface at this 
point. Deism posits a Creator God, but not a sustaining deity. God created a world which 
operated according to natural laws, but then ceased involvement in that world. They 
rejected claims made by Church, Tradition, and Scripture which were supposedly above 
reason. This meant that Deists rejected Christian Trinitarian and soteriological dogmas. 
In regards to exegesis of Scripture, this meant that one could not suppose that God was 
active in a Church, or that revelation was safeguarded through divine offices. The 
constraints of Deism also affected the possibilities of worship. God was to be worshipped 
by ethical living, not dogmatic praise and confession. God gave humans the capacity to 
discern reality, but not an obligation to confess unverifiable formulations. To the Deist, 
natural laws obviously controlled the universe, and doctrinal concerns needed to be 
replaced with a focus on ethical and social issues.416 Little else could be verified 
rationally.  
A seminal Deist text was John Toland’s Christianity: Not Mysterious, wherein he 
contended that religion must “necessarily be reasonable and intelligible.”417 Although 
Toland (1670–1722) personally held to several traditional Christian confessions, 
something his heirs often departed from, he still saw human reason as providing the 
essential support for the Christian religion. Revelation was valuable, not as “a 
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necessitating motive of assent,” but as an informant of truth. For Toland, claims of 
spiritual realities still needed rational “evidence” in order to be believed.418 Any defense 
of revelation must be entirely understandable and clear, and any appeal to mystery had to 
be rejected because it suggested unintelligibility. Nothing was mysterious; even those 
things not yet understood still contained factual information. The gospel, God, his 
attributes, and eternity were not enigmatic; people were simply ignorant of the essences 
of those objects.419 The emphasis on rational clarity within Deism helped raise 
fundamental questions regarding revelation. Was it intelligible to suggest a good God 
would abandon humanity for so long until the time of Christ? Was it reasonable to posit 
that only a few select folk received special understanding of truth? The quest for facticity 
led others to doubt the credibility of not only Christianity, but any religion that claimed to 
be based on the miraculous. Numerous Deists were motivated by skeptics, such as Hume, 
to cleanse Christianity of its dogmatic confessions; they concluded that Christian dogma 
was “the height of unreason.”420  
In their attempts to attain accurate understanding of reality, Deists appear to have 
limited their field of knowledge. To this reader, they unnecessarily shied away from, and 
even misunderstood, Christian mystery. For the medieval Christian, mystery was often 
seen as intelligible; it was knowable, but it was an infinite comprehension. For Aquinas, 
as an example, God was not fully comprehensible; however, the human mind could come 
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to some limited understanding of God by way of analogy.421 Christian elucidation of 
revelation was knowledge of an infinite object. Conversely, Deists denied the possibility 
of knowledge gained by revelation. 
The popularity of Deism is important to evangelicals for its location in the 
trajectory of biblical interpretation. It shows yet another feature in the development of 
biblical exegesis since the Reformation. The Reformation challenged the authority of the 
Catholic Church to interpret the Scriptures; the Radical Reformers and Pietists challenged 
the authority of the Lutheran Church to interpret the Scriptures; particular spiritualists 
posited an antithesis between Word and Spirit; literary critics in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries challenged the reliability of Scripture; rational Deists challenged the 
basic idea of revelation. 
Hume’s Skepticism  
Skepticism developed as a response to rationalists and empiricists.422 Distinct 
from some rationalists, empiricists attempted to test claims to knowledge through 
analysis of sense data. They generally rejected all sorts of innate knowledge or 
information supposedly gained by intuition. Empiricists concluded that the human mind 
does not have the capability to discover the nature of the universe by pure reasoning. 
John Locke (1632–1704) specifically argued that human knowledge is restricted to ideas, 
but ideas that are generated by human experience; there are no innate ideas.423 Locke 
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argued that when knowledge of an object was not possible, one could “achieve 
probability on the basis of experience.”424 For Locke, even internal reflection is 
empirical. Locke argued that religious people rightly have recourse to faith after analysis 
has gone as far as possible. The believer accepts the proposition, which reason cannot 
confirm, based on the “credit of the Proposer.”425 When propositions of faith cannot be 
verified, the human mind is justified believing them based on the experience of the 
trustworthiness of the one giving the revelation. Here, the skeptics objected. 
David Hume (1711–1776) argued that Locke’s probability thesis was untenable. 
He claimed that neither reason nor experience provided a basis for certainty. For Hume, 
humans have certainty of nothing, and must rely on instinct or habit.426 A person who 
observes the contact of billiard balls cannot claim to know what really happened. His 
perception of the experience is all that he has. “The mind can never possibly find the 
effect in the supposed cause.” “It must invent or imagine some event, which it ascribes to 
the object as its effect; and it is plain that this invention must be entirely arbitrary.”427 
Hume argued that although experience is “our only guide in reasoning concerning matters 
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of fact,” that our senses are not “infallible.”428 Human senses convey impressions, not 
true understanding. For Hume, people rightly observe motions, but they unjustly assume 
a law of Cause and Effect. Hume restricted what was accepted to be knowledge. Humans 
only know sensations, not the supposed corresponding realities beyond those sensations. 
Hume’s critique of human knowledge threatened the possibility of any science which 
worked under assumed principles.  
In regards to the Christian faith, Hume undermined the credibility of authoritative 
claims of truth. People could not know if any of their religious experiences were valid. 
All they could testify to was that they possessed sensations. And they certainly could not 
verify if experiences from a bygone era were reliable. The Bible could not be reckoned as 
reliable because it made truth claims based on the ancient, unproven testimonies of 
others. Hume specifically discounted any confidence in a religious tradition, such as 
Christianity, being established on miracles. This was because a supposed miracle cannot 
be verified even if it was witnessed first-hand; only one’s perception could be verified. 
Worse, for Hume, was to trust someone else’s supposed experience with miracles. For 
Hume, human testimony of the miraculous was unreliable for multiple reasons. First, 
insufficient testimony exists for miracles; they generally occur in obscure locations with 
few witnesses. Second, people are dishonest and exaggerate the truth of their perceptions. 
Third, claims of miracles usually occur among uneducated barbarians who know little 
about reality at all. Fourth, all claims of miracles are challenged by someone; no claim is 
undisputed. Every traditional assertion can be countered by another tradition, “resulting 
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in the mutual destruction of belief and authority.”429 The fact that the supposed miracles 
of Christianity happened centuries ago made it impossible to accept them. For Hume, 
religious tradition was unreliable and only an ignorant person believed it. 
Kantian Critique 
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) was deeply disturbed by Hume’s skeptical 
arguments.430 His anxiety was two-fold. He agreed with Hume that rationalism could lead 
to unfounded dogmatism; however, he saw Hume’s skepticism as threatening the 
legitimacy of all science and religion. If empirical science could not justify its own 
existence, and was limited in doing so to its own data, then human understanding, 
whether scientific, ethical, or religious would not be possible. In his epistemology, Kant 
sought to make room for both science and religion. 
Kant argued that both experience and reason were needed for human knowledge. 
He corrected rationalists for thinking their reason could surpass its own limits and speak 
about things they could not know. The topic of supernatural verities is a “realm” where 
“all use of reason ceases.”431 Some objects of knowledge, such as God, immortality, and 
human free will, go beyond sensory awareness; they cannot be known in themselves. 
However, Kant also corrected the empiricist by arguing that human reason was needed to 
process all sensory data. Metaphysical ideas, to Kant, were not necessarily created by our 
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senses. Kant noticed that society successfully practiced science and math assuming the 
veracity of metaphysical realities which Hume claimed they could not know. Kant 
proposed a Copernican revolution to resolve the tension. 
Kant argued that “our cognition” “arises from two basic sources of the mind.” The 
first was the senses, or intuition, which was “our receptivity for impressions.” Similar to 
Hume, Kant argued that whatever comes to the person via his senses is a representation, 
not the thing in itself. A person only knows the sensory impression. The second source of 
knowledge involved “our ability to cognize an object.”432 Here, Kant parted with Hume. 
Kant argued that people do have a priori knowledge. The human mind received 
sensations and impressions, but it had the capability to categorize the sensations in a way 
that “produce presentations to ourselves.”433 Humans understand their sense impressions 
according to already existing concepts in their minds. Kant’s revolutionary epistemology 
called for an active mind. The mind brings something to its experiences; it imposes its 
way of knowing things on the impressions it receives. Human knowledge of metaphysical 
objects, including religious awareness, is possible because the human mind determines it. 
The thinking subject’s mind, not the objects under study, produces that awareness. The 
mind therefore provides the structure for experience.  
Kant’s epistemology sought to make room for valid knowledge without 
permitting it beyond proper parameters; he attempted to synthesize rationality and 
empiricism. An overemphasis on one or the other resulted in a person being unable to 
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think about anything. He memorably wrote, “Thoughts without content are empty; 
intuitions without concepts are blind.”434 Only from “their union” can “cognition 
arise.”435 Kant’s middle ground between empiricism and rationalism enormously affected 
biblical exegesis. 
Kant’s epistemology put strict limits on a person’s ability to know spiritual 
realities through revelation. For Kant, there can be no such thing as real religious 
revelation originating from outside the human being. All knowledge a thinking person 
possesses is contained within himself. Impressions come to a person solely through his 
sensory faculty, and a person organizes his impressions according to the concepts already 
in his own mind. In addition, the diversity of particular religious claims demonstrated to 
Kant that doctrinal dogmatism was presumptuous. If reason was universal, then valid 
religious professions needed to be common to all humanity. Historical religion, such as 
Christianity, was perceived by Kant as a once serviceable shell,436 bearing forward the 
kernel of true religion. The goal of the modern exegete of Scripture was to get at the 
kernel. It is through the process of reasoning that a person and society removes the 
historical shell and uncovers the grain of reason in order to offer the true veneration of 
morality which God desires.437 Dogmatism becomes a yoke of bondage to any 
ecclesiastical body that maintains particular confessions. Doctrinal confessions are 
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cumbrous. Further, “dogmatic faith” appears “dishonest and presumptuous.”438 It is 
“childish” to claim to know the eternity of a person’s destiny based on his life, or to insist 
that one needs to request his sins to be forgiven. For Kant, Christ’s death was exemplary, 
not vicarious. Knowledge of Christian atonement cannot be accessed because such claims 
are beyond the human ability to know. When a church insists on its people adhering to 
what it cannot truly know, then it has “placed a yoke upon the multitude.”439 To Kant, 
people needed “independence from perceived authorities plus the exercise of reason”440 
in order to experience the maturity of the Aufklärung. People need to limit their judgment 
to “regulative principles.”441 Attention needs to be given to practical ethics. For Kant, the 
“ideas” of “God and immortality” were unsupported in speculative, or theoretical, 
reason.442 However, even though “we cannot cognize and have insight into” them, “their 
possibility can and must in this practical reference be assumed even without our 
theoretically cognizing and having insight into them.”443 In other words, God was a 
necessary postulate of practical reason.  
For Kant, the reasonable scribe needed to replace the orthodox priest in the work 
of biblical exegesis because “religion is hidden within and has to do with moral 
disposition.”444 For Kant, the Christian Scriptures themselves indicated that moral faith 
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was genuine religion, and the universal conviction of humanity. For Kant, rational 
religion could provide the proper moral interpretation of “sacred texts,”445 which could be 
empirically verified. In short, people needed to learn how to live, not be taught what 
confessional to recite. Humanity needed to emerge from its “self-imposed immaturity,” 
the “inability to use one’s understanding without guidance from another.”446 Religion 
should not be allowed to weigh people down with the chains of “blind superstition,” that 
“dreadful voice of orthodoxy.”447 Instead, one must adjust his focus towards veneration 
of God through an ethical life.448  
The authors just mentioned are merely representative of inquiry into human 
understanding that moved biblical exegesis beyond post-Reformation debates and toward 
evangelicalism. Many more authors with different ideas are worthy of mention, and those 
touched on certainly had numerous critics. Epistemological theories multiplied and 
matured throughout the modern era. Hermeneutics began to place greater emphasis on the 
author and reader of the text. A deeper comprehension of the function and limits of 
human understanding was needed before the meaning of the biblical text could be known. 
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The limitations placed on a person’s ability to know divine truths needed to chasten his 
dogmatic confession. It was presumed by some that a bishop-led church had been 
exposed as fraudulent; the text of the Bible was tainted; now, revelation itself was 
reduced to one’s imagination. With these obstacles to true religion removed, universal 
ethical maxims frequently became the popular goal of biblical exegesis.  
Conclusion 
 The historic trajectory of Christian hermeneutics is helpful to evangelicals who 
wish to reevaluate how to read the Bible in the present day. Up until the Reformation, an 
axiomatic relationship was generally understood between Church and Scripture; a 
spiritual interpretation of the text was often presumed to be safeguarded by those in 
unbroken succession with Christ and the apostles. Through multiple developments during 
and after the Reformation, Biblicism began to gain a stronghold in Protestant thinking. 
Specifically, Protestants did not consider the Catholic Church as being necessary for 
interpreting Scripture. In time, a conviction grew that any faith, ecclesial or otherwise, 
was a hindrance to gaining a clear understanding of the Bible. New challenges were 
posed by various modern advances in biblical studies, and they affected both Catholic 
and Protestant theologies. Looking forward, both Catholics and Protestants had to 
respond to the influence that human intellectual progress had on biblical exegesis.  
To this reader, the struggle with biblical modernity can trace part of its origin to 
the diminished appreciation for a sacramental Church, a consequence of the Reformation. 
The purpose of a hierarchical Church was disregarded by most exegetes soon after the 
Reformation. Tradition was generally set aside because of its potential for corruption, 
which had been demonstrated in history. By the time of the great increase of Protestant 
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evangelicalism in America, the consequences of long-standing, anti-ecclesial decisions 
began to sprout. 
At this point in history, immediately prior to various full blown crises in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, one needs to pause and consider if the very nature of 
Christian revelation had been incompletely grasped from the start of modernity.449 An 
increasing assumption among several authors of the era was that revelation was either 
something purely objective which could be analyzed by scientific methods, or it was so 
remote from human knowing that the thinking subject could never access it. For some, 
revelation was contained in Scripture alone, but not in the Church; it was in pious 
believers, but not in the Church; it was in special disclosure, but not in the Church. Of 
course, some didn’t think revelation was legitimate at all. There was no revelation, 
especially not in the Church; the Scriptures were flawed, but the Church was severely 
corrupted. Truth may lie in the deep interior wells of human understanding, but the 
external Church was not an able assistant to draw it out. As evangelicalism began to 
develop in America, the sacred function of a hierarchical Church was widely forgotten; 
tacit religious knowledge which flowed from an organic living community was 
obstructed. The growing habit of interpreting Scripture outside of an ecclesiastical setting 
contributed to the secularization of theology. One has to wonder if the ecclesial stones 
that some claimed were obstacles to biblical exegesis and needed to be removed, were 
actually the ancient landmarks the Fathers had set.450 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 AMERICAN PROTESTANT AND EVANGELICAL THEOLOGY: AN 
IMBALANCED PENDULUM 
Introduction 
 This chapter will analyze how biblical modernity was played out in one of 
Protestantism’s most fruitful fields: nineteenth-century American evangelicalism. Four 
major movements will be analyzed: Princeton scholastic theology, revivalism, liberal 
theology, and Mercersburg theology. Although these four movements are not exhaustive, 
they sufficiently demonstrate divergent emphases within evangelical theology during the 
nineteenth century. However, they also exhibit one similarity. Although evangelicalism 
in America was diverse, and each group distinct from the others, they all make evident 
the difficulty of interpreting Scripture in its fullness once sacramental ecclesiology has 
been diminished. Most esteemed Scripture as God’s written Word, but only a few 
regarded Church as necessary to scriptural exegesis. A high number of evangelicals, 
especially those associated with revival movements, had a low ecclesiology. However, 
even high church evangelicals had little regard for other denominations, and less for the 
Catholic Church. While evangelicalism numerically flourished in America, its soil was 
often shallow,1 and polluted with a toxic aversion towards anything ecclesial.  
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The concomitant challenges of biblical modernity alongside a weak ecclesiology 
exacerbated the problems American evangelicals wished would go away. Without an 
ecclesial Tradition, the Bible became the primary framework within which theology was 
accomplished. Defense of divine revelation was often reduced to arguments over the 
inerrancy of the biblical text. Similarly, cheap understandings of sola scriptura recast 
history as a collection of static, random events. The presence of Christ at work in human 
history, the history he concretely entered, was not a viable concept to some theologies. 
Specifically, the ongoing mystical presence of Christ in his Church was often neglected, 
resulting in the Christological dimension of exegesis being diminished. For several 
evangelicals, theology was derived solely from the Bible; the voice of the Spirit among 
the living People of God was muted.2 Further, the disparate evangelical parties were not 
able to establish a single storehouse where their separate ideas could be integrated. In 
regards to scriptural exegesis, multiple interpretations of the sacred text were put forward 
with no mechanism for incorporation of distinct thoughts or reconciliation of differences. 
As a result, a high frequency of fragmentation occurred among evangelical groups over 
biblical interpretation. The back-and-forth debates over whose theology was more 
biblical were left unresolved.  
To this reader, the pendulum of American evangelicalism was imbalanced 
because of its lack of ecclesiology. Looking forward, evangelicals need to attend to the 
reality that unless the erosion of ecclesiology under their feet stops, they will continue to 
stumble due to a lack of equilibrium.  
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Princeton Scholastic Theology 
An analysis of the trajectory of thought developed at Princeton is fundamental to 
understanding Protestant reactions to the inroads of biblical modernism in America. 
Although Princeton theologians were not representative of all of American 
evangelicalism on various theological issues, they operated within a broad consensus 
regarding the sole authority of the Bible, and they directly interacted with all major 
evangelical movements. Their influence remains significant to the present day.  
In many ways, the crisis surrounding modernism in the Presbyterian Church, 
specifically through the experience of Princeton Seminary, served as a prototype of 
similar crises that would soon be replayed in every American denomination. After the 
conflict and deliberations over biblical interpretation at Princeton, heresy trials began to 
occur in every denomination, and multiple schisms led to innumerable new communities 
of faith. Two theologians who best represented Princeton theology were Charles Hodge 
(1797–1878) and Benjamin Breckinridge (B. B.) Warfield (1851–1921). Princeton 
theologians were intellectually among the most capable of the nineteenth century. They 
were astute, well-trained, and had studied abroad.  
 The nineteenth-century theologians at Princeton Seminary responded to the threat 
of biblical modernity by stressing the objective credibility of Christian revelation. Since 
the Scripture was the centerpiece of their faith, they focused their polemics on defending 
the believability of the Bible. For them, revelation was primarily propositional, and found 
in the biblical text. Dogmatic conclusions were deduced from divine statements, which 
meant the text of the Bible needed to be mined for literal statements of truth. Their 
emphasis on the objective nature of revelation appeared to protect them from the growing 
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threat of immanence in theology. In this milieu, doctrinal agreement often became the 
basis of Christian fellowship.  
 Other American evangelicals, while affirming the integrity of the text of 
Scripture, even its inerrancy, complained that Princeton theologians had failed to convey 
the life force of Christianity. For the revivalist, right doctrine was useless without 
personal conversion and heart-felt religion. And for those evangelicals who were 
sensitive to the complexity of growing social needs, a privatized faith based on a literary 
text missed the point of Christianity. A warmer, more practical gospel was needed. For 
Reformed theologians at Mercersburg, Princeton’s theology failed to grasp the 
sacramental reality of Christian faith. One of the challenges in this diverse setting was 
that it was difficult for evangelicals to be self-critical. Intellectual advances in the 
methodologies of biblical studies commonly resulted in exclusive reliance on one-sided 
methods. Specifically, the lack of a unifying thread among American evangelicals 
regarding how to interpret the Bible, which all parties claimed to believe in, often 
resulted in separation from each other.  
Four Aspects of Princeton Theology 
 Despite their various emphases over generations, Princeton theologians 
consistently emphasized four aspects in their theology.3 First, Princeton theology was 
unashamedly Reformed Confessionalism. This was possibly the school’s most significant 
feature. The scientific precision of Calvinism led B. B.  Warfield to call it the “purest 
form of religion.” The Reformation was “the greatest revolution of thought” since 
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Christianity began, and Calvin was its seminal thinker.4 Unlike Luther’s “mystical and 
violent preaching,” Calvin’s production was the work of a “most learned” theologian, a 
labor of “organization and concentration.”5 Calvin brought a “new exegesis,” a “genuine 
exegesis” to the Church, a “sober grammatico-historical method.” His “humanistic 
training” and “acute philological sense,” coupled with “trained skill in the interpretation 
of texts” and “religious comprehension” made him an exegetical master who possibly 
surpassed Augustine, Jerome, Chrysostom, and Cyprian.6 Calvin was a “man of letters” 
who fulfilled his saintly role as a reformer through his “literary labors.”7  
Princeton theologians utilized several Reformed confessions, especially the 
Westminster, to articulate the truths of Scripture. Charles Hodge credited the 
Westminster Confession with having “probably the best definition of God ever penned by 
man.”8 Although the Westminster and other symbols of faith were subordinate to 
Scripture, they were considered sure interpretive guides which were not to be rashly 
revised. Many debates in nineteenth-century Presbyterianism were ignited by suggested 
changes to the Westminster Confession. Princeton theologians were concerned that the 
“historical enunciation”9 of Reformed theology was being compromised in the modern 
era. As an example, the Calvinistic understanding of total depravity and predestination, 
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which excluded any human free moral will, was especially highlighted in the debates 
surrounding the growing threat of revivalism. One of the chief goals of Princeton 
theologians was “calling attention just at this time to the doctrine of predestination as 
expressed in the Reformed creeds,” including the “Westminster Standards.”10 Strict 
confessional adherence to the creeds was a recognizable sign of orthodoxy.  
Second, within its Calvinistic view, the school’s theologians sought to maintain 
the highest view of the Bible’s inspiration and authority. The role of the biblical exegete 
was especially esteemed because the Bible was the locus of revelation. Princeton’s 
scholars used up-to-date tools to refute biblical modernity. While critical advances in 
science and literary analysis led some to doubt the veracity of biblical narratives, 
Princeton used the same developments to defend the reliability of the sacred manuscript.  
Princeton theologians argued that the Bible was inspired by God. Their emphasis 
on the objective aspect of revelation in the text of Scripture naturally led them into 
debates over inerrancy. For Hodge, the Bible was penned by human hands, but it was 
primarily regarded as the Word of God; it was written under “supernatural influence.”11 
The original authors of Scripture were “rendered infallible as teachers.”12 Hodge and 
others at Princeton denied the charge that they believed in mechanical dictation as the 
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method of biblical inspiration. However, they approach such a view very closely. 
Although the words of Scripture were not dictated, the authors were “controlled” in order 
to prevent error in their writings.13 Although God used people “according to their 
natures,” which meant their human faculties were not suspended,14 those people were 
“moved by the Holy Spirit, and their words were his words.”15 Not only were the written 
words of the authors inspired, but so were the very thoughts behind their words; God 
controlled their thinking. Hodge argued that the grammatical meaning of the term “divine 
inspiration”16 was univocal; the only possible meaning of the term could be the common 
meaning which society in the apostolic age attached to the word. “When therefore, the 
sacred writers use the same words and forms of expression which the ancients used to 
convey that idea, they must in all honesty be assumed to mean the same thing.” To 
Hodge, it was assumed in ancient times that “God has access to the human mind and can 
control its operation,” and he did at times take “possession of particular persons as to 
make them organs of his communication.”17 Therefore, when an exegete notices that Paul 
used the same term as an ancient writer when speaking of inspiration, he naturally 
concludes the same term carried the same meaning for both authors.  
With a pastoral concern, Princeton theologians encouraged people to read the 
Bible for themselves in order to come to personal faith. Without doubt, “the Bible is a 
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plain book.” It is “intelligible” for people, who can “read and interpret it for themselves.” 
As a result of his individual investigation, a person’s “faith may rest on the testimony of 
the Scriptures, and not that of the Church.”18 Each person must search the Bible to verify 
the correctness of what the Church teaches him.19 The individual must “pay the greatest 
deference to the faith of the Church” when interpreting the Scripture, but he cannot lazily 
think “that Christ has appointed any officer, or class of officers, in his Church to whose 
interpretation of the Scriptures the people are bound to submit as of final authority.”20 He 
must diligently study the Bible for himself, trusting that the Spirit who wrote the text is 
interpreting it.   
Third, Princeton’s theologians drew heavily upon the philosophy of Scottish 
Common Sense Realism21 and the inductive method of Baconian science in order to 
defend the objective aspect of Christian revelation. Contrary to Hume and Kant, Common 
Sense epistemology buttressed the theologian’s conviction that divine truths were 
knowable. And, Bacon’s scientific method of induction provided the biblical exegete 
with the best method to mine those knowable truths out of the biblical text. Combined, 
these two thought streams provided rational certainty for Princeton’s theologians.  
Princeton College’s own President, John Witherspoon, introduced Scottish 
Common Sense philosophy to America in 1768. Presbyterian philosophers Francis 
Hutcheson (1694–1747) from Ireland and Thomas Reid (1710–1796) from Scotland 
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articulated Common Sense in an effort to respond to skepticism, such as represented by 
David Hume. Reid, in particular, influenced early American evangelical thought. 
Reid argued that all people have a “fixed belief” in an “external material world,” 
and the belief is not gained by “reasoning or education.” Instead, factual sensations, 
“phenomena of human nature,” provided people with certain knowledge of the world. For 
Reid, it was “contrary to philosophy” to begin with hypothetical arguments of ideas and 
then to refute facts from those hypotheses. He likened idealistic extremes, such as 
Hume’s and Descartes’, to a Trojan Horse, beautiful in appearance, but resulting in 
“death and destruction to all science and common sense” once it is let inside the walls.22 
Reid argued that the human mind can directly perceive the reality of the object 
under investigation; the thing in itself could be known. Common Sense, to Reid, did not 
refer to widespread popular opinion, as Kant apparently misunderstood Reid to mean.23 
Rather, it referenced basic principles at work in the process of human reasoning and 
belief formation. In his Essay on Judgment, Reid listed twelve principles of “contingent 
truth.” His first was “the existence of everything of which I am conscious.”24 A person is 
confident in what he perceives because he is built to accept such conclusions. To Reid, 
the skeptic erred when he denied the validity of belief because he failed to analyze human 
constitution. Unwittingly, skepticism itself relies on common sense; the skeptic assumes, 
                                                          
22 Thomas Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind... With an Account of the Life and Writings of the Author 
(Edinburgh: R. Tullis, 1823; PDF e-book), 5:8, 86.  
23 Gordon Graham and Edward N. Zalta, “Scottish Philosophy in the 19th Century,” The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2011, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/scottish-19th/.  
24 Thomas Reid, Essays on the Powers of the Human Mind; to Which Are Added, An Essay on Quantity, 
and An Analysis of Aristotle’s Logic (London: T. Tegg, 1827; PDF e-book), 6:5, 300. Also, cf. Nicholas 
Wolterstorff, The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Reid, ed. Terence Cuneo and René Van Woudenberg 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 77–100. 
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for example, laws of non-contradiction. Even “Mr. Hume, after annihilating body and 
mind, time and space, action and causation, and even his own mind, acknowledges the 
reality of the thoughts, sensations, and passions of which he is conscious.”25 Without 
these common assumptions rooted in human nature, the skeptic would have no footing 
for his views. Human nature “requires us to believe” what is obvious, the commonly held 
“passions and operations of our minds.”26 Reid used pain as an illustration: “When a man 
is conscious of pain, he is certain of its existence.” The authoritative conviction of the 
reality of pain is “immediate and intuitive;” it is not the result of protracted reasoning.27 
Reid helped empower Princeton’s exegetes, who regarded the Bible as the first principle 
of revelation, to confidently claim knowledge of divine truths. Using Reid’s idea of 
Common Sense, they were able to approach Scripture positively with the assumption that 
its truths were fully knowable.  
Francis Bacon provided Princeton exegetes with the scientific method of 
induction, which they used to extricate meaning from the Bible. For Bacon, idols were 
false paradigmatic structures that went unquestioned, yet governed popular conclusions.28 
Bacon’s inductive model proposed a deliberate critique of commonly held assumptions 
followed by painstaking analysis of raw nature, and limiting conclusions to the results of 
                                                          
25 Reid, Powers of the Human Mind, 6:5, 301.  
26 Ibid. Also cf. Gideon Yaffe, Ryan Nichols, and Edward Zalta, “Thomas Reid,” in The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2009, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/reid/.  
27 Reid, Powers of the Human Mind, 6:5, 301.  
28 Francis Bacon, New Organon, Aphorism 39-44: 40-42.  
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arduous research.29 “Our only hope lies in true induction.”30 Bacon saw the need to rid 
science of toxic superstitious assumptions; for Princeton exegetes, theology needed a 
similar purging.  
Princeton’s theologians as well as many other evangelicals confidently used the 
tools of Bacon’s inductive methods for interpreting Scripture.31 Christian theology 
needed to be purged of mysticism,32 Tradition, and anything else which clouded the 
perspicuous meaning of the raw text of the Bible. As a science, theology assumed that 
“all the facts” belonging to its “sphere of truth” were contained in the words of the 
Bible.33 It was the “scientific presentation of all the facts concerning God” interpreted 
from the text of the Bible.34  
                                                          
29 Cf. Jürgen “Francis Bacon,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, section 7: “The Ethical 
Dimension of his thought.”  
30 Bacon, New Organon, Aphorism 14:35.  
31 Cf. Hodge’s introduction to Systematic Theology, 10: “The Bible is to the theologian what nature is to the 
man of science. It is his storehouse of facts; and his method of ascertaining what the Bible teaches, is the 
same as that which the natural philosopher adopts to ascertain what nature teaches.” Also, cf. Paul C. 
Gutjahr, Charles Hodge, Guardian of American Orthodoxy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 354: 
“To answer the skepticism shown by those who no longer thought the mind adequate to understand God’s 
will and character, Hodge turned to Bacon and his scientific method to buttress his long-held inductive 
theological predilections.” Gutjahr also notes the “stunning absence” of any mention of Bacon in Hodge’s 
lectures. Also, cf. Mark A Noll,  American Evangelical Christianity, 157: Noll quotes Leonard Woods Jr. 
as confessing that his own appropriation of the Bible was regulated “by the maxims of Bacon and Newton.” 
Noll also notes that Hodge’s Systematic Theology was the “best known statement” of “scientific biblicism” 
after the Civil War. 
32 Cf. Hodge, Systematic Theology, 4:1-7: 61-103. For Hodge, mysticism causes theology to become the 
“logical analysis, and scientific arrangement and elucidation” of intuition. In the end mysticism strips 
Scripture of its objective authority (Hodge, Systematic Theology, 4:1: 66). 
33 Benjamin B. Warfield, “The Idea of Systematic Theology,” The Presbyterian and Reformed Review 7, 
no. 26 (1896): 246. http://journals.ptsem.edu/id/BR1896726. 
34 Warfield, “The Idea of Systematic Theology,” 258.  
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For Hodge, an inductive hermeneutic operated with three assumptions. First, it 
assumed the objective reality of the subject matter. The revelation of God was objective 
and observable in the text of the Bible; divine truths were not mysterious. Second, it 
assumed the capacity of the human mind to comprehend the subject matter and “subsume 
it under the forms of its thinking and to rationalize it.”35 Divine truths needed to be 
catalogued. Third, it assumed the words of the Bible were a sufficient medium for 
communicating the subject matter of revelation to the human mind.36 Divine truths were 
discoverable in the text.  
Fourth, Princeton theologians emphasized religious experience. Despite their 
reputation as scholastics, and their stress on the objective work of God, they gave 
prominence to the moving of the Holy Spirit in the heart of the individual Christian. Yet, 
where they placed the moving of the Spirit in their theology kept them distinct from 
revivalists. According to Noll, Princeton theologians without question made personal 
conversion a part of their theology.37 Of particular interest for this study is how they 
understood the role of the Spirit in reading Scripture. 
Princeton theologians were not pure Biblicists; they understood both the 
composition of the text and the proper reading of it as primarily a divine event. They 
attempted to maintain both the perspicuity of Scripture and the need for divine 
illumination.38 In order to correctly interpret the sacred text, the exegete must be a “true 
                                                          
35 Warfield, “The Idea of Systematic Theology,” 247. 
36 Ibid.  
37 Cf. Noll, The Princeton Theology, 23–24. 
38 Princeton theologians sought a critical balance between scientific exegesis and reliance on the Spirit. Cf. 
Gutjahr, Charles Hodge, 354. Gutjahr speculates that the reason Hodge did not specifically mention Bacon 
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Christian” who “partakes” of the faith which God gives to select individuals. Personal 
faith was established neither on reason nor emotional persuasion because God elected 
whom He desired to believe. Faith derived from Scripture was an “internal” 
“demonstration of the Spirit,” a “supernatural illumination imparting spiritual 
discernment.” Inner pneumatic stimulus renders illumination “irresistible;” it cannot be 
“shaken off” voluntarily, but it “is a power, controlling at once the convictions, the 
affections, and the conscience” of the recipient.39 The Spirit provides an “inward state of 
mind which enables us to apprehend the truth.”40 True faith is the acceptance of the 
revelation of God’s Son contained “in every part of the Bible.” The true believer 
naturally assumes the plenary inspiration and infallibility of the written text because of 
the inner work of the Spirit. However, reliance on the Spirit’s illumination could not be 
reduced to a private, mystical, or experienced-based interpretation of the text. Neither 
could it be entrusted to the authority of a church. The perspicuity of the objective text 
prevented such extremes. 
Princeton theologians were often wary of the study of religion, as found in 
Schleiermacher,41 because it reduced theology to psychology. Such an approach 
examined constantly changing people. Princeton theologians were equally suspicious of 
Christocentric theology because it was deductive, not inductive, in its methodology. 
                                                          
by name while using Bacon’s methods was because he did not want his students to reduce theology to a 
pure science. Hodge sought to preserve the Holy Spirit’s role in exegesis. However, Hodge’s idea of 
illumination appeared to primarily be personal and private.  
39 Charles Hodge, “The Inspiration of Holy Scripture, Its Nature and Proof,” The Biblical Repertory and 
Princeton Review 29, no. 4 (1857): 661, http://journals.ptsem.edu/id/BR1857294/dmd006. 
40 Hodge, Systematic Theology, 6:3:174.  
41 For example, cf. Hodge, Systematic Theology, 6:3:176–179.  
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Certainly, systematic theology might be aided by a study of nature, human history, 
biblical ethics, historical theology, and other disciplines, but the special handmaid of 
systematics needed to be exegetical theology. Biblical exegesis was a pure science that 
was to be practiced separately from all other disciplines. It “does its work wholly without 
thought or anxiety as to the use that is to be made of its results.”42 Systematic theology, in 
particular, is “not a historical discipline.” It “does not care” what has been or is held to be 
historically true. Instead, it searches for what is demonstrably true. Just like geological 
science, its ultimate goal is to organize the static “facts into one all-comprehending 
system.”43 Further, the superstitious teachings of the Church needed to give way to 
accurate, scientific analyses of the sacred text.  
Inerrancy 
Benjamin Breckinridge Warfield, particularly, articulated a specific form of the 
doctrine of biblical inerrancy in his scholarly conflicts with historical critics. For 
Warfield, the physical text of the Bible, in its original autographs, was without error in all 
matters it addressed. With this argument, he possibly placed the entire weight of 
defending Christianity on the integrity of the biblical text; the text itself was the first 
principle of the faith. For Warfield, in “point of authority,”44 there is no distinction 
between God and Scripture.  
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Many of Warfield’s polemics focused on the objective credibility of the Bible. As 
an example, he critiqued the modern notion popular in his day which claimed that New 
Testament authors did not cite the Old Testament as God’s actual words. For Warfield, 
this view was not only inconsistent with Jewish customs, but also with the historical 
understanding of pagans. The Bible was “the living voice of God,”45 and there has always 
been an “absolute identification” between the text of the Bible and the “speaking God.”46 
Warfield supported this claim from the grammar of the biblical text itself and in the 
history surrounding the text. He cited numerous sacred passages which synonymized the 
biblical text with God’s voice, and he cited extra-biblical authors, such as Philo, to 
convey similar Jewish exegetical assumptions. Jesus’ use of “it is written” during his 
temptation was also used by Paul in Romans 3:10. The phrase was understood by both 
Jews and pagans as a reference to divine speech. Paul, in line with common Jewish 
presumptions of the day, quoted the text of Scripture as if it were the “oracle” of God.47 
For Warfield, the notion that the biblical text was inspired or “God breathed” had 
prevailed since the beginning of Christianity. It had only “recently been broken” by a 
“new view” of lexical interpretation.48 As another example, some nineteenth-century 
scholars, such as August Hermann Cremer, argued that the Greek term that translated 
“divinely inspired” in 2 Timothy 3:16 suggested inspiration was an effect of the 
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Scriptures, not their cause. Cremer and other “higher critics” claimed that the term 
indicated that the biblical text inspired its readers; the texts themselves were not 
necessarily God’s voice. To support their views, they referenced Plutarch’s use of the 
identical Greek term that is found in Timothy and its appearance in the fifth book of the 
Sibylline Oracle, which they claimed had Jewish origins. Cremer and other critics 
claimed that the term possibly had different meanings in those extra-biblical texts, and 
that Paul used the term with their ancient understanding of the term, not the latter 
Christian idea. In response, Warfield marshaled grammatical and historical arguments to 
refute the “new” lexical conclusions. Certainly, Scripture itself claims its origin in God, 
thereby justifying an understanding of the term in Timothy as meaning inspired by God. 
However, Cremer’s use of Plutarch was flawed because Cremer assumed Plutarch’s 
source for the term was Jewish. To Warfield, this assumption was unfounded. Warfield 
argued that the manuscripts Plutarch relied upon give evidence of a Christian 
interpolation, as does the fifth Sibylline Oracle. The traditional Christian understanding 
of inspiration coming from God might actually be the influential idea behind all the texts 
in question.49 Warfield argued that Cremer and others did not carefully analyze the 
sources behind the texts they were analyzing. Their exegetical error in Timothy derived 
from a wrong assumption regarding the use of the term “divine inspiration” in antiquity; 
they were not sufficiently critical of their own criticism. 
 
 
                                                          
49 Cf. Warfield, “God Inspired Scripture,” 90.  
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Ecclesiology 
Princeton theologians stressed a supernatural view of Scripture, but not a 
concomitant view of the Church. Although the Presbyterian Church was considered high 
Church in contrast to other groups, their theologians did not advocate an ecclesial 
interpretation of the Bible. Instead, they claimed that the correct understanding of the 
Church was derived from the Bible alone. The true Church was comprised of believing 
Christians, known only to God, in all Christian congregations.50 The universal Church 
crossed all particular denominational lines; it was identified by right belief, not by 
historic association. To Hodge, Christianity had endured whole periods of dispersion and 
heresy. The claim that the Church consisted in a specific organization would have 
suggested that sinners occupied God’s Temple, which was unacceptable.51 The true 
Church could only be defined as those who have personally been justified and cleansed of 
guilt.52 The Church was indeed visible by multiple means, but it was not an exclusive 
organization.53 It was visible by virtue of being composed of human beings, not ghosts; it 
was visible by the good works of its members; it was visible by the obvious moral 
separation its members had from the world; it was visible as the true church sustaining 
                                                          
50 Cf. Gutjahr, Charles Hodge, 239. Charles Hodge received intense criticism for defending Catholic 
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the various external churches in which the true members operated. For Charles Hodge, 
even the term “Body of Christ” did not reference a specific physical, organized body of 
people.54 Although no one outside of the Church could be saved, it was not because the 
Church conveyed the grace of God. Instead, it was because anyone who was saved was 
already in the Church.  
Summary 
To this reader, Princeton theologians avoided the popular secularization of 
theology by maintaining the divine inspiration of the biblical text. They also avoided a 
philosophy of immanence which blurred distinctions between God and the world.  They 
engaged the top scholarship of their day, and their astute attention to the text helped 
unmask several anti-supernatural biases within modern biblical criticism. This helped 
them maintain their confession of historic Christian dogma. However, they painted 
themselves into a philological corner by disavowing divinely mandated ecclesial 
exegesis. Their faith in the Spirit did not extend to a universal operation of the Spirit in 
the Body he organized. Instead, the contemporary scholar with the best access to ancient 
grammar and history authoritatively explained Scripture. When scholars disagreed, their 
only recourse was to develop a more convincing forensic argument.  
Other evangelicals became aggravated by the scientific method of Princeton 
theologians. They argued that scientific analysis of objective revelation failed to get at the 
deeper realities of Christian faith. In the end, scientific exegesis was incapable of 
maintaining the unity of faith even among others who claimed to believe in sola 
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scriptura. Exclusive reliance on Scripture could not avoid private interpretations of the 
sacred text. 55  
Revivalism 
American revivalism, in its multiple variations, sought to reform aspects of 
religious life by emphasizing a genuine, direct encounter with God. Individuals were 
summoned to immediately respond in saving faith to a biblical message, resulting in 
instant salvation. Despite the movement’s emphasis on encountering God, they had little 
regard for God’s people. Not only was the historic Roman Catholic Church reviled, but 
revivalists increasingly were critical of their own Protestant denominations, traditions, 
and ordained clergy. Some revivalists even considered any organized religion as a 
hindrance to genuine divine encounters. For the revivalists, no mediation was needed 
between the individual and God. A pastor, priest, bishop, and church could assist the 
individual, but were secondary to authentic religious experience.  
Despite the revivalists’ positive emphasis on connecting with Jesus, the 
movement’s ecclesiology prevented them from satisfactorily responding to biblical 
modernism. Revivalists gave prominence to securing one’s own eternal salvation, which 
took attention away from the development of theological thought. This approach 
eventually led to an anti-intellectual disposition in several leaders. By the twentieth 
century, revivalism had obstructed legitimate venues for evangelicals to seriously engage 
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biblical modernism. Many outside of the movement considered revivalism as born in the 
backwoods and irrelevant to the modern world. 
Revivalism has impacted America’s religious landscape throughout its history. 
The Great Awakening, a movement which involved Jonathan Edwards (1703–1758) and 
George Whitefield (1714–1770), began in the first part of the eighteenth century. It was 
followed by a Second Great Awakening near the turn of the nineteenth century, which 
included the ministry of Charles Grandison Finney (1792–1875). Revival fervor spread 
freely throughout the entirety of the new nation and penetrated every denomination. The 
societal passion for liberty with its recent successes in the Revolution, combined with 
Protestant sola scriptura, helped ignite wildfire expansion of revivals. The American 
frontier was perceived by conservative New Englanders as a wild, untamed primitive 
existence. Society was expanding “faster than civilized institutions could keep up,” and 
illiterate people had “strayed too far from the institutional order of decent society.”56 The 
civilized Presbyterians back in the cultured northeast eventually left the Christianization 
of these half-savages to the Baptists and Methodists.  
Calvinism and Revivals 
Ironically, early revivalism in America was generated by Calvinists, such as 
Jonathan Edwards. As a Calvinist, Edwards advocated predestination; however, he 
justified revivals by arguing that the “objects of God’s favor” needed to be pointed out by 
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“distinguishing and clear marks;”57 a “sign of a state of grace” was needed.58 Without 
ridiculing the extreme “outcries, faintings and the like”59 of some converts, Edwards 
defended revivals in general. The notable “great and abiding alteration” that occurred in 
peoples’ lives was true evidence that the effect of his work, and that of friend and fellow 
Calvinist George Whitefield, was genuine.60 In his sermon “True Grace Distinguished 
from the Experience of Devils,” Edwards argued that moral changes in peoples’ lives 
evidenced an authentic work of the Spirit.61 Revivals influenced moral behavior in all 
strata of society. 
By the early nineteenth century, revivalism was unsettling the intellectual 
foundation of Calvinism by calling people to freely give up their sins and become 
followers of Christ. The revivalists’ shift of accent from God’s sovereign decision to 
human ability to decide brought tension into the Presbyterian Church; the doctrines of 
predestination and double predestination were threatened. Salvation was now open to all, 
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and the eternal destiny of each individual lay in his own hands.62 Presbyterians struggled 
to find a balance between old, revered theological convictions and the new reality of 
large-scale revival conversions; but, they could not.  
The New Haven theology provided a bridge for Presbyterians from the dominant 
old Calvinism to what they considered to be broader thinking. New School 
Presbyterianism advanced with a modified Calvinism, openness to revivals, emphasis on 
the power of human agency in conversion,63 concern for moral reform, and 
interdenominational cooperation on various projects. Yale Professor Nathaniel William 
Taylor (1786–1858) was an example of a theologian who sought to reconcile the revivals 
with Calvinism, with what could be called “Arminianized Calvinism.”64 Taylor rejected 
the imputation of Adam’s guilt to all humanity, but still claimed people were innately 
disposed toward sin.65 There could be no sin until it was actually committed; both sin and 
repentance were voluntary. The evident moral capabilities of humans, according to 
Taylor, implied free agency. Alone, a person will not do what he can do; he will not 
choose the good, although capable, because of his inherent disposition. He needs God’s 
help. For Taylor, revivalism, where God’s Word was preached by a man of God, was 
God’s provision of grace. The persuasive effect of the preacher roused the individual’s 
ability to freely respond to God’s Spirit.  
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The efforts to integrate Calvinism with revivalism created conflict among 
Presbyterians. Lyman Beecher (1775–1863), renowned Presbyterian minister, delivered a 
sermon in 1823 that demonstrated the diverging views within American Calvinism. 
Following the title of his message, The Faith Once Delivered to the Saints, taken from 
Jude 3, Beecher claimed up front, “That men are free agents,” and that “all men are 
invited sincerely … to return to God.”66 Beecher’s authority for his “new” interpretation 
lay in the “accordance” his views had with the “direct and most obvious meaning of the 
text. By obvious meaning, I intend that which is actually suggested, without note or 
comment, to the minds of honest and unlettered men.”67 The denominational tension 
became known as the Old School and New School controversy. Princeton’s Charles 
Hodge was among the leaders of the Old School group, which strictly emphasized God’s 
sovereign power in human conversion. In 1835, Beecher was accused of heresy by Old 
School Calvinists for his new views of evangelism. Although he was acquitted, he and 
other New School ministers were expelled from the denomination in 1837 because of 
their integration of Calvinism and Arminianism. During the 1837 assembly, the Old 
School won a formal victory against New School measures calling for the “dissolution” 
of every church presbytery, or synod “not organized on Presbyterian principles.”68 The 
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Presbyterian schism of 1837 was not healed until the latter part of the nineteenth century, 
and then only for a brief time.  
 Over time, many revivalists, including Charles Finney, left the Presbyterian 
Church and began to openly teach that people had free will before God. Finney’s 
revivals, in particular, began in upper New York. As other revivals spread in the trans-
Appalachian frontiers of Kentucky and Tennessee and beyond, the high demand for 
missionary preachers resulted in many new ministers, whether Baptist, Methodist, or 
Presbyterian, who were largely uneducated. Despite the low level of theological training 
among the revivalists, they effectively appealed to the sentiments of the people, and 
witnessed boisterous and emotional responses. Calvinism faded in both the North and 
South; it was increasingly perceived as outmoded, and European Deism was not biblical 
enough to be seriously considered.69 Through the Baptist and Methodist revivals, the 
common people could touch God, hear the Bible for themselves, and learn to live holy 
lives. Salvation was not only for the elect, but for “whosoever will.” In time, the 
movement became marked as broadly anti-traditionalist.70 Theological standard bearers 
such as John Calvin were forgotten, and reliable symbols such as the Westminster 
Confession were disregarded. An anti-intellectual reputation among evangelists 
especially surged during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Strict theological 
confession became secondary to immediate experience. Kentucky revivalist ministers 
Robert Marshall and John Thompson, after being confronted with quotes from Calvin 
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that demonstrated their theological errors, replied, “We are not personally acquainted 
with the writings of John Calvin, nor are we certain how nearly we agree with his views 
of divine truth; neither do we care.”71 
Unlike Finney’s revivals, the ones that developed in the West and South, 
including southern Illinois and Missouri, were primarily led by Baptists and Methodists, 
such as Peter Cartwright (1785–1872). Cartwright was converted at age 17, and was soon 
thereafter licensed to preach as a Methodist circuit rider. He preached countless revival 
camp meetings in Tennessee, Kentucky, and Illinois for over 50 years. Unlike the 
northern branches of Protestant denominations, “who wanted at least a semblance of 
learning and doctrine from their preachers, the southern Methodists spurned learning.”72  
Millions were brought into evangelical denominations through the Second Great 
Awakening, which helped create an evangelical coalition that, although it was not 
formally defined, significantly shaped American culture. By 1840, one in three 
Americans was Methodist.  
Biblicism and Revivals 
With little regard for ecclesiology or Tradition, revivalists claimed exclusive 
support for their activities from the Bible. The problem was that the revivalists’ 
opponents did the same. In the end, it came down to who was more “biblical” than the 
other. The deeper problem was that there was no ordained Church which both sides fully 
trusted to adjudicate their debates. The idea of a sacramental Body of Christ had long 
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since been lost in the bottom of their saddle bags. This is evidenced in Charles Hodges’ 
polemics with Charles Finney.  
To Hodge, the foundational flaw of Finney’s work was that it “was not based on 
the authority of God speaking in his Word, but on human reason.” It was not based on the 
biblical text; therefore, it was a philosophy, not a theology. Hodge’s particular complaint 
was that Finney emphasized human moral capability to a degree that diminished God’s 
role in human salvation. For Hodge, God’s will was impotent to “impose” itself in 
Finney’s theology; it “only discloses what is obligatory.”73 Finney, using the same 
Scripture, believed that every person was a moral agent capable of choosing God’s 
grace.74 Finney insisted that a “right view,” which did not chill “the heart of the Church,” 
was needed. Both “election and free agency” needed to be taught.75 The innate moral 
intuition within everyone convinced Finney that human nature was not essentially sinful. 
Rather, people individually choose to sin. The role of the preacher, therefore, was to 
awaken the sinner’s inner moral consciousness so he can choose to accept God’s 
redemptive grace.  
Prior to his conversion, Charles Finney had been pursuing a law career. Shortly 
after his conversion in the autumn of 1821, he gave up that endeavor and was licensed to 
preach by the spring of 1824. He was ordained as a Presbyterian home missionary. 
Although Finney had privately studied with his pastor, he had not seriously examined the 
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catechism or Westminster Confession by the time he was licensed.76 Nonetheless, Finney 
quickly became renowned as a persuasive revivalist in western New York by using his 
legal training and natural abilities. He preached revival meetings throughout New York77 
and surrounding states. Frustrated with the Presbyterian Church, he left them in 1836 to 
serve in a Congregational Church. At Oberlin College, Finney served as a professor in 
Systematic Theology, Pastoral Theology, and later became the school’s president. He 
concurrently served as pastor of Oberlin’s First Congregational Church.78  
The tension between the Reformed theology of the day and Finney’s impulse to 
revivalism is seen in Finney’s sermon, “Sinners Bound to Change Their Own Hearts.” 
Interpreting Ezekiel 18:31’s command to “Make ye a new heart,” Finney concluded that 
the heart is “something over which we have control; something voluntary.” We are called 
upon and are therefore capable to change our “moral characters” and “dispositions.”79 
This struck the core nerve of Calvinists, such as Princeton’s Charles Hodge. 
Hodge considered Finney’s methods to be showmanship; he was uneasy with 
Finney’s emphasis on practical results because it diminished the sovereign role of God in 
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human salvation. Hodge accused Finney of embracing modernity by relying on calculated 
methods to generate a religious response from people. In response Finney argued that 
methods were essential to “success.” As a man of his era, Finney saw the need for 
premeditated techniques in ministry. For Finney, there was nothing miraculous about a 
revival. A good revival required a natural scientific theory in which to operate; it was the 
result of using the right tactics. In Finney’s thinking, political and sales techniques were 
divine tools to gain others’ attention. Biblical exposition, like politics, needed to involve 
psychological persuasion towards conversion. People can clearly understand the truths of 
Scripture on their own once their attention is gained, and they are naturally capable to 
respond with their own moral decisions. Consequently, the effective revivalist will 
employ the same laws that govern the harvesting of wheat to bring people into the faith 
by selecting the best and most efficient tools of reaping.80 “New Measures are necessary 
from time to time to awaken attention and bring the Gospel to bear upon the public 
mind.”81 For Finney, the measures belonging to the professional revivalist included 
longer meetings that wearied the audience, making them ready to convert, widespread 
dissemination of literature, direct appeal to the individual’s conscience, camp meetings 
that lasted several days, and anything else that might awaken the slumbering soul. Finney 
also employed the anxious seat, also called the mourner’s bench. It was an appointed 
chair where those who were anxious over their own souls could come for personal 
counsel. The seat was intentionally placed in a public location at the front of the 
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assembly. The goal was to prevent the sinner from keeping his troubles private, and 
enabling him to “break away from the chains of pride”82 through exposure to others. 
Charles Hodge was much more critical of Finney than he was of Edwards’ 
revivals from a century earlier. When reviewing the revivals of Edwards, Hodge 
criticized the lack of order and polity more than the theology. The eighteenth-century 
revivalists, unlike Finney, were at least committed to the Westminster Confession and 
catechism.83 The lack of decorum in the celebration of claimed bodily manifestations of 
the Spirit, such as people fainting, violently shaking, or crying out loud, raised Hodge’s 
doubts that Edwards’ revivals were a genuine move of the Spirit. However, Hodge’s 
greater concern with Finney was the lack of consistency with Calvinistic orthodoxy. 
Unlike eighteenth-century revivalists, Finney’s theology stood in opposition to Reformed 
thinking.  
Finney understood that he was at odds with the traditional Reformed 
understanding of depravity, which renders humanity incapable to affect any change in 
itself. However, he based his new biblical exposition on his three-step exegetical method. 
First, Finney sought to understand the “meaning” of the command in the text. What does 
the passage plainly say? Second, he ascertained the reasonableness of the biblical 
command. Is the plain biblical command doable for the reader? Third, Finney sought for 
“consistency” between his particular text and other biblical texts which seemed to 
contradict his interpretation. Can the plain interpretation harmonize with different 
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passages that appear to be contradictory?84 For Finney, theology did not need to search 
outside of the Bible to understand divine truths. 
As revivalism grew throughout the nineteenth century, Finney and other leaders 
became increasingly critical of established churches and ordained leaders. Revivalism 
presumed the decline of true spirituality within Christian communities; it “presupposes 
the church is sunk down in a backslidden state.”85 God had chosen evangelists to “excite” 
the hearts and minds of the people. The people were “sluggish” in their faith and needed 
to wake up, but the Church had “so little firmness and stability of purpose” that it was 
impotent to help. The Church was asleep and not sufficiently “enlightened” to counteract 
the spiritual decline of its people. Therefore, God chose to go outside of the Church 
structure in order to lead the sheep back into the fold.86 In his lecture “How to Preach the 
Gospel,” Finney argued that the decline of vitality in Christianity “throughout the history 
of the Church from the days of the Apostles” was “chargeable upon ministers.”87 In 
another place, Finney specifically accused the Presbyterian ministers of being “amazingly 
jealous” over others directing spiritual meetings. They “always freeze a prayer meeting” 
and become obstacles to the work of God.88 The young men who are ordained in the 
“poor Presbyterian Church”89 are so obsessed with theological controversy that they have 
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lost sight of true religion. As a result, “the Church is groaning in all her borders for want 
of suitable ministers.”90 Finney complained that denominations were not favorable 
towards “new measures.” They do not tolerate “any of this new-light preaching, or of 
these evangelists that go around the country preaching.”91 He concluded that those in the 
Presbyterian Church are as “absolutely fanatical” as those leading the Roman Catholic 
Church because they each adhere to “particular forms and modes” in the Church. “The 
fact is, that God has established, in no church, any particular form, or manner of worship, 
for promoting the interests of religion.”92 Just as Luther and the Reformers countered the 
“ridiculous things of the Roman Catholics” by introducing “new measures,” “new 
modes,” and “new expedients,” so the revivalists “in Divine Providence” have been “set 
forward as prominent in introducing new innovations.”93 God was behind the revivalists, 
but the Church’s ordained clergy were obstructing divine initiatives. 
Certainly, the revivalists quoted Luther, Calvin, the Westminster and other 
confessions when it was beneficial. However, it ultimately did not matter to revivalists 
whether they themselves were consistent with Tradition. Finney argued that the Bible 
was the only authority in determining the validity of his new measures. “Sadly,” Finney 
wrote, “young converts” are taught the “catechism” instead of the “Bible.”94 He 
referenced Paul’s admonition that all sacred services be conducted “decently and in 
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order,”95 and then insisted that his measures, including both the “anxious seat” and 
“protracted meetings,” were within the biblical mandate. That was all the authority 
Finney needed.  
The revivalists’ low esteem for ecclesiastical organizations and traditions 
naturally led to a diminished appreciation for theology. The Christian religion was often 
reduced by them to the immediate conversion of souls. A theological education was not 
needed for the primary task of converting sinners. With the obvious exception of 
Jonathan Edwards, many revivalists downplayed the need for formal theological study. 
Later in the nineteenth century and into the early twentieth century, the ministries of 
Dwight Lyman Moody (1837–1899) and William Ashley “Billy” Sunday (1862–1935) 
became prominent, and served as examples of effective, but uneducated clergy. Moody 
was educated through grade school, and Sunday into high school. Yet both men helped 
shape the religious faith of hundreds of thousands of people. 
The New Century and Revivals 
Finney, perhaps speaking for the next century of revivalists, had written that “the 
great object of all the means of grace is to aim directly at the conversion of sinners.”96 
The editor to D. L.  Moody’s works, written during Moody’s lifetime, wrote that if 
Moody, in his theological outlines, left out any teaching “usually found in Systematic 
Theology,” it was because the evangelist replaced it with something else he deemed 
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“more important.”97 In his Outline of the Doctrine of God, Moody wrote on what was 
most important in the teaching on God: the practical love of God for sinners.98 He 
addressed none of the formal questions often associated with Theology Proper. Moody’s 
urgency for the personal salvation of sinners is sensed in his closing remarks to a 
gathering of businessmen at the Chicago Board of Trade: “I beg of you as a friend and 
brother, do not go out without salvation. May God wake up every soul here tonight!”99 
According to Billy Sunday, “the first thing to remember about being saved is that 
salvation is a personal matter.” “The world is not hungry for a religion of theory. There 
was a time when people were interested intensely in fine-spun theological theories;” but, 
that time had thankfully passed for Sunday.100 “People are dissatisfied with philosophy, 
science, new thought—all these amount to nothing when you have a dead child in the 
house. These do not solace the troubles and woes of the world.”101 “The way to salvation 
is not Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Vassar or Wellesley. Environment and culture can't put 
you into heaven unless you accept Jesus Christ.”102  
Although revivalists were often involved in social relief efforts, they were wary of 
allowing the Gospel ministry to be reduced to social action. Charles Finney was a fierce 
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opponent of slavery, but he was even more concerned with “Who does God say will go to 
heaven?” Finney warned of potential divine damnation for those who joined the Anti-
Slavery Society but refused to pay their dues. Their hypocrisy and dishonesty risked their 
souls.103 D. L.  Moody poured incredible effort into relief work for the poor, but when 
preaching on Christ’s command to “Seek first” the Kingdom and its righteousness,104 
Moody admitted reservation at giving loaves of bread alongside the Gospel of salvation. 
“If I had the Bible in one hand and a loaf in the other the people always looked first at the 
loaf; and that was just contrary to the order laid down in the Gospel.”105 Revivalist Billy 
Sunday echoed similar concerns when he preached “You cannot bathe anybody into the 
kingdom of God. You cannot change their hearts by changing their sanitation.”106 Sunday 
supported education and charity, but saw them as secondary. “It is a Christian act to 
maintain schools and universities, but the road into the kingdom of God is not by the 
bathtub, the university, social service, or gymnasium, but by the blood-red road of the 
cross of Jesus Christ.”107 
Revivalism, it can be argued,108 benefitted Christianity in various ways. It kept a 
legitimate concern for personal faith in view, called for moral habits to be developed 
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among its people, and it gave attention to marginalized groups, such as slaves, poor, and 
immigrants. Genuine moral “alterations” in society, such as the abolition of slavery, can 
partially be credited to the influence of revivals.  
Summary 
To this reader, the revivalists’ disregard of the presence of Christ in the actual 
structure of his Church hindered them from listening to voices other than their own. For 
the revivalists, ecclesial structure was practical, not sacramental; the Church was the 
result, not the source, of the grace of God within society. To some evangelists, the 
Church was considered an obstacle to true religion. The upshot of this was Church 
discipline or theological correction was often perceived as persecution, and not as divine 
restoration. For the revivalist, Scripture was sacred. However, their Biblicism hampered 
their ability to provide any lasting reform to American Christianity. If God was only 
found in the Book, then the weight of Christian revelation was solely carried by the text 
of Scripture. In reality, however, that burden fell on the shoulders of the individual 
because the meaning of the Bible was supposedly plain to him. Such privatization of a 
universal religion, such as Christianity, resulted in a multitude of “unfettered 
interpretations” of Scripture,109 which only increased fragmentation among Protestants. 
Numerous new denominations sprang up from the seeds of discord during this time, 
including Disciples of Christ, Adventists, Mormons, various offshoots of Methodists and 
new groups of Presbyterians, each with its own distinctive. Although revivalists, like 
Princeton theologians, were confident that the Bible could be sufficiently understood by 
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individuals, the revivalists’ adulation of experience created new types of factions within 
Christianity. Holiness and Pentecostal groups began forming their own separate 
fellowships by the early twentieth century.  
A long list of beneficial social services, including care for the homeless and 
orphans were generated by revivalists. However, some of them saw their own good 
works as ancillary to true gospel ministry. This reveals a deeper problem in their 
comprehension of salvation in Jesus Christ, and it is related to their impoverished 
ecclesiology. When the Body of Christ becomes invisible, salvation is often reduced to a 
spiritual deliverance, and care for the poor becomes nothing beyond a stepping stone to 
real spiritual ministry.  
Sadly, revivalism could not speak to biblical modernism adequately. While it 
maintained the supernatural character of the Bible, it insufficiently engaged the ordinary 
aspects of the text. Revivalists, such as Moody, were suspicious of modern science and 
only read books that helped him better understand the Bible. Obsession with other-
worldly concerns possibly contributed to disengagement with modern currents of 
thought. The lack of an ecclesiastical structure resulted in revivalists being largely 
incapable of learning from or responding to literary critics. Low ecclesiology liberated 
them to simply ignore those with whom they disagreed. A suspicious attitude toward 
formal theological training prevented revivalists from discovering reforming truths within 
the very book to which they were devoted. Theological inquiry was constrained to what 
was essential to being saved, resulting in another form of theology’s demystification. The 
spiritually formative role of an ongoing theological pedagogy was bartered away for a 
one way ticket out of this world.  
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American Liberalism 
 American liberal theology110 formed from several sources, including intellectual 
development in natural sciences, historical studies, social sciences, philosophy, and 
literary criticism. It also grew in reaction to what was perceived to be blind Biblicism, 
dead dogmatism, revivalist revelries, and silence regarding obvious social evils. Many 
Christian theologians and clergymen saw a need to return to the genuine Christian faith 
which existed prior to later adulterations. Often, liberal theology discounted supernatural 
concepts attached to ecclesiology, dogmatics, and the Scriptures.  
 Attention will be given to two broad theological movements within nineteenth-
century America which can be loosely categorized as liberal. First, attention will be given 
to historical criticism and its polemics with Biblicists at Princeton. Second, focus will be 
directed to attempts at making evangelization more socially prophetic. The works of 
Charles Briggs, Horace Bushnell and Walter Rauschenbusch will be utilized.  
Historical Criticism and Inerrancy  
Scientific exegesis of the Scriptures was welcomed by many because it was 
assumed it would provide a surer footing for the Christian faith. Once “legal 
compulsion”111 towards Church authority disappeared, the biblical exegete would be free 
to explore the text without inhibition. Efficient grammatical and historical tools were 
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employed to get at the world behind the text. Close examination of the history 
surrounding the text enabled scholars to reconstruct the environment of biblical authors 
and their audiences. Free from ecclesial constraint, both conservative and liberal scholars 
utilized the same analytical tools to study the Bible. However, they came to opposing 
conclusions regarding the credibility of the biblical text.  
Critics within the Presbyterian Church and elsewhere called for conservatives to 
“face up” to the fact that several incidental errors were present in the Scriptures that did 
not affect the essence of Christian faith.112 Others flatly said the traditional faith had been 
proven baseless by literary analyses. Princeton’s resounding response was that the 
inerrancy of the biblical text was based on “evidences.”113 Princeton theologians 
employed the same scientific methods as liberals to demonstrate that the Bible “was a 
trustworthy record of the working of God among men.”114 The uptake of all this was that 
conservative Biblicists were forced into a single corner of defense; their particular form 
of inerrancy made the Bible become the only “bulwark” of Christianity, and science was 
its shield.115 However, if a single error were discovered in the text, it could spell disaster 
for the entire faith. To this reader, Princeton theologians accurately identified moments 
when historical critics were insufficiently critical of their own anti-supernaturalism; they 
argued that some of their scholarly criticisms were not purely objective. However, due to 
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Princeton’s high stress on propositional revelation, many of their most intense polemics 
were fixated on the inerrancy of Scripture. The traditional understanding of the Bible as 
God’s Word was buttressed by Princeton’s “almost impregnable apologetic” of biblical 
inerrancy.116  
In 1881, Archibald Alexander Hodge (1823–1886), son of Charles Hodge, 
published a defining article with B. B. Warfield on Princeton’s view of inspiration and 
inerrancy. The article, entitled “Inspiration,” set out the authors’ first principle of all 
Christian faith: the text of the Bible. For the younger Hodge and for Warfield, the text of 
the Bible was “the first religious truth which we embrace, upon which, subsequently, the 
entire fabric of true religion rests.”117 The Bible is “an infallible record” of God’s 
revelation, and “absolutely errorless.”118 For Princeton, inspiration was verbal; God had 
inspired the actual written words and the thoughts behind the selection of those words. 
Inspiration also had to be plenary; the text in its entirety was from God.119 Working under 
the assumption that each statement was inspired in this particular manner, the exegete 
researched the Bible in search of coherent verbal statements which addressed a plethora 
of topics. Although the Bible was not a science or history book, or a text on philosophy, it 
was accurate every time it referenced those subjects. The Princeton professors defended 
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their version of the doctrine of inerrancy as if the future of Christianity might depend on 
it. If the texts contained error, then the “objective ground of faith” was threatened.120 
Princeton’s doctrine of inerrancy rested on a rationalistic definition of truth.121 
Perfect revelation, they pre-determined, was a Bible free from errors, contradictions, 
mysteries, paradoxes, and inconsistencies. It was a “prejudice”122 based on the 
“externally verified credibility of the apostles as teachers.”123 Neither miracles, nor a 
teaching Church, nor an inward witness124 were necessary warrants. Instead, the texts 
were considered inspired because they themselves made such a claim.125 This assertion 
was accepted as true based on the assumed trustworthiness of the apostles.126 If the 
apostles were trustworthy, then all they wrote was to be believed. The plenary text was 
assumed inerrant because the text was assumed inspired, and its authors were assumed to 
be trustworthy.  
Princeton’s rational view of inspiration was very close to a theory of dictation. It 
assumed that Christian truth could only be understood in a non-paradoxical structure. 
Rationally, if the divine Spirit inspired the text, then the text cannot contain any 
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incongruence. “The heart of their position was the argument that God could not, would 
not, convey truth through an errant document.”127 If God was truthful, then it was only 
safe to conclude that his words were without defect. However, this assumption of what 
divine truth looks like seems to have neglected that God’s revelation was most fully 
found in frail human flesh.  
Princeton’s rationalism was also illustrated in their recourse to lost original 
documents. Warfield limited the extent of inerrancy to the original autographs; scribes 
and copyists made errors transmitting the Bible from the original autographs, but those 
first texts were flawless in all their testimony. On this point, fellow reformed theologian 
Philip Schaff128 took Princeton theologians to task. Schaff argued from the Westminster 
Confession that God had kept his word “pure in all ages.”129 For Schaff, Princeton’s 
theologians were essentially saying that God originally provided an errorless document, 
but he did not preserve it.130 Oddly, Warfield challenged skeptics to bring any argument 
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which discredited the Scripture’s reliability. However, according to Warfield’s own 
stipulations, this was impossible. On one hand, he agreed that biblical scholars must be 
honest and turn up evidence gathered by critical investigation. He was open to such 
evidence because all scholars must admit any errors in the sacred text. On the other hand, 
he confined critical investigation to an impossible field of study. No one in the modern 
era had seen the original documents. Only discoveries pertaining to the original texts, 
which no one possessed, would be considered.131  
The doctrine of inerrancy, as taught by Hodge and Warfield, potentially created a 
“blind” spot for evangelical posterity; it was difficult for many to distinguish between 
lesser and “weightier matters”132 in the Bible. By basing the doctrine of inerrancy on the 
trustworthiness of biblical authors, Princeton ironically created an almost “limitless 
ability”133 to rationally justify any doctrine of one’s choosing. If a teaching could be 
demonstrated solely by propositional statements in the Bible, then it was to be believed 
with the same intensity as any teaching. The inspired quality of each statement made it 
binding. This possibly provides insight into why some of Princeton’s heirs became 
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fundamentalist separatists. Polemics were often an exaggerated response to the slightest 
theological disagreement. 
The Briggs Affair 
 Within the Presbyterian Church, Charles Augustus Briggs (1841–1913) was one 
of the most notable biblical scholars and theologians excommunicated for his views of 
Scripture. He and Princeton’s B. B. Warfield engaged in lengthy polemics over the 
integrity of the text of the Bible. Briggs was a Presbyterian pastor, and later the professor 
of Hebrew and Cognate Languages, and then Biblical Theology, at the prestigious Union 
Seminary in New York City, a Presbyterian institution. To the minds of Princeton and the 
Old School leadership within the Presbyterian Church, Briggs had succumbed to 
modernity in his critical analyses of the Bible.  
 After his appointment to Union in 1891, Briggs delivered his inaugural address, 
The Authority of Holy Scripture.134 Briggs’ message created uproar in the denomination, 
for he admitted “errors” in the sacred text. In his address, Briggs argued that God 
disclosed his presence to people by means of three pillars: the Church, Reason, and the 
Bible. All three of these pillars were fallible yet divine vehicles of revelation. All three 
were needed because they supported the inadequacy of the others. The interpreter of 
Scripture could not rely on the Bible alone. In another place, Briggs argued that the three 
were not necessarily coordinated. Such an assumption neglected the value of each 
particular resource.135    
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Despite his affirmation of three pillars mediating the truth, Briggs’ prejudice came 
out early in his message. Certainly, for an “educated Protestant” it is “difficult, even 
impossible” to experience the authority of God within a church because of widespread 
ecclesiastical corruption. Yet, like little children blindly obeying their good parents, some 
do find God in the church.136 For Briggs, it appeared that some who were pitifully 
immature in their scholarship, thankfully still stumble, albeit naively, across some truth 
within ecclesiastical environs. Others have been able to find God through Reason, which 
included their consciences and religious feelings. Rising up from their created natures, 
they were mystically able to reflect on God without either Church or biblical text 
providing mediation. These rationalists, although they frequently rejected Church and 
Bible, found God enthroned in their own souls.137  
Briggs’ message was pointed towards the pitfalls associated with exclusive 
reliance on Scripture, the third pillar. The majority of Protestants, he argued, held to the 
Bible alone, consequently assailing Church and reason. Briggs acknowledged some 
people found God while reading the Bible. However, Briggs’ contention was that the 
exclusive treatment of the Scripture as the locus of God’s activity led to endless barriers 
of “traditional dogmatism” and “ecclesiasticism.” Biblicism added unjustified meanings 
to the text, thus obstructing access to God for others.138  
                                                          
136 Briggs, Authority of Holy Scripture, 26. 
137 Briggs, Authority of Holy Scripture, 26–27.  
138 Briggs, Authority of Holy Scripture, 31. 
166 
For Briggs, one of the primary barriers to the interpretation of the Bible was the 
notion of “verbal inspiration.”139 Such an idea failed to see that the Scripture was written 
in human form with “errors in transmission” to which any piece of literature was subject. 
The view of verbal inspiration failed to see the enormous difference between text and 
meaning. For Briggs, the concepts, not the literal words, were divine in origin. In error, 
the text ascribed authorship to people, such as Moses or Paul, who did not really write 
some of the books, and told accounts that did not necessarily occur. Yet, the concepts 
behind the text were what lead people to encounter God.  
Another significant barrier to the interpretation of the Bible was the doctrine of 
inerrancy of the sacred text. It was “not a pleasant task to point out errors in the sacred 
Scriptures,”140 but the task was necessary for Christians to grow up. To Briggs, neither 
Scripture nor Creeds sanctioned the doctrine of inerrancy. The authority of Scripture lay 
in its divine content, not human words purported to be infallible. It is especially 
noteworthy that these errors occurred in “circumstantial” sections of the Scriptures, not 
areas that dealt with “essentials.”141 Briggs thought it unwise to try to determine the 
extent of “providential superintendence.” People should not be forced to accept the claim 
that divine superintendence included “every particular” of the text. Briggs suggested 
leaving some of these questions alone.  
For Briggs, higher criticism rendered service to believers by bringing them into 
the “Bible itself,” identifying superfluous elements, and retrieving its genuine contents. 
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Believers could be freed from superstitions surrounding the Scriptures, and liberated to 
understand their true meaning. Briggs asserted that the “inner substance of thought” in 
Scripture, its concept, is what higher critics could provide. These concepts could only be 
penetrated by “the language and the letter, the grammar and the style.”142 He promoted a 
rigorous, scholarly analysis of the text of Scripture, free from the encumbrances of 
religious faith. Scientific exegesis of the text of the Scriptures and their historical 
surroundings provided the surest footing for understanding what God was speaking. 
Briggs was conservative in most of his theological positions, but his criticism of 
the literal text of the Bible was one of the first major steps towards a full blown 
modernist crisis within the Presbyterian Church. The Briggs affair tallied multiple heresy 
trials, and ended in his eventual excommunication from the Presbyterian Church. In 
addition to Briggs being removed from ministerial association with the Presbyterian 
Church, some of his opponents sought to have him relieved of teaching duties at Union. 
However, Union stood behind their professor and, with Briggs, departed the Presbyterian 
Church.143 Briggs continued to teach at Union, and was later ordained an Episcopalian 
priest in 1899. 
A Warmer and More Practical Gospel 
Horace Bushnell 
Horace Bushnell (1802–1876) is significant to American theology because he is 
an emblematic transitional figure from a time when American Protestants were beginning 
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to find another way to authoritatively read and apply the Scriptures. Bushnell is 
illustrative of many nineteenth-century Protestants who were both suspicious of excesses 
in the revivals and dissatisfied with the rigidity of propositional theology. Dissatisfied 
with the available theological options, Bushnell began a theological move which gave 
greater emphasis to pragmatism and social development. In many ways, he was an 
antecedent of later American liberal theology; some called him the American 
Schleiermacher or Father of American liberalism.144 Bushnell stood between the old 
orthodoxy and new interpretations of the faith. Yet, these labels can be deceptive because 
Bushnell would not have embraced the extreme direction in which some of his heirs took 
his thought.145 He maintained several of the conservative confessions of his Puritan 
heritage throughout his life, while disavowing a legalistic enforcement of them. Having 
studied divinity at Yale prior to being ordained in a Congregational Church, Bushnell 
gave more emphasis to education than revelation and his interest in practical over 
dogmatic theology foreshadowed pragmatism. His ethics stressed interpersonal and social 
concerns, not orthodox law. He was neither a revivalist nor a high Church theologian. He 
was not an orthodox Calvinist, but he could not be classified as a Unitarian.146  
In his work, Christian Nurture, Bushnell critiqued excessive attention given to the 
revivalist “mode” of extending the kingdom of God through conversion. He performed 
his critique by casting the entire economy of salvation in the context of a family’s healthy 
nurturing of children. Without completely dismissing the value of someone coming “over 
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to the side of faith and piety” in a revival, Bushnell was concerned that “the grand idea” 
which had “taken possession of the churches of our times” was that “they are going to 
convert the world.”147 The emphasis on immediate reversal of one’s entire life and habits 
neglected God’s ancient “economy.” Since the Garden, a familial “reproduction” of 
character and grace in children was how God extended his kingdom.148 Bushnell often 
referred to Paul’s use of “seed of Abraham” to argue that God’s children were birthed in 
a domestic context.149 The idea of Christian nurture was “not a novelty, propounded” 
now for the “first time.” Instead, it is “as old as the Christian church.”150 Citing the 
influence given to Timothy by his mother and grandmother,151 Bushnell argued that 
Christian nurture began prior to one’s birth;152 it was “physiologically” in one’s blood 
lines.153 Bushnell complained that this biblical concept had been lost in the current 
revival fervor. “We can hardly find a place for any such thought.”154 In response, 
Bushnell called for Christians to “restore” a “juster impression” of the great subject of 
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salvation.155 For Bushnell, Christian salvation went beyond an instantaneous 
transformation of an individual. Redemption included the development of Christian 
character in a communal context, nurtured in a familial setting; genuine transformation 
occurred over time. No one knew the precise moment when a child came to full maturity; 
“the transition is gradual, and it will even be doubtful when it is passed.”156 In the same 
manner, Christian salvation was cheapened when too much emphasis was given to an 
instantaneous event. For Bushnell, people needed to understand the comprehensiveness 
of salvation; it was more than the conversion of a lost soul. A godly parent physically 
nurtured his child’s soul and body; therefore, it is “important” for the “religious life of the 
soul” to include the feeding of the body.”157 The revivals were insufficient because they 
only saw salvation as a spiritual event. In addition, Bushnell critiqued the anxious bench 
of revivalists. “Anxiety is a word of unbelief, or unreasoning dread,” and it “destroys the 
comfort of others.” Instead, Christian parents need to teach their children that “full faith 
in God” puts anxiety to rest.158 Bushnell understood that true conversion occurred in a 
nurturing environment, one free from unhealthy anxiety.  
Although Bushnell was aggrieved over revivalism, he did not turn to dogmatic 
confession for relief. He argued that the basic “spirit and life” of Christian faith was lost 
in the speculative theology of the dogmatists.159 The fundamental danger of dogmatism 
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was that it spoke scientifically on issues for which it had no certain knowledge. The 
depths of the person and work of Christ were beyond comprehension. Bushnell resisted 
overly-scientific explanations for what he believed.160 “What, in fact, do we prove but 
that, when we undertake to shape theologically the glorious mystery of salvation by 
Christ, we just as much reduce it, or whittle it down, as human thought is narrower and 
tinier than the grand subject matter attempted.”161 How could one speak with precision 
regarding that which was inexpressible? Bushnell argued that the gospel needed to be 
evoked in figural images, not dialectical propositions.162 It needed to be expressed in 
worship rather than minutely explained. If theology were placed in poetics, then they 
could evoke an embrace of what was beyond comprehension.  
To Bushnell, scientific theologians attempted to “measure the sea with a 
spoon;”163 their works were “dogmas of a bigot age.”164 They had lost sight of the 
grandeur of God’s great salvation by teaching that God only wishes to save those whom 
he “predestinates,” or that Christ only died for a “particular part of humanity.” For these 
teachers, regeneration was wrought “by baptism,” repentance was reduced to “doing 
penance,” and the forgiveness of sins was a “priestly dispensation.”165 Bushnell criticized 
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the “church-craft” of “ecclesiastics,” such as are in Rome, who “reduced the gospel” by 
adding “new ornaments and powers to it.”166 They are impostures who wrongly “give the 
church the prestige of a monarchy” instead of practically educating the character of its 
people.167 In addition, the systematic arrangements of theology in places like Princeton 
caused unnecessary dissension in the churches. The attempt at “anchoring” a person in 
the faith by submitting him to catechetical formulations actually encased his soul in “an 
opinion;” it shut him in and was “training him to be a sectarian before he is a Christian.” 
Bushnell called for a return to the less dogmatic and simple gospel found within the 
Nicene or Apostles Creed.168 The creeds were confessions of worship, not scientific 
explanations of the unknown. Bushnell critiqued the “New England teachers,” including 
the late Jonathan Edwards,169 who “for nearly a century” had taught penal substitution in 
Christ’s atonement.170 For Bushnell, the suffering of the innocent in the place of the 
guilty “shocks the most immoveable, and most nearly innate convictions of our moral 
nature.”171 Bushnell found it repugnant to suggest that God’s justice was so thirsty for 
suffering that it would not be satisfied until a victim’s blood was shed.172 Such 
“theological constructions” made it impossible to sympathetically understand the depth of 
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Christ’s salvation. The suggestion that Christ was “punitively treated in his person” 
violated the subject matter and was “an offense to our most inborn convictions.”173  
 Instead, Bushnell found poetic power in the “moral view” of atonement, which 
had been “in all ages” of the Church. The reconciliation wrought by Christ’s death was 
accomplished in the depths of his “character.”174 The suffering which Christ endured 
throughout his “life and ministry” was the “reconciling power” of God at work in him.175 
Bushnell referenced Luke 22:44, where the Scripture says that Christ, in deep agony, 
sweat great drops of blood. Through this passage, Bushnell acknowledged that Christ 
brought salvation through his agony. However, Bushnell rejected “judicial chastening” 
found in traditional atonement theologies.176 The depth of Christ’s personal agony was a 
“mystery” for Bushnell, something that was “unrealizable” by “dogmatic solutions.” 
Dogmatism actually confounded rather than solved the mystery. For Bushnell, the 
mystery of salvation was something that was unknown, or “certainly” not able to be 
understood “on earth.”177 The several theories of atonement actually divided God’s 
people, rather than united them in awe of Christ. 
Bushnell used the illustration of an overbearing parent to critique the dogmatic 
tendencies of ecclesiastics. Godly character within parents was a greater need than rigid 
rules. Didactic teaching was insufficient in itself to nurture a child in the Christian faith. 
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Parents needed to do more than command children to turn to Christ; they needed to 
possess “such qualities or qualifications as to be able to command.”178 Bushnell said the 
sin of some parents was they “command, govern, manage, punish, teach, and turn about 
the way of their child” “without any sacred qualifications”179 for themselves. He 
criticized parents who made a habit of petty commands and criticisms of their children. 
These parents, especially the fathers, “discourage” their children from true Christian 
piety.180 “It is a great discouragement to piety in children, when they are governed in a 
hard, unfeeling, way or in a manner of force and overbearing absolutism.”181  
Bushnell blamed dogmatists, such as those at Princeton, for the increased distaste 
for traditional faith in American society. Their rigidity had pushed many people away. 
Bushnell asserted that a mystical awareness must return to the Christian faith. Dogmatism 
needed to be chastened, not completely discarded.  Some in Bushnell’s day were trying to 
form a “new Christianity, the more liberal, advanced belief” which was free from dogma. 
For Bushnell, this new Christianity reduced everything to nature, where “all the flaming 
glories of the gospel are stifled as extravagances.” For Bushnell, such liberalism had no 
salvation.182 He rejected the reduction of all things to nature; the grace of God was 
supernatural, and it gradually worked God’s salvation in society. “True, there is no grace 
that will suddenly make us perfect; but there is a grace that will take away all conscious 
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sinning,” eventually “raising us above the dominating power of sin.”183 On this point, 
Princeton’s Charles Hodge possibly misunderstood Bushnell. 
Hodge complimented Bushnell for his Discourses on Christian Nurture as 
“organic” and “distinguished,” very much in the “Old School” cast.184 Hodge appreciated 
Bushnell’s critique of revivalism. However, Hodge criticized Bushnell’s lack of the 
supernatural in human salvation. According to Hodge, Bushnell’s view of redemption did 
not take depravity seriously enough; salvation was an ordinary result of natural causes.185 
While rejecting the emotional emphasis of the revivals, Hodge contended that salvation 
still needed to be an instantaneous, supernatural event. Bushnell rejoined by accusing 
Hodge of the same individualism of the revivalists. In retrospect, Bushnell did not 
abandon the idea of supernatural intervention in redemption as Hodge feared; instead, he 
deemphasized its instantaneous aspect in personal Christian development. Bushnell 
heightened the value of character development in the community of faith. The 
conservative Calvinists within the Congregational denomination were livid with 
Bushnell’s theology because he was open to integrating aspects of Arminianism into 
Calvinism; he had compromised his dogmatics. They pressed for a heresy trial for many 
years. Bushnell’s local Congregational government refused to indict him and shielded 
him from their formal assaults. Bushnell’s works significantly influenced many American 
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theologians, and help propel a liberal movement that demystified more than Bushnell had 
envisioned. One of the theologians particularly influenced by Bushnell, but who went 
beyond him, was Walter Rauschenbusch. 
Walter Rauschenbusch 
Walter Rauschenbusch (1861–1918), from Rochester Seminary, helped shape the 
Social Gospel movement in America. Rauschenbusch had studied in America and 
Europe. He drew on Bushnell’s works and those of German scholars Adolf von Harnack 
and Albrecht Ritschl. Rauschenbush’s work deemphasized the mystical aspects of 
Christianity even further than Bushnell did. He championed the practical manifestation of 
the Kingdom of God. 
For Rauschenbusch, modern Christian theology was perverted in almost all of its 
forms. Therefore, a prophetic call was needed to return to primitive Christianity. In his 
mind, the social gospel was that prophetic summons; it denounced the “ceremonial 
performances”186 of organized religion and called Christians back to “original purity,”187 
“absolute spirituality,” a faith that was “almost wholly emancipated from ceremonial 
elements, insisting simply on right relations to men as the true expression of religion.”188  
The ancient gospel of the “primitive” church was originally focused on ethical treatment 
of one’s fellow as the primary concern of religion. Rauschenbusch saw the life of Jesus as 
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the “highest perfection” of the “historical evolution of religion.”189 Ancient Christianity 
was originally a “great revolutionary movement” armed with a “pledge to change the 
world,”190 not to strive to live in another sphere. However, after Jesus, “Christianity 
quickly dropped back to the pre-Christian stage.”191 After Christ, “ceremonial actions and 
orthodox beliefs became indispensable to salvation.”192 “When the inspirationism of the 
primitive church died out, the understanding of its nature grew artificial.”193 The 
realization of the Church’s “charismatic” life faded from memory. Christianity had “lost 
its power of moral transformation” because it “turned its deepest interest from ethical 
conduct to sacramental ritual.”194 Contrary to common teaching in the churches, the rite 
of baptism was not originally intended to be a “ritual” related to personal salvation. 
Instead, it was properly understood as a “dedication to a religious and social 
movement.”195 Over time, Christian ceremonies of Baptism and Eucharist became 
superstitious and magical, and lost sight of the gospel’s ethical imperative.  
Rauschenbusch blamed medieval theology, especially the “teaching authority” of 
the Church, for the increase of superstition within Christianity. The hierarchical Church 
had “systematized and reinforced” practices which were irrational. These included the 
sign of the cross, prayers, and “naming of holy names.” The “Papacy” was a “haughty, 
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luxurious, domineering” “international hierarchy” which obstructed a “freer religion.”196 
Just as ancient, backslidden Israel’s leaders resisted the prophets, so modern “religions of 
authority” resisted the prophets, like Rauschenbusch, who railed against systemic evils. 
The modern ecclesiastical hierarchy used the sayings of old prophets to “furnish a 
supernatural basis”197 for its old doctrines.  
Rauschenbusch also decried lower church theological movements within 
Protestantism. The dogmatics of both orthodox and revivalist evangelicals focused on 
individual salvation, to the neglect of the primitive revolutionary intentions of Jesus. The 
weakness with the “individualistic gospel” was that it did not “evoke faith in the will and 
power of God”198 to transform permanent institutions of society. Its focus on individual 
sins failed to address the deeper problems in society. The “old theological system” was 
“puny and inadequate”199 in the face of societal needs. It was a “dumb-bell system of 
thought.”200  
 According to Rauschenbusch, an integrated theology of individual and societal 
salvation was needed. “Religion wants wholeness of life.”201 Personal salvation certainly 
included the entrance of an individual spirit “into voluntary obedience to God,” whence it 
“feels the higher freedom”202 of Christ. However, personal salvation was insufficient if it 
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did not engage one’s society. “Complete salvation” involved the free coordination of 
one’s personal life with “the life of his fellowship in obedience to the loving impulses of 
the spirit of God.”203 True Christian salvation “must turn from a life centered on 
ourselves toward a life going out toward God and men.”204  
Rauschenbusch referenced Jesus’ critique of the Pharisees traversing sea and land 
to make a single proselyte, only to have him became a ghastlier child of hell, to say that 
revival religion might even make people worse. Referencing the revivals of D. L.  
Moody, Rauschenbusch warned that an emphasis on personal salvation only produced 
“skin-deep changes.”205  
Rauschenbusch intentionally demystified his theology. The social gospel was 
practical, and it contained nothing that would “breed or reinforce superstition.”206 Its 
focus was on “ethical righteousness.” Sin, for example, was not a supernatural flaw 
inherited from one’s progenitors. Instead, following Schleiermacher, Rauschenbusch 
argued that sin was a defect common to all. It was “essentially selfishness.”207 Only 
social salvation could address the universal human flaw, and restore communal 
righteousness. Righteousness must be organized because salvation was more 
comprehensive than mere personal liberation. Rauschenbusch did not completely dismiss 
the need for personal forgiveness of sins; social salvation included personal forgiveness. 
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However, the doctrine of a vicarious atonement of Christ was “rigid” and too 
individualistic.  
Rauschenbusch admitted that the death of Christ was central to Paul’s theology. 
However, he argued that the “early church never appropriated or utilized more than a 
few” of Paul’s ideas. How, then did Rauschenbusch think Jesus bore humanity’s sins? 
For Rauschenbusch, it was not by imputation because personal guilt and merit “cannot be 
transferred from one person to another.” Instead, Jesus bore human sin with an 
“unparalleled sense of human solidarity.”208 He “generalized his personal experiences” 
and made them significant for everyone. Jesus did not pay a penalty for peoples’ 
particular sins, but he bore the “weight of public sins of organized society”209 through his 
suffering. And, those public sins which Jesus bore were “casually connected” with all 
private sins. Rauschenbusch outright denied the Church dogma on atonement. 
Rauschenbusch saw himself as in the middle of the theological spectrum. To his 
own mind, he was prophetically restoring the “primitive gospel” through his work. On 
one hand, the social gospel was more religious than the “orthodox type” because it 
emphasized the primitive idea of ethics. On the other hand, it was more positive than the 
“liberal type” because it emphasized action. For Rauschenbusch, the social gospel was 
the “old message of salvation, but enlarged and intensified.”210  
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Summary 
To this reader, the two expressions of liberalism surveyed in this chapter 
benefitted biblical studies by providing a larger understanding of the biblical text. 
However, their liability was that they were often narrow-minded.  
Historical criticism, in its various forms, attempted to begin with the text of the 
Bible. Through scientific investigation, which was assumed to be unbiased, it sought to 
get at the world behind the text. Historical criticism was able to illuminate the original 
meaning of particular texts, as well as detect redactions in the Bible. In addition, efforts 
to reconstruct the historical setting of the text uncovered the influence of other world 
literature on Scripture. The value of these efforts was inestimable towards trying to 
reconstruct the world of the text. Although some critical conclusions were viewed as 
sinister by those who held traditional confessions, the scholarship displayed an 
unashamed openness to understanding the raw text of Scripture. Bushnell, 
Rauschenbusch, and other socially-minded theologians highlighted the neglected aspect 
of charity in the Christian gospel,211 as well as the communal aspect of salvation.212 The 
gospel was the life force of Christianity, and it could not be reduced to Princeton’s 
principles abstracted from propositional revelation. Nor could it be cheapened by 
shallow, quick conversions. In addition, these theologians attempted to redirect 
evangelical attention away from narcissistic concerns to broader societal needs. The 
affairs of this world, located in real history, mattered.  
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Despite liberal theologians’ positive impact on exegesis, they appeared closed-
minded at crucial moments. Many biasedly assumed the impossibility of the supernatural 
in the world of the text. At the same time, they presumed their own impartiality. By 
closing themselves off to the role of faith in exegesis, they limited their reach. In 
addition, by claiming traditional dogma, such as Christ’s Atonement, to be the remnants 
of a “bigot age,” some demonstrated a lack of openness to the fullness of Christian 
theology. Others simply ignored what was clearly written in the New Testament. Their 
own prejudices hamstrung their scholarly efforts. Bushnell and Rauschenbusch 
minimized, and even rejected, dogmatic elements of Christianity; but, they did not realize 
they were disfiguring the faith in the process. From this perspective, a lack of 
ecclesiology was near the root of the problem. It was difficult for apparently disputing 
theologies to co-habit without a common home. 
Mercersburg Theology 
During the 1840s and 1850s, John Williamson Nevin (1803–1886) and Phillip 
Schaff (1819–1893) led a significant attempt to reform Protestant theology at the small 
German Reformed seminary in Mercersburg, Pennsylvania. Mercersburg’s theology is 
especially relevant to this dissertation because of its attempt to import elements of 
Catholic teaching into American Protestantism, creating what some called Reformed or 
Evangelical Catholicism. Mercersburg’s theologians were some of the only Americans to 
assert that evangelical theology needed both a mystical Church and the Roman Catholic 
Church. For them, genuine reform required a robust ecclesiology.  
Both Nevin and Shaff came into the German Reformed Church from outside the 
denomination, “bringing with them broad perspectives, interdenominational friendships, 
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and a passion for ecumenical unity.”213 Nevin was raised Scots-Irish Presbyterian and 
trained at Princeton. Although he was initially supportive of Old School Presbyterianism, 
his “enthusiasm”214 for contemporary German thinking was part of the reason the 
German Reformed Church called him to Mercersburg. Schaff, Swiss by birth and trained 
in Europe, was a product of the Lutheran Awakening that occurred throughout Europe in 
the early years of the nineteenth century.215 Although Mercersburg was not located in 
New York, Philadelphia, or Boston, its seminary “may have had wider horizons than any 
other center of American theology in its time.”216 The polarizing debates surrounding 
revivalism and biblical criticism were dominating the religious landscape at the time.217 
Nevin and Schaff saw no lasting value in popular revivalism, or in the diminished 
supernaturalism of Bushnell. Further, Princeton’s scientific exegesis neglected the living 
history of the Christian Church. The result of sola scriptura in America had been 
disastrous. American Protestantism needed reform. 
Christocentric Theology 
 In “Theology of the New Liturgy,” an article written shortly after the Civil 
War,218 Nevin reflected on Mercersburg’s theology as an attempt to apprehend theology’s 
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“nature,” its “interior character and constitution.”219 Nevin and others were convinced 
that American theology was too provincial, focusing on “one or two points of theological 
opinion” while neglecting the “universal view.”220 As a remedy, Nevin laid out three 
areas where Mercersburg’s theology attempted to reform American Protestantism. 
First, theology needed to be Christological. Nevin and Schaff’s theology, unlike 
most American evangelical thought, was Christocentric and sacramental. “Christ 
himself” was present in the Christian faith. “The religion which he brought into the world 
was not merely given by him; it was in him, and remains in him still, as its living 
fountain.”221 All doctrines and promises must revolve around Christ, not the text of 
Scripture. All dogmatic “concepts gather themselves up into Him ultimately as their 
root.”222 Practically, this meant that all interpretation of Scripture was governed by the 
faith that Christ provided the full meaning of the text. For Nevin, each act of exegesis 
must “pass through the mystery of the Incarnation” and stand “perpetually in the presence 
and power of that fact.”223 Theology’s “facts and forms are not enough;”224 they must be 
interpreted from a view of the whole, which was only gained with a Christocentric lens. 
Christ’s person, not the text of the Bible, was the first principle of theology at 
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Mercersburg. Each particular tile was analyzed under the presumption that it contributed 
to the living mosaic of Jesus Christ.  
Second, theology needed to be “ruled by the Apostles Creed.”225 Nevin’s point 
here was that the Creed provided the comprehensive view of the faith. The interpreter of 
Scripture must start from the whole view of Christian faith prior to asserting the meaning 
of select sacred passages. For Nevin, it was this comprehensive vision of the Creed that 
contained the power to reform the Church.226 Although the words of the Creed were not 
strictly composed by the Apostles, it was a “common rule of faith, or canon of truth, 
which the Universal Church held from the beginning.”227 In another place, Nevin said 
that the Bible needed to be interpreted within the “orbit of the creed,” from within the 
communion of the Church. “The Bible, to be a true word of Christ, must be ruled by the 
life of the Church.”228  
Throughout his career, Nevin resisted Princeton’s reduction of theology to a 
“science” because that method focused on parts of Scripture to the neglect of the “whole 
history of Christian revelation.”229 Purely inductive approaches to exegesis also resulted 
in ecclesiastical division. All of the various sects claimed a supreme “regard for the 
Bible,”230 but this did little to maintain unity in the faith. “It sounds well to lay so much 
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stress on the authority of the Bible as the only textbook and guide for Christianity. But 
what are we to think of it when we find such a motley mass of protesting systems.”231 
Nevin cited numerous contemporary examples within the Congregationalist, Methodist, 
Baptist, and Presbyterian denominations to argue that the “breaking of church 
communion” occurred at the hands of those who claimed the “exclusive authority of the 
Scriptures.”232  
Third, theology needed to be “objective and historical.” God had objectively 
revealed himself in time; therefore, the history of revelation needed to be examined 
before the “subjective or experimental”233 was explored. This point sought to avoid 
excessive individualism. Theology could not be reduced to a system of “subjective 
notions” “born only of the human mind.” God was not a magician who exclusively spoke 
to individual souls “as enthusiasts and fanatics fondly dream.”234 The veracity of 
Christianity went beyond cold rationalism, with its abstract thought and “metaphysical 
theory of God and religion.”235 Nevin admitted that, according to his faith, indeed “the 
gospel is supernatural; but it is the supernatural joined in a new order of existence to the 
natural; and this, it can only be in the form of history.”236  
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For Nevin, the Incarnation, that “great fact” which occurred in “natural 
history,”237 was where objective research of divine revelation must start. On this point, 
the significance of the Creed came into play. For Nevin, the Creed confessed the “whole 
significance” of the “Divine deed” of Christ’s Incarnation, “whereby God manifested 
himself in the flesh.”238 However, the Church was examined “next” as the ongoing 
“historical character of Christianity.”239 For Nevin, the gospel’s “supernatural economy” 
in its “perennial force” needed to be surveyed; it was insufficient to only have 
“memories” of God’s revelation in Christ.240 The “carrying out of this mystery of 
godliness among men,” and the “new order of existence that was constituted for the 
world by the great fact of the Incarnation”241 must be investigated. This field of study was 
the “objective, historical form” of the “Holy Catholic Church as we have it in the 
Creed.”242 Nevin claimed that “the supernatural, as thus made permanent and historical in 
the Church, must, in the nature of the case, correspond with the form of the supernatural, 
as it appeared originally in Christ himself.”243  
Ecclesiology 
For Mercersburg’s theologians, the Christian Church was sacramental. God had 
continually revealed himself in both the natural body of Christ and the ecclesial body of 
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his Church. The Church was not merely a human construct, nor should it be considered 
an obstacle to theology. Rather, as an ongoing manifestation, it was an essential “medium 
of communication between Christ and his people.”244 God’s salvific grace was found in 
the Church in ways it was not present in the world. To Mercersburg’s theologians, the 
idea of an invisible Church tragically restricted the objective nature of the Incarnation to 
“memories only of what was once such a real presence in the world.”245 Such a view 
disregarded the organic constitution of the gospel. Furthermore, to present God’s 
revelation in ahistorical terms was insensitive to the increasing self-consciousness of the 
modern generation.246 The history of the Church needed to be studied in order to 
understand God’s revelation in Christ.  
Mercersburg’s sacramental ecclesiology led them to reconsider the presence of 
the Roman Catholic Church in human history. On one hand, Nevin and Schaff rejected 
outright several Catholic doctrines and placed the Catholic Church in a light that would 
be unacceptable to a practicing Catholic. For Nevin, the ecclesiology which was “held by 
Rome and also by Oxford” was a “terrible error.”247 For Schaff, its “central sin” was 
“creature deification.” By “making itself identical with the universal church,”248 the 
Catholic Church excluded the necessary development of Protestantism. For Schaff, a 
significant problem with Catholic doctrine was that its “predominant spirit” was 
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“legal.”249 On the other hand, Mercersburg’s theologians affirmed the “legitimate” and 
“divinely appointed” role of the Catholic Church.250 As part of the Church Militant, the 
Catholic Church “has error along with the truth;” she “bears golden treasures in earthen 
vessels.”251 The “error itself contains a truth,”252 and “the truth will never disappear from 
her communion.”253 The truth may be “obscured,” but “never absolutely lost.”254 For 
Schaff, it was “unhistorical and unchurchly altogether” for evangelicals to reject the 
Catholic Church. Such a view was either “conscious” or “unconscious” “treason.”255 
Christ had promised to “build his church on a rock” and perpetually guide it. Schaff noted 
that Paul referenced the Church as the “pillar and ground of truth.”256 For Schaff, the 
Catholic Church was “the legitimate bearer of the Christian faith and life;” it was a 
“divinely appointed preparatory institute.”257 In his 1849 article, False Protestantism, 
written for the Mercersburg Review, Nevin cautioned his fellow Protestants that “the loss 
of the pope is not necessarily, in and of itself, the gain of Christ.”258 The “worst” kind of 
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zeal for Protestants was to blindly support an opinion or action simply because it opposed 
Rome. 
 Within the framework of Hegelian dialectic, Schaff argued that the Roman 
Catholic Church had been the legitimate bearer of Christian life and faith. However, 
during its ancient and medieval form, the Catholic Church was “pressed with the inward 
necessary impulse towards Protestantism.”259 Chronologically, the Catholic Church was 
the thesis; the Reformation was the antithesis; the future ecumenical union, which 
Mercersburg was participating in, would be the synthesis. In this outline, a denial of the 
Catholic Church’s legitimacy would have jeopardized the validity of Protestantism.  
It was wrong, in Schaff’s mind, to think that the Reformation was a break with the 
Catholic Church. “Thousands” of Protestants misunderstand the Reformation by 
“separating it from all right relation to the time that went before.”260 Instead of being a 
break, Protestantism was an organic development from the ancient and medieval Catholic 
Church.261 The Reformation was not to be “regarded as a revolutionary separation from 
the Catholic Church, holding connection at best with some fractionary sect of the Middle 
Ages.”262 Sadly, for Schaff, many of his fellows “renounce the wealth of the Middle 
Ages” and forget the Lord’s promise to be with his Church until the end of the age.263 For 
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Schaff, the Protestant Reformation was “an absolute historic necessity.”264 The 
Reformation served the Catholic Church by the attempt at “raising it” to a “new and 
higher form.’”265 As an example, the sixteenth-century Reformed doctrine of justification 
and other soteriological tenets had not yet been addressed by general councils. The 
Church developed these doctrines over time, and the Reformation helped finally 
articulate the mature teachings. Schaff likened the relationship between Catholicism and 
Protestantism to the relationship of Law and Gospel.266 Protestantism did not destroy 
Catholicism; by design, it perfected Catholicism. 
For Schaff, the final synthesis between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism was 
beginning to occur, and one day the ideal fusion would be realized. Therefore, it was the 
“duty” of all Christians to seek reconciliation and “unity”267 despite the current disease of 
sectarianism. “All these storms that gather in the horizon, will but serve fully to purify 
the atmosphere.”268 The “mighty advances of the Romish Church” will “compel the 
Protestants to take another position,”269 resulting in ecumenical unity. The 
“consummation” of both Catholicism and Protestantism will be “at the same time their 
union.”270 “Why should we despair of another Reformation?”271 In a manner similar to 
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late nineteenth-century Russian author Vladimir Solovyov, Schaff used the apostles 
Peter, Paul, and John to represent the three stages of Christianity. Peter represented the 
Catholic stage, Paul the Protestant stage, and John the final unity.272 The “great task,” in 
the eyes of Mercersburg’s theologians, was both ecumenical and theological; it was 
“bringing Christianity to its last universal form.” 273 Mercersburg saw itself as a catalyst 
of the final synthesis.274 
The theologians’ warmness towards Rome was too much for their Protestant peers 
to accept. Schaff’s “Principle of Protestantism” immediately met disapproval in America, 
leading to a heresy trial before his new denomination in York, Pennsylvania, in 1845. 
Schaff was accused of exalting Tradition over Scripture, and secretly trying to bring 
Christians back to the shackles of the Roman Church. Schaff was not convicted, but the 
suspicions and verbal polemics continued to hound him. The American revivalists, whom 
Nevin sarcastically called Puritans, feared that any “churchly, priestly, sacramental” 
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element was identical to the “abomination of Romanism itself.”275 Mercersburg’s 
German Reformed denomination had accepted the wildfire revivals positively, which left 
the denomination’s leadership uneasy with Nevin and Schaff’s criticism of heart-felt 
religion. American Protestants were anxious over suspected Catholic infiltration, and 
shunned nearly any semblance of a sacramental faith. The American theological mind 
could not handle a mystical ecclesiology. 
Interpretation of Scripture 
Mercersburg’s theology elevated the role of Tradition in the interpretation of 
Scripture. For them, biblical theology was incomplete without studying the “real 
supernatural constitution unfolding itself historically in the world.” An exegesis which 
elevated detached systematic propositions as its goal, neglected Christ’s “permanent 
order of life.”276 Christianity’s truth could not be reduced to propositions derived from a 
scientific analysis of a closed text, developed without regard to the dynamism of history, 
and the Spirit moving within that history. The very conception of Christianity is that its 
“supernatural economy should be of perennial force;” its resources and powers of 
salvation, if they were indeed for all ages, must be ever present in an objective and 
historical manifestation. For Nevin, the Church, “standing in the middle” of the Apostles’ 
Creed, was the “objective, historical movement of the grace” manifested in Christ. 
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Theology, then, must be “at once sacramental.”277 “The theology we are speaking of, 
then, is churchly.”278  
For Mercersburg Seminary’s theologians, the Scriptures must be read with an 
ecclesial consciousness. Following Schleiermacher and Tübingen’s Johann Adam 
Möhler, Schaff taught that Tradition was more than the “objective aggregate of beliefs” 
and practices arbitrarily handed down.279 Tradition was also the subjective and common 
apprehension of the Church. Reading a pure Bible was neither possible nor desirable. 
Biblical exegesis void of Tradition, as “held by many, particularly in our own time,” is 
beset by “insuperable difficulties.” Biblicism possessed an “isolated character” and 
brought a “lifeless void of eighteen centuries between its completion and the present 
time.”280 It neglected the reality that the Church was the definite object of the Spirit’s 
activity in the world. In addition, the very existence of multiple sects demonstrated that 
those who “dismiss tradition in favor of Scripture” were nonetheless reading it through 
their own denomination’s customs. Biblical exegesis needed to occur within the range of 
creedal confession. Nevin acknowledged that traditions had been misused, but he 
understood they still expressed “deep and sacred truth.”281  
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Both Nevin and Schaff argued that the Church needed to be ruled by the Bible;282 
Scripture was primary. Schaff “conceded” that Church and Tradition preceded the New 
Testament; apostolic testimony existed in the Church prior to the writing of the gospel. 
However, Tradition alone could not preserve the “purity and simplicity” of the “Christian 
doctrine,”283 as if it were a self-sufficient testimony.284 For Nevin, the Bible was the 
living flow of the Spirit that had been continuously poured into the Church throughout all 
ages, conditioning its life. Nevin saw the Bible as “supreme” in relation to Tradition, 
which left room for private judgment within the parameters of creedal confession.285  
Schaff complained that the Catholic Church had as “its object” to “subordinate” 
the Bible to Tradition, and then to make the Church “the infallible judge of both.”286 
Although several Catholic traditions were neither explicitly demonstrated in Scripture nor 
had received universal acceptance, the Catholic Church nonetheless insisted on the 
importance of those traditions.287 Schaff noted that very many Catholic dogmas rose in 
the middle ages after Augustine.288 In Schaff’s estimation, Catholics thought Tradition 
“springs in part from Christ himself, and in part from the Apostles under the guidance of 
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the Holy Spirit.”289 For Schaff, Tradition was “regenerated reason, the Christian 
consciousness of the Church; which stands not beside the Scriptures as an independent 
fountain, but is simply the streams of their contents reaching to us through the life of the 
Church, embracing always only what is contained in the Scriptures themselves.”290  
Mercersburg theology placed the Bible in a derived and correlative position.291 
Nevin acknowledged that Church and Tradition could be exalted to such a height as to 
“put Christ in the shade,” but so could the Bible.292 Although the former was a weakness 
of Catholics, the latter was the hazard of American Protestantism. “Blind outward 
authority, and mere private judgment are alike insufficient as a key to the Bible.”293 A 
hermeneutical circle of Scripture, Tradition, and private illumination was needed to 
govern the right interpretation of the Bible. “Will it be said that this is a circle? Be it 
so!”294 For Nevin, both Scripture and Tradition were siblings, sprung from Christ’s one 
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presence in the Church. The Church was “the living revelation” of God, and the Bible his 
written word. They both ever “do homage to Christ” by virtue of their “nature.”295 “Creed 
and New Testament were coordinate, independent testimonies and vehicles of the same 
revelation.”296 Regardless of distinctions between them, both of Mercersburg Seminary’s 
primary theologians argued for the theological role of ecclesiastical tradition in exegesis. 
Biblical exegetes needed Church Tradition because “without a continuous tradition” all 
“higher sense for the Scriptures would fail us.”297  
Mercersburg theologians insisted on an ecclesial hermeneutic in their polemics on 
soteriology. Although Nevin agreed with Bushnell’s critique of the “ostentatious methods 
of promoting religion”298 in Finney’s revivals, the incompleteness of Bushnell’s own 
doctrine of moral atonement, as well as Hodge’s shallow teaching on forensic 
justification, alarmed him.  
Soteriology 
John Nevin was troubled that German Reformed churches were increasingly 
interested in revivalism,299 even though the movement had brought division into his 
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today as Churches of God, General Conference. Cf. Randall H. Balmer, “John Winebrenner,” Encyclopedia 
of Evangelicalism (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2004), 753. 
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denomination.300 He did not reject all the effects of revivals, but he had little patience for 
them. He admitted that “some” people were “converted in fact” at the revivals, but the 
“general operation” of the system remained “intrinsically and permanently bad.”301 The 
revivalists’ sales methods and undue pressuring of people were shallow substitutions for 
genuine spiritual care. People were being coerced to do what only God could accomplish; 
pressurized sales gimmicks were used to convert souls. In his work, The Anxious Bench, 
Nevin said the revivalist techniques were “quackery,” within the reach of “fanaticism and 
error.”302 They procured quick conversions, but little substantial change. Even earlier 
revivalists “Whitefield and Edwards needed no new measures” to move people, unlike 
the modern “quacks.”303 Nevin laid bare the need for a “different system altogether” in 
order to build up the people of God. To him, catechesis within a living and structured 
Church provided a firmer alternative to the “shallow and fleeting experience” of 
revivalism.304 Unfortunately, “the spirit of the anxious bench was at war with the spirit of 
Catechism.”305  
Nevin applauded Bushnell for teaching that Christ’s death brought “a higher 
moral sense in mankind,” and produced “a more appalling conviction of their guilt, or 
                                                          
300 Nichols, Mercersburg Theology, 8. For example, the United Brethren in Christ and the Church of God 
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301 Nevin, Anxious Bench, 15. 
302 Nevin, Anxious Bench, 19. 
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304 Hewitt, Regeneration and Morality, 95; and Nevin Anxious Bench, 55–56. 
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guiltiness, before God.”306 However, in Nevin’s estimation, Bushnell failed to articulate a 
sacramental understanding of salvation.307 Bushnell’s theology did not allow the Church 
to convey grace, especially in its sacraments. To Nevin, Bushnell was correct in asserting 
that revivals did not result in genuine regeneration and Christian morality. However, 
Bushnell was incorrect in suggesting that Christian character was primarily achieved by 
natural processes. According to Bushnell, God used the death of Christ to raise the moral 
consciousness of his people; God used natural means and mental processes, not Nevin’s 
superstitious appropriation of sacraments, to develop inner human integrity.308 Nevin was 
dissatisfied with the “whole” method of moral atonement because it remained “something 
external to the subject of salvation itself.”309 For Nevin, mere “appeals addressed to the 
understanding and will”310 in the “process of education”311 are only “outward” 
persuasions. Nevin complained that in Bushnell’s thinking, Christ was “gazed upon and 
admired” as being outside of one’s self,312 but he never constitutively or directly 
influenced the soul. For Nevin, personal salvation needed to result in a new life, not just a 
reoriented life. Salvation occurred “by an inward living union with Christ.”313 The 
mystical union between the believer and Christ was more than following the example of 
                                                          
306 Bushnell, Christ and his Salvation, 117. 
307 Hewitt, Regeneration and Morality, 135.  
308 Hewitt, Regeneration and Morality, 154. 
309 Nevin, Mystical Presence, 165. 
310 Nevin, Mystical Presence, 165. 
311 Nevin, Mystical Preesnce, 165. 
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Jesus; salvation was a new life resulting from the actual entrance of the real Christ.314 In 
partaking of Holy Communion, one encountered the real presence of Jesus Christ. 
Communion is a “participation of the Savior’s life.”315 Nevin contended that if he could 
not partake in what he gazed upon, then “I am left to starve and perish spiritually in the 
midst of a merely moral and rationalistic redemption.”316 Bushnell’s Christian nurture 
had muted the supernatural and forgot that “Christianity is redemption and atonement.”317 
 Nevin judged Princeton’s teaching on imputation to be “higher and more 
orthodox” than moral theories of atonement.318 In Princeton’s system, the believer 
personally participated in Christ’s redemption by faith, and he was legally reckoned 
righteous before God. Supernaturally, God, “in virtue of the terms of the New Covenant,” 
transferred Christ’s righteousness and multiplied benefits to the believer. However, Nevin 
complained that this view of justification only provided a “mere forensic act on the part 
of God;”319 it involved “no change of character whatever but only a change of state.”320 
Legal imputation of Christ’s righteousness said little about personal transformation 
beyond a promise of future sanctification; it issued divine decisions rather than Christian 
attributes. Such a narrow view was “unintelligible” to Nevin because it only involved an 
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“abstract, outward transfer of Christ’s righteousness.”321 For Nevin, salvation was more 
than judicious decisions, but its “last and deepest root” was the “unity of Christ in 
God.”322 Christian salvation required more than the mere “presence and influence”323 of a 
mediator; Christ’s “actual personality”324 was essential. According to Nevin, it needed to 
be understood that Christ was “in the believer, and the believer in Christ” in a “bond of 
common life.” It was this idea of salvation that satisfied what “the Scriptures teach” 
about “new life.”325 The “nature of Christian salvation” required this union, and the 
“demands of the heart and understanding”326 yearned for it. For Nevin, salvation meant 
that “Christ does indeed dwell in his people by the real presence of his personal life, 
through the Spirit, and not simply by the presence of his Spirit as a surrogate for his 
own.” Christ’s “whole life” was participated in through the “mystical union.”327 For 
Nevin, the Eucharist was the “true supernatural vehicle and bearer” of the presence of 
Christ.328 Regeneration was mystical, and “the context” of the mystical “occurrence”329 
                                                          
321 Nevin, Mystical Presence, 169.  
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of salvation was the Church. It would be “treason to the gospel” to deny the fact that 
salvation contained a personal aspect.330 However, it would be equally “one sided and 
false” to “exclude the dependence of the individual spiritual life” from the general life of 
the Church.331  
Summary 
Aspects of Mercersburg’s “Protestant Catholicism”332 were unique within 
America’s religious landscape; they sought to undo negative trends within modernity by 
offering a “churchly” theology. Mercersburg Seminary called for true revival, but they 
centered it in Church life replete with creed. They not only affirmed the need for 
Tradition and a visibly-structured Church, but they directly claimed that the Catholic 
Church was essential for a vital Protestant interpretation of Scripture. Nevin and Schaff 
can be credited for opening their theological minds to sacred voices outside their own 
immediate traditions. It was August Neander who first encouraged them to study patristic 
works, and they were influenced by their own contemporaries, such as Johann Möhler 
from Tübingen. Their openness was due to their commitment to the objective and 
historical nature of theology; they sought continuity beyond their own Reformed milieu.  
Mercersburg Seminary’s ecclesiology was able to uphold the central authority of 
Scripture without burdening it with the entire weight of Christianity. Their affirmation of 
the historical character of divine revelation enabled them to assert traditional Christian 
                                                          
330 Nevin, introduction to Schaff’s Principle of Protestantism, 12. 
331 Ibid. 
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dogma; they sought to align their theology with the churches through the ages. Nevin and 
Schaff  based their understanding of a sacramental Church on the Incarnation of Christ. 
The result was that their theology sustained belief in the Virgin Birth, Resurrection of 
Christ, and the trustworthiness of Scripture, all the while engaging modern thinkers such 
as Hegel, Schleiermacher, and Baur. In addition, their conviction of Christ’s presence in 
the Church “until the end of the age” propelled them to seek unity among other 
denominations; their eschatological understanding freed them to labor under the 
assumption that Christian unity would indeed be realized. 
Despite these strengths in Mercersburg theology, several problems become 
obvious as well. Their analogy of Catholicism and Protestantism paralleling Jewish Law 
and Christian Grace floundered. Contrary to Mercersburg’s teachings, the sixteenth-
century Reformers did not call for a “new” New Testament. In addition, Catholicism, in 
reality, was based on faith in Christ’s grace and the power of his Spirit, not on a letter that 
kills. Although Nevin and Schaff affirmed the value of the Catholic Church, they only 
tolerated a restricted version of it. They acknowledged the divine role of historical 
Catholicism, but not its current status. This might have been possible without forfeiting 
all of their theological differences with the Catholic Church. Finally, despite their efforts 
at ecumenical unity, and especially in light of their appreciation of patristic sources, it is 
noteworthy that the Eastern Orthodox churches were largely neglected by Mercersburg’s 
theologians. In some ways, the Orthodox churches of the East are closer aligned with 
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Catholicism than Protestant churches. Yet, the Hegelian dialectic of Schaff excluded the 
eastern churches.333  
In the end, and despite good intentions, Mercersburg theology was not able to 
maintain its own movement. Similar to other Protestant attempts at renewal, it failed to 
realize its goals. Some of the reason might lie in their peers. Not many nineteenth-century 
evangelicals expressed openness to sacramental ecclesiology. Another reason might be 
their theology’s devaluation of the contemporary Catholic Church. Their Hegelian 
dialectic did not put them face-to-face adequately with the present day Catholic Church. 
Continued fragmentation occurred over time, and the German Reformed Church was 
ultimately merged into the United Church of Christ, a denomination well known for 
dismantling traditional orthodox Christian dogma. Demystification was inevitable 
because Mercersburg Seminary could not amply safeguard the deposit of faith.334 The 
Apostles Creed was insufficient to preserving the faith without the living voice that first 
spoke the creed.  
The Resultant Rupture 
Controversies between fundamentalists and modernists at Princeton reached an 
apex in the early twentieth century, resulting in a deep rupture in the denomination and 
seminary. In the end, the Presbyterian Church and Princeton Seminary split over 
irreconcilable differences. Many of the contentions came down to how to read the Bible. 
                                                          
333 Cf. Arakaki, Robert, “An Eastern Orthodox Critique of Mercersburg Theology,” Orthodox-Reformed 
Bridge (blog). July 22, 2012. http://orthodoxbridge.com/an-eastern-orthodox-critique-of-mercersburg-
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The crisis in the Presbyterian Church would become a prototype for similar divisions 
throughout American evangelicalism.  
Around 1910, a series of pamphlets by different Christian authors entitled The 
Fundamentals began to appear. “The crucial issue” in these articles was “the authority of 
God in Scripture in relation to the authority of modern science, particularly science in the 
form of higher criticism of Scripture itself.”335 At first, the authors of these pamphlets 
applauded the “scientific spirit” common in current biblical studies. Reuben Torrey, for 
example, claimed that Christianity was established as “historically proven fact.”336 
Beyond that, the authors warned against pseudo-science, which ruled out the possibility 
of miracles and supernatural occurrences before it analyzed the facts. To these authors, 
modern criticism was not being self-critical. The apologetics of The Fundamentals were 
especially focused on the topics of Virgin Birth, inspiration of Scripture, the atonement of 
Christ, and his physical resurrection.337  
In 1922, Harry Emerson Fosdick (1878–1969), a Baptist minister, delivered a 
sermon at the First Presbyterian Church in New York City, entitled, Shall the 
Fundamentalists Win? In the sermon, Fosdick depicted fundamentalists as “illiberal and 
intolerant.” They feared modern developments as “strange new movements in Christian 
thought.” They insisted on consensus regarding “the historicity of certain special 
                                                          
335 George M. Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2006), 120.  
336 Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture, 121.  
337 Although evolutionary science was a point of contention for several conservative Christians, as is seen 
in the Scopes Trial involving William Jennings Bryan, it was not a polemic that Protestants, even 
fundamentalists, were in agreement. Many, including Warfield, were able to reconcile elements of 
evolutionary science with the biblical text. 
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miracles, preeminently the Virgin Birth of our Lord, that we must believe in a special 
theory of inspiration—that the original documents of the Scripture, which of course we 
no longer possess, were inerrantly dictated to men a good deal as a man might dictate to a 
stenographer.” These doctrines and others “are some of the stakes which are being driven 
to mark a deadline of doctrine around the church.” For Fosdick, all liberals did not 
necessarily disparage sacred religious claims. Instead, Fosdick was opposed to shutting 
“the doors of Christian fellowship” based on consent to these doctrines. Fosdick wanted 
“an intellectually hospitable, tolerant, liberty-loving church” that was intellectually open 
about such teachings. “You cannot challenge the dedicated thinking of this generation to 
these sublime themes upon any such terms as are laid down by an intolerant church.”338 
 Bitter infighting continued between modernists and fundamentalists in the 
Presbyterian denomination, resulting in endless heresy trials and incessant polemics. 
Princeton Seminary was in the middle of the controversy. It was the last bastion of Old 
School Presbyterianism and a “lighthouse of orthodoxy in an increasingly secular 
world.”339 However, its faculty were divided as well by the late 1920s. The 
fundamentalists sought to drive the liberals from the denomination, but they were the 
ones who ended up leaving voluntarily.   
In 1929, the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church voted to reorganize 
Princeton, accommodating moderate and liberal theologians, and commenced what John 
Gresham Machen (1881–1937) feared would be the death of Princeton and “the end of an 
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epoch in the history of the modern church and the beginning of a new era in which new 
Evangelical agencies must be formed.”340 Machen quickly began to form “new 
Evangelical agencies.” He soon helped create a new seminary for conservatives, 
Westminster in Philadelphia.  
Conclusion 
A survey of American evangelicalism displays diversity of thought related to 
biblical interpretation. While different approaches to reading Scripture may have their 
particular benefits, the recurring weakness of evangelical hermeneutics is its lack of 
ecclesiology. 
Within evangelicalism, the Bible is generally posited as the ultimate rule of belief 
and action, but it has proven incapable to maintain unity among those who believe in it. 
In a Bible-only worldview, the text of Scripture becomes the framework within which 
theology is accomplished; it becomes its own paradigm. The truths of Christianity are not 
discovered in the organic life of the Church, but in the analysis of literary facts. With this 
working assumption, history can become flat, and spiritual renewal no more than pristine 
“restitutionism.” In this paradigm, the exegete hopes to get closer to true Christianity 
primarily by “studying the New Testament documents.”341  
Most strains of evangelicalism lack an intrinsic self-critical mechanism. Princeton 
theologians’ “bravado,”342 for example, was apparently evident to everyone but 
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themselves. They did not seem to be aware of the eighteenth-century rationalism that 
dominated their own “empirical” interpretation of Scripture. Their scientific approach 
was not pure; it contained unproven presumptions and indicted them with some of the 
criticisms they had leveled against their opponents. The same can be said about some 
contemporary Calvinists. Part of their arrogance is due to mistakenly assuming that 
theology is a scientific endeavor with indisputable results. Princeton criticized Finney 
because he relied on Enlightenment techniques; however, their inductive method of 
exegesis had bases in the Enlightenment. They censured Bushnell for departing from old 
Calvinism; yet, they had departed from Calvinism in their celebration of the Eucharist.343 
They repudiated Mercersburg for wearing the used clothing of Hegel and 
Schleiermacher;344 yet, their philosophical rationalism was not necessarily drawn from 
the pages of Scripture. They criticized Briggs for disregarding the inspiration of Scripture 
in his exegesis; however, they uncritically relied on similar scientific assumptions. Many 
of the debates in evangelicalism simply got down to who was more biblical. The people 
often did not seem aware that they were breathing the same air and held many of the 
same interpretive assumptions as their opponents. In the end, an emphasis on Scripture 
alone provided no self-critical capability, did not unify evangelicals, or heal theological 
schism.  
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The intense emphasis on the text of Scripture has resulted in a loss of 
Christocentric hermeneutics. If evangelicals forget that Christ entered real history, and 
continues to operate through his Church in that history, then their exegesis will be similar 
to archaeology. They will fall prey to the modernism they are trying to avoid. One 
historian has argued that the only way for American evangelicalism to escape full 
entrapment to modernity is to develop a “better principle” in its theology. That principle, 
he argued, was Incarnation.345 Hermeneutics guided by Incarnation is pre-modern 
because it shows that God can and does enter history and it demonstrates that history is 
accessible. However, hermeneutics guided by Incarnation is also modern, and not 
docetic. It demonstrates that ordinary time is significant, thus liberating modern methods 
of research. Nonetheless, this reader asks how one can even get to such a positive 
determination without the Church. How can one have a Christocentric lens, such as 
Incarnation, without a Church replete with an authoritative teaching office? 
 Reflection on evangelical struggles with biblical modernity uncovers the need for 
a sacramental structure in which to perform biblical exegesis. There is no sacred location 
within most evangelical thought where Christ’s presence is guaranteed and scholarship 
can be combined with Tradition. Evangelicals lack a universal cohesive authority to 
maintain unity and adjudicate theological disagreement while maintaining a 
Christocentric vision. Most Church groups have some system of adjudication in place, 
but those systems often lack universal or apostolic character; debates usually come down 
to who is more persuasive in his reading of the Bible. Scripture has been the structure in 
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which theology is achieved, but it has not resulted in the “unity of faith in the bond of 
peace.” In recent years, appeal to retrieve patristic or medieval texts has surged within 
evangelicalism, engendering hope of genuine reform. Others have advocated a “creedal 
imperative.”346 However, those appeals are not frequently accompanied with equal 
engagement with the living librarian of those patristic texts and creedal statements. One 
needs to be concerned that the letter is again being preferred over the Spirit. A few 
American evangelicals have seen the need for an Incarnational paradigm in hermeneutics, 
but fewer have explained how such a sacramental lens can be formed outside of a 
sacramental Church, one physically connected to Christ. To varying degrees, much of 
American evangelicalism continues to reject a proposition that is older than the New 
Testament: Christ has established his universal Church with the mandate to “guard the 
deposit entrusted to you.”347 For fear of losing their own identity, evangelicals usually 
deny the legitimacy of the Catholic Church’s role as part of the mystical presence of 
Christ on the earth. Some evangelicals wrongly fear they will need to relinquish 
justifiable theological protests; others think they will be forced to mute legitimate calls of 
repentance directed to the Catholic Church; many have simply walked away. Some 
evangelicals have simply forgotten that God ordained teachers throughout his universal 
                                                          
346 Cf. Trueman, The Creedal Imperative. This reader appreciates aspects of Trueman’s criticism of 
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Church.348 While reasonably dissenting with the Catholic Church at key moments, they 
have utterly refused any pastoral guidance from a bishop’s voice. If not abated, the 
continued demystification of universal ecclesiology within evangelicalism will 
unfortunately result in theology being perpetually gutted of its sacred innards. As chained 
Prometheus, evangelicals might experience a sense of renewal at the dawn of every 
generation, but it will only end with the return of the devouring “birds.”349 
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CHAPTER THREE 
BUOYANT EFFECT OF CATHOLIC ECCLESIOLOGY: TÜBINGEN 
Introduction 
 While the Catholic Church’s challenges in the modern era were distinct on many 
levels from American evangelicals, they similarly needed to respond to the threat posed 
by biblical modernity. The credibility of external revelation was jeopardized, the 
transcendent dimension was in danger of being rendered immanent, and immutable 
dogmatic truths were at risk of being changed. Distinct from evangelical polemics, 
Catholic responses to biblical modernity frequently integrated ecclesiology. The next two 
chapters will examine the benefits of ecclesiology in the Catholic Church’s engagement 
with modernity. Specifically, the buoyancy of Catholic ecclesiology1 evident in Tübingen 
theologians will be highlighted in this chapter.2 The hope behind this dissertation is that 
                                                          
1 Cf. Avery Dulles, Models of the Church (Garden City, NY: Image Books, 2002). Several models of 
“Church” exist among Catholics, and advocates of particular models debate over the best conception of 
Church. The use of the phrase “Catholic ecclesiology” here does not intent to imply a monolithic 
understanding of the institution of the Catholic Church. Rather, it refers to a basic, agreed-upon articulation 
of Church within Catholicism. The Catholic Church views itself as sacramental, a Mystery, containing both 
divine and human aspects. It exists in “wholeness or balance” (Dulles, Models of the Church, 3) in spiritual 
and material unity. This includes, but is not limited to, a historic, apostolic succession of bishops, a visible 
hierarchy headed by a Primate, a living Tradition and written Scripture (Dulles, Models of the Church, 7–
14). 
2 With regret, neither the works of John Henry Newman nor the debates surrounding the topic of papal 
infallibility will be able to be addressed in this dissertation, although both are relevant to the topic of 
biblical interpretation. It is not possible, in this dissertation, to comprehensively cover the range of Catholic 
reactions to the Enlightenment throughout various European countries; responses to the Age of Reason 
varied from France to Italy to England. Nor is it possible to adequately report on every theater of conflict 
within Catholicism regarding the reading of Scripture.  
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evangelicals will follow the example herein of analyzing Catholic thought in critical 
empathy from an evangelical perspective.  
The Catholic Tübingen School proves a helpful starting place for examining 
Catholic responses to biblical modernity. Tübingen theologians highlighted some of the 
primary challenges perceived by Catholics at the time, and they exhibited some of the 
perennial hermeneutic resources provided by Catholicism. Certainly, the theology at 
Tübingen was not fixed or stagnant. Yet, the early theology at the school, specifically the 
work of Johann Sebastian von Drey and Johann Adam Möhler, provide an adequate entry 
point for examining Catholicism’s persistent ability to absorb modernity without 
succumbing to the demystification of theology. Tübingen theologians demonstrated that 
Catholicism had the ability to open itself to modernity without paranoia, and could even 
benefit from the engagement.3 For various reasons, the Tübingen School has been 
selected as a starting point to study Catholicism’s response to biblical modernity instead 
of late nineteenth-century theaters. First, Tübingen theologians often provided a 
genuinely Catholic response which preceded the polemics surrounding Alfred Firmin 
Loisy and others by several decades. Second, Möhler’s response to modernity drew on 
Catholic ecclesiology in a manner distinct from some of those in controversy at the turn 
of the twentieth century.4 Third, Tübingen’s influence on the interpretation of Scripture in 
the Catholic Church has continued into the twenty-first century. It remains relevant. 
                                                          
3 Cf. Himes’ introduction to Brief Introduction to the Study of Theology: With Reference to the Scientific 
Standpoint and the Catholic System by Johann Sebastian Von Drey, trans. Michael J. Himes (Notre Dame, 
IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), ix. 
4 Cf. Bernard M. G. Reardon, Roman Catholic Modernism (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1970), 
15, note 2. Reardon says that Loisy himself denied any connection with Möhler’s school, and the evidence 
supports Loisy’s claim.  
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The Catholic Church certainly did not emerge unscathed from its various 
engagements with modernity. However, it appears to have weathered the storm much 
better than did evangelicals. With notable exceptions, Catholic theologians were able to 
open-facedly engage modernity, while maintaining utmost regard for Holy Scripture and 
traditional dogma. In addition, it appears that the Catholic Church was able to maintain a 
higher degree of unity among its people than were evangelicals. From this reader’s 
perspective, Catholic ecclesiology is partly to be credited. 
Modern authors need to give more attention to the positive effect Catholic 
ecclesiology has had on hermeneutics. Studies of the Catholic modernist crisis often 
focus on particular crises with modernity to such a degree that they possibly lose sight, 
albeit unintentionally, of the panoramic view of what occurred. The strong subterranean 
current within Catholic ecclesiology is often understated while select suppositions of 
theologians or distinct declarations of authorities are elevated. The broader view of what 
transpired in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries cannot be adequately represented by 
simply identifying inflated discrepancies between Vatican I and Vatican II mentalities. 
Such accentuation of disparities is very important, but can risk failure to recognize a 
deeper continuity grounded in ecclesiology. The contribution of Tübingen theologians to 
the dialogue with modernity is especially important because it highlights the buoyant 
effect of Catholic ecclesiology. Johann Sebastian von Drey helped direct the initial 
theological trajectory of the Catholic Tübingen School. One of his students, Johann 
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Adam Möhler, is considered the best representative of the rigorous and fundamentally 
Catholic theology developed at the school.5  
Early Catholics at Tübingen  
A brief look at the polemical context surrounding Catholic Tübingen provides 
clarity to their ecclesiological constructions. Severe theological criticisms of Catholic 
theology by Protestants, coupled with formal encroachments on the Church by political 
states, led to an “apologetic and defensive tone”6 in many Catholic ecclesiologies. 
Catholic theologians pushed back by defining the Church not only as spiritual but also an 
unequaled institutional authority as well; they often emphasized the juridical power of the 
hierarchy. In addition to these external attacks, the struggles within Catholicism were no 
less intense. Kantian thought had begun to influence numerous Catholics. By the 
nineteenth century, more people were becoming favorable to the idea of an “invisible 
Church,” which was often set in opposition to the external and hierarchical Church. 
The dawning of the rationalistic spirit in the Aufklärung had dissipated the ancient 
mist of divine mystery imbuing the episcopate. In addition, dogmatic formulations which 
could not be penetrated by reason were finally seen in their supposed proper light; the 
ethical value of dogma was highlighted while metaphysical claims were understated. 
Traditional teachings were under assault throughout Europe. For example, the rationalism 
of English Deism, through its heightened emphasis on human reason, is generally 
perceived as moving theology to the precipice by calling into question the very 
                                                          
5 Michael J. Himes, Ongoing Incarnation: Johann Adam Möhler and the Beginnings of Modern 
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6 Peter Riga, “The Ecclesiology of Johann Adam Möhler,” Theological Studies 22, no. 4 (December 1961): 
566, http://cdn.theologicalstudies.net/22/22.4/22.4.2.pdf. 
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possibility of divine revelation. In eighteenth-century France, Voltaire’s attacks on the 
established Catholic Church, as well as Denis Diderot’s initial compilation of the 
Encyclopédie were representative of broad antagonism against the Catholic Church. 
However, Leonard Swidler and Michael Himes note that, especially in Germany, not all 
nineteenth-century perception of the Enlightenment among Catholics was negative. Some 
German Catholics perceived the Aufklärung more positively than did their neighbors to 
the west, and several saw the moment as an opportunity to reform Catholicism.7  
Leonard Swidler points out that most histories of the era tend to emphasize the 
extreme secularization that occurred in some parts of Europe, while neglecting to report 
positive attempts at integrating Enlightenment thinking with Catholicism.8 Swidler argues 
that overemphasis on these negative realities often fail to report positive attempts to 
reconcile ideals from the modern era with Catholicism.  
                                                          
7 Cf. Himes, Ongoing Incarnation, 2–3, and 7–12; Leonard Swidler, Aufklärung Catholicism 1780–1850: 
Liturgical and Other Reforms in the Catholic Aufklärung (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1978; PDF e-
book), 1–2. Himes cites Ignaz Heinrich von Wessenberg (1774–1860), vicar general of the diocese of 
Constance, as one example of Aufklärung Catholicism. For Wessenberg, only individual members of the 
Church could be moral; the community as a whole was not considered ethical because it was a collection of 
free persons. Wessenberg did not consider the individual to be either crippled by sin or dependent upon 
grace. The human subject was free; therefore, a moral act was genuine only when it was self-motivated by 
the subject. Wessenberg’s soteriology posited the free individual as one capable of imitating Christ’s 
altruism; vicarious atonement for humanity was not stressed. God provided each person with a moral 
conscience consisting of clear imperatives. Subsequently, moral behavior meant living in harmony with 
one’s conscience, and therefore God’s will. When one followed God’s inner dictates of conscience, he 
enjoyed a clear sense of direction in life and confirmation of his beliefs. The upshot of Wessenberg’s 
Aufklärung Catholicism was that the conscience became the ground for certitude in religious matters. 
Wessenberg’s ecclesiology deemphasized the Church as a mystical reality, but laid stress on its function as 
an educational center. The Church’s teachings contributed to the development of moral conduct among 
each student. For Wessenberg, even the liturgy’s primary function was pedagogical. Scripture readings, as 
well as hymns and prayers, were to be in the German vernacular. Religious instructors were to be 
suspicious of speculative theology and emphasize clarity in their theological training. Pilgrimages were 
curtailed, but longer sermons were provided. Theology needed to be simple, and faith demanded practical 
morality.  
8 Swidler, Aufklärung Catholicism, 1. 
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Other German Catholics, notably those who utilized Romantic ideas, were 
suspicious of attempts to integrate Catholicism with Aufklärung ideals.9 They perceived 
that Aufklärung Catholics were naturalistic and materialistic, even Pelagian. Aufklärung 
teachings dismissed the doctrine of grace through Christ, resulting in the individual being 
cut off from God, and left alone.10 Romanticism developed partly as a response to the 
arid rationalism of the Auflklärung. In response, Catholic theologians at Tübingen 
developed a renewed interest in the Church’s past. The writings of the Church Fathers, 
the liturgy, and especially the communal character of Christianity were rediscovered with 
fresh interest during the struggle with biblical modernity. However, the inherent dangers 
                                                          
9 Cf. Himes, Ongoing Incarnation, 21–27; Himes’ introduction to Drey’s Brief Introduction, x-xii; Thomas 
F. O'Meara, Romantic Idealism and Roman Catholicism: Schelling and the Theologians (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1982), 41–47, 67; Riga, “The Ecclesiology,” 570–571. Johann Michael 
Sailer (1751–1832) was a key transitional figure among German Catholics in the move from Aufklärung 
ideals, which he taught in his early career, to Romantic forms of thought. Sailer influenced several priests 
whom he taught, many of whom later became bishops. During his academic career, he served as one of 
Wessenberg’s professors. Although Sailer did not teach at Catholic Tübingen, his influence on the 
development of the School was significant. His writings influenced Drey, the school’s founder. One of 
Sailer’s students, Johann Nepomuk Bestlin, was Drey’s pastor at Röhlingen and colleague at Ellwangen 
and Tübingen. Another of his students, Peter Alois Gratz, was Drey’s colleague at Ellwangen and 
Tübingen. A third of Sailer’s students, Johann Baptist von Hirscher, joined the Tübingen faculty in 1817. 
All of these men would later become Möhler’s professors. For Sailer, the Aufklärung was valuable for 
different reasons, such as seen in its emphasis on education. Nonetheless, for Sailer, the Aufklärung was 
ultimately unable to elucidate the most important aspects of Christianity. One did not necessarily 
experience the Sacred through rationally grasping moral concepts. The fashionable terms of “clarity” and 
“reason” failed to convey the meaning of “life” and “power” that Sailer encountered as a Catholic. Sailer’s 
Catholicism apparently helped open him to these Romantic ideas. Sailer demonstrated that the mystagogy 
of experience was nonetheless already present in the structure of the Catholic Church. As a result of Sailer 
placing heavy emphasis on the centrality of individual experience of the sacred, Michael Himes suggested 
the Church community risked being reduced to secondary importance in his thought. For Himes, Sailer 
might even have considered the institutional Church a potential hindrance to those who were being grasped 
by divine love (cf. Himes Ongoing Incarnation, 27). Nonetheless, Sailer did not completely tumble into 
private pietism. His primary concern was that people might receive more than data about historic faith; they 
needed to experience the preached faith already present in the Church (cf. Riga, “The Ecclesiology,” 570–
571). Also, cf. Keith F. Pecklers, “Ressourcement and the Renewal of Catholic Liturgy: On Celebrating the 
New Rite,” in Gabriel Flynn and P. D. Murray, eds., Ressourcement: A Movement for Renewal in 
Twentieth-century Catholic Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 320–321.  
10 Himes, Ongoing Incarnation, 10. Himes is specifically referencing Möhler’s concerns at this point. 
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of immanentism came with Romanticism. The spiritual study of history risked uniting 
deity and humanity in history so intimately that the two were not easily distinguishable.  
Johann Sebastian Drey 
Johann Sebastian von Drey (1777–1853) is generally considered the founder of 
the Catholic Tübingen School. Drey was raised near Ellwangen, in a strongly Catholic 
area, and pursued studies in theology and natural sciences. After his seminary years at 
Augsburg, he was ordained a priest in 1801. Drey taught at the Lyzeum in Rottweil 
between 1806–1812. In 1812, he was called to teach theology at Ellwangen’s new 
Catholic university.11 In 1817, Drey moved with the entire Catholic faculty at Ellwangen 
to Tübingen, where he helped establish the Catholic faculty.  
Drey sought to join openness to his times with fidelity to the Church.12 However, 
he considered the Enlightenment to be impotent in its conveyance of the historic, 
symbolic, and mystical aspects of Christianity that he knew well from the Catholic 
Church.13 In countering the sterility of the Aufklärung, he interacted with Romanticism 
from within a Catholic framework.  
Drey and Revelation  
The Enlightenment’s denial of revelation was the nub of Drey’s concerns. An 
exaggerated belief in “independence” severed mankind from divine disclosure. As a 
                                                          
11 Cf. Bradford E. Hinze “Roman Catholic Theology: Tübingen,” in The Blackwell Companion to 
Nineteenth-century Theology, ed. David Fergusson, 1st ed., vol. 44, The Great Theologians (Oxford: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 192. 
12 O’Meara, Romantic Idealism, 97.  
13 O’Meara, Romantic Idealism, 96. 
219 
result, “God and his revelation receded into the background.”14 In the same act of 
professing itself as “I,” humanity declared itself as “Not-I;” by severing itself from God, 
humanity had lost its true identity. Now, humanity was autonomous, “existing in itself, 
working of its own accord, and following its own laws.”15 The world originated with 
God, but was no longer subject to his influence. Therefore, it was assumed that the 
efficient way to study the world was to analyze nature without any religious 
interference.16 In such a world, the Church could not be an ongoing presence of God. 
Neither could the voice of divinity be heard in the pages of Scripture. Legitimate study of 
the workings of the human mind could only occur in an environment which was 
disinfected from religion.  
For Drey, Kantian thinking misunderstood the relationship between history and 
the truths of faith.17 It presumed that religious truth was noumenal knowledge which 
could not be gained by phenomenal experience. There was no possible transport from 
sense experience, phenomenal knowledge, to noumenal knowledge, the thing in itself. In 
this system of thought, the archaic testimony of others, a type of a posteriori knowledge, 
could not furnish the basis for contemporary religious claims.18 Therefore, any claim to 
theological certainty, such as was contained in Church dogma, was absurd if it was based 
on historical phenomena. God, human free will, and immortality could not be known in 
                                                          
14 Drey, Brief Introduction, 21:8. 
15 Drey, Brief Introduction, 20:8.  
16 Wayne L. Fehr, The Birth of the Catholic Tübingen School: The Dogmatics of Johann Sebastian Drey 
(Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1981), 23. 
17 Himes, introduction to Drey, Brief Introduction, xv–xvii. 
18 Cf. Himes, introduction to Drey, Brief Introduction, xvi.  
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themselves. Instead, such truths came into play as postulates of practical reason; they 
made ethics intelligible. For the Kantian thinker, the value of religion was its stimulus for 
the ethical life. For many in the Enlightenment, Jesus Christ became the best possible 
example of human goodness. Still, his archetypal goodness was discoverable in reason, 
not in human history. Drey disputed this “most common and the primary way” the 
Enlightenment mistakenly conveyed historic Christianity. To Drey, Christianity was 
more than a temporal phenomenon, “one moment in the general history of religion.”19 To 
Drey, Christianity needed to be understood as the “center of all historical religious 
phenomena.”20  
In his argumentation, Drey tried to avoid the pitfalls of the Deists. He noted that 
the supernaturalists, those who defended biblical revelation against the Deists, worked 
under similar premises as their opponents. “Empirical naturalism has denied revelation 
and positive Christianity. Supernaturalism has been able to respond to this only weakly 
and never really to refute it, since it stands in the same unhappy position as naturalism 
and …combats it with the same weapon.”21 While the naturalists relegated God to being a 
spectator, one who does not interact with his creation, the supernaturalists made a similar 
move. The Deists claimed miracles would violate laws of nature, and the supernaturalists 
agreed.22 For Drey, the presumption that God violated the laws of nature every time he 
engaged the world diminished the possibility of encountering God through a living 
                                                          
19 Drey, Brief Introduction, 107:51.  
20 Himes, introduction to Drey, Brief Introduction, xv–xvii. 
21 Drey, Brief Introduction, 56:3-4.  
22 Cf. Fehr, The Birth of the Catholic Tübingen School, 24–25. 
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Church or tracing God’s steps through human history. Drey recognized that the outcome 
of either side jeopardized the “historical event and religious institution” of Christianity.23 
In response, Drey argued that God’s activity in the world persisted from the beginning. 
God’s active presence was not a divine intrusion in an autonomous world. In order to 
accomplish this, Drey recast the relationship of God and the world, the infinite and finite, 
in the context of primal creation.  
For Drey, God can only reveal himself to that which is other than himself, 
namely, the universe he created. Drey divided the universe into “two realms:” humanity 
and the rest of nature.24 He argued that God had revealed himself from within each realm. 
“The existence of things—including human beings—and their unchanging relationships 
to one another and to God are the content” of revelation;25 the world and its history were 
the substance of God’s disclosure. Underlying Drey’s thought was an awareness of the 
inexpressible unity of the infinite and the finite. Drey’s world was thoroughly penetrated 
by God and radically characterized as belonging to Deity.26 His presupposition was that 
“every existing finite reality has not only emerged from an eternal and absolute ground 
but that its temporal being and life remain rooted in that ground and dependent upon it.”27 
With a Romantic tone, Drey said that the infinite was present in the finite; its presence 
was in all of nature attracting humanity “as the force of love toward that eternal reality 
                                                          
23 Drey, Brief Introduction, 32:13.  
24 Drey, Brief Introduction, 16:7.  
25 Ibid.  
26 Cf. Fehr, The Birth of the Catholic Tübingen School, 27. 
27 Drey, Brief Introduction, 1:1.  
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which has first poured itself into all things.”28 Revelation, because it was integral with all 
of finite reality, “has been from the beginning, continues in the present, and can never 
come to an end.”29 Drey would not permit the amputation of revelation from the world or 
human existence. The bifurcation of reality, found in both the naturalism and 
supernaturalism of his day, was fundamentally absurd. For Drey, there was no hostility 
between creation and revelation. For Drey, this understanding instantly made the modern 
world, the contemporary Church, and all history relevant to understanding divine 
revelation.  
Drey and Catholicism 
Drey was obviously benefitting from some of the German Idealism of his day, but 
it would be a mistake to place the primary influence of his thought outside of his 
Catholicism.30 Drey demonstrates that as much as he benefitted from new developments 
in philosophy and epistemology, Christianity, specifically the Catholicism in which he 
lived, was the constitutive structure of his thought. Without always naming Schelling or 
other philosophers, Drey admitted that “one system may be more congenial to the spirit 
of Christianity and hence of greater usefulness to Christian theology than another.” Drey 
                                                          
28 Drey, Brief Introduction, 10:4.  
29 Drey, Brief Introduction, 16:7.  
30 Hinze attempts to show the fine balance which Tübingen theologians kept over time. On one hand, young 
Drey, Möhler, and Staudenmaier significantly engaged Schleiermacher and Hegel. This is seen by their 
emphasis on the work of the Spirit in the individual Christian and the life of the Church. On the other hand, 
Hinze cautions that their engagement of these philosophers “dare not be overdrawn.” Tübingen theologians 
clearly resisted reduction of the Holy Spirit to the human spirit, or the common spirit of the community. 
This dissertation’s author specifically credits Drey’s Catholicism for providing buoyancy to his theology 
over time. Cf. Hinze, “Roman Catholic Theology,” in The Blackwell Companion to Nineteenth-century 
Theology, ed. David Fergusson, 196–197.  
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regarded the philosophical system as “best” which was “religious at its base.”31 Drey 
borrowed from Schelling’s ideas of Wissenschaft and other philosophers’ concepts, but 
he attempted to utilize them with Christian presumptions. 
Schelling’s insistence that nature and history—the world—were not self-
sufficient, but rather forms of the Absolute’s self-manifestation resonated with Drey,32 
who explicitly said, “God’s revelation is the expression of God’s being in another which 
is not God.”33 For Drey, this meant that the science of theology must have an intrinsic 
unity. According to Michael Himes, the idea of Wissenschaft in nineteenth-century 
Germany had a different connotation from current views of science which may not 
require universal intrinsic unity. Currently, science is hypothesis, experimentation, and 
recording of results; a systematic whole is not necessarily presumed. Nineteenth-century 
Wissenschaft, on the other hand, referred to a body of knowledge organized in such a way 
that every part of that body was related to certain fundamental principles.34 Drey, 
noticing that the “spirit of our age is strongly scientific,” proposed that a “rigorously 
scientific construction of theology” was necessary. “Arbitrary and merely casual division 
and association of ideas” was not satisfactory.35 Schelling’s idea of philosophical 
knowledge (Wissen), a higher certainty, was important to Drey’s theology because it 
                                                          
31 Drey, Brief Introduction, 96:43.  
32 Cf. Fehr, The Birth of the Catholic Tübingen School, 30. 
33 The original German reads,“Offenbarung Gottes ist Darstellung seines Wesens in einem anderen, was 
nicht Gott ist,” in Johann Sebastian von Drey, Kurze Einleitung in Das Studium Der Theologie: Mit 
Rücksicht Auf Den Wissenschaftlichen Standpunct Und Das Katholische System (Tübingen: Heinrich 
Laupp, 1819; PDF e-book), 16:10. Himes’ English translation is in Drey, Brief Introduction,16:7.  
34 Himes, introduction to Drey, Brief Introduction, xix. 
35 Drey, Brief Introduction, 56:23.  
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maintained the intrinsic unity between various elements of a whole. Schelling’s effort to 
achieve a “universe of knowledge”36 required him to attempt to overcome dualism. The 
tension between subject and object, finite and infinite, God and the world could not be 
allowed to dissolve into one against the other. Rather, they needed to be understood in 
their unity. The human mind must participate in absolute knowing in order to attain 
certain knowledge. Knowledge of a particular thing was legitimate only as its relation to 
the whole was understood; an absolute character was required for knowledge to be valid. 
In this sense, an “Urwissen,”37 or primal knowledge, was needed to understand any 
specific Wissen.  
On one hand, Drey did maintain that revelation (Offenbarung) was the expression 
or presentation (Darstellung) of God. Drey contended that the “religious impulse” or 
“religious restlessness of the human heart” historically has been expressed as recognition 
of the “relation of all things to God.” Specifically, a “dependence on a higher reality” was 
revealed in the existence of earthly things. Humanity evinces dependence on a higher 
reality external to itself; this impulse the “human being senses in himself as a drive 
toward and a demand for free obedience.”38 On the other hand, Drey’s personal and free 
God was distinct from Schelling’s Absolute. In concert with early Romanticism, Drey 
attempted to recast creation and history as intrinsic to revelation, the effect of which drew 
human hearts, through love, to eternal realities. For Drey, the Kingdom of God was the 
governing principle in the inner core of “all God’s decrees” and permeates in all Christian 
                                                          
36 Cf. Fehr, The Birth of the Catholic Tübingen School, 75–77. 
37 Cf. Fehr, The Birth of the Catholic Tübingen School, 76. 
38 Drey, Brief Introduction, 10:4.  
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doctrine,39 as well as ancient human religious history. However, it was Christ who 
concretely revealed this idea, as did his apostles after him.40 God’s determinations 
concerning humanity and the world were gradually revealed from the beginning. Yet, it 
was when Christ visibly appeared in the fullness of time that they were proclaimed in 
“definitive form.”41 The Kingdom of God (Reich Gottes), that “controlling idea of 
Christianity”42 and “authentic idea of all religion,”43 the “supreme” idea, was held in 
tense unity, both “theoretically and practically” in Jesus Christ.44  
At key points, Drey’s Christology was not compatible with Schelling’s. For 
Schelling, Christ could be surpassed. For Drey, Christianity introduced something new 
which was unsurpassable.45 To Drey, the Incarnation of Christ climaxed a gradual 
unveiling of God. However, it was consistent with previous revelations; it fulfilled 
them.46 By fulfilling them, it could not be exceeded. Christianity was not merely a 
moment in the general history of religion. Instead, as the definite revelation, it became 
the “summary of all previous revelations because in Christ God has most perfectly 
revealed himself to humanity.”47 The “Incarnation and the idea of the God-man” is 
                                                          
39 Drey, Brief Introduction, 71:30.  
40 Drey, Brief Introduction, 65:28.  
41 Drey, Brief Introduction, 60:25.  
42 Drey, Brief Introduction, 71:30. 
43 Drey, Brief Introduction, 60:25.  
44 Drey, Brief Introduction, 32:13.  
45 Cf. Himes, introduction to Drey, Brief Introduction, xxiii. 
46 Matthew 5:17. 
47 Drey, Brief Introduction, 32:13. 
226 
revelation in its highest form,48 and it fulfilled all previous disclosures. “In all ages,” 
many have experienced longing for redemption, and many of these desires have “lain 
dormant.” However, in the “unique historical event” of Christ these human aspirations 
“were given clarity and vitality.”49 For Drey, Christ himself was thus the interpretive lens 
for all theology. Christ was the decisive arbiter’s judgment bench. In him, some of the 
ancient religious “concepts and institutions” were “corrected or discarded as insufficient, 
ineffective, and erroneous,” while others were given a “higher significance, a revitalized 
strength, a purer meaning.”50  
Drey’s christology caused him to sharply part with Schelling on ecclesiology. For 
Drey, truth could only be understood in its historical form; the infinite was discovered in 
the finite, and the finite was comprehended when seen in the infinite. For Drey, one could 
not unite the real and the ideal, the many and the one, exclusively through speculative 
understanding of the ideas of Christianity; a historic embodiment of truth was needed. 
Christian revelation was supremely manifested in the historic Incarnation, and the Church 
was the ongoing corporeal manifestation of that supreme revelation. A theologian must 
therefore be a man of the Church.51 He must theologize from within the historic 
manifestation of God’s revelation. Without the Church, one cannot get to the “realization 
of Christianity’s ideas.”52  
                                                          
48 Drey, Brief Introduction, 32:13.  
49 Drey, Brief Introduction, 31:13.  
50 Ibid.  
51 Cf. Himes, introduction to Drey, Brief Introduction, xxiv. 
52 Drey, Brief Introduction, 53:22.  
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Drey also had significant moments of engagement with Schleiermacher, but 
parted from him at key points. According to Schleiermacher, “the total development of 
Christianity” needed to be analyzed as a “historical phenomenon.”53 This included both 
attention to the whole, developing over time, and to the particular historical moments.54 
One of the “defects” that Schleiermacher complained about in theological trends was 
overemphasis on particular parts of Christianity to the neglect of observing the “total 
life.”55 For Schleiermacher, “knowledge of the whole” of Christianity can only be gained 
by “combining” a “mass of individual facts” in their relation to one another.56 Drey 
echoed Schleiermacher’s insistence that theology is deficient if it lacks a firm historical 
basis. Historical skills, such as rigorous textual studies and historical analyses, are 
foundational to historical theology; knowledge of Christianity in the present is dependent 
upon the accurate examination of its texts. Biblical exegesis included grammatical 
analysis, philology, historical study, and clear methods. However, Drey’s Catholicism led 
him to part with Schleiermacher at key moments.  
Theology, for both Schleiermacher and Drey, was a “positive science” which 
consisted of a body of connected elements. Yet, Schleiermacher claimed that the parts of 
theology are connected to the whole “only by their common relation to a determinate 
mode of faith,” such as “Christianity.” According to Schleiermacher, these elements were 
                                                          
53 Friedrich Schleiermacher, Brief Outline of the Study of Theology: Drawn up to Serve as the Basis of 
Introductory Lectures, trans. William Farrer. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1850; PDF e-book), 147:149.  
54 Cf. Schleiermacher, Brief Outline, 149:147. 
55 Schleiermacher, Brief Outline, 163:150–151.  
56 Schleiermacher, Brief Outline, 159:149.  
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not connected by a “necessity arising out of the very idea of science,” but “only in so far 
as they are requisite for the solution of a practical problem.”57 Drey, unlike his Protestant 
contemporary, could not accept a theology that appeared as “simply accidental.”58 For 
Drey, the extensions of an idea must be studied as if intimately related to its germinal 
thought. Contemporary Christianity, if it is to be properly analyzed, must be seen in its 
innermost relation to its historic faith. For Drey, this meant that the theologian’s task was 
to demonstrate how each particular concrete manifestation of Christianity was generated 
by and governed by the original Christian idea. Unlike Schleiermacher, Drey gave “the 
whole of Christianity,” its “history and doctrine,” a “positive reality.”59 Drey was 
indebted to his Catholicism for these necessities; the Protestant had no such obligation.  
Unlike Schleiermacher, Drey was convinced that the primal idea of Christianity 
could best be analyzed in its intrinsic relationship with the contemporary manifestation of 
the Catholic Church. Drey’s explicit concern was for the “construction of Catholic 
theology in particular.”60 He offered his outline of theology as a “construction of 
Christian religious belief through knowledge based on the Catholic Church.”61 The 
“phenomenon of Christianity” had a beginning, but its development continued “to the 
present” in “the Christian church.”62 The “true end of theologians and their studies” is 
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therefore “found in the realization of Christianity’s ideas in the church.”63 For Drey, “the 
Church, then, is the true basis of all theological knowledge” because it provided the 
empirical content of theology. Unlike Protestants, Drey could reference the Church as the 
“concrete expression” of Christianity in contemporary humanity.64 These convictions 
expanded Drey’s field of study by giving him more than a text to analyze. 
 Drey rejected Deism and its disbelief in divine activity in the world. However, to 
some, Drey’s understanding of the interpenetrating relation between the infinite and the 
finite risked falling into monism, which would make nature identical with God.65 Drey’s 
interaction with Romanticism made him vulnerable to accusations of Pantheism and 
Panentheism, and the concerns may have been justified at certain points. However, his 
Catholic context ultimately gave buoyancy to his views. For Drey, the teaching organ of 
the Catholic Church mattered; divine revelation remained the basis for Christian 
theology, and the formal concrete terms in Scripture and Tradition needed to be heeded. 
For example, divine names which specified a free personal God could never be reduced 
to Schelling’s Absolute. The names for Deity within Scripture were not arbitrary, and 
they could not be loosely exchanged for ones that seemed more fashionable. The 
Archetype of the perfect human, Jesus Christ, could not be discovered in the narrow 
limits of reason alone. Instead, the advent of Christ and Christianity was to be seen by the 
theologian as the “center of all historical religious phenomena.”66 The Church was the 
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66 Drey, Brief Introduction, 107:51.  
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objective phenomenon wherein the ongoing interpretation of Christianity’s Fact occurred. 
Drey’s thinking may have wandered outside the parameters of orthodoxy at times, but it 
was the Church that provided those parameters and kept him from rambling too far. 
Drey and Ecclesial Exegesis 
Drey’s biblical exegesis was significantly influenced by ecclesiology. Original 
divine revelation was directly given to all humanity, and has been revealed throughout 
history.67 The emergence of peoples’ consciousness of revelation, albeit in need of 
purification, appears in numerous traditions throughout the world.68 Nonetheless, 
revelation found its perfect form in Jesus Christ, the God-man. For Drey, the transmitters 
of the revelation of Christ included the Church, Scripture, and living traditions. The 
Scripture needs to be studied because it is the “primary document” of primitive 
Christianity; it is divine revelation in written form.69 However, in order to properly 
interpret the biblical text, the theologian is required to analyze the “completeness”70 of 
Christianity. Drey considered the Church the “living objective reality” and “continuance 
of the originating event” of the final revelation.71 The biblical exegete must therefore 
simultaneously comprehend the “wider expansion” and “development”72 of the revelation 
of Christ when interpreting Scripture. For Drey, all exegetical labor needed to occur 
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within ecclesiastical parameters. Drey favored the efforts of “lower and higher 
criticisms.”73 Yet, philology was insufficient in itself to understand the Scripture. Living 
Tradition cannot be maintained by “Scripture alone” because the Bible is not the 
exclusive manifestation of the revelation of God in Jesus Christ.74 Similarly, dicta 
probantia, proof-texting, was “inadequate” because it failed to comprehend the full range 
of various uses available to biblical ideas.75 For Drey, the core ideas of Christianity were 
knowable, but needed to be drawn from the wells of the Church. The Holy Spirit had 
formed the Church and guided its development in real history. Biblical exegesis needed 
to occur within the pneumatically-formed structure.76 
For Drey, revelation was intrinsic to the visible structure of the Church. The 
Church, formed by the Spirit, was the ongoing revelation of Jesus Christ. Dogma was 
more than human imaginings; it was explicitly articulating the ideas of God. Drey likened 
ecclesiastical interpretation of Scripture to inquiring of a living person the meaning of his 
speech. Questions and clarifications can be bidden of a living speaker. Similarly, 
“Catholic exegesis” constantly probes the spiritual meaning of the Bible from within the 
                                                          
73 Cf. Drey, Brief Introduction, 141-144:66–67.  
74 Drey, Brief Introduction, 47:20.  
75 Drey, Brief Introduction, 116:55.  
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Church.77 For Drey, the Church remained the locus of revelation, and all interpretation of 
Scripture must be in concert with what was originally given. Therefore, “orthodoxy” was 
understood to be “the effort to hold fast to what has been definitely closed in doctrine and 
to construe what is mutable.” Conversely, “heterodoxy” was an attempt to alter what is 
“fixed” or alter what is mutable so as to place it against what is fixed. Hyperorthodoxy, 
for Drey, was a complete denial of the mutability of all doctrines.78  
  Drey’s ecclesiology was an important moment in the Tübingen school’s 
theological development. German Romanticism’s emphasis on the continuous life that 
each generation partook of resonated with the communal character of Catholic 
ecclesiology. Theology on the precise nature of the political structure of the Church’s 
hierarchy developed among the school’s professors, and individual theologians amended 
their own views over time. However, the “fundamental intuition” remained the same 
through these changes: the Holy Spirit fashioned the Church and guided it in all its forms, 
both visible and invisible.79  
Michael Himes carefully elucidates vital aspects of Drey’s ecclesiology at many 
turns, but he possibly places Drey too close to Schleiermacher in the end.80 Himes argues 
that Drey’s notion of Tradition was more in line with traditio, the living process of 
handing on what has been realized, than with tradita, rigidly parroting finished and 
                                                          
77 Drey, Brief Introduction, 155:72.  
78 Drey, Brief Introduction, 260:118.  
79 Riga, “The Ecclesiology,” 576. 
80 Cf. Himes, introduction to Drey, Brief Introduction, xxiv–xxv. 
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unchanged positions.81 For Himes, Drey heralded a new role for the theologian. The 
“essentially conservative” function of yesterday’s theologian was to “simply” elucidate 
the Church’s doctrinal positions. The new “progressive” theologian, exemplified by 
Drey, was “charged with developing the tradition beyond its current state so that it can 
meet new questions.”82 It is not clear to this reader if “progressive” is the best label to 
give Drey. Tübingen’s founder indeed resisted what he termed “hyperorthodox,” a 
rigidity that “denies the mutability of doctrine” when an item is plainly “mutable” 
(beweglich);83 he saw the role of the theologian as transcending one who simply parrots 
the Church’s doctrinal pronouncements.84 However, he did not present himself as broadly 
disconnected with his theological predecessors. Drey was interested in carrying forward 
more than the insights of Christianity; he sought to remain within clearly defined 
parameters which had been established by ecclesial hierarchy. Perhaps, Drey’s 
Catholicism needs more attention. Although Drey sought to correct errors among his 
contemporaries in order to be relevant to his age, it is questionable if he would have 
perceived his work as creating such a sharp break with former Catholic theologians. 
Himes’ point risks simplifying Drey by constructing sharply divided categories of 
“conservative” and “progressive,” and inserting Drey exclusively in the latter. This 
position is possibly not sufficiently sensitive to Drey’s Catholicism, and it risks casting 
Drey too much as a progressive in the light of a post–Vatican II understanding.  
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82 Ibid. 
83 Drey, Brief Introduction, 260:118.  
84 Himes, introduction to Brief, xxv. 
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Himes argues that Drey’s “new theologian” was kept orthodox by devotion to 
science, and that the Church’s hierarchy did not exercise a normative function for him.85 
According to Himes, Drey’s new theologian was kept from the extremes of heterodoxy or 
hyperorthodoxy by “remaining firm” in the wissenschaftlich viewpoint of Schelling.86 To 
this reader, part of Himes’ conclusions need to be reconsidered.  
It is correct that Drey was concerned with the rigidity of theologians who failed to 
emphasize the organic continuous life of Catholicism, and that Drey laid great emphasis 
on the importance of scientific efforts (wissenschaftliches Bestreben) as safeguards for 
his theologian. However, for Drey, scientific efforts were evaluated by their stance 
(Stellung) on doctrine. Das Bestreben apart from the faith of the Church could only result 
in heterodoxy or hyperorthodoxy. For Drey, the test was whether das Bestreben of the 
theologian were intended “to preserve in doctrine what has been definitively decided.”87 
The theologian was kept orthodox by his science insofar as his efforts were in line with 
the concrete faith of the Church. Certainly, various ecclesiologies at Tübingen, including 
Drey’s, appeared to lean more towards Conciliarism in their views of the Magisterium. 
However, a hierarchical structure of some sort was required to “protect the creed” and 
“keep the doctrine pure.” “Church polity,” the “legislative and executive “action” of the 
Church was needed to “preserve the historical basis of the creed.”88 As the ecclesiology 
at Tübingen was developing, it is doubtful that Drey failed to recognize a “normative 
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87 Drey, Brief Introduction, 260:118.  
88 Drey, Brief Introduction, 334:154.  
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function” for theology in the political manifestation of the hierarchy of the Catholic 
Church. If the Spirit formed and guided the Church, then hierarchy could not be arbitrary.  
  For Drey, faith was required for biblical exegesis, and that faith opened new 
interpretive possibilities. However, Christian faith was located in the Church, in the 
ongoing life of the people of God in the Spirit. It was “kept pure” and “safeguarded” by 
the “legislative and executive action” of the Church.89 Drey argued that the exegete must 
possess an “inner belief” so that he “sees everything and accounts for everything as being 
under God’s governance.”90 With such faith, the “world’s chaotic confusion” is 
reinterpreted as the “drama of providence.” Faith provides perspective on both miracles 
and “ordinary history” that the “profane historian” lacks. For Drey, biblical interpretation 
grounded in faith was a “higher understanding of the Bible, based not on the flesh but on 
the Spirit,” mediated by the same Spirit that “originally quickened the authors as they 
wrote.” This is “far nobler than a matter of grammar and the art is a holy one.”91 Drey 
commented that the New Testament often furnishes a meaning to an Old Testament 
passage “which is not demonstrably in accord with the sense of the ancient author…but it 
is certainly in accord with the meaning of revelation.”92 For Drey, even the Biblicist 
needed to acknowledge that his interpretation of sacred passages required a view of the 
entire canon.93 The key to loftier interpretations of the world and Scripture was the 
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presence of the Holy Spirit who first formed the Church. The two could not be set against 
each other. 
 Drey’s concept of intrinsic revelation affected his biblical exegesis and influenced 
some Catholic theologians, including Möhler. Drey’s theology was meant to correct the 
deistic idea of God’s detachment from creation. For Drey, the infinite penetrated the 
finite, and was encountered in it. The presence of God in creation attracted humanity, as 
the force of love, toward eternal realities. The Church had been formed and penetrated by 
the Spirit of Christ from the beginning, and was currently vivified by the same Spirit. As 
the co-author of the Bible, the living Church needed to be entreated in the process of 
biblical exegesis. 
Johann Adam Möhler 
Johann Adam Möhler (1796–1838) was born into a Catholic family in the small 
town of Ingersheim. He began his philosophical studies at Ellwangen in 1813, and turned 
his attention to theology in 1815. As a student, he moved with the Ellwangen Catholic 
faculty to Tübingen in 1817. In 1818, Möhler left Tübingen and entered the seminary at 
Rottenburg. He was ordained a Roman Catholic priest in 1819; he served in parish 
ministry in Weil der Stadt and Riedlingen.94 In 1821, Möhler served as a tutor at 
Tübingen, and was soon offered a teaching position by the Catholic faculty. In 
preparation for his position, Möhler visited the best known German and Austrian 
universities, and met several leading theologians. Protestants August Neander and 
Friedrich Schleiermacher made significant impressions on Möhler due to their 
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willingness to use organic metaphors to describe the Christian Church.95 Möhler’s two 
most significant works were Unity in the Church or The Principle of Catholicism (1825), 
and Symbolism (1832).96 Möhler died when making the fifth revision of Symbolism.  
The development of Johann Möhler’s theology is generally considered the highpoint of 
the Tübingen School, and his ecclesiology has affected the Catholic Church up to the 
present day. Philip Schaff considered Möhler the “most important Catholic theologian of 
this age.”97  
Möhler and Revelation  
Möhler’s Catholicism provided him with resilience in his developing 
understanding of revelation. Throughout his career, Möhler was consistent in stipulating 
the need for divine revelation with living Tradition as its correlate. However, as his 
thoughts formed, Möhler subtly shifted his view on the possibility of a natural 
understanding of God outside of special grace in the Church. Early in his career, he 
argued that no knowledge of God was possible outside the gospel and the Church. Later, 
his view modified to acknowledge a native awareness of God and his attributes in all 
people, even those beyond the influence of historic Judaism or Christianity. To this 
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reader, Möhler’s Catholic faith was the primary resource that provided him the tools to 
alter his views.  
Early in his career,98 Möhler resisted the naturalism of the Aufklärung by arguing 
that it was impossible for the self-sufficient individual to independently possess any 
spiritual knowledge. Only the revealing act of God could provide humanity with an 
understanding of the divine; only those in possession of the Spirit could understand 
divinity.99 Citing Origen, Möhler argued that human nature was riddled with errors and 
rendered incapable of achieving the great knowledge of God merely by purification of 
thought. He referenced Origen’s use of Matthew 11:27100 in responding to Celsus’ charge 
that the concept of God could be deduced simply by enunciating good human qualities 
and removing the evil ones. Möhler asserted that reason was a passive organ open to God 
and ready to receive disclosure, but not able to acquire it of its own initiative.101 No one 
could independently set out to search for God; however, all had a passive “inner 
capability to receive the true knowledge of God.”102 Humanity, in Möhler’s view, was 
receptive to knowledge about God, but it could not attain any understanding by its own 
                                                          
98 Cf. Geiselmann, The Meaning of Tradition, 62. According to Geiselmann, this emphasis carried from his 
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cognitive powers.103 “External light cannot reach infected eyes;”104 revelation 
(Offenbarung) was required.105 Any comprehension of Deity by sinful humanity resulted 
from the “miraculous” and “unmediated inner action of the divinity.”106  
Like Drey, Möhler perceived that God was immanently revealed in universal 
creation. The universe had its ground in God “and is his total revelation.”107 Considering 
that God had revealed himself in the totality of creation, comprehension of revelation 
surpassed commanding a series of facts; it involved a grasp of the whole universe. “Only 
in the whole can he who created the whole be known because he reveals himself 
completely only in the whole.”108 Creation was therefore Möhler’s objective condition 
which made it possible for humanity to know God.109 For Möhler, the universe was 
represented in humanity. God had spoken his word into all families in the beginning, but 
his speech could not be understood without a comprehensive audible range. Möhler was 
left with the obvious question: “How is the single individual to know him?”110 
Here, Möhler’s idea of Tradition helped answer the question. What was 
impossible for the individual was possible to the society through Tradition. A person can 
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understand the “relationship”111 he has to the “great Whole,”112 when, through Tradition, 
he sees himself as an interrelated member. Tradition provided a comprehensive view of 
God’s universal revelation. It was only when the individual imaginatively viewed himself 
in association with the universe that he could sufficiently understand any aspect of it.113 
By nature, Möhler argued, people learn about themselves in the society of others; self-
awareness was developed in a communal environment. Similar to a person who comes to 
self-knowledge by immersion in relationships, the individual cannot understand the 
knowledge of God without the external influence of society. For Möhler, conscious 
knowledge of the whole was not a given. In an accent that resonated with the 
Romanticism of the day, he argued that the “single individual” must internally “expand” 
himself to grasp the whole. This universal embrace occurs through imagination and love. 
The limits of the individual are broken down, which allows him to connect with the 
whole and understand God. It is love that comprehends God.114 The individual can only 
understand his relation to the whole when he, in love, embraces the “totality” of God’s 
believers.115 The community is the ground for his own existence. “Just as each individual 
in the whole is grounded in God, God can be known by the individual only in the 
                                                          
111 Verhältnis. Erb translates this as “relationship.” The term also can be translated “ratio.” In other words, 
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whole… living in Him, embracing the All with a full heart. This is the mystery of our 
knowledge of God.”116 In order to understand God’s revelation, the individual must 
specifically see himself as grounded in the community marked by God’s Spirit and 
grace.117  
For Möhler, the whole revelation could only be understood within Christianity. 
The sovereign, self-sufficient individual of the Enlightenment was incapable of grasping 
divine truth because he had separated himself from human society;118 he had emasculated 
his own mind, and deprived it of fertility consequential to divine disclosure. Utilizing 
Justin’s idea of the “Logos,” Möhler wrote that the “seed of the Logos spread among all 
people.” “Intermittent, separate rays of divine wisdom” had illumined all humanity; even 
the pagans “found themselves in the possession of truths.”119 However, these peoples 
only possessed fragmented understanding of the divine.120 They were uncertain whether 
their disparate truths “corresponded to something outside of themselves or whether they 
were merely subjective products or some erroneous impressions or assumptions.”121 
Möhler critiqued Enlightenment rationalism as impotent, and he judged the patchy 
visions of pagans as bearing no “significant result.”122 Both may have “single truths 
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concerning God and divine things but not the truth itself.”123 The “desire for the divine, 
an anticipation, a need for it, the foundation and inner capability to receive the true 
knowledge of God” common to all people, if “left to itself” could only err “in 
darkness.”124 The special grace in the Church was needed to interpret it. In Unity, Möhler 
argued that humanity could not comprehend any natural revelation. “In Jesus, however, 
separation came to unity, need to fullness, unconsciousness to clarity.” Truth, God’s 
truth, objectively appeared in “Jesus Christ, the Son of God, the truth in itself.”125 The 
Christian Church was therefore the exclusive community where God’s complete 
revelation could be grasped.  
Möhler used these ideas to resist the construction of Aufklärung bulwarks in the 
territories of Christian doctrine. For Möhler, Tradition was the corollary of revelation. 
God had revealed himself to all humanity at creation, but this knowledge was scattered as 
it was passed down through traditions. However, the Church alone possessed all the 
diverse rays of truth together. Knowledge of God was not available outside of the 
“special revelation”126 discovered in the divinely ordered tradition of Christianity.127  
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Throughout his career, Möhler maintained the core conviction that divinely 
ordered Tradition is the correlate of revelation. Within this principle, however, he shifted 
his views on the capability of humanity to comprehend natural revelation apart from 
special grace. Catholicism helped stabilize Möhler’s stances, and established boundaries 
for future development.  
Josef Rupert Geiselmann is credited with noting Möhler’s theological shift of 
emphasis made after Unity. Peter Erb and others have concurred,128 pointing out that after 
the writing of Unity, Möhler adjusted the focus of his anthropology in order to avoid the 
danger of pantheism. Möhler’s earlier emphasis on the activity of the Divine in the world 
potentially blurred the lines between divinity and humanity. Möhler later became more 
keenly aware that the integrity of the human person needed to be protected, and human 
freedom preserved. Later, Möhler shifted his emphasis from the individual as rooted in 
God, the particular in the universal, to the human in the image of God, laying greater 
stress on fallen human nature.129 While still maintaining Divine activity in the world, 
Möhler focused more on the nature of the human person. Möhler’s shift is noticeable in 
the first pages of Symbolism. His first two chapters of Symbolism focus on doctrinal 
differences between Catholics and Protestants regarding the state of humanity. 
Specifically, he addresses the condition of primitive humanity, the imago Dei, and the 
nature and consequences of the Fall. At the time of Symbolism, Möhler also was 
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embroiled in various apologetic dialogues with Protestants. Moral freedom, as formally 
declared by the Church, was at the center of Möhler’s developing concerns. While 
repeatedly referencing the “Council of Trent,” Möhler emphasized the importance of 
attributing free will to “fallen man.”130 Although humanity is weakened, it still bears the 
image of God. Freedom of choice, something most Protestants rejected, remained part of 
that image. Within his renewed interest in anthropology, Möhler gave less attention to the 
human being rooted in God in creation through the Spirit, and more consideration to 
humanity being made in God’s image but suffering from fallen nature.  
Möhler’s analysis of Catholic Tradition influenced his maturing understanding of 
the integrity of the human person and moral freedom. Geiselmann notes that Augustine 
and the Synod of Orange influenced Möhler to realize that a person can have a rational 
belief in God without special revelation.131 In addition, in his works Möhler defended 
medieval Catholic theologians, such as Bonaventure, Scotus, and Aquinas, from 
Protestant charges. Each author, although in distinct ways, highlighted original sin in 
humanity and could not be accused of Pelagianism.132 It was also significant to Möhler 
that the fathers of Trent suggested that “not every religious and moral action of man is 
necessarily sinful.”133 For Möhler, these Church resources informed him that rational, 
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natural belief in God was possible in humanity left to itself. It provided him with the 
conviction that a person outside the Church can possess natural belief in God’s existence 
and attributes. Möhler’s teacher, Drey, had already taught him that all societies had 
received original revelation from God, and had handed down glimmers of the knowledge 
of God to succeeding generations. The “word which names God is everywhere found.”134 
Through the most ancient traditions, the basic concept of God was in the languages and 
cultures of all nations.  
At this stage, Möhler began to see the need to distinguish between natural and 
supernatural knowledge of God. In his letter to Louis Bautain in 1835, Möhler supported 
Bautain’s position against unbridled rationalism, of which the French philosopher 
accused the Bishop of Strasbourg.135 However, Möhler did not concur with Bautain’s 
excessive reduction of the role of reason in Christian faith. Bautain, almost in a fideistic 
manner, had argued that divine revelation was the exclusive source of knowledge and 
certitude about God. Möhler, at this stage, now understood that human reason, even apart 
from special revelation, was able to understand general truths about God. 136 Möhler 
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argued that natural man left to himself intuitively has basic knowledge of God’s existence 
and attributes. This knowledge can exist in a person who possesses no awareness of 
historic Judaism or Christianity. This knowledge is based in primitive revelation; it does 
not require the “special revelation” required in Unity and other earlier works. Möhler’s 
study of Church theologians helped lead him to these conclusions.  
As some shifts were becoming apparent in Möhler’s thinking, he kept the basic 
conviction that revelation and its corollary Tradition were needed. To Möhler’s thinking, 
fundamental desire for God was acutely placed in human nature similar to a seed being 
deeply embedded into the soil.137 However, like a natural seed, it needed external 
stimulus in order to develop. Revelation was that stimulus, and it was conveyed by 
Tradition. This basic concept did not significantly change for Möhler. The human person 
did not approach the knowledge of God with a blank slate; but, external revelation was 
needed to awaken innate truths. In Möhler’s view, Tradition played both a normative and 
authoritative role in the understanding of God. For him, faith was both traditional and 
rational.138 Faith did not begin with inductive analyses of either the natural world or the 
interiority of one’s self. Cartesian ideas of the ego insufficiently addressed the human 
need for communal Tradition. Neither was Christian faith fideistic. Faith did not go out to 
prove what it already believed. Instead, once the revelation was passed on through 
Tradition,139 each person freely decided to assent to it or not. For Möhler, this made faith 
rational.  
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Soon after the publication of Unity (1825), Möhler noticed the need to shift away 
from the philosophy he had utilized to describe the relationship between God and the 
world. In Unity,140 Möhler had cast the God-world relationship in a form of panentheism 
in a fashion similar to Schleiermacher’s and Schelling’s views. Geiselmann termed it 
“Romantic entheism.”141 Möhler maintained the transcendence of God to avoid 
pantheism, but emphasized God being in everything to such a degree that it was difficult 
to distinguish between the Spirit of the Son (Geist des Sohnes) and the spirit of the 
community (Gemeingeist). 
It was specifically in his criticism of Schleiermacher in Athanasius der Grosse 
(1827), that Möhler is seen beginning to move away from this panentheistic outlook. In 
Athanasius, Möhler critiqued Schleiermacher’s way of interpreting the relationship 
between the finite and the infinite, as well as his Sabellian view of the Trinity. It was 
Möhler’s Catholicism that equipped him to make these moves.  
Schleiermacher’s The Christian Faith had put forward three reasons why the 
Sabellian view of the Trinity needed to be reconsidered, and possibly preferred over the 
“Athanasian hypothesis”142 held by the Catholic Church. First, he argued that the 
“ecclesial” doctrine of the Trinity was not the only option one could take from the Gospel 
of John. The doctrine of three separate Persons equal in essence was not the necessary 
clear conclusion of the fourth gospel. Second, the classical view of the Trinity was 
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incoherent. The idea of one and three simply did not work together. Three separate 
entities comprising the identical essence forced the exegete into disjointed maneuvers. A 
more sensible doctrine, for Schleiermacher, was a type of Sabellianism which included a 
gradation of revelation, from Father to Son to Spirit. God was one, with various 
manifestations revealed over time. These manifestations could not be confused with 
distinct entities simultaneously existing as one. Schleiermacher’s view meant that either 
the “unity of essence” was “less real” than the three persons, or the three persons were 
“less real” than the unity of essence.143 Third, the teaching on the Trinity in Christianity 
was not closed. Schleiermacher argued that there was room for development in 
articulating the essence of God, especially within Protestantism.  
Schleiermacher’s third point was especially alarming to Möhler. Schleiermacher 
rejected the classic “ecclesial” definition of the Trinity because “obviously there is no 
prospect” of developing a “formula adequate for all time.”144 Our “dogmatic expressions” 
“inevitably suffer” to explain the immanent relations between Father, Son, and Spirit.145 
In addition, Unitarians and other Christians who rejected the “ecclesial” definition of 
Trinity certainly lived lives of piety.146 Schleiermacher concluded that belief in such a 
doctrine of unknowable verities was not essential and certainly should never be a 
“precondition” of Christian redemption or the “divine life in Christ and in the Holy 
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146 “In point of fact their piety is by no means lacking” (Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, 172:749).  
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Spirit.”147 Schleiermacher, convinced that the “Athanasian hypothesis” of the Trinity was 
neither coherent nor clearly expounded in Scripture, concluded that “new construction”148 
in the theology of God was required. The term Son of God could no longer “always and 
exclusively” refer to Christ; distinctions between Christ and other believers needed to be 
reassessed. The term Father could no longer be used to refer to a “special distinction”149 
in the divine essence, but should be understood as a stage in divine disclosure. 
Schleiermacher’s God, as Monad, could not endure distinctions. When discussing divine 
attributes, Schleiermacher contended that religious expressions have more to do with 
“representing the immediate impression”150 than establishing scientific knowledge. 
Dogmatic definitions of God were speculative and ultimately unknowable. Articulations 
of divine attributes designate nothing in God, but are statements of how people 
experience God. For Schleiermacher, the God who was revealing himself in the whole 
was wholly other and defied dogmatic definition. The one infinite God is the mover 
behind all finite reality; he is constantly manifesting himself anew in creation. It was at 
this point of conjunction of the divine and human that Möhler detected severe problems. 
For Möhler, if God is only known through his relations with the finite, and those 
relations only convey human impressions and not divine realities, then why even bother 
with a transcendent God? Exactly what is the nature of the relationship if it is only human 
impressions, and not essentially God who is being encountered? Why even posit a Monad 
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if “nothing is known”151 of it? For Möhler, if the term God was an arbitrary affirmation, 
divine activity was reduced again to the force of the universe. Panentheism was no longer 
needed; pantheism satisfied once more. To Möhler, panentheism had destroyed the divine 
pole; it failed to clearly define what humans were to strive towards. In addition, if after 
“religious interests” a determination is made concerning the number of the divine 
Persons, then who can tell if some new divine persons are yet to come to light.152 There 
was no reason that a new, fourth, manifestation of God would not come to light. In the 
end, Schleiermacher’s panentheism caused the particularities of the Christian faith to 
disappear.153  
Practically, Möhler’s greater alarm in Schleiermacher’s God-world relation was 
the destruction of the finite pole. If the one God was progressively unfolding himself in 
the embodiment of creation, then the Father, Son, and the Spirit were reduced to the 
material of God’s self-development.154 Schleiermacher’s panentheistic universe rendered 
humans incapable of genuinely relating to God, and robbed them of their free moral will; 
it put the integrity of the human in jeopardy. According to Schleiermacher’s Sabellian 
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view of the Trinity, the human being “did not fall,”155 and was “thus not redeemed from a 
freely chosen fall.”156 Original creation was merely incomplete, to be perfected by later 
“evolutions of the Godhead.”157 Christianity was a “natural” development of mankind, 
rooted in the “evolutions of the Deity.” Sequentially, in the first, it was difficult to 
distinguish the Father from creation; in the second, the Redeemer from the redeemed; in 
the third, the Spirit from the Church.158 For Möhler, the upshot of such a scenario was 
that human freedom was illusory, “Christianity is not salvation, and man is not born again 
in it.”159 Möhler saw that the loss of particularity in defining God led to the recasting of 
God as simply one with the vital force of the universe. Christianity had lost its 
distinctiveness, and the God behind it all was not really knowable. In the end, 
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Panentheism caused the divine and human poles to “collapse” into each other.160 God was 
made unreal and vanished.  
As he began to move further away from the entheism of Unity, which he later 
considered a “work of an enthusiastic youth,” “not properly digested,”161 Möhler 
searched for a way to describe the God-world relation which maintained an integral 
connection between the two poles but did not confuse them. Through the several editions 
of Symbolism, Möhler used Chalcedonian Christology to amend his own views and help 
solve his dilemma. This tool was given to him in the Church, and affected his 
ecclesiology and interpretation of Scripture.  
Möhler’s Ecclesiology 
Möhler’s theology of the Church developed over time and demonstrated his 
struggle to present the Church as necessarily both human and divine. In the end, he 
retrieved an ecclesiology from the ancient Chalcedonian definition of Christ that 
postulated both poles in the Church, distinct but united. In addition, Chalcedonian 
ecclesiology provided him a locus for the interpretation of Scripture. 
Möhler sought to retrieve an authentic Catholic ecclesiology; he attempted to 
avoid several pitfalls, such as God-world relations conveyed by Schelling and 
Schleiermacher. At the same time, he sought to circumvent fideism found in 
Traditionalist French authors, such as Bautain.162 He attempted to get beyond several 
Catholic ecclesiologies which were polemical, and noticeably “anti-Protestant, anti-
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statist,” and others which were influenced too strongly by Aufklärung demystification.163 
One of the significant struggles of Sailer and Drey was integration of the finite and 
infinite in ecclesiology. The Chalcedonian definition of Christ helped Möhler better 
define that relation. His ecclesiology markedly developed from Unity through his 
successive editions of Symbolism.  
Möhler’s ecclesial recovery included a mystical Church, something that was 
noticeably absent in Enlightenment rationalism. However, the essential vision of a 
sacramental Church which was the “self-communicated presence of God”164 was 
consistent in all of his works. Early on, he had described the Church more in terms of a 
pneumatic reality, while his final works emphasized more of a Christocentric structure. 
Despite the shifting of his emphases in regards to how God communicated himself 
through the Church, he consistently asserted that the Church was an essential part of 
God’s revelation in Jesus Christ. 
In Unity, Möhler centered his emphasis on the work of the Holy Spirit in order to 
elucidate the principle of unity within Catholicism. He was aware of the tension his 
emphasis on the Spirit would bring, and that to some it “may appear strange”165 that he 
did not begin with “Christ, the center of our faith.”166 In preparation for criticism, he 
attempted to disassociate himself from any “false idealistic school” and “possible 
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misunderstanding.”167 He defended his stress on the Spirit rather than Christ because the 
Spirit is who “guides us to the Son.” The Spirit is “first in our becoming Christians.”168 
Although all truth is “originally in Christ,” no one can receive that truth unless he first 
“participates in his divine life,” which is “the work of the divine Spirit.”169 The Spirit was 
the source of all Christian life, whether individual or communal. The “communication” 
(die Mitteilung) of the Spirit is the basis of personal faith,170 and faith itself is born in an 
individual as the effect (Wirkung)171 of the Spirit. True “Christian knowledge” and the 
entire Christian life have their beginning in the Holy Spirit.172 The “dark cloud of sin” is 
removed in the baptized individual by “the power of the divine Spirit.”173 However, the 
“Church community,” as it is “enlivened by the Holy Spirit,” is the basis of the individual 
Christian’s life.174 Through the divine Spirit, the Church “exists,” and is “maintained and 
continued.” The particular must be grounded in the universal; the individual believer 
cannot be born outside of the Church. No person experiences Christ independent of the 
Spirit’s “divine life flowing” in the “community of believers.”175 The “holy, divine life” 
spreads itself “abroad in the Church.” While “flowing out from the Church,” it grasps and 
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draws “non-Christians in a mysterious and irrepressible way.”176 The Spirit penetrates 
individual believers and unites them to a “spiritual community.”177 For Möhler, the Holy 
Spirit was not merely an external power “outside of human beings” bringing forth results. 
Rather, he was “essentially”178 in the people, making them into children of God. 
Wherever God works, “there he necessarily is, and what is has being insofar as it is 
grounded in God.”179 The Spirit’s work, in Möhler’s Unity, is from the interior of the 
Church. For this reason, it is “one-sided” to define the Church as merely a human 
“construction” or “association.” It is better termed an “offspring”180 of the Spirit. “The 
total conception of the Church is the love of believers manifesting itself in a specific 
form.”181 
The Church’s doctrine is a result of the indwelling Spirit. The Holy Spirit, interior 
to the Church, ever presses itself outwards. It surges as a living word.182 The apostles 
“proclaimed” “in living speech” what they had received, the “whole Church” experienced 
“extension” (Ausdehnung) under their leadership, and new congregations “continued” 
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after their departure as the “expression (Aussprache) of one and the same Spirit.”183 Due 
to the presence of the same Spirit, “the speaking” (Ausdruck) of a constant doctrine 
marked “one inner religious life”184 as the Church spread out over time.  
Between Unity and Symbolism, Möhler shifted his emphasis from a pneumatic to 
a Christological ecclesiology. Without denying the fundamental role of the Spirit, unity 
was now seen in the Incarnation. The divinity and humanity of Christ united in one 
person was analogously seen in the person and work of Christ, and in the Church. 
Throughout his career, Möhler consistently affirmed that ecclesial Tradition was 
necessary to understand divine revelation. “Christ, the Son of God, the New Creator, can 
be understood only in the totality of his believers.”185 In Unity, it was the Holy Spirit 
within the Church who was notably the source of all Christian doctrines, individual 
acceptance of Christianity, and the unity of all believers. In Symbolism, however, the 
Spirit certainly continues to act within the Church, but the “outward institution”186 
wherein the Spirit operates is given greater attention. While not rescinding his earlier 
point that the inner principle of the Spirit must have visible expression, Möhler without 
hesitation now posited the Incarnate Son as the analogy for the ecclesiastical structure. 
“The divine truth, in a word, must be embodied in Christ Jesus, and thereby be bodied 
forth in an outward and living phenomenon.”187  
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The hypostatic union in Christ, as defined by Chalcedon, became Möhler’s 
ecclesiastical model. Himes points out that Möhler sought to avoid classical 
Christological heresies in his ecclesiology. The portrayal of the Church influenced by 
Nestorian Christology distinguished the supernatural and human missions of the People 
of God to such a degree that the invisible church was divorced from the visible 
community. Conversely, monophysite ecclesiology fused the indwelling divine into the 
human institution to such a degree that the human “disappears within a divinized 
community.”188 Analogous to Christ’s person, Möhler asserted that the divine and human 
must be kept inseparable but distinct in the Church. As Christ’s “permanent 
manifestation,” the Church is “at once divine and human,” “the union of both.”189 Both 
the “divinity and humanity” of the Church are to be “clearly distinguished” while “bound 
in unity.”190 For Möhler, the Church was the ongoing Incarnation of the Son of God, 
Jesus Christ. God “manifested” his action “in Christ, according to ordinary human 
fashion,” which provided “the form also in which his work was to be continued.”191 Thus, 
the visible Church” is “the Son of God himself,” forever “manifesting himself” among 
people “in human form.”192 Through the “visible Church,” the Son shows himself to 
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others “in human form,” “perpetually renovated and eternally young—the permanent 
incarnation of the same.”193  
The Church was sacramental to Möhler: as divine, it maintained a mystical aspect, 
a divine presence in the earth; as human, it was a datum of the world that could be 
analyzed and critiqued. It was a living community where Christ was “concealed under 
earthly and human forms”194 and effectively communicated through the human authority 
which he established.  
Möhler and the Hierarchy 
  Two years before Unity, Möhler reviewed Das erste Zeitalter der 
Kirchengeschichte, the work of famed Catholic patristics scholar Johann Theodor 
Katerkamp. Despite his admiration for Katerkamp’s erudition, Möhler took issue with the 
historian’s claim that the Catholic hierarchy was “the center around which everything 
moves,”195 the “guiding principle of all history.”196 In a manner that anticipated Unity, 
Möhler argued that the “true center, the true leading principle of the Church” was “the 
Spirit of God.”197 It is correct that one of Möhler’s main foils was the idea of the Church 
“formulated essentially as a juridical societas.”198 However, Möhler’s developing 
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emphasis on the Spirit, both in his review of Katerkamp’s work and then Unity, should 
not be misconstrued as a dismissal, or even a strong misgiving, of ecclesiastical 
hierarchy. Such exaggeration should be avoided. Leonard Swidler, for example, nearly 
pits Symbolism against Unity. He calls Unity “much more liberal, non-papal, non-
authoritarian” than Symbolism, something more in line with particular post–Vatican II 
theologies.199 Dennis Doyle claimed that Möhler held that the “main job of the 
episcopacy and the papacy is not to impose a narrow uniformity but rather to affirm and 
hold in tension the diverse and often contrary forms of expression that the Christian life 
will generate.”200  
The degree of contrast between early and late Möhler as given by Swidler, Doyle, 
and others needs to be questioned.201 Early Möhler does not appear to reject hierarchical 
structures as would an anti-authoritarian adolescent. His concern, noticed as early as his 
review of Katerkamp, was that leaders within those divinely ordained structures would 
not presume autonomy from the living Spirit of God. The hierarchy, left to itself, would 
indeed become a “blind, dead tool in the hand of the wise.”202 However, Möhler 
explicitly insisted that the primary function of the episcopacy was positive, not negative. 
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“The hierarchy is necessary; the Spirit of God has initiated a lot of good by it.”203 Möhler 
certainly conveyed concern over juridical religion in his writings, but the “slavery” he 
warned against resulted from “nonobservance” of the “divine economy”204 in the 
Church’s structure. The episcopacy was an external expression of the Spirit’s love within 
the Church, not something to be mistrusted. Today, it will make a difference how one 
portrays Möhler if one assumes the existence of totally externalizing juridical 
reductionists in his day, and sees Möhler as counteracting them. It might be more 
accurate to perceive Möhler, in his criticisms of Katerkamp and others, as one who 
accentuated the positive role of the living Spirit-infused hierarchy. Even in early Möhler, 
the hierarchy can be seen as a means to unity which does not necessarily sacrifice the 
external hierarchy as the foundation of Christ’s Church.  
Unity is valuable to understand the continuity throughout Möhler’s career. To 
severely divide Möhler’s productions, or place him with others from his “early” era 
simply in “Post–Vatican II Liberal” or “left wing” categories205 fails to recognize the 
context of his writings. Möhler was not opposed to the idea of an ordained hierarchy 
within the Church even though there were abuses of it in his era. Instead, he was 
elucidating the “true center” of the hierarchy in order to prevent further scandal.206 The 
hierarchy was necessary, but it needed to see itself as originating from and maintained by 
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the Spirit. Ultimately, it was the Spirit that formed Tradition as an interior living reality 
in the Church.207 For Möhler, the Spirit was not opposed to the hierarchy; the Spirit 
actually moved within the juridical structure to form Tradition.  
In Unity, Möhler emphasized that the Spirit presses itself outwards in the 
“external, visible structure” of the Church, replete with hierarchy.208 Any “thought of an 
invisible Church founded on earth by Christ is so completely opposed to Christianity.”209 
The visible Church, as a living organism, is the “external production” of an inner forming 
power, similar to a spirit creating a body for itself. For Möhler this implied that the 
hierarchical structure of the Church was ordered by the Spirit. As soon as the “forming, 
holy principle was active” in believers, they were naturally drawn to one another and 
strove for union. This “inner movement” towards unity was satisfied in the bishop. The 
bishop was the “manifestation” and living center of the Christian disposition; he makes 
“firm” the consciousness of Christian unity.210 In Unity, Möhler saw the bishop as the 
“offspring” of the congregation. The bishop’s office could not be arbitrary, simply arising 
out of human agreement. In reference to Acts 20:28, where Paul reminded the Ephesian 
elders that the Holy Spirit made them overseers, Möhler claimed that the modern day 
bishop was “of divine origin.”211 The episcopal office was the outward work of the Holy 
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Spirit; it reflected the expressed desire for unity and free production of the love of God’s 
people. The spirit of unity was in each church, but the realization of that spirit was 
centered in each bishop. “If these are removed, there is no longer a Church.”212 In Unity, 
Möhler continued to describe the various offices of the Metropolitan and the total 
Episcopate. Each serves as a center of an expanding unity. However, the singular body of 
the Church, the “organic unity of all parts in a whole,” could not be complete without the 
Primate,213 Rome’s bishop. Otherwise, the Church would merely be a “lifeless mass” of 
“dead concepts.” It would not be a single living Body.214 Möhler argued that the history 
of the early centuries of Christianity, despite needing “further development and outward 
formation,” supported the claim that the occupant of Peter’s chair was the “prototypical 
unity of the Church.”215  
From Unity through Symbolism, Möhler consistently affirmed the need for a 
living hierarchy. He saw the need to provide a “deciding authority”216 in the Church. 
Möhler perceived that “Christ wished to be the adequate authority for all ages,” and the 
Church was how he concretely realized “his authority before all generations of men.”217 
The proclamation of the Gospel needed A “visible, human medium” was needed, which 
would proclaim the gospel through “visible envoys.”218 For Möhler, a “visible society,” 
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which was “under the guidance of the Spirit,”219 was given the leadership of the Church. 
It would be a “contradiction” to suppose that the Incarnate Savior’s authority would be 
continued through “purely spiritual means.”220 “All” will relapse “into darkness, 
uncertainty, doubt, distraction, unbelief, and superstition”221 if ecclesiology is not 
analogous to Incarnation. The Church was “the visible community of believers, founded 
by Christ, in which, by means of an enduring apostleship,” is “under the guidance of his 
Spirit” until the “end of the world.”222 Truth is “manifested and embodied”223 in the 
Church and its leadership. 
Möhler maintained a distinction between an infallible Church and fallible leaders. 
The Church placed herself in the heart of an evil world. Consequently, those in the 
Church often have “wild, untamed natures.”224 The Church’s “priests and bishops fall not 
from the sky!”225 From the days of Judas onward, “there has been much evil in the 
Church.”226 Möhler argued that “Catholics must not shrink from” admitting the 
unfaithfulness and immorality of its leaders, “for Protestants themselves furnish 
irrefragable proof of the state of manifold neglect.”227 Möhler makes a key distinction 
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between individual failure and an infallible church. “The human” leadership of the 
Church is “not inerrable in itself, but only as the organ and as the manifestation of the 
divine.”228 “We all have erred—it is the Church only which cannot err.”229 “To no 
individual, considered as such, does infallibility belong.”230 Instead, “the living Christ 
and his Spirit” are what “constitute undoubtedly that which is infallible.”231 Only when 
the individual leader is conceived as a “member of the whole,” as “living and breathing in 
the Church,” and “conformable” to the Spirit and word within the Church, can he “attain 
to inerrability.”232 The polemical setting of Möhler at this time needs to be understood. 
He was not necessarily arguing in favor of or against papal infallibility.233 Instead, he was 
fighting the “individualization” of his day, which was opposite the “notion of 
community.”234 Möhler recognized that the hierarchical leaders of the Church often 
missed the mark, but the Spirit never failed the Church. The Church, specifically the 
hierarchy, needed to submit to the Holy Spirit. 
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Möhler and the Interpretation of Scripture 
Möhler and Tübingen theologians were conscious of the “ecumenical dimension 
to Christian theology.”235 The interpretation of Scripture, for Möhler, must be conducted 
in an ecclesial context. The Church, as the Body of Christ, was intrinsic to divine 
revelation;236 it was essential to the fullness of God’s disclosure in Jesus Christ. The 
Church is the location of Christ’s mystical presence. “He dwells in the community.”237 
Therefore, one must be in the Church to expound Christian dogma. Möhler critiqued 
Protestants because they supposed they could interpret Scripture after separating from the 
Body.  
“Outside the Church,” the Holy Scriptures are “not understood” because the 
Spirit, who authored the text, is resident in the Church.238 The Church has always been 
found with the Spirit, and the Spirit will always be found in the Church. The clear 
“internal consciousness of God”239 is only obtained in the Church. Referencing Origen, 
Möhler argued that the Church was not founded on the letter, but on the Spirit.240 “The 
person who has the Spirit will acknowledge it in the form of the Church,” and 
subsequently “understand the letters.”241 Referencing Ignatius of Antioch’s letter to the 
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Smyrnaeans, Möhler contended that heresy has always been understood as a separation 
from unity. It is a revolt against the “organic coherence of all believers.”242 “Heresy 
understands the Christian as isolated and knows no common Spirit.”243 Heretics flourish 
when “the concept of the Church is defined in a one-sided manner,” as merely a human 
“construction or an association, founded for the preservation and perpetuation of the 
Christian faith.”244 Several heretics acknowledged the same Scriptures that the Catholic 
Church used, but perverted the meaning of the texts.245 However, others contradicted the 
gospel by the “fictional creation” of their own scriptures.246 Through reading the Church 
Fathers, Möhler concluded that apostolic succession had always been seen as the setting 
in which to interpret Scripture. As an example, Origen’s mystical allegorical reading of 
Scripture consistently operated within the “rule of the heavenly Church” as it came down 
“through apostolic succession.”247 “The Church was founded by Jesus and has come to us 
through an unbroken succession.” The interpretation that contradicts the Church is the 
false interpretation.248 
 Although the Scripture must be interpreted according to the faith of the Church, 
Möhler did not advocate a particular method of exegesis. Each method was conditioned 
by its culture and the expertise of its era; also, every method has its capricious twisters of 
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truth. Instead, the Christocentric vision furnished by the Church is the prerequisite focus 
of any exegetical method.  
Origen’s method might certainly seem anachronistic and “of little use” to modern 
exegetes, and it cannot be allowed to become a “restriction of the exegete.”249 However, 
Origen’s explication of Christ in the Scriptures should be considered “uncommonly 
significant, inspired, and truly divine” to any Catholic reading of the Bible250 because it 
opens “the mystic veil” for all ages.251 Christ is the vision of all exegesis. He is the center 
of the biblical text, and he is encountered in every passage. This “peculiar Christian 
sense,” this “ecclesiastical consciousness,” which tradition provides, is “the standard of 
Scriptural interpretation—the rule of faith.”252  
 For Möhler, a unity comprised of distinct duties existed between scientific 
exegesis and the Church’s interpretation of the Bible. The ecclesiastical interpretation of 
Scripture “does not descend to the details.” In other words, it does not concern itself with 
determining the authorship of particular books within the Bible, intertextuality between 
books, the history and grammar in the texts, or stimuli behind the biblical authors 
penning certain texts. Such important details are necessary, but are left to “learned” and 
“scientific” exegetes.253 Instead, the Church’s role as interpreter of Scripture applies to 
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the “doctrinal concepts of Scripture,” to the “essential matter of Holy Writ.”254 Its 
“interpretation extends only to doctrines and morals.”255 The ecclesial interpretation of 
Scripture addresses the loftier vision of the Church and remains constant through all ages 
in a deeper understanding of its mystical Resident, who is “eternally present in the 
Church.” The Church “exists only by Christ, and yet she must have to find him out.”256 
While scientific exegesis rightfully seeks to study the objective details surrounding the 
sacred text, the ecclesial interpretation cannot begin with a blank slate.  
 For Möhler, an ecclesiastical interpretation of Scripture provided the fullest 
meaning to the Scripture. Möhler criticized modern exegetes who demystified the text 
because of the unnecessary limitations they placed on themselves. By separating 
themselves from any idea of a divinely ordained teaching office in the Church, they 
thought they could “teach themselves and rise above all times.” Yet, in the end, they 
could “understand neither earlier times nor themselves.”257 For Möhler, the faith of the 
Church opened penetrating insights into Scripture otherwise inaccessible. Möhler said it 
succinctly in a footnote attached to his Preface to Unity: 
I do not think much of the proposition that to write a history one must be 
without religion, native land, and the like. Insofar as this means that a 
historian must be unbiased, I agree, but one can be unbiased only if one 
has religion, and this must be a specific religion since there are no 
unspecific ones.258 
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 Ecclesial faith provided practical value to Möhler by allowing him a greater 
opportunity to be self-critical. He was able to rise above his own milieu because of his 
Catholicism.259 Knowledge of a communal faith required more than individual erudition. 
Möhler’s presumption of the continuity of the one faith conducted over time by the one 
Spirit suddenly made the ancients his contemporaries. Although it was Lutheran August 
Neander who primary encouraged Möhler to study patristics, it was Möhler’s Catholicism 
that instructed him to read them as authorities. By assuming continuity within a Church 
marked by apostolic succession, Möhler was able to correct his own ecclesiology with 
Chalcedon.260 He was able to modify his theology by emphatically returning the 
Incarnate Christ to the center of his thought. He was not afraid to explore within the mists 
of Schelling and Schleiermacher because the ancient breeze of Catholicism blew 
Romanticism’s dreamy fog away at key moments. 
Möhler as Catholic 
 Johann Adam Möhler’s theology, as well as the thought of others associated with 
Tübingen, is best understood when it is located within Roman Catholicism. Möhler 
interacted with multiple currents of thoughts, and several rivulets of contemporary ideas 
can be traced in his works; however, Catholicism is the steady undercurrent of his 
reflections. Some have considered him to be the “most important figure in the formation 
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of ecclesiology as a field of systematic theology,”261 one who anticipated “the major 
movement of Roman Catholic thought” in the twentieth century.262 However, it is 
misleading to then suggest that Möhler’s theology “began” in the “appropriation of the 
insights of German Romanticism.”263 This risks distortion. It is true that aspects of 
Romanticism appealed to some theologians, including Catholics at Tübingen, because of 
their “longing for communion with the transcendent,” but it is false to suggest that their 
desire for a “richer and warmer spirituality”264 was birthed in nineteenth-century 
Germany. Möhler must be understood as constitutively a Catholic; he picked fruit from a 
vast orchard of Romantic thought, but he was not the product of that grove. He used 
different philosophies to better understand his own faith which had been born in the 
Church.  
 In his review of Katerkamp’s church history, Möhler resisted an overly-polemical 
portrayal of the Church, and suggested the center of the Church has always been life in 
the Spirit. “The basic teachings of Christianity were, if I may use the expression, lived.” 
They “were held in the feasts, in the whole liturgy.”265 The present creeds and doctrines 
confessed by the Church were not the result of adapting past philosophy to a modern 
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milieu. Instead, ecclesiastical symbols were developed in a lived Christianity. Peter Erb 
cites Möhler’s initial response to the completion of Unity, as recorded in a letter to friend. 
In it, Möhler claimed to have “discovered” a “living, fresh, full Christianity.”266 Möhler, 
as a Catholic, and certainly as a priest, was living in the sacramental life of the Church. 
He recovered ancient living traditions from within the living context of Catholicism. 
When he enthusiastically claimed to “discover for the first time a living, full, fresh 
Christianity,” he was already standing in the Church’s territory and mining its ancient 
soil. The mystery was not necessarily ever lost for him. Even when he severely critiqued 
a view of the hierarchy which reduced the institution to a juridical reality, he saw no need 
to escape hierarchy and institution altogether. To this reader, Möhler seemed to 
understand that some of the juridical ecclesiology he spoke out against was partially a 
response to the Reformation, and Church-State tensions. Möhler was doing more than 
simply constructing an ecclesiology “over against a medieval, juridical view of the 
Church.”267 He was retrieving what already existed. 
Definite shifts are noticeable throughout Möhler’s career, but it is possibly more 
helpful to highlight the continuity in his thinking. As Erb mentioned, too much 
characterization of Möhler in categories such as “mature” only “misrepresent the 
situation.”268 A view of Möhler’s continuity is obscured by simply inserting him into 
Vatican I and Vatican II categories, according to whether his texts were from his 
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“younger, more liberal years” or from his later “more conservative period.”269 Although it 
is beneficial to track Möhler’s improvements, failure to emphasize the continuity he 
owed to Catholicism is detrimental. Based on the breadth of writings Möhler has 
provided during his short lifetime, it appears he would have at least attempted to discover 
continuity between the two councils and their aftermaths, rather than pit one against the 
other as is not uncommon today. 
 As is obvious in both Unity and Symbolism, Möhler was an apologist for 
Catholicism throughout his career. Although he hoped for reconciliation with 
Protestantism, he dialogued as a Catholic, not a minimalist ecumenist.270 Neither can 
Möhler be reduced to Romanticism. Unquestionably, Möhler interacted with German 
Romanticism, but he moved away from Schelling and Schleiermacher at key moments 
because of his Catholicism. It would be an “error” to define him as a “subjectivist.”271 
Möhler maintained buoyancy because his Catholic faith was his fundamental anchor.  
Möhler’s foundational Catholicism is seen in the censure levied by one of his 
fiercest critics, Tübingen’s Ferdinand Christian Baur. Both Baur and Möhler agreed on 
the nature of what they called “Symbolics.” Möhler considered Symbolics to be the 
“scientific exposition” of doctrinal differences among various religious groups. By 
starting with the formal symbols, or confessions, of a religious party, one could break 
down respective “dogma into the elements out of which it has been formed,” in search of 
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the “ultimate principles” 272 manifest in the symbols. Once the confessional parts of a 
system were viewed in relation to the whole governing principle (gestalt) of that system, 
the essential nature of the religious confession could be analyzed. After this, the essential 
nature of that particular religious system would be viewed in relation to the Gospel and 
Christian reason.273 The purpose of this theological method was to determine the validity 
of particular religious confessions, such as the Protestants’, in light of the “universally 
acknowledged truths” of Christianity.274 Möhler claimed that such a method of Symbolics 
could “furnish a solid and impartial account” of religious differences through scientific 
analysis.  
Baur basically agreed with Möhler that a scientific treatment of doctrinal 
differences consisted in uncovering the system behind doctrinal statements; the totality of 
final confession and governing principle needed to be seen together. For Baur, 
“Symbolics” “seeks to reconstruct two opposed doctrinal concepts as systems by 
grasping each in the unity of its principle.” This was because “at the root of each system 
lies a primary determination of the religious consciousness.”275 However, Baur accused 
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his Tübingen colleague of being unscientific because Möhler operated out of Catholic 
presumptions.  
For Baur, Möhler failed in his claim to “scientific objectivity” by refusing to grant 
Protestantism an equal claim to truth as Catholicism. In Symbolism, Möhler censured 
Protestantism as ultimately mere subjectivity, the apotheosis of Luther’s ego. Möhler 
acknowledged that evil behavior of individual Catholic leaders fanned the flames of the 
Reformation. However, Baur argued, Möhler was selective in what he critiqued in 
Protestantism and Catholicism. Baur argued that Möhler failed to adequately address the 
confessional character of Protestantism, merely reducing it to Luther’s ego.276 In addition, 
Baur accused Möhler of being unwilling to consider that the essence of Catholicism, not 
just a few individual Catholics, was part of the problem in the sixteenth century.277 In 
short, Baur argued that Möhler was not scientific at all; he operated out of Catholic 
presumptions. 
Baur’s analysis was correct in that he recognized that Möhler did not study 
religion from a sterile laboratory. Due to his Catholic ecclesiology, Möhler’s Church 
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remained sacramental. To Möhler, the Church was alive, visible, full of the Spirit, and 
still speaking. It could be studied no other way. Baur’s scientific analysis left little room 
for a mystical faith. He, like other Protestant contemporaries, could only study religion as 
an archaeologist uncovering unmarked graves in an ancient tomb.  
Conclusion 
Catholic ecclesiology gave Tübingen theologians a degree of resiliency during 
their engagement with biblical modernity. When the Catholic Tübingen School began in 
1817, the influence of the Aufklärung was being felt in German Catholicism. Certain 
Church leaders integrated Enlightenment ideals with Catholicism, and highlighted the 
practical preference to ethical living over dogmatic faith. Others were left questioning the 
credibility of revelation. In response, some thought they found an “ally” of the Christian 
faith in the “seminal” spiritual aspects of Romanticism, 278 or in one of the other rapidly 
developing philosophies. Insistence on humanity’s innate spiritual sense appeared to be a 
bulwark against the Enlightenment’s mechanistic determinism. However, divine 
revelation, at least in a Christian sense, was still often rejected. Both the validity of 
revelation and the validity of the Church’s witness to that revelation were excluded by 
most philosophies. 279 Even Drey and Möhler each appeared to drift at different moments. 
However, they each were able to move away from toxic elements in contemporary 
thought at critical moments. Drey, for example, never exchanged the Christian God for 
Schelling’s Absolute, and Möhler, through Chalcedonian Christology, was able to avoid 
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Schleiermacher’s panentheism. Christopher Ruddy argues that the Tübingen theologians 
“offered the most nuanced engagement with the intellectual challenges of modernity” 
among Catholic thinkers.280 To this reader, Catholic ecclesiology played a significant role 
in the buoyancy of Tübingen’s theologians. Their life in the Church influenced the 
development of their thought as much as did their scholarly abilities. Despite the 
scholarly accomplishments of Tübingen’s Catholic theologians, the stimulus of their 
work was discovered in a retrieval of ancient sources already existing in the Church. 
They integrated “scriptural and patristic Ressourcement”281 with the thoughts of 
Schelling, Hegel, and Schleiermacher.  
The works of Tübingen’s Catholic faculty influenced the theology of subsequent 
generations.282 Möhler and the Tübingen School were antecedents to twentieth-century 
Ressourcement theology.283 Möhler’s sensitivity to the critical role of history in 
revelation influenced theologians such as Marie-Dominique Chenu,284 and his 
Chalcedonian view of the Church not only influenced Yves Congar, but the entire 
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“ecclesiological movement of the twentieth century.”285 Maximilian Heim notes Möhler’s 
influence on Vatican II’s assertion that the Church is “one complex reality” of “the 
visible together with the spiritual.”286 In addition, Möhler was instrumental to Pope 
Benedict XVI’s sacramental ecclesiology, specifically the view that the Church was 
understood “by way of analogy with the Incarnation of the Divine Logos.”287 Even recent 
Protestant attempts at Resssourcement might trace some of what has influenced them to 
the Catholic Ressourcement, and then back to Möhler and other Tübingen theologians.288  
It is questionable if evangelicals can exhibit buoyancy without rigorous 
ecclesiology, and without much regard for the Catholic Church. Tübingen theologians 
read the Church Fathers from within the Church, with the assumption that the Fathers had 
a normative value for theological determinations. Their confident use of these resources, 
as well as their open-faced engagement with modernity, largely came from their lives in 
the Church.  
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CHAPTER FOUR  
RESTORING EFFECT OF CATHOLIC ECCLESIOLOGY: BEYOND THE 
MODERNIST CRISIS 
Introduction 
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, Catholic leaders perceived that the 
threat of biblical modernism was growing. Some in the Church’s hierarchy feared that the 
transcendent dimension was being jeopardized through a philosophy of immanence. This, 
they claimed, would eliminate the need for divine inspiration of Scripture, which would 
in its turn marginalize traditional Church dogma. These concerns were some of the 
reasons behind a search for a unitary method of philosophy and theology within 
Catholicism. For some, the solution to modern philosophical and theological dilemmas 
was found in pre-modern resources. Specifically, scholastic methods, notably the thought 
of Thomas Aquinas, were utilized. The nineteenth-century retrieval of scholasticism is 
generally referred to as Neo-Scholasticism, or Neo-Thomism. 
Over time, others in the Catholic Church perceived Neo-Scholastic theology to be 
narrow-minded and its advocates rigid in their application of its methods. Among other 
items, they argued that Thomas was being misinterpreted by the new scholastics. The 
extrinsic aspects of revelation were being accentuated by Church leadership to such a 
degree that other valid understandings of divine revelation were played down. Several 
Catholic thinkers were disciplined by the Church for employing methods that were 
279 
 
contrary to Neo-Scholastic procedures, which only added to existing tensions in ongoing 
polemics. For good reasons, historians often refer to the time period as a crisis for the 
Catholic Church. To some in the Catholic Church, many long standing foundations 
appeared to be unstable.  
Despite ongoing internal disputes, Catholic ecclesiology eventually helped restore 
a noticeable degree of theological equilibrium back into the Church over generations. 
Catholic philosophers and theologians offered modes of though distinct from Neo-
Scholasticism and the theology of the manuals. To this reader, credit was due to 
underlying ecclesiological assumptions in Catholicism as much as the erudition of any 
particular author for providing steadiness to the Catholic Church in its time of crisis.  
Although the Catholic Church engaged multiple changing realities in the modern 
world on several levels, this dissertation will focus on its encounter with modernity 
relative to biblical interpretation. This work will accentuate the stabilizing effect of 
Catholic ecclesiology during crises, as it operated through various authors and events. 
Conversely, evangelicals may have some brilliant theologians, but they do not have any 
outstanding ecclesiology. Evangelical theology will continue to exhibit instability if this 
reality is not addressed in more depth.  
Promotion of Neo-Scholasticism 
 In 1907, in Pascendi Dominici Gregis, Pius X identified “modernism”1 as a 
“system” with two sides: “agnosticism” was the negative side, and “vital immanence” 
                                                          




was the positive side.2 According to Pius X, the philosophical errors of modernism had 
directly affected theology and biblical exegesis. Therefore, the entire “system” of 
“modernism” needed to be critiqued.3 He described modernism as the “synthesis of all 
errors.”4 In response, the Catholic Church put medieval scholasticism forward, especially 
the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, in order to comprehensively counter the growing 
threat of “modernism” in both philosophy and theology. Neo-Scholasticism was 
perceived to be capable to deal with contemporary philosophical challenges and engage 
good developments of modern science.5 It was often characterized by a rigid method of 
amassing external data in order to support propositional claims. It sought to convince its 
opponents of particular religious claims by undeniable external evidence. Although Neo-
Scholasticism’s advocates thought they were retrieving scholasticism from the thirteenth 
and fourteenth centuries, it has been demonstrated that instead they were drawing on 
                                                          
2 Cf. Pius X, Pascendi, 7. Etienne Gilson referenced the combined “criticism of Kant and the Positivism of 
Comte.” Etienne Gilson, God and Philosophy, ed. W. H. Jellema (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2002), 111.  
3 According to Pius X, the principle of philosophical immanence misled theologians to conclude that “God 
was immanent in man,” resulting in the “objects” of faith becoming merely symbolical. This resulted in a 
loss of Church dogma. The idea of eternal inspiration of Scripture was subsequently lost, and the Bible was 
reduced to human testimonies of religious “experiences.” Cf. Pius X. Pascendi, 19–22, and 39. Also, cf. 
Denzinger and Hünermann, Enchiridion Symbolorum, 3487–3491: 700–701.  
4 Cf. Pius X, Pascendi Dominici Gregis, 39.  
5 Nicholas Bunnin and Jiyuan Yu. “Neo-Scholasticism,” in The Blackwell Dictionary of Western 
Philosophy (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 468.  
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Baroque misinterpretations of Thomas.6 In reality, Neo-Scholasticism did not convey the 
full-orbed quest for truth evident in Thomas and other medieval scholastics.7  
 This dissertation is focused on theological and exegetical developments; however, 
it is important to briefly examine the philosophical use of Neo-Scholasticism to combat 
modernism. The Catholic Church, due to its ecclesiology, was able to respond to more 
than how one interpreted the Bible. It was also able to address philosophical issues 
perceived to be deeply related to reading the Scripture, but distinct from it. Despite the 
restrictive method of Catholic Neo-Scholasticism and its narrow parameters of thought, a 
noteworthy distinction becomes evident opposite Protestantism: the Catholic Church had 
the resources to comprehensively safeguard Church dogma through its ecclesiology. The 
Catholic Church could directly address scriptural exegesis, as well as the philosophical 
environment in which those labors were made. Despite the detrimental restrictions of 
Neo-Scholasticism, the Catholic Church’s ecclesiology helped it restore mystical 
elements to its theology which had been neglected. Over the next two generations of 
internal polemics, and various misjudgments by the Catholic hierarchy, this distinction 
would prove significant.  
 
 
                                                          
6 Today, most historians and theologians agree with this assessment. It appears that nineteenth-century 
Neo-Scholasticism failed to retrieve the breadth of Thomas’ thought. Instead, it was a retrieval of Baroque 
interpreters of Thomas. Cf. Jared Wicks, “Manualistic Theology,” in Dictionary of Fundamental Theology, 
ed. René Latourelle and Rino Fisichella (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 2000), 1102–1105; 
Francis Schüssler Fiorenza and John P. Galvin, Systematic Theology: Roman Catholic Perspectives, 2nd 
ed. (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2011), 29–30; and Gerald O’Collins, The Second Vatican Council: 
Message and Meaning (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2014), 6.  
7 Cf. Wicks, Manualistic Theology, 1104. 
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Philosophical Neo-Scholasticism 
Pius IX and Vatican I 
 Pius IX’s (1846–1878) first encyclical, Qui Pluribus (1846), was a broad response 
to much of the previous century’s rationalism and agnosticism. Pius brought attention to a 
“very bitter and fearsome war against the whole Catholic commonwealth” that was 
currently being “stirred up by men bound together in a lawless alliance.”8 Specifically, 
Pius criticized the philosophical systems of the Church’s opponents.9 He blamed the 
conflict on “many harmful methods”10 peddled by self-proclaimed “philosophers.” 
“These men do not preserve sound doctrine, but turn their hearing from the truth.”11 It 
was “by means of” their “obviously ridiculous and extremely specious kind of 
argumentation” that these philosophers were misleading people.12 The principal error of 
these philosophers was to deny the rational justification for religious faith. They “invoke 
the power and excellence of human reason” to such a degree that it disparages “the most 
holy faith of Christ.”13 The “philosophers” claimed that reason had rendered religious 
faith unintelligible. Therefore, the thoughtful person would need to either confine his 
religious faith within its proper limits or outright reject it. Philosophy, which was 
                                                          
8 Pius IX, Qui Pluribus, 4 
9 Throughout the struggle with modernism, several authors were targeted. However, Immanuel Kant often 
stood out as the great enemy of the faith even when he was not named.  
10 Pius IX. Qui Pluribus,4. Also, cf. Denzinger and Hünermann, Enchiridion Symbolorum, 2781:571.  
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid.  
13 Ibid. 
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supposed to be directed towards discovering truth in nature, was used by these men to set 
reason against faith.  
For Pius, faith and reason needed to complement one another. “They give such 
reciprocal help to each other that true reason shows, maintains and protects the truth of 
the faith, while faith frees reason from all errors and wondrously enlightens, strengthens 
and perfects reason with the knowledge of divine matters.”14 Although Pius argued that 
the conclusions given by divine revelation could “never be arrived at or perfected by 
human reason,”15 he affirmed the ability of reason to demonstrate the authenticity of 
Christianity. 
Pius laid emphasis on the persuasiveness of external demonstrations of the 
Christian faith. Contrary to the skepticism and agnosticism of his day, Pius contended 
that Christian revelation was convincing, and that human reason had the ability to 
understand it and positively respond to it.16 In his encyclical, Pius argued that open-
minded people were capable of analyzing the data of faith, and rationally acquiesce. 
“Anyone” who considers the evidence for Christianity will “easily understand” the 
religion’s divine origin.17 Certain proofs, most notably those based on the prophecies, 
life, and miracles of Jesus, were “ready at hand;”18 they provided a rational person with 
sufficient reason to believe. “Human reason knows clearly from these striking and certain 
                                                          
14 Pius IX, Qui Pluribus, 6. 
15 Pius IX, Qui Pluribus, 7.  
16 Cf. McCool, Nineteenth-Century Scholasticism, 129. 
17 Pius IX, Qui Pluribus, 9.  
18 Pius IX, Qui Pluribus, 8.  
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proofs that God is the author of the Christian faith; therefore it is unable to advance 
further but should offer all obedience to this faith, casting aside completely every 
problem and hesitation.”19  
 Throughout his pontificate, many of Pius IX’s encyclicals imply an embattled 
Church. In addition to philosophical concerns, apprehension over nineteenth-century 
encroachments on the Church by political foes is evident.20 On many fronts, Pius IX was 
compelled to address “the great anxieties and difficulties, especially in these evil times, 
that the episcopal ministry is exposed to.”21 In a letter to Italy’s bishops, Pius IX warned 
that “wretched enemies of all truth” were employing “a variety of deceits for turning the 
spirits of the Italian people away from the Catholic faith.” He called on the bishops to 
“spare no effort and to shrink from no problem in protecting the practice of the Catholic 
religion.”22 In his 1864 encyclical addressed to all bishops, Quanta Cura, and the 
attached Syllabus of Errors, Pius IX denounced the growing separation between the 
secular and religious spheres of life. He condemned what he perceived to be an effort “to 
raze the foundations of the Catholic religion and of civil society, to remove from among 
men all virtue and justice, to deprave persons, and especially inexperienced youth, to lead 
                                                          
19 Pius IX, Qui Pluribus, 9.  
20 Even by the end of the century, during Leo XIII’s pontificate, some leaders in the Church perceived the 
need for an over-arching method to address the challenges of modernism, and prevent “ad hoc” responses 
to them. Cf. Russell Hittinger, “Pascendi Dominici Gregis at 100: Two Modernisms,Two Thomisms: 
Reflections on the Centenary of Pius X’s Letter Against the Modernists,” Nova Et Vetera, English 
Edition 5, no. 4 (2007): 854. Hittenger suggest the socio-politico concerns were primary for the Vatican. 
Without ranking an order of primacy between the social, political, philosophical, and theological, this 
dissertation, while acknowledging the importance of all aspects for nineteenth-century Catholicism, focuses 
on the theological reading of Scripture.  
21 Pius IX, Probe Noscitis Venerabiles, 3.  
22 Pius IX, Nostis Et Nobiscum, 1, 3, 34.  
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it into the snares of error, and at length to tear it from the bosom of the Catholic 
Church.”23 Pius IX restated and categorized eighty propositions he had previously 
condemned. Among the propositions he denounced was that Christian faith was opposed 
to reason, and that fidelity to revelation hindered human perfection.24 He also condemned 
the idea that human reason was the ultimate judge of all truth and falsehood, and that 
religion ultimately flowed from the “inborn” power of human reason.25  
 Near the end of his papacy, Pius IX came to the defense of the Church in Prussia, 
complaining of “the contempt of episcopal dignity, the violation of the Church’s freedom 
and its rights, the abuses which oppress not only those dioceses mentioned above, but 
other Prussian dioceses as well.”26 Although the broad term “modernity” was not 
formally used by Pius IX or the Vatican at this time to succinctly describe its foes, it was 
clear that they perceived the formation of a new alliance which opposed the faith. A 
unified evil from outside the Church was attempting to fracture the Church’s 
philosophical, political, and theological foundations.  
 Qui Pluribus primarily critiqued those outside of the Church. However, by the 
middle of the 1850s severe censure of Catholic thinkers was becoming more common. 
Catholic leadership was increasingly anxious that its own people were being influenced 
by modern errors. The enemy had infiltrated the camp, and the leadership identified him 
                                                          
23 Pius IX, Quanta Cura, 1. Cf. Denzinger and Hünermann, Enchiridion Symbolorum, 2890–2896: 588–
590. 
24 Pius IX, The Encyclical Letter of Pope Pius IX and the Syllabus of Modern Errors, 6:11–13. Cf. 
Denzinger and Hünermann, Enchiridion Symbolorum, 2901–2980: 590–598.  
25 Pius IX, The Encyclical Letter of Pope Pius IX and the Syllabus of Modern Errors, 3–4:9. 
26 Pius IX. Quod Nunquam, 5. 
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by his methods. Conversely, some theologians and philosophers in the Catholic Church 
were not alarmed with the new methods, but eagerly explored ways to reconcile the faith 
with current thought. Although Catholic thinkers were not united in their methods, the 
Church was “aligned” against the form of rationalism that “rejected the intellectual and 
moral claims of positive Christian revelation.”27 The Vatican’s heightened concern 
regarding its own thinkers was evident in its disciplinary actions. In the end, the methods 
of several theological systems were scrutinized, and numerous Catholic thinkers endured 
sanctions. Gerald McCool notes that in the eleven years between 1855 and 1866 the 
Vatican’s leadership had led possibly an unparalleled regulation of the development of 
theology.28 The Church’s hierarchy interpreted some attempts to demonstrate the 
compatibility of Catholicism with the modern world as discordant with the Catholic faith. 
According to the leadership, some Catholic philosophers blurred distinctions between 
natural and supernatural orders, which led to confusion about the relation between 
philosophy and theology.  
 On one hand, Catholic traditionalists denied reason’s natural ability to acquire 
certain knowledge of the first principles of metaphysics and ethics.29 This resulted in 
undervaluing the ability of natural reason and often led to fideism. On the other hand, 
Catholic thinkers who emphasized human intuition blurred the lines between nature and 
grace, compromising the “freedom of man’s creation” and the “gratuitous character of the 
                                                          
27 McCool, Nineteenth-Century Scholasticism, 17. 
28 Cf. McCool, Nineteenth-Century Scholasticism, 129–132. Of course, it could be argued that the 
challenges to the faith were likewise perceived to be unparalleled. 
29 McCool, Nineteenth-Century Scholasticism, 139. 
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order of grace and faith through its metaphysical unification of creation, illumination, and 
revelation.”30 Some of the forms of rationalism put forward by Catholic philosophers 
attempted to ground first principles in human reason. These philosophers claimed the 
human mind could grasp naturally knowledge that was previously considered exclusive 
to the province of revelation, thus neglecting philosophy’s dependence on theology. In 
addition, the Cartesian subject starting with a reflection on his own act of knowledge led 
to the metaphysics of a thinking mind separated from a world of extended bodies.31 
Similarly, Catholic ontologists posited an intellectual intuition of God in order to ground 
first principles of metaphysics and ethics. In these different systems, the metaphysical 
unity of humanity and nature was demolished, and the essential distinction between 
philosophy and theology was potentially undermined.32 All of this was unacceptable to 
the Vatican’s leadership. Within roughly a decade, various forms of “traditionalism, 
ontologism, Günther’s dualism, and Frohschammer’s rationalism”33 were condemned. 
Almost every form of theology among Catholics had been denounced in short order, with 
the exception of Scholasticism.34  
 At the First Vatican Council (1869–1870), the bishops and theologians drafted 
Dei Filius, the Dogmatic Constitution on revelation and faith.35 Dei Filius cautioned 
                                                          




34 Cf. McCool, Nineteenth-Century Scholasticism, 132–140. 
35 Although papal infallibility was a significant issue at Vatican I, it is not the focus of this dissertation. The 
centuries-old dispute among Catholic theologians regarding the primacy of papal or conciliar authority is 
recognized, but cannot be addressed in detail here. Much of evangelical Protestantism has outright 
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against both a “generalized”36 rationalism which assumed the sufficiency of “human 
reason in itself”37 as well as a supernaturalism which failed to demonstrate “the basis of 
faith.”38 Although the Council participants were conscious of the effect of Kant’s critique 
on Christian claims of religious knowledge, their attention was not focused on rebutting 
him directly. Nor did they combat French supernaturalists precisely. Instead, they 
attempted to elucidate a positive path between the extremes of rationalism and fideism by 
clarifying a “twofold order of knowledge.”39  
 First, the Council affirmed the ability of human reason to discover general truths 
about God through observation of the external world. God can be “known with certitude 
by the natural light of human reason from created things.”40 A general knowledge of God 
was available to all people. Correspondingly, the Council critiqued exclusive confidence 
in human reason to understand divine truths. The Council contended that God had chosen 
to reveal specific truths which were “impenetrable” to human reason “left to itself.”41 
Through revelation, centered in Jesus Christ and safeguarded by the Catholic Church, 
                                                          
demystified the Catholic Church, or any church, regardless of its internal structure. In addition, Möhler’s 
broader emphasis prior to Vatican I was the Church; the pope was understood within that purview. This 
dissertation will attempt to keep that wider focus. For that reason, attention is given to Vatican I’s Dei 
Filius rather than the conclusions on papal infallibility. 
36 Cf. Gabriel Daly, Transcendence and Immanence: A Study in Catholic Modernism and 
Integralism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 8.  
37 Dei Filius, 2. Dei Filius is Session Three of Vatican I (9 April 24, 1870). Also, cf. Denzinger and 
Hünermann, Enchiridion Symbolorum, 3000–3045: 600–609. 
38 Dei Filius, 4. 
39 Dei Filius, 4; Cf. Daly, Transcendence and Immanence, 8.  
40 Dei Filius, 2. 
41 Ibid. 
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these truths could be “known readily by all with firm certitude and with no admixture of 
error.”42 Miracles and prophecies served as “external proofs” of revelation, “suited to the 
intelligence of all.”43 The Council insisted that particular “certitude” was possible in both 
orders of knowledge, confirmed by legitimate “external proofs.”44 
 The distinctions between the “supernatural” and the “natural” in Dei Filius were 
not intended to suggest an antithesis.45 Rather, “although faith is above reason, 
nevertheless, between faith and reason no true dissension can ever exist.” “God cannot 
deny Himself, nor ever contradict truth with truth.” The “same God” who “reveals 
mysteries” and “infuses faith” has also provided people with “the light of reason.”46 Dei 
Filius attempted to express the two orders of knowledge as harmoniously benefitting each 
other. Faith was rational, and reason could be “illustrated by faith.”47  
 Russell Hittinger points out that one difficulty with documents of this era, such as 
the Syllabus of Errors, was they were negative in nature; they focused on identifying 
“liberal theses” without explicitly formulating positive “Catholic Doctrines.”48 Although 
the Church did not endorse a unitary method at the time, it is noteworthy that 
Scholasticism emerged somewhat unscathed from formal disapproval. A growing number 
of Catholic theologians found secure footing in what they considered a return to Saint 
                                                          
42 Dei Filius, 2. 
43 Dei Filius, 3. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Cf. Daly, Transcendence and Immanence, 8. 
46 Dei Filius, 4.  
47 Ibid. 
48 Hittinger, Pascendi Dominici Gregis at 100, 853. 
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Thomas. They assumed their system was a retrieval of thought which predated the 
modern era, and which enabled them to recover weapons which could combat the assaults 
of harmful ideas. As the intrinsic errors of contemporary thought systems became 
evident, scholasticism was increasingly favored because it could meet modern scientific 
demands and maintain fidelity to the deposit of faith.49  
Giovanni Perrone  
 One of the most prominent thinkers of the era was Jesuit Giovanni Perrone 
(1794–1876). Although Perrone may not be considered a full “adherent” to the complete 
appropriation of Neo-Scholasticism,50 his works were in circulation until Vatican II in 
order to teach principles of scholasticism.51 His recourse to the pre-modern bolstered the 
growing confidence in scholastic methods. To Perrone, his ideas contained in his large 
nine volumes of Dogmatic Theology were not new. Instead, for him, it was Saint Thomas 
who had planned long ago to refute modern errors such as the ones Spinoza had 
promoted.52  
                                                          
49 McCool, Nineteenth-Century Scholasticism, 137–138.  
50 Gerald A. McCool, From Unity to Pluralism: The Internal Evolution of Thomism (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 1989), 33. McCool claims Perrone, although a scholastic, was “open” to aspects of 
German theology. Also, Perrone was influenced both by Newman’s “Essay on the Development of 
Christian Doctrine” and his personal communication with Newman. Michael C. Shea, “Father Giovanni 
Perrone and Doctrinal Development in Rome: An Overlooked Legacy of Newman’s ‘Essay on 
Development.’” Journal for the History of Modern Theology/Zeitschrift Für Neuere 
Theologiegeschichte 20, no. 1 (October 2013): 85–116, doi:10.1515/znth-2013–0009.  
51 Cf. Daly, Transcendence and Immanence, 13. 
52 Perronne, Giovanni. Théologie Dogmatique, tome premier, cinquième edition, (Paris: Louis Vivés 
Libraire, 1877), 3:49–50. “que l’on se rappelle ici ce que nous avons dit dans la prevue; et alors on verra 
que l’objection de Spinosa est impossible, et qu’en outré Saint Thomas l’avait prevue et refute longtemps à 
lavance.” 
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 Perrone’s thought was expounded in strict, logical, and “forensic” style.53 The 
structure of his writings was first, a propositional statement, then different objections to 
the proposition, and then concluding refutations of those objections.54 He gave attention 
to rational external supports for revelation, such as fulfilled prophecies and miracles.  
 Perrone made divine revelation the initial focus of his work. He immediately 
made it clear that he was writing against “deists and rationalists”55 who were challenging 
the validity of a religion based on revelation. Perrone refuted Deists who claimed that 
miracles contradicted the created order, and that “God cannot do miracles without 
changing himself.”56 He argued that the same God who gave the “decrees that govern the 
world” also gave “decrees” for the miraculous.57 Perrone countered skeptics, such as 
Hume, who discredited the “historical and moral certainty” of Christian testimony. 
Perrone contended that if one were to outright discredit the testimony of others, then 
there would be no certainty about any ancient history.58 Although Perrone was not strictly 
Neo-Scholastic, he helped demonstrate that the antidote for the contemporary malaise 
was increasingly being sought in what some thought were pre-modern medications. 
                                                          
53 Daly, Transcendence and Immanence, 13–14.  
54 This is his style throughout Théologie Dogmatique.  
55 Perrone, Théologie Dogmatique, 4:103.  
56 Perrone, Théologie Dogmatique, 3:49. “Dieu ne peut pas faire des miracles sans changer lui-même . Les 
Lois qui regissent le monde sont, en effet, des decrets de Dieu qui ne peuvent pas changer sans qu’il y ait 
changement en Dieu, ce qui est absurde.” 
57 Perrone, 3:49. “Elles sont les décrets même s de Dieu, qui ont pour objet soit les lois, soit les derogations 
de ces même s lois, qui doivent avoir lieu dans le temps.” 
58 Perrone, Théologie Dogmatique, Chapter III. Proposition II, under heading Objections tirées du défaut de 
certitude, 3:67. “Si pourtant les arguments de ce genre et autres semblables avaient quelque valeur , ils 
bouleverseraient et anéantiraient la certitude morale et historique, et l’on n’aurait aucune certitude sur ce 
qui s’est passé dans les temps anciens, et que nous raconte l’histoire.”  
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Joseph Kleutgen  
 One of the most influential proponents of a return to a pre-Cartesian philosophy in 
Catholic thought was Joseph Kleutgen (1811–1883). Gerald McCool considers Kleutgen 
to be the “most profound and original thinker” among Jesuit Neo-Thomists, as well as the 
most influential.59 After his appointment as consultor to the Sacred Congregation of the 
Index in 1851, he provided sufficient theological footing to reinforce several of the 
disciplinary judgments enacted by the Congregation.60 Additionally, he participated in 
drafting the Constitution of the Catholic Faith for Vatican I, and was reportedly one of 
the authors who drafted Aeterni Patris for Leo XIII.61 Two of his works, Die Theologie 
der Vorzeit62 and Die Philosophie der Vorzeit63 long served as apologies for the 
scholastic method in Catholic thought.64  
 When addressing the sickness of the modern world, Kleutgen clearly observed a 
chasm between “the old and the new”65 in both theology and philosophy. In noting this, 
he effectively cut the history of Christian thinking in half, with clear deference given to 
the earlier age. Although philosophy and theology were distinct disciplines with different 
                                                          
59 McCool, Nineteenth-Century Scholasticism, 167. 
60 The Supreme Sacred Congregation of the Roman and Universal Inquisition (formed in 1542 and renamed 
Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office in 1908) merged with the Sacred Congregation of the Index 
(formed 1571) in 1917. Benedict XV’s Alloquentes proxime declares their merger. The Congregation, often 
referred to as the Holy Office, was renamed the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith in 1965. 
61 McCool, Nineteenth-Century Scholasticism, 167. 
62 Kleutgen, Joseph. Die Theologie Der Vorzeit. (Münster: Theissing, 1860). 
63 Kleutgen, Joseph. Die Philosophie De Vorzeit. (Innsbruck: Felician Rauch, 1878). 
64 Cf. McCool, From Unity to Pluralism, 21–22.  
65 From the subtitle of his first chapter of Die Philosophie der Vorzeit: Ueber die alte und neue Philosophie 
in Allgemeinen. 1.  
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starting points,66 he perceived that both were failing because of “new” principles and 
methods.  
 For Kleutgen, the remedy for the current malady was a return to medieval 
thinking. Kleutgen’s repeated use of the term Vorzeit, translated l’ancienne, certainly 
refers to ancient modes of thought evident in patristic authors. However, he generally 
used the term to denote medieval scholastics, specifically the work of Thomas. This was 
because Kleutgen considered Scholasticism as the full flowering of patristic thinking. The 
schoolmen’s Aristotelian methods were superior to the early Father’s Platonic methods. 
Scholasticism had perfected patristic thought. Through the Scholasticism of Thomas and 
Bonaventure, ancient Christian thought had “reached its peak.”67  
  For Kleutgen, the “new” ideas plaguing Catholicism primarily came through 
Descartes, and constituted a monumental historical breach within Christian thought. It 
was Descartes who sought to “break” “openly” from the philosophy that had “prevailed 
in the Church” since its beginning. Descartes sought to create a “new basis” for 
philosophical research and build a “new foundation” for his system of thought.68 
                                                          
66 For Kleutgen, Philosophy’s first principles are evident to reason, while theology’s first principles need 
revelation; Theology’s first principles are only seen through the light of faith. Cf. McCool, From Unity to 
Pluralism, 21–23.  
67 Kleutgen, Die Theologie¸ Erste Abhandlung, Erstes Hauptstück, 1:7, 20. “In diesen beiden Männern, 
welche die katholische Kirche als ihr von Gott gegebene Lehrer verehrt, hatte die Scholastik, ein 
Jahrhundert nachdem sie entstanden war, ihren Höhepunkt erreicht. Doch ehe wir nun fortfahren, ihre 
Schicksale zu betrachten, müssen wir mit mehr Genauigkeit als es bis jezt geschehen ist, untersuchen, 
worin die Natur oder das Wesen der Scholastik bestehe.” 
68 Joseph Kleutgen, introduction to La Philosophie Scolastique (Paris: Gaume Frères Et J. Duprey, 1868), 
3:4. “Dans la philosophie de Descartes, nous devons distinguer trois choses; car, brisant ouvertement avec 
la philosophie qui régnait alors dans l’Eglise, il voulut donner une nouvelle base à ses recherches 
philosophiques et construire un système de doctrines sur ces nouveaux fondements. Non content d’attaquer 
quelques doctrines isolées de la scolastique, il ne craignit pas de dire que jusqu’à lui on avait 
complétement ignore le premier principe de toute philosophie véritable, ainsi que la method seule légitime 
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Descartes considered his method of rationally beginning with the person’s “proper 
existence,” his self-awareness, as the only “legitimate” start to philosophical 
knowledge.69 Conversely, Kleutgen maintained that philosophy’s first principles were 
objectively discerned. Although the first principles of Christian theology required 
revelation and faith, they were observable and accessible through Scripture and the 
Church’s Tradition.  
 Kleutgen “devoted” his efforts to restoring Scholasticism,70 and his influence was 
effective. Despite the fact that philosophy and theology constituted distinct orders of 
knowledge, Kleutgen sought to restore a coherent integrated method of thought 
applicable to each. He attempted to vindicate the Aristotelian scholastic method for 
“apologetics, and positive, speculative, and moral theology.”71  
Leo XIII 
 As the nineteenth century continued, Neo-Thomism gained greater authority 
during the pontificate of Leo XIII. The thought of Aquinas, in particular, was put forward 
as providing the Church with a positive and unitary method. The “magna carta” of the 
                                                          
pour en déduire tout l’édifice des doctrines philosophiques.” Translations are this author’s taken from the 
French translation. The German text is found at Kleutgen, Die Philosophie der Vorzeit, Introduction 3:5. 
69 Kleutgen, La Philosophie Scolastique, Introduction, 4:5. “La method, que Descartes regardait comme 
seule légitime, consiste en ce que l’esprit humain, partant de sa proper existence don’t il ne peut douter, 
n’affirme que ce qu’il reconnaît avec la même clarté.” In German, Joseph Kleutgen, Die Philosophie De 
Vorzeit , Introduction, 4:5–6.  
70 Kleutgen, Die Philosophie De Vorzeit, Introduction, 1:1. “Unter der Philosophie der Vorzeit, deren 
Verteidigung diese Schrift gewidmet ist, verstehen wir jene Philosophie, welche von den ersten Zeiten der 
Kirche bis in das achtzehnte Jahrhundert wenigstens auf den catholischen Schulen allgemein gelehrt, und 
von den Theologen für die heilige Wissenschaft benuzt wurde.”  
71 McCool, Nineteenth-Century Scholasticism, 86. 
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revival of official Thomism was Leo XIII’s 1879 encyclical Aeterni Patris.72 The pope 
had institutions in mind who would train students for the priesthood.73 He warned that the 
“Catholic philosopher will know that he violates at once faith and the laws of reason if he 
accepts any conclusion which he understands to be opposed to revealed doctrine.”74 
Aeterni Patris was a call to unify the methods of philosophy and theology within a 
Scholastic paradigm, and to show the compatibility of faith and reason. “Those, therefore, 
who to the study of philosophy unite obedience to the Christian faith, are philosophizing 
in the best possible way.”75 The call for a unified method was only logical since God was 
the author of all truth; one truth could not contradict another. For Leo XIII, the “bitter 
strife” and “false conclusions” of the day “originated in the schools of philosophy;”76 the 
academy denied the “force” of “those things which become known by revelation.”77 
Unfortunately, some current philosophers “overestimate” the capability of the human 
mind, and presume that the intellect subject to “divine authority” was “retarded and 
hindered in its progress” towards truth.78 Some perceived that the Church obstructed 
intellectual progress. Leo XIII responded by saying that the “right use of philosophy”79 
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79 Leo XIII, Aeterni Patris, 2.  
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“in a certain way tends to smooth and fortify the road to true faith.”80 Certain truths 
confessed in the Church went “beyond” reason’s capabilities; however, “humble” 
“esteem” for revelation could enable the intellect to soar beyond its limited abilities. 
Referencing the recent Vatican Council, Leo XIII claimed that “faith frees and saves 
reason from error, and endows it with manifold knowledge.”81 Philosophy had a specific 
“path”82 it must follow; it was intended to support the faith, not assault it. For Leo XIII, 
Scholasticism, and specifically the work of Thomas Aquinas, best fulfilled that call.  
 The diverse “patrimony”83 of Christian philosophy included the works of various 
esteemed authors, including Athanasius, Basil the Great, Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine, 
Boethius, and several councils. However, these “scattered” “fertile harvests of Christian 
learning” needed to be “diligently” collected, sifted, and stored up “in one place.”84 The 
helpful “science”85 and “excellence”86 of Scholasticism, “in particular angelic St. Thomas 
and the seraphic St. Bonaventure,”87 provided the Church with a “formidable”88 
philosophy for the modern world. Citing the sixteenth-century statement of Sixtus V, Leo 
XIII praised Scholasticism’s ability to provide “ready and close coherence of cause and 
                                                          
80 Leo XIII, Aeterni Patris, 4.  
81 Leo XIII, Aeterni Patris, 9.  
82 Leo XIII, Aeterni Patris, 8.  
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effect,” “order and array as of a disciplined army in battle,” lucid “definitions and 
distinctions, that strength of argument and those keen discussions,” whereby “light is 
distinguished from darkness, the true from the false, expose and strip naked, as it were, 
the falsehoods of heretics wrapped around by a cloud of subterfuges and fallacies.”89  
Leo XIII saw the “new order” of philosophy as a “dangerous” threat to the faith.90 Leo 
XIII encouraged a return to the sources, especially critical editions of the writings of St. 
Thomas. He mandated Catholic universities to “defend this doctrine.”91 According to 
Daly, Leo XIII wanted the “somewhat untidy philosophical eclecticism” of the nineteenth 
century replaced with “strict fidelity to the theological and philosophical system of St. 
Thomas Aquinas.”92 Teachers were to be carefully “selected” as pedagogues who would 
“endeavor to implant the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas in the minds of students.”93 
Advocates of the Neo-Scholastic method for Catholic Philosophy commended its ability 
to respond to the “many harmful methods” 94 of modern philosophy. Emphasis on the 
external aspect of revelation prevented the reasonable philosopher from wandering too 
far into ontology, intuition, or immanence. By returning the Church to what they 
considered to be Thomistic thought, Neo-Scholastics were able to impede the advances of 
modernism in the Church. 
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 While Leo XIII was calling for a return to Thomistic philosophy, he was also able 
to call for a concurrent return to pre-modern scriptural theology. In 1893, Leo XIII wrote 
the encyclical Providentissimus Deus, which provided instruction on how to study the 
Scriptures. The restorative resources of Catholic ecclesiology, not necessarily the full 
accuracy of Leo XIII’s description of Thomism, are the present attention of this 
dissertation. Due to Catholic ecclesiology, Leo XIII could authoritatively retrieve both 
medieval and patristic resources in an attempt to deal with modern philosophical and 
theological challenges. Catholic ecclesiology gave ancient voices a contemporary value.95 
However, evangelicals have no such recourse. Princeton theologians could go back to 
Westminster or Calvin, but not much further.96 Due to their frequent dismissal of the 
Catholic Church, evangelicals usually did not have normative value for anything outside 
of the text of the Bible and the particular philosophy they were utilizing at any moment.97 
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Warfield disparages claims of miracles in his chapter entitled “Patristic and Medieval Marvels.” Warfield 
claimed there was only one answer for multiple miracles claimed throughout Church history, beginning 
around the fourth century: The claims for miracles “represent an infusion of heathen modes of thought in 
the Church” (61). He argued that claims of the miraculous in Church history were a “transplantation of 
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Over the next two generations of internal polemics within each group, Catholic 
ecclesiology demonstrated restorative qualities which were absent in evangelicalism.  
In Providentissimus Deus, Leo XIII asserted that the Bible was from God98 as an 
“infallible” testimony99 that God had given to his Church.100 Again, however, Leo XIII 
claimed that Scholastic methods of interpreting Scripture had refined and perfected the 
patristic reading of Scripture. Thomas, in particular, had subsumed the best of the 
patristic tradition. In Leo XIII’s view of church history, Thomas was the “prince of 
theologians.”101 For Leo XIII, Thomas did not bring anything new. Instead, Thomas 
helped restore the “ancient beauty” of the faith.102 The scattered teachings of “the 
disciples of the apostles” found in “their letters and their books,” as well as the 
multiplicity of later teachings found in various “Sees, Catechetical and Theological 
schools” were best interpreted and explained by the scholastics.103 “With the age of the 
scholastics came fresh and welcome progress in the study of the Bible.” For, it is “to 
them we owe the accurate and clear distinction, such as had not been given before, of the 
various senses of the sacred words.”104  
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  Leo XIII emphasized the need for continuity in biblical interpretation, and the 
Catholic Church provided that possibility. For Leo XIII, the Church was the “supreme 
teacher of the peoples,” and was the construct of a “divine” architect.105 The Church was 
more than a random collection of followers of Jesus; its very structure was “instituted by 
Christ.”106 From the time of “Blessed Peter” until the present the Church’s bishops had 
sought to confirm their fellows in the faith.107 The “sovereign Pontiffs, the holy Fathers 
and the councils” “always” provided “the greatest assistance to “really and soundly 
understanding and interpreting the Scriptures.”108 The Scripture, which some hold to 
exclusively, was given by Christ to the Church under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit.109 
The same Spirit who gave the Bible also furnished the “Church, her institutions, her 
nature, her office, and her gifts.”110 For Leo, the constitutive relationship between 
Scripture and Church had always been in place, leading to the conclusion that the “Holy 
Scripture was safely interpreted by those who had the Apostolic succession.”111 God’s 
people have always believed that “God has delivered the Holy Scriptures to the Church, 
and that in reading and making use of His Word, they must follow the Church as their 
guide and their teacher.”112 “This cannot be done completely or satisfactorily except by 
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means of the living and proper Magisterium of the Church.”113 For Leo XIII, the Church 
was to be the judge of the true sense of the Scriptures. “It is most unbecoming to pass by, 
in ignorance or contempt, the excellent work which Catholics have left in abundance, and 
to have recourse to the works of non-Catholics, and to seek in them, to the detriment of 
sound doctrine and often to the peril of faith.”114 In his appeal to an ecclesial 
interpretation of Scripture, Leo XIII was expressing faith in the Scriptures and the Spirit 
behind the Bible. Christ had promised to “build”115 his Church, to be present in the 
Church until the end of the age, and to send the Spirit who would lead and guide the 
Church into all truth.116 For Leo XIII, both the original writing and the contemporary 
interpretation of the Scriptures needed to occur “under the assistance of the same Holy 
Spirit.”117  
Manualistic Theology   
 The Catholic Church implemented textbooks, known as “manuals”118 to express 
“fundamental” and “dogmatic” 119 theology between the two Vatican councils. The 
Catholic Church used the manuals “above all”120 as “the major instrument”121 during the 
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modernist crisis. Most Catholic manuals were written in Latin, with translations furnished 
in several languages. The manuals emphasized that Scripture and Tradition contained 
propositional revelation. The role of theology was to deduce truth from those 
propositions.  
 Catholic manuals are often classified as “Neo-Scholastic,” because they 
developed under the influence of Leo XIII’s Aeterni Patris, with its endorsement of 
Thomas Aquinas.122 Jared Wicks, however, argues that the manuals “diverge 
considerably” from the universal “quest of wisdom” found in Thomas and other medieval 
works.123 Instead, it is argued, the development of the manuals can more accurately be 
traced to the influence of Melchoir Cano and other Spanish Scholastics of the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries.124 “The manuals are children of their own time, the age of 
positivism, and give pride of place to the amassing of data to support their 
conclusions.”125  
 One purpose of manuals was to “explain in a clear and comprehensive manner 
every point of our holy faith.”126 While focusing on “objective historical criteria” for 
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Catholic faith, the manuals, along with Pius X’s notably influential works of 1907,127 
were primary instruments used to argue against and condemn “modernism.”128 The 
fundamental theology of the manuals focused its arguments on the nature of religion, the 
nature of revelation, convincing evidence that Jesus was the bearer of God’s revelation, 
demonstration that Jesus indeed founded the Catholic Church, and identification of the 
sources of revelation, which were Scripture and Church Tradition.129 According to Jared 
Wicks, argumentation was the centerpiece of the manuals.130 The purpose of the manuals 
was to demonstrate the credibility of Christian faith; they attempted to do this by 
highlighting objective proofs that Jesus really was who the Church claimed him to be, 
and that Jesus legitimized the claim through his miracles and prophecies fulfilled in his 
life. The manuals put forward the objective credibility of New Testament revelation, 
which forcefully imposed itself on the thinking person by the strength of “assembled 
evidence.”131 The rational person was brought to the threshold of faith by argumentation. 
However, the final step of faith was still the gracious work of God. In this way, the 
manuals were assumed to affirm both the rational and supernatural aspect of Christian 
belief.132 
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 The manuals stressed propositional truth. Most manuals implied that God’s 
revelation was instruction about otherwise unattainable truths; God gave clear knowledge 
through his disclosure. Subsequently, advocates of manualistic theology frequently were 
hostile towards theologies which contained even a hint of understanding revelation under 
the principle of immanence.133 The advocates of the manuals feared that modernism 
shifted attention away from the supernatural and positive character of revelation, and 
moved it to subjective interiority. Immanence potentially blurred the distinctiveness of 
the transcendent realm.  
 In the dogmatic theology of the manuals, Wicks detected a “regressive” 
method.134 The manuals often began their arguments from the present day teaching of the 
Magisterium, and worked backwards to show how Scripture, Church Fathers, Councils, 
and medieval theologians were in agreement with the contemporary Church.135 In time, 
specific complaints were voiced regarding the narrow method of the manuals. For one, 
the manuals interpreted Scripture and Tradition in a way to satisfy present day doctrinal 
formulas. They subjected the past Tradition to contemporary conclusions. In addition, 
they neglected the richness of God’s saving revelation in Christ.136 Faith was 
theoretically reduced to submission to authority and assent to the best argument. 
Revelation was limited to the past, and interpretation was restricted to understanding the 
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past revelation.137 Instead of the manuals being used as intermediaries in peoples’ union 
with the living God by helping them understand Christ better, they themselves became 
the objects of faith.138 The manuals’ overt emphasis on objectivity and their apprehension 
over immanence made them incapable to show the connection between what arises in the 
human heart and God’s gift of life in the revelation of Christ.139 The Scripture’s invitation 
to communion with God and the human desire for that union were obscured. 
Mutual Suspicion  
When Catholic leadership stressed overconfidence in Neo-Scholasticism as a 
unitary method of thought, it created consternation in other Catholics. The universal 
Church could not afford to be insular in its time of great need! Several Catholic thinkers 
began to voice their contrariness with Neo-Scholasticism, claiming that Neo-Scholastic 
advocates did not see the narrow-mindedness of their own methods. In response, the 
Church leadership who was in favor of Neo-Scholasticism expressed suspicion towards 
those who promoted dissenting “modern” philosophical and theological methods. As a 
result of the crisis, some authors were disciplined by Church leadership, and others even 
excommunicated from the Catholic Church. To some observers, the Catholic Church 
appeared destabilized as a result of the penetrating effect of the various crises. However, 
despite the apparent undermining of its poise, the Catholic Church was able to resume its 
balance over the next two generations. To this reader, the Catholic Church’s ecclesiology 
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was pivotal towards restoring stability. The events surrounding two Catholic authors who 
were critical of Neo-Scholastic methods supports this argument.  
Maurice Blondel 
 French Catholic philosopher Maurice Blondel (1861–1949) provided one of the 
most significant dissenting voices to the dominant Neo-Scholasticism at the turn of the 
century. His 1893 work L’Action was particularly pertinent to the Catholic Modernist 
Crisis. While remaining a “devoted and faithful Catholic,”140 Blondel was critical of the 
extrinsicism of the manuals. Through a philosophical method of immanence, Blondel 
argued that reason alone could not account for human action. For Blondel, human action 
demonstrated that people drive towards something beyond their capacities, which 
suggests that faith is needed for supernatural completion. Although Blondel’s works led 
to unwelcome hostilities directed toward him, even “philosophical excommunication,”141 
he remained in the Church.  
 In his 1896 Letter on Apologetics, Blondel cautioned against recent “ingenious 
efforts to restore harmony” between science and philosophy. Specifically, 
“scholasticism” was attempting to show how current developments in the “positive 
sciences” “must” be brought into harmony with one another, and ultimately “bear witness 
to the truth of Dogma.”142 To Blondel, it was “asking too much of philosophy” to create 
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such a harmony.143 In the “efforts” of “Neo-Scholasticism,” Blondel saw both “splendid 
fruitfulness” and “incurable sterility.”144  
In a series of articles in 1903, Blondel noted the “conflict” between “two quite 
incompatible” modes of thought among two different groups of thinkers, whom he 
labeled “extrinsicists” and “historicists.” The former group referred to Neo-Scholastics; 
the latter denoted modernists such as Alfred Loisy. “Since there cannot be two 
Catholicisms,” Blondel saw the tension as “abnormal.” Unhealthy conflicts “set Catholic 
against Catholic” throughout social, political, and philosophical spheres.145 Both sides in 
this conflict “believe in the inspiration of Scripture and the truth of positive revelation.” 
However, each side ended with “contrary conclusions”146 on fundamental issues such as 
the historical Jesus.147 In the end, they turn and “reproach one another with endangering 
religion.”148 For Blondel, the emphases of each group neglected humanity’s intrinsic 
impulses and need for the transcendent.149 Both groups separated the supernatural from 
the natural realm to such a degree that the human subject was insufficiently examined and 
religion became extraneous to the autonomous life of reason.150 Exclusive reliance upon 
external forms of knowing resulted in either a priori agnosticism or a posteriori 
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fideism.151 For Blondel, these deductive methods of thought were insufficient for the 
modern world.  
According to Blondel, the methods exhibited in the manuals neglected the human 
subject, overly stressed concepts, and were therefore sterile. The conclusions of these 
methods were based on facts, but not lived experiences. For Blondel, reality was too 
complex to be comprehended within a single stream of thought, Neo-Scholastic or 
otherwise. Over-emphasis on the compelling quality of extrinsic facts neglected natural 
human desire which could only be completed by divine grace. It reduced the 
communication of divine truths to a one-sided imposition by God; there was no 
cooperation of human desire or intelligence.152 For Blondel, revelation did not come to 
humanity exclusively “from the outside like a completely empirical datum.”153 Blondel 
affirmed the ability of miracles to assert divine truths, but miracles could be “miraculous 
only in the eyes of those already prepared to recognize divine action.”154 The “force” of 
external proofs depended “on the fact that each one bears them within himself.”155 In a 
Neo-Scholastic worldview, convincing proofs for particular doctrines were to be 
uncovered in historical sources,156 such as Scripture, patristic writings, and conciliar 
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teachings which provided reliable testimony to what must be believed. Blondel’s problem 
with this view was it gave little attention to the constitution of the receiver of the 
revelation, the human person. For Blondel, this negligence could result in a robotic faith; 
people would believe merely because propositions were backed by authority without 
regard for the internal need of the subject.157 In addition, this reduced the value of human 
history in which revelation occurred. It was as if the real history surrounding a 
miraculous event “had never entered.”158 The “accidental, extrinsic, and generic 
character” of miracles was mentioned in manualist apologetics, but not the “original 
content” or “real relation” between the miracles and the lives who experienced them.159 
While Blondel was careful not to discount the ability of miracles to provide verification 
of divine claims, he criticized the “incomplete use” that “some apologists” made of 
them.160 The new “Thomism,” for example, may appear to some as an “exact” account of 
reality, an “inventory” which provides assurance against all assaults and objections.161 
However, for Blondel, it could not deal with advances in human thought. While modern 
society sought to understand itself, Neo-Thomists merely busied themselves with 
“refurbishing old arguments” about external objects.162  
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 While Blondel received negative attention from Church authorities for his 
criticism of Neo-Scholasticism, he furnished a parallel critique of historicism. Historical 
positivism, such as seen in Loisy, would not entertain an understanding of the historical 
Jesus beyond what could be verified through empirical observation.163 The historicist 
assumed the religious and secular dimensions were at odds with each other, resulting in 
his search for “history and history alone.”164 Armed with his purely philological and 
historical skills, his sterile search for the historical Jesus would not allow contamination 
by dogma. Blondel complained that in such a system of thought the living actor in history 
was replaced with facts about Jesus; Christ’s person was exchanged for a portrait. 
Analyses of a chain of events satisfied the historicist while the understanding of the 
“initial operation of real beings” was dismissed. As a result, historicism could only 
provide a “mechanical explanation” of the complex, kaleidoscopic human experience 
with God through Jesus Christ.165 Historical facts were categorized, but narrow 
restrictions prevented the real persons who lived through those facts, and their interior 
motivations, from being addressed. For Blondel, neither rationalism nor historicism could 
sufficiently get at the “real Christ.”166 Neither provided passage from Christian facts to 
beliefs.167 
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 Blondel sought to bring religion and philosophy back together by showing the 
necessity of the question of the supernatural.168 He argued that action begins with the 
natural human will to act in a certain manner when given multiple behavioral options to 
choose from; it begins in human subjectivity. Human action then extends into personal, 
social, and political expressions.169 Blondel developed a phenomenology which 
concluded that human action was insufficient to satisfy the dialectic of human willing.170 
He perceived the human will to be striving beyond its temporal objects, and the natural 
order had no explanation for this driving impulse; the end of all activity was “always 
disappointed and always rising again.”171 After passing through “the immense field of the 
phenomenon,” a person realized that a “mystery” outlived him and his powers.172 People, 
through their actions, were seeking a secret to life that was “higher” than the vision of 
“Kant or Spinoza.”173 It was more than ethics or morality; it was beyond the domain of 
human science. “Rational critique and moral practice have a certain role of clearing out 
and preparing the way, but the living source is elsewhere than in them.”174 The “last idol” 
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of humanity was therefore the superstition of “self-sufficiency.”175 Blondel concluded 
that only the supernatural could complete a person. “Man cannot equal his own 
exigencies.”176 Human action could only be understood when viewed in relation to the 
supernatural order because “there is in man a life better than man.”177 Blondel countered 
the rationalistic notion that a relationship with the supernatural primarily proceeded from 
the top down. In his view, this neglected the natural upward movement of the human 
spirit;178 it failed to note the grace of God at work in human nature. Blondel’s apologetics 
of immanence argued that people were necessarily confronted with a free option, whether 
to accept the supernatural or not.179 However, the supernatural was not completely 
opaque. Christian revelation furnished the only meaningful answer to the exigencies of 
the human will.180  
 For Blondel, Tradition was the “intermediary between history and dogma.” 
Tradition was distinct from texts and formulas, but it harmonized and organized them.181 
For Blondel, Church Tradition was more than “historical facts, received truths, accepted 
teachings, hallowed practices and ancient customs.”182 Tradition stood in 
“contradistinction to the Scriptures, which relate the immediate testimony of the apostolic 
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age.” Tradition was the “immense echo of oral revelation.”183 Tradition “discovers and 
formulates truths on which the past lived, though unable as yet to evaluate or define them 
explicitly.” Tradition bears fruit by putting the “total deposit” into “currency” little by 
little.”184 For Blondel, a study of history alone would “reduce” Catholicism’s criterion to 
“an extrinsic and accessory argument.” For Blondel, the truthfulness of “Catholicism” 
was “demonstrated” by more than history. Rather, through Tradition, Catholicism also 
“has within it a power of self-justification which is independent of historical proofs or 
moral probabilities.” To Blondel, “the Church is a proof of itself.”185 For this reason, the 
biblical exegete, in order to “pass from facts to dogma,” must achieve more than “an 
exact analysis of the texts.” He must also meditate on the “collective life, and the slow 
progressive labor of the Christian tradition.”186 
 Throughout much of his career, Blondel was persistently criticized by fellow 
Catholics.187 Some were apprehensive that he was bringing a new form of Kantianism188 
into the Church. In his “Testis” series, written almost two decades after L’Action, Blondel 
sought to connect the act of knowing with the subjectivity of the knower in an integral 
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realism.189 Overall, his phenomenology of the human spirit190 threatened Thomistic 
theologians with an “illegitimate intrusion into their domain.”191 To the Neo-Scholastic, 
philosophy needed to stay on its own side of the fence like a congenial neighbor. 
Blondel’s incursion into theology earned a hostile reception from some in the Church, 
similar to Bautain’s reception decades earlier.192 One such Thomist was Dominican M. B.  
Schwalm, who considered Blondel’s work as “heretical, erroneous, or recklessly rash.”193 
Blondel was suspected of threatening the rational basis of faith, and depriving miracles of 
their probative value.194 Blondel’s critique of Loisy helped restore his reputation to some 
Catholic leaders, but others still presumed him to be a modernist.195 Some sought to place 
particular works of his on the Index.196 Although he was never condemned specifically, 
he was “delated” multiple times.197 Despite the suspicion Blondel endured, he was not an 
individualistic Protestant. He thought from the context of the living Catholic Church.198 
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Church Tradition, owing to ecclesiology, enabled him to uphold Church dogma while 
exploring modern thought.  
Alfred Loisy 
Alfred Loisy (1857–1940) was a French Catholic priest and biblical scholar who 
was later excommunicated. While a Catholic, Loisy was convinced the Church needed to 
translate Christian truth into modern terms; it was incumbent on Catholic scholars to 
present religious verities in forms appropriate to the contemporary mind. Loisy especially 
despised outdated “theorums” of the faith which were based on abstract scholastic 
speculation. Rather, modern theology needed to reestablish the faith in “reality.”199 
Through academic research, specifically historical criticism, Loisy sought to remedy 
inherited theological ailments in Catholic teaching, such as scholasticism.200 The 
direction he wished theology to travel was wide open to the horizon of historical science, 
and it frequently led him to relativize traditional dogma.201 Loisy’s desire for progressive 
theology is evident in his rebuff of Lutheran Adolph Harnack’s historical criticism.  
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While Loisy was not content with the Catholic Church’s intellectual response to 
the needs of his generation, he also was aware of the need to reply to the attacks of liberal 
Protestants, such as Harnack. The Catholic Church’s understanding of the relation of 
Scripture, Church, and Tradition was being assaulted on scholarly grounds, resulting in a 
growing consensus that Christianity’s original jewels had been stolen years earlier. For 
many Protestants, the real Robber Barons were Catholic ecclesiastics who had 
confiscated Jesus’ original teachings and buried them under centuries of Hellenization. 
Although Loisy agreed that Tradition had woefully distorted the original message of 
Jesus, he argued that the only hope of getting at Jesus’ original teaching was nonetheless 
through the Catholic Tradition.  
Adolf von Harnack sought to identify Christianity “solely in its historical 
sense.”202 Through his studies of Church dogma, he opened a “new approach” to 
historical critical studies of Scripture.203 His methods intentionally excluded “speculative 
reasoning” regarding religious concepts;204 his “purely historical”205 method paid no heed 
to the “apologist and the religious philosopher.”206 Instead, he wished to study the 
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Gospels free from all theological overlays. In seeking to get at the real historical Jesus, 
Harnack admitted he only had a few reliable resources beyond the Synoptic Gospels and 
a few Pauline texts. The fourth gospel certainly was not an “historical authority,” and the 
remaining sources could be “easily put on a small sheet of paper, so little does it come 
to.”207 Even the Synoptics were not historically reliable because they were “composed for 
the work of evangelization.”208 “It is true” that miracles “do not happen;”209 however, 
Jesus may have done deeds that were “inexplicable” to the immediate audience, while 
still not supernatural.  
Harnack argued that Christianity had developed over the centuries, with ideas far 
removed from the original intent of its namesake. Jesus never meant to found a church 
replete with dogma and authority. The simple message of the “whole Gospel” was in 
Jesus’ teaching of a loving God, our Father, who could become known to each individual 
soul as “my Father.”210 Jesus completely experienced the love of God, and he taught the 
Father’s love to others. Over time, ecclesiastical dogma, influenced by Hellenization, had 
burdened Jesus’ simple message of the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of human 
beings. The loss of “the original, living element” of Christianity helped create a 
“Draconian” shape to the Christian religion.211 The upshot of Harnack’s emphasis on the 
individual soul’s experience of the Father’s love was that an organized church body 
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became superfluous. For Harnack, original Christianity was a practical religious life, 
defined within the “sphere of the ethical.”212 The “practical proof” of Christ’s religion 
was not in theological dogma or Church structure, but “in the exercise of neighborly love 
and mercy.”213  
Harnack primarily valued the shelled corn of Christianity. He referred to the 
natural analogy of a kernel and husk214 when contrasting original and modern Christian 
faith. The contemporary exegete needed to get at the kernel of faith, the original kerygma 
of Jesus. In order to do this, centuries of ecclesiastical growth and decay, the husks, 
needed to be removed. The historian needed to extract what was meaningful for the 
modern world, and dispose of the useless husks. To Harnack, the early Christians, 
including Paul, did not seem to think it “desirable” to order their lives in “externals” of 
ecclesiastical organization.215 Considering Harnack’s lifelong context of the urban 
university, as he was the child of a professor,216 this reader thinks Harnack possibly 
neglected to realize that husks were essential to the life of the kernel, and that even the 
inner seed had a pericarp, an outer covering. Husk and kernel are inseparable for the 
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maintenance of life. It seems to this reader that Loisy, the son of a farmer,217 possibly 
snagged Harnack on this agricultural analogy.  
For Loisy, the honest “historian” will “find that the essence of Christianity has 
been more or less preserved in the different Christian communions.”218 “Herr Harnack 
peels his fruit with such perseverance, that the question arises if anything will remain at 
the end.”219 For Loisy, the essence of Christianity was discovered in its full life, not just 
its primitive origins.220 The entire traditional life of the Church needed to be analyzed. 
Contrary to Harnack, Loisy taught that living Tradition, not just literary fragments, was 
necessary to get at the real Jesus. Harnack had erred by imagining that historic Christian 
development was extrinsic and therefore unnecessary to the Gospel.221 Loisy 
distinguished himself from Harnack and other Protestants by critiquing their 
individualistic understanding of Christianity. “An invisible society formed forever of 
those who have in their hearts faith in the goodness of God” was hardly an accurate 
historical image of the message of Jesus. It was obvious to Loisy that Jesus at least had a 
“rudiment of a social organization,” “a society,” in mind.222  
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Despite Loisy’s criticism of Harnack, he ultimately seemed to use his Protestant 
counterpart as an opportunity to address his complaints with his own Roman Catholic 
Tradition. “Every jibe at Harnack was a blade thrust at the Roman theologians.”223 
Loisy’s Gospel and the Church was a critique of Protestant liberalism, but it also 
appeared to be Loisy’s attempt to encourage Catholicism to be more progressive. The 
Church needed to change in order to be suitable for its modern audience. It was this 
implicit thrust in his criticism of Harnack that got Loisy into trouble with the Vatican 
leaders. 
 In his criticism of Harnack, Loisy confessed that it is “often difficult to 
distinguish between the personal religion of Jesus and the way in which his disciples have 
understood it.” “In the Gospels there remains but an echo, necessarily weakened and a 
little confused, of the words of Jesus.”224 In effect, Loisy argued that there were two 
gospels: the first was the original religion of Jesus; the second was the apostolic witness 
in the New Testament. “The mission of Christ” was not presented in the Gospels in its 
“primitive form.” Instead, the “natural tendency” of Tradition idealized Christ’s 
“discourses and his acts”225 even among his first followers. Loisy perceived that a natural 
evolutionary process of gospel and Church had occurred since the beginning of 
Christianity. The current Church was not Jesus’ original plan, but it was a natural 
outgrowth of the gospel. “Jesus foretold the kingdom, and it was the Church that came; 
                                                          
223 Ratté, Three Modernists, 87. 
224 Loisy, The Gospel and the Church, 12–13. 
225 Loisy, The Gospel and the Church, 38.  
321 
she came, enlarging the form of the gospel, which it was impossible to preserve as it was, 
as soon as the Passion closed the ministry of Jesus.”226  
Loisy’s polemic implied that while the contemporary Catholic Church mistakenly 
assumed it thundered with the original voice of Christ, it only imitated a faint echo. The 
original religion of Jesus was distinct from the earliest traditions contained in the New 
Testament, and the distortion increased in the Church during subsequent generations. 
Loisy nearly concluded on the impossibility of getting at the original religion of Jesus 
through Tradition,227 but he did not. He argued that although contemporary Church 
Tradition was different from Jesus’ original teachings, it remained the primary way to get 
at any understanding of Jesus’ religion. In this, he differed from Harnack.   
 Loisy angered his Catholic superiors when he wrote that “Jesus did not 
systematize beforehand the constitution of the Church as that of a government established 
on earth and destined to endure for a long series of centuries.”228 The idea of an 
organized institution replete with dogma and teaching authority was an embellishment of 
Jesus’ simple vision. Loisy referred to Jesus’ eschatological preaching to buttress his 
argument. Jesus’ kingdom “regards, and can only regard, the future.”229 How could Jesus 
have meant to establish an institutional Church when it appears that he was entirely 
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focused on the next world?230 The most plausible explanation for Loisy was that the 
Church was not in Jesus’ original intentions. 
Loisy rejected Harnack’s diminution of Jesus’ person in the earliest traditions. 
Harnack had argued that the earliest Christian teaching focused solely on the Father’s 
love, not the person of Jesus. Unlike Harnack, Loisy argued that “everything assumes” a 
“relation to the Messiah, and all contributes to prove that Jesus was the Christ.”231 
However, in criticizing Harnack, Loisy demonstrated how he wished the Catholic Church 
would recognize its own need to update its dogmatic forms. For Loisy, the Church 
needed to re-formulate its teaching in accord with the conceptual forms of each era and 
culture. For Loisy, Christian dogmas essentially evolved over time, and were even 
legitimate appendices to the teaching of Jesus. These developments were reasonable 
because they “proceed from the gospel.”232 However, the final formulae were not 
historically taught by Jesus. At this point, Loisy’s Christology alarmed the leaders at the 
Vatican. Loisy taught that Jesus was not conscious of his own divinity. 
 Loisy taught that early belief in Jesus as the Messiah gradually developed over 
centuries into “Christological dogma.” Christ never “gave himself out” as God, and 
“displayed no consciousness whatever of being divine.”233 It was the later Church leaders 
who formed the doctrine of Christ’s divinity. The teaching was not from Jesus, and 
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certainly not in his consciousness. The Hellenizing concept of Logos in the fourth Gospel 
“enlarges the formula of faith, and changes its own nature,” but it was not taught by 
Christ. The idea of Logos was beneficial to conveying the message of Jesus to the “whole 
pagan world,”234 but it was not what Jesus originally taught.  
Loisy’s critical study of history gave him hope for the future. Loisy did not 
necessarily disparage the gradual Christological development within the Church; he saw 
it as a natural evolution, culturally appropriate for the time. Instead, he had hoped that the 
modern Catholic, upon realizing the actual history of events, would again be open to new 
development. For Loisy, the Church needed to again progress in its dogmatics. “Neither 
Christological dogma nor the dogma of grace nor that of the Church” should be expected 
to remain unchanged, “firmer than the rock.”235 Dogmas were not “truths fallen from 
heaven.” Although they were sourced in the divine teachings of Jesus, “they are human in 
structure and composition.”236 Going forward, which Loisy had hoped Catholicism would 
do, “it is inconceivable that their future should not correspond to their past.”237 They 
changed in ancient times; they needed to change again. Without surprise, the only part of 
the Apostles Creed that Loisy could historically assent to was that Jesus suffered under 
Pontius Pilate.238  
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Disciplinary Responses 
 The growing concern over Blondel and Loisy, and multiple other Catholic 
thinkers, prompted formal action by the Vatican. Due to their criticisms of scholastic 
abstractions, many modern thinkers were broadly accused of Kantian agnosticism.239 
Church dogma was jeopardized, and appreciably through the philosophy of immanence.  
 Pius X’s July, 1907 Lamentabili Sane marked out errors made by Catholic 
thinkers which were “daily spread among the faithful.” The sad fact was that “many 
Catholic writers” had gone “beyond the limits determined by the Fathers and the 
Church.” “In the name of higher knowledge and historical research” these teachers strove 
for the “progress of dogma,” but only “corrupted” it and the people.240 Among the errors 
was the assumption that “scientific exegesis” was “more accurate” than Church teaching, 
and was not subject to ecclesiastical law.241 The Church’s Magisterium was no longer the 
custodian for biblical interpretation;242 it lay in the hand of the exegete. The “organic 
constitution of the Church” was actually mutable; it was subject to “perpetual 
evolution.”243 Without a divinely ordered Church, doctrine became relativized. 
“Scientific progress demands that the concepts of Christian doctrine concerning God, 
creation, revelation, the Person of the Incarnate Word, and Redemption be re-
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adjusted.”244 In the end, “modern Catholicism can be reconciled with true science only if 
it is transformed into a non-dogmatic Christianity; that is to say, into a broad and liberal 
Protestantism.”245 
 Two months later, Pius X’s encyclical Pascendi Dominici Gregis specifically 
identified the enemy who had infiltrated the camp: modernism, the “synthesis of all 
errors.” The terms “modernism” or “modernist” appear over one hundred times in the 
Pascendi text, and were confidently employed as “commonly used and rightly called” 
terms.246 The agnosticism of modernist philosophers claimed “ignorance” whether God 
had in fact intervened in human history.247 The thinking person was deflated; he was no 
longer able to use his reason to lift himself “up to God” through observing the material 
world. This was because the modernists limited their resources; their scientific research 
only allowed observable facts regarding phenomena, leaving the possibility of God 
“utterly excluded.”248 The result of this agnosticism was that the credibility of natural 
theology and confidence in external revelation were demolished. The agnosticism of the 
modernist philosopher led to the formulation of vital, or “religious immanence.”249 The 
human consciousness exhibited a need for God, implying the reality of the divine, which 
grew up into actual religion. Once the limits of human consciousness and science were 
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reached, the person came face to face with the “unknowable.” At this point, a leap into 
the darkness of fideism occurred, finally connecting the person with God.250 One 
dangerous conclusion of this process was that “all existing religions are equally true.”251 
All people who were spurred on by the same generic inner impulse were equally valid in 
their conclusions. 
The modernists, due to their conviction that religious thought was the 
consequence of a primitive “species of impulse or necessity,” gave the inner sentiment 
primacy in religion. The results were devastating: dogma became categorized as a 
secondary value in religion;252 the Bible became a “collection of experiences;” inspiration 
was now sourced in the individual;253 the Church was reduced to the vital presence of a 
“society of individual consciences.” In all, the Catholic Church was stripped of its “triple 
authority” of discipline, dogma, and liturgy. 254 In many ways, Catholic modernists were 
like “liberal Protestants” who rejected “all external worship” and “external religious 
community” in favor of an “individual religion.”255 The encyclical uses the term 
“system,” in the singular, multiple times throughout the document. The assumption was 
that modernism was a “synthesis of all heresies.”256 The original nest of this evil beast 
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was hidden in curiosity and pride.257 The remedy was obvious: Scholasticism, especially 
“that which the Angelic Doctor has bequeathed to us.”258 The encyclical called upon 
seminaries and dioceses to vigilantly uphold scholastic principles. Publications were to be 
monitored, and censorship enforced.259 
In 1910, Pius X followed up his encyclical with the requirement of The Oath 
Against Modernism,260 to which allegiance was to be sworn by “all clergy, pastors, 
confessors, preachers, religious superiors, and professors in philosophical-theological 
seminaries.”261 The Oath affirmed five basic convictions: that God could be known with 
certainty “by the natural light of reason from the created world;” that miracles and 
prophecy were the “surest signs” of the authenticity of the Christian faith; that the 
Church, as the “guardian and teacher of the revealed word,” was “personally instituted by 
the real and historical Christ;” that the faith in its modern form was the same as was first 
passed down from the apostles; that “faith is not a blind sentiment of religion welling up 
from the depths of the subconscious under the impulse of the heart and the motion of a 
will trained to morality; but faith is a genuine assent of the intellect to truth received by 
hearing from an external source.”262 The Oath concluded that Catholic dogma is the same 
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“absolute and immutable truth preached by the apostles from the beginning;” it may not 
be “tailored according to what seems better and more suited to the culture of each age.”263 
The Oath Against Modernism was in place for nearly six decades, until it was suspended 
in 1967. The victory had been secured against modernism, but at a high cost. 
Blondel was never excommunicated, nor were his books put on the Index. 
However, he was delated and watched with suspicion. For Loisy, the end was more 
severe. Even back in the 1890s, Alfred Loisy assumed his days were numbered in the 
Catholic Church. He could not reconcile himself with the doctrines and beliefs of the 
Church, and he saw little hope they would heed his advice to progress. He was 
excommunicated in March, 1908.264 Loisy’s “grave errors” which especially received 
condemnation regarded his views on “primitive revelation, the authenticity of the Gospel 
facts and teachings, the divinity and the supernatural knowledge of Christ, the 
resurrection” of Christ, as well as “the divine institution of the Church and the 
sacraments.”265 Loisy’s excommunication was the most severe, with Pope Pius X using 
the term vitandus. Beyond his removal from the priesthood, he was to be shunned in 
Church circles. Loisy wrote that his excommunication actually set him free. His only 
regret was that it “had arrived twenty years too late.”266 
Although this reader might be sympathetic towards some of what Blondel was 
trying to do, and saddened that Loisy apparently lost his faith, the purpose here is to 
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assess the long term value of ecclesiology. To this reader, there seems to be a restorative 
effect of ecclesiology. It appears that living Tradition can be a positive tool for biblical 
interpretation, and even contribute to the long term stability of the fellowship. Although 
this is not always evident in the heat of debate, it often emerges over time. The 
unintentional reduction of Tradition to facts or observable historical criteria, such as the 
manuals sometimes displayed, risked neglecting the contemporary Church and confining 
revelation to the past. Those who discarded Tradition, such as Harnack, limited their field 
of vision to only include what they considered to be historical. Those who assumed that 
progressive Tradition fundamentally included discontinuity, such as Loisy, downgraded 
the authoritative voice of Jesus to a distant echo. Through the back-and-forth polemics 
over generations, and even discipline which at times appeared to be unjust, ecclesiology 
exhibited the ability to stabilize the Catholic Church. 
Catholic Ressourcement: Henri de Lubac  
The influence of Neo-Scholasticism and debate over its adequacy continued well 
into the twentieth century, even until the Second Vatican Council. The Ressourcement 
movement in the 1930s and 1940s reacted against Neo-Scholasticism, and furnishes an 
example of the restorative effect of Catholic ecclesiology. The Ressourcement movement 
was dubbed by its critics “la Nouvelle Théologie,”267 but those in the movement did not 
appreciate the title.268 Instead, they saw their work as “rediscovering Christianity in its 
                                                          
267 As an example, Father Reginald Garrigou-LaGrange’s widely known 1946 article in the Angelicum was 
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plentitude and in its purity.”269 Ressourcement theologians claimed they were not seeking 
to retrieve pristine Christian faith; they were not attempting to return to Christianity’s 
past, but to its center.270 They drew on patristic “treasures,” which they said were being 
“so little utilized,” in order to address the needs of the contemporary Church.  
David Schindler argues that the prevailing European ethos at the time was secular; 
Christianity had lost authentic contact with society and God was absent from the heart of 
human culture.271 The Church and the modern world were estranged as Catholic theology 
was exiled from contemporary streams of thought.272 Worse, as one theologian said, the 
insulation between Church and society was partly “our own fault.”273 A “purely extrinsic 
and secular conception of Catholicism or our salvation,” as taught by Neo-Scholastics 
and the manuals, led to a “grievously mistaken” understanding of the “essence of 
Catholicism.”274 In order to genuinely respond to the current need, the Ressourcement, as 
the name suggests, sought to rediscover the living essence of Christianity in its historic 
roots.  
                                                          
269 Henri de Lubac, Paradoxes of Faith, trans. Ernest Beaumont (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987),  57. 
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The Ressourcement began in France prior to World War II,275 and it ultimately 
influenced the Second Vatican Council. Henri de Lubac (1896–1991) was a significant 
participant in the Ressourcement. Various other authors have been associated with the 
movement in different ways, including Marie-Dominique Chenu, Pierre Teilhard de 
Chardin, and Yves Congar. These authors did not necessarily operate within a 
coordinated school of thought, but they all sought to intentionally engage the 
contemporary world with the fullness of Christian faith. Pertinent to this dissertation, de 
Lubac sought to retrieve the spiritual sense in biblical interpretation with the hope of 
effecting renewal.276  
De Lubac, Ecclesiology, and Exegesis 
The retrieval of the spiritual senses of biblical exegesis by de Lubac reflected his 
understanding of the relation between nature and the supernatural. At the heart of de 
Lubac’s concern with Neo-Scholastics and the manuals was that they exacerbated the 
tragic modern break between secular and sacred. Many were “grievously mistaken” about 
the social essence of Catholicism, holding to a “purely extrinsic and secular” 
conception.277 De Lubac sought out the historical reasons why nature and supernatural, 
the two orders of reality, were disconnected in peoples’ minds. De Lubac argued that the 
concept of “pure nature” had intensified over centuries, partly as a Baroque misreading of 
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Aquinas, and was at the root of the modern dilemma.278 For de Lubac, one reason for the 
development of the idea of pure nature involved Cajetan, the great commentator on 
Thomas.279 De Lubac argued that the idea of pure nature was used as early as Cajetan to 
reference humanity’s natural end prior to God’s gift of grace. In this system of thought, 
humanity did not have a natural desire for God; it could not strive beyond its natural 
state. In what de Lubac considered an innovative interpretation of Thomas, Cajetan stated 
that a human could only have telos for what naturally belonged to him;280 the desire to 
see God “face to face” could not be a natural human desire, but could only be in a person 
who was enlightened by revelation.281 Referencing Baius, de Lubac said that in such a 
mistaken concept, the “divine Architect” needed to construct a “second story,” a 
“supernature,” on top of the lower human nature.282 Although de Lubac could appreciate 
the distinction between the two orders, he thought that Cajetan’s model threatened the 
integrated relation between the two orders. For de Lubac, although the natural and 
                                                          
278 Henri de Lubac, Augustinianism and Modern Theology, trans. Lancelot C. Sheppard (New York: 
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supernatural aspects of humanity were “distinguished” from each other, they ought not be 
severely separated.283 With Augustine as his representative, he argued that humanity and 
its beatific end had always been perceived among Catholic thinkers as “entirely 
supernatural.”284 De Lubac specifically attacked extrinsic understandings of grace based 
on the works of Augustine.285 Similarly, St. Thomas had taught that humanity had a 
single beatitude.286 
De Lubac notes that some reputable theologians, even near the time of Cajetan, 
did not creatively read a pure nature into Thomas’ works as had Cajetan.287 And several 
who preceded Thomas or were his contemporaries wrote in a manner that contradicted 
Cajetan’s interpretations. Neither Augustine, Thomas himself, Alexander of Hales, 
Bonaventure, nor Duns Scotus would have “ever envisaged” humanity having more than 
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a single end, consisting of “knowledge of God other than the beatific vision.”288 
Nonetheless, the overwhelming consensus by the early twentieth century was to accept 
Cajetan’s interpretation of Aquinas almost without reservation.289 According to de Lubac, 
Cajetan’s two-tiered interpretation of Thomas, as was seen in the polemics with 
Jansensism, influenced several theologians over the centuries,290 including modern Neo-
Scholastics and manualists. Emphasis was disproportionately laid on the external, 
objective aspect of revelation. As a result, theology was often reduced to mining 
Scripture and Church Tradition for facts; the integration between literal and spiritual 
meaning in the text of Scripture was lost. Consequently, for de Lubac, Christianity was 
frequently viewed as irrelevant to a secular world which was increasingly self-aware. De 
Lubac’s use of historical theology was a counter to the “univocal” approach of Catholic 
theology in his day; de Lubac attempted to recover the full breadth of patristic 
tradition.291 
In his hermeneutics, de Lubac analogously emphasized the unity between 
different levels of meaning in the biblical text, as well as unity between the text of the 
Bible and other elements of the Christian faith. He surveyed multiple patristic and 
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medieval theologians to argue that they too saw an integration of literal and spiritual in 
the biblical text. Specifically, de Lubac coordinated ecclesiology with biblical exegesis. 
In doing this, he was able to construct a hermeneutic which he considered relevant to his 
generation, but which did not succumb to a rationalistic use of historical critical 
methods.292 
For de Lubac, the nature of the Church required that biblical exegesis must always 
occur in the Church.293 The Church was singular, and “not to be confused with an 
aggregate.”294 For de Lubac, the term “catholic” references “an intrinsic feature” of the 
Church; it suggests the Church’s spiritual nature, not only its material makeup. The term 
transcended geography and statistics. When the Church was only found in a small room 
in Jerusalem, it was catholic; it would remain catholic tomorrow if vast numbers of her 
faithful succumbed to apostasy.295 For this reason, interpretation of the biblical text could 
not be regional. The universal Church naturally calls for a unitary rule of faith.  
The Church was the mystery of Christ on earth. De Lubac makes a strong 
connection between Christology and ecclesiology; Monophysitism was a danger to 
both.296 The Church had both a spiritual and a human nature; a “fatal” consequence will 
result from neglecting either of those realities. As a visible body, the Church can be 
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concretely recognized, just as Jesus was identified.297 The Church’s “hierarchy” was a 
“juridical constitution” which crystallized, organized, and guided its activities.298 
However, the Church was also an “abstraction.”299 It was more than a “hierarchical and 
disciplined body,” whose apostolic succession demonstrated its “divine origin.”300 “The 
Church is for us the sacrament of Christ; she represents him in the full and ancient 
meaning of the term; she really makes him present.”301 For de Lubac, although one 
should never believe in the Church in the same sense as he believes in God, one must 
nonetheless understand that the Church is the Body of Christ, the presence of Christ, on 
the earth today.302 
The mystery of the Church was evidenced in various ways for de Lubac. He 
argued that “Catholicism is essentially social.”303 Yet, he said that its social aspect was 
two-fold. On one hand, it was certainly one of several “natural institutions”304 in human 
society. Its people constituted a formally recognized organization. On the other hand, it 
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was social “in the heart of its mystery.”305 It was formed by the Spirit,306 and was the 
“meeting place of all mysteries.”307 In Christ, all of the Church’s “dogmas are bound up 
together,”308 its sacraments “are instruments of unity,”309 its ancient scriptures and 
“liturgical texts” nourish its people,310 grace is distributed to each “member of that great 
body,”311 all history is interpreted anew,312 the two testaments are seen in a unified 
view,313 and the internal mystery of the human race is encountered.314 For de Lubac, the 
mystery of the Church also had practical ramifications for hermeneutics. 
The Bible, which was written in community, needed to be read in that same 
community. There was no room for private interpretation, and schism was seen as “an 
attack on the very unity of God.”315 This highlighted the formal role of Tradition. For de 
Lubac, Tradition was the constitutive thinking of the Christian community.316 The 
exegete must strive to be “faithfully bound to the apostles;” he must “accept and 
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understand” the Scriptures as Tradition teaches.317 Put simply, the Scriptures needed to be 
read “through the eyes of tradition.”318 “The first rule of hermeneutics” had always been 
“orthodoxy.”319 For de Lubac, as with Origen, the purpose of spiritual exegesis was to 
elucidate Scripture according to the rule of faith established in the succession of the 
apostles.320 Like Möhler, de Lubac viewed the ancients as his contemporaries with whom 
he had to reckon. This was the logical conclusion if the Church was the singular and 
living Body of Christ, the sacrament of Christ’s presence, and if the Bible was from the 
beginning the book of the Church. 
An ecclesial reading of the biblical text guided de Lubac to a Christocentric 
reading. 321 “The whole Christian Fact is summed up in Christ.”322 As the fulfillment of 
the Law and Prophets,323 “Jesus Christ brings about the unity of Scripture.”324 However, 
Christ’s fulfillment went beyond words or propositions. Christ, as God’s full revelation, 
fulfilled the Scripture through his “action.”325 Prior to propositionally explaining to the 
disciples on the Road to Emmaus how he fulfilled the Scripture, he actually brought 
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about the change.326 His cross, therefore, was the “sole and universal key” to 
understanding God’s revelation.327 Within Christianity, a “natural bias” had always 
brought the Christian’s thoughts “to the contemplation of the cross.”328 Christ’s actual 
death and resurrection united the two testaments “into a single body of doctrine, 
intermingling the ancient precepts with the grace of the Gospel.”329 The upshot of this 
was that the goal of the biblical exegete could not be limited to an assemblage of diverse 
facts or varied propositions. Rather, it needed to strive for the One in whom all truths 
existed. Exegesis “does not consist in ideas, but it communicates the very reality of the 
One whose riches are unfathomable.”330 “This is how the spiritual understanding” of 
Scripture has “always been understood in the Church.”331 De Lubac sought to return 
exegesis to its proper Christological center, but it was his Catholic ecclesiology which 
helped provide him with direction. 
A reminder of the nature of de Lubac’s writings is helpful. De Lubac 
acknowledged that his work was not the “technical”332 production of a historian, an 
apologist, or even a textual scholar. Nor did he seek to draw conclusions fit for “social 
                                                          
326 Luke chapter 24, and de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, vol. 1, 238. 
327 de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, vol. 1, 239. 
328 de Lubac, Catholicism, 367. 
329 de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, vol. 1, 239. Here, de Lubac references quotes from Augustine and Peter 
Damian.  
330 de Lubac, History and Spirit, 382. 
331 de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, vol. 1, 264. 
332 de Lubac, Catholicism, 16, 19. 
340 
reform.”333 Instead, he wrote as a theologian; his concerns rested in the “implications of 
dogma.”334 His acknowledgement helps explain why his works emphasized the spiritual 
interpretation of Scripture significantly more than historical critical methods. In his 
context, he was alarmed at the “total secularization” in biblical studies,335 and he sought 
to avoid the hypnotizing effect of an exclusively “critical method.”336 However, he did 
admit that the “first” concern of the biblical exegete must be to establish the actual 
history of the text.337 He affirmed the foundational role of critical historical studies in 
theology. History was the “necessary interpreter between God and man;”338 “God acts in 
history and reveals himself in history.” Therefore, the interpreter of Scripture must give 
history a sacred “consecration;” he is “compelled to treat it with due respect” during the 
process of scriptural exegesis.339  
De Lubac’s polemics were often directed towards theologies, including Neo-
Scholasticism and Protestant liberalism, which stressed the extrinsic nature of exegesis to 
such a degree that they risked missing the full sense of the sacred Scriptures. For de 
Lubac, “theology” could never be “clearly separated from exegesis.340 Spiritual exegesis 
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was a necessary, but “so little utilized,”341 aspect of biblical interpretation. The “profound 
sense” of historical events could only be understood “in a spiritual manner.”342 “Faith 
must provide the needed answer, and must do so before it is too late to be of help to 
many.”343 The spiritual interpretation of Scripture neither “eliminates” the literal sense of 
biblical passages, nor “adds something to it. Instead, it “rounds it out” and gives it its 
fullest meaning.344 
De Lubac’s response to misunderstandings and possible mistreatment of himself 
by Catholic authorities is telling of his ecclesiology. His troubles with the Vatican 
authorities are well known.345 His Neo-Scholastic opponents, such as Garrigou-Lagrange, 
accused him of advocating a “new theology” which potentially destroyed the gratuity of 
the supernatural order. Some of de Lubac’s works were withdrawn from Catholic 
libraries and bookshops, and he was subjected to a heavy vetting process prior to any 
future publications. One author significantly noted that de Lubac “accepted without 
question the restrictions placed on his intellectual freedom.”346 In time, however, his 
reputation changed. It became evident that his writings were not necessarily contrary to 
the Catholic Church, but actually expanded the understanding of theological 
anthropology. Catholic esteem for him is evident in the opportunity given to him to serve 
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as peritas at Vatican II, where he played a major role, and his elevation to Cardinal by 
John Paul II.  
De Lubac provides an example of a theologian whose ecclesiology proved 
beneficial. He submitted himself to the judgment of his superiors, even when he was 
misunderstood or possibly misjudged. He kept the faith that the Divine was in the Church 
even when the human leaders were flawed. As a result of his submission to an 
ecclesiastical censure, he was able to maintain unity during a crisis, and finally emerge on 
the other side to see the benefit he brought to the larger Body through his labors. 
 The various currents of renewal evident in Ressourcement influenced Vatican II, 
and thereby the entire Catholic Church. Ressourcement theological method demonstrated 
recourse to biblical and patristic witness, followed by the subsequent history of doctrinal 
development. For these reasons, its methods have been termed “genetic,” as opposed to 
the “regressive” methods of manualist theology.347 As is evident in Dei Verbum, the call 
of the Ressourcement to return to the sources of Scripture and Church Fathers showed 
that theology was more than participating in officially sanctioned discourse about God.348 
The thrust of scientific analysis of Church teaching or propositional statements in 
Scripture could not penetrate the depths of Christian theology. Dei Verbum reminded that 
theology probed the personal revealing of God, and it necessarily involved a personal 
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response.349 This was in contradistinction from the emphasis of the manuals. The manuals 
emphasized the objective nature of revelation to such a degree that theology and 
apologetics were reduced to evidence that demanded a verdict. As Brian Daley reminded, 
“to say that we, as persons, are made in the image of God is to remind ourselves” that 
“our contact with God” “begins in mutual knowing.” This knowledge is something which 
“God must initiate, form, and complete,” and which “is meant to end in friendship.”350 
The Ressourcement also influenced the conclusions of Dei Verbum on the “hotly 
debated” topic of the sources of God’s revelation.351 By affirming that Christ was the 
single source of all of God’s revelation, the Scripture was placed within its broader 
historical relation to Church and Tradition; the Bible, for Catholics, could not be 
interpreted in a vacuum. On one hand, this reaffirmed the ancient conviction that the 
canonical texts were fully inspired of God. On the other hand, it confirmed another 
ancient conviction that the Scriptures needed to be read in their “unified sacred 
narrative.”352 Dissimilar to restrictive methodical features in the manuals, Christian 
theology needed to observe the operation of the Spirit in the living history of the Church. 
Ressourcement theology helped form this emphasis in Vatican II.  
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Conclusion  
In order to preserve the integrity of the Church’s faith in the face of “modernism,” 
Catholic leaders endorsed Scholasticism as a pre-modern method of philosophy and 
theology. However, fellow Catholics perceived the new application of Thomas to be 
ahistorical and rigid in its method, often resulting in unwarranted suspicion of those who 
endorsed other methods. The guide to determining orthodoxy had become narrow and 
was “responsible for rigidifying mainline Catholic theology.”353 According to Avery 
Dulles, one of the liabilities of this sort of approach to Church life was that it unwittingly 
encouraged people to be “overly concerned with fulfilling ecclesiastical obligations, and 
insufficiently attentive, at times, to fulfilling the law of charity.”354 It raised an obstacle to 
“creative and fruitful theology;” its rigidity diminished “critical and exploratory 
thinking.”355 Gabriel Daly argues that the Vatican’s severe response to modernism, 
especially near the time of Pascendi, did less to show the modernist that he was not 
Catholic, and more to demonstrate he was not Scholastic.356 A single “party in the Church 
had identified its tenets with those of universal Christianity.”357  
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355 Dulles, Models of the Church, 36. 
356 Daly, Transcendence and Immanence, 220. 
357 Daly, Transcendence and Immanence, 221. 
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Alfred Loisy complained that the “theologians of His Holiness” had, without 
right, too quickly grouped him, Blondel, Laberthonnière, Tyrrell, Kant, and all of liberal 
Protestantism into a single system. The Vatican’s leaders had strategically “constructed a 
sort of encyclopedic doctrine with agnosticism as its foundation.”358 Several other 
scholars and priests who will not be surveyed here were disciplined by the Church during 
the crisis. Jesuit George Tyrrell was excommunicated a year prior to Loisy, although with 
a less severe punishment than Loisy’s vitandus.359 As with Blondel, Friedrich von Hügel 
was not excommunicated, but both lived under a cloud of suspicion as potentially 
undermining the Church’s teachings.360 Decades later, Henri de Lubac and some 
Ressourcement theologians experienced varying degrees of censure as well. It appears 
that Church discipline was not infrequently punitive, arguably reaching the level of abuse 
at times.  
To this reader, some of the Vatican leadership’s determinations appear to have 
been justified. Select conclusions of Loisy, for example, clearly countered beliefs which 
were long-held convictions within Christianity. However, other perceived threats to the 
faith seem to have been exaggerated. Blondel, for example, was suspected of an 
unbridled philosophy of immanence although he was careful to affirm the value of 
                                                          
358 Loisy, My Duel with the Vatican, 307–308. 
359 Ecclesiology was a key factor to be considered. Cf Reardon, Roman Catholic Modernism, 15, where he 
states that neither Tyrell nor Loisy drew upon Tübingen for their ecclesiology.  
360 For Tyrrell: cf. Ratte, Three Modernists, 145–251; Daly, Transcendence and Immanence, 140–164, and 
David G. Schultenover, “George Tyrrell and Catholic Modernism (review),” The Catholic Historical 
Review 97, no. 4 (October 2011): 842–43. 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/catholic_historical_review/summary/v097/97.4.schultenover.html. For Von 
Hügel: cf. Lawrence Barmann, “The Modernist as Mystic,” in Joddock, Catholicism Contending with 
Modernity, 215–247; Daly, Transcendence and Immanence, 117–139. 
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miracles and external evidences supporting Christian faith.361 Nonetheless, while certain 
problems associated with the Catholic Church’s handling of biblical modernity became 
obvious, something good emerged. It had been present at Tübingen decades earlier, and 
should not be neglected in the present day. 
Most Catholics on all sides of the polemics believed that Christ was somehow 
present in the ordained leadership of the Church in a very real way, guiding its 
theological development. Despite the apparent narrow-mindedness and authoritarian 
behavior of some within the Catholic hierarchy, Catholic ecclesiology provided 
continuity which brought stability back into the Church over time. One of the contentions 
of this dissertation is that commentaries on the Catholic Modernist Crisis should not be 
negligent reporting the preserving and invigorating effect of Catholic ecclesiology. Often, 
scholarly works eruditely convey particular characters and their historic crises, as through 
a microscope, but insufficiently bring attention to the macroscopic image of vast 
processes extending throughout time. Although divergent concepts of the ideal 
ecclesiastical structure persisted among Catholics, most assumed some form of a 
sacramental view of the Church.362 Some distinct benefits of Catholic ecclesiology 
become evident when one surveys their struggles with biblical modernity. 
Ecclesiology enabled Catholics to maintain a degree of unity during and after 
their crises. Certainly, some theological polemics tragically ended with real wounds for 
particular participants. However, in the end, disciplinary measures were effective. 
                                                          
361 In the end, none of Blondel’s books were put on the Index.  
362 Cf. Dulles, Models of the Church, 2–3. 
347 
Particular dogma, such as personal revelation, the knowledge of God, the historical 
validity of the Gospel accounts, the divine Person of Jesus, and the supernatural 
consciousness of Jesus, were safeguarded. An ideal role of ecclesiastical hierarchy is to 
provide parameters, such as the dogma just mentioned, in which theologians can safely 
function without jeopardizing unity. The purpose of hierarchy is not intended to control 
the minutiae of exploration. Ecclesiology is vital to transmitting, maintaining, and 
guaranteeing the central beliefs of Christianity. Sacramental Church teaching authority is 
more capable of proscribing error and securing unity than an anarchistic mob of brilliant 
theologians. Evangelicals lack such a universal mechanism for unity. Their 
denominations are often ideologically or geographically provincial. Some might have 
coalitions with other like-minded believers, but there is no comprehensive device to 
establish universal Christian unity on central theological claims.  
 Catholic ecclesiology provided their Church with tools to correct itself. The 
mistakes made by nineteenth-century Neo-Scholastics could be corrected in time by 
virtue of an ecclesiastical structure. At times, the Church’s hierarchy may have been 
wrong in how it administered discipline.363 However, the Church’s hierarchy was able to 
recognize its own disciplinary failures and attempt to prevent them from recurring. 364 As 
George H. Tavard points out, hardly any in the Vatican’s 1893 inner circles would have 
imagined that, in less than a century, no fewer than three future popes and the Second 
                                                          
363 From a Catholic perspective, infallibility does not presume to extend to discipline; it is confined to 
teaching on faith and morals applicable to the entire Church. 
364 Cf., for example, John Paul II’s 1992 admittance that the manner in which the Inquisition handled the 
trial of Galileo was wrong. 
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Vatican Council would “recognize the merits of Maurice Blondel as a Christian and as a 
philosopher.”365  
 Catholic ecclesiology also provided the individual exegete with wider resources 
for developing self-criticism. Patristic and medieval Scholastics have normative value for 
the Catholic theologian. Catholic ecclesiology forbids an exclusively private 
interpretation of the Bible; ideally, the text is read in an intergenerational community. 
Both Drey and Möhler amended some of their convictions, and expanded other ideas, 
after reading their own Tradition. When some theologians possibly became overly-
friendly with Aufklärung sentiments or others nearly fell off the Romantic cliff into 
Pantheism, Catholic ecclesiology provided a self-critical mechanism for them. Even 
without the Magisterium, Loisy knew that he had departed from Catholicism.  
Catholic ecclesiology provides the opportunity to creatively maintain orthodoxy 
by linking different generations in continuity. One example of this is the Church’s 
tolerance regarding the use of profane sciences in biblical exegesis. On one hand, Leo 
XIII’s 1893 encyclical stated that “a knowledge of natural science will be of very great 
assistance” to the “Professor of Sacred Scripture.”366 On the other hand, Pius X’s 1907 
Pascendi cautioned against taking the Bible as merely a human book367 in light of the 
crisis surrounding Loisy’s historical criticism. Similarly, Benedict XV’s 1920 Spiritus 
                                                          
365 George H. Tavard, “Blondel’s Action and the Problem of the University,” in Joddock, Catholicism 
Contending with Modernity, 168.  
366 Leo XIII, Providentissimus Deus, 18. 
367 Pius X, Pascendi, 22. 
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Paraclitus emphasized the “immunity of Scripture from error or deception.”368 “It is 
impious to even admit the very notion of error where the Bible is concerned.”369 Even de 
Lubac was concerned that some in his day remained hypnotized by the effects of an 
exclusively “critical method.”370 Yet, while maintaining the recommendations of 
Benedict XV,371 Pius XII, in his 1943 Divino Afflante Spiritu, clearly emphasized the 
need for honest historical critical studies. The biblical text needed to be studied as a 
human production; the philology of the text and the history behind it were vital to 
apprehending its full meaning. These distinct emphases do not contradict one another; 
instead, they give the exegete the opportunity to develop theology creatively within 
orthodox parameters. Further, as a result of Divino Afflante Spiritu, a sense of liberty to 
study the literal text of the Bible burgeoned. However, Pius XII’s encyclical should not 
be interpreted as emancipation for Catholics to finally study the Bible as literature. Pius 
XII’s emphasis was distinct from his predecessors, but it was not opposed to them.372 
Fitzmyer states that Pius XII’s “insistence on the literal sense did not commit Catholic 
interpreters to any fundamentalistic literalism, but it meant that the real religious meaning 
of the written Word of God had to be ascertained.”373 One generation’s needs differed 
from another generation’s. However, it was ecclesiology that linked the generations 
                                                          
368 Benedict XV, Spiritus Paraclitus, 13. 
369 Benedict XV, Spiritus Paraclitus, 14. 
370 de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, vol. 3, 95. 
371 Pius XII, Divino Afflante Spiritu, 9. 
372 Pius’s encyclical was written on the fiftieth anniversary of Leo XIII’s Providentissimus Deus. 
373 Joseph A. Fitzmyer, The Interpretation of Scripture: In Defense of the Historical-critical Method (New 
York: Paulist Press, 2008), 5.  
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together, and provided each generation’s theologians the opportunity to discover deeper 
understandings of orthodox dogma creatively.  
 Catholic ecclesiology is largely responsible for maintaining the sacramental 
dimension of biblical studies. Catholic hermeneutics is built upon the doctrine of 
Apostolic Succession. The hierarchy operates with confidence that God continuously 
ordains the Church’s leadership. Möhler was aware of corruptions in past leaders, but 
was still sure that it was the Spirit who had always designed the Church’s hierarchy. As 
late as 1943, Pius XII stated that the contemporary exegete will “find invaluable help” in 
the exegetical works of the “Holy Fathers, the Doctors of the Church and the renowned 
interpreters of past ages.” However, the help provided by these ancients is “by reason of 
the office assigned to them by God in the Church.”374 Pius acknowledged that “some” 
Fathers were “less instructed” “than the Scripture scholars of our time” because they 
simply did not have the benefit of historical critical methods of twentieth-century 
exegetes. Yet, it was their divinely-given “office,” not their scholarship, which 
“distinguished” them with a “certain subtle insight” into heavenly things, and the ability 
to “penetrate to the very innermost being of the divine word.”375 Pius recognized that 
divinely-given “office” within a broader ecclesiology of the authority of the Tradition, 
was vital to a profound reading of the Scriptures. This underlying confidence was an 
expansion of faith in Christ, who promised to be with the Church until the end of the age. 
                                                          
374 Pius XII, Divino Afflante Spiritu, 28. 
375 Ibid. 
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Faith in the mystical presence of Christ in the Church correlated to a mystical 
understanding of the biblical text. 
It is doubtful if Scripture studies can sustain a mystical element in evangelical 
theology without a reconsideration of ecclesiology. Certainly, evangelicals have always 
had a remnant, sometimes relatively large, who preserve the conviction that the 
Scriptures speak God’s words. However, without a universally authoritative teaching 
endorsement, it is questionable if evangelicals can prevent further fragmentation over 
how to read the Bible.  
The Catholic Church’s engagement with biblical modernity raised critical 
questions, and not all of them were answered well. However, many answers were 
discovered already existing within the same Church. It is important to remember that the 
multiple fights within Catholicism at the turn of the twentieth century were under one 
roof. They lived in the same house in which Möhler, and many before him, dwelt. It’s 
critical to recognize the preserving effect ecclesiology can have on theology. Possibly, it 
is taken for granted and easy to miss for those inside the Catholic communion. However, 
even some who were cast out still recognized it. “With all of its accretions and 
perversions Catholicism is, for the Modernist, the only authentic Christianity. Whatever 
Jesus was, he was in no sense a Liberal Protestant.”376 
                                                          
376 George Tyrrell, Christianity at the Crossroads (London: Longmans, Green, 1909), Preface, xx–xxi. This 
Preface was written two years after Tyrell’s excommunication. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
A CALL FOR EVANGELICAL POST-CRITICAL REASSESSMENT OF 
ECCLESIOLOGY AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 
Introduction 
In light of the historical assessments of the previous chapters, this author calls 
upon fellow evangelicals to reexamine the role of ecclesiology, and the Catholic Church 
specifically, in biblical hermeneutics. The theological bane of evangelicalism is the 
widespread assumption that ecclesiology should play an insignificant role in the exegesis 
of Scripture. The range of evangelical treatment of Scripture remains very diverse. Yet, a 
common assumption operates in most paradigms. Very few evangelicals register the need 
for ecclesiology in exegetical labors. Fewer still acknowledge any pneumatic value in 
authoritative Catholic interpreters of Scripture. This prevalent neglect of ecclesiology and 
correlative antagonism towards the Catholic Church has affected exegesis by 
compromising the mystical quality of Christian faith at key moments of evangelical 
history, and has legitimized sectarianism; it is an enduring pathology that needs to be 
addressed.  
Whether or not evangelicals reevaluate ecclesiology will bear future 
consequences. In addition to the pertinent topics Christians struggled with in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, new crises of faith will constantly appear. Many of 
these will affect discussions on human origins, the dignity of human life, human 
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sexuality, communication of the gospel across religious boundaries, and confession of 
dogmatic orthodoxy. If the trend of denying, or even undervaluing, the role of 
ecclesiology in the interpretation of the sacred text continues unabated, it will contribute 
to further demystification of sacred Scripture and fragmentation of Christian unity over 
such important issues. A universal interpretation of the biblical text on the deepest 
matters of Christian faith and morals will remain unattainable.  
The remainder of this dissertation will call for a constructive, post-critical 
response to the dissimilar effects of ecclesiology on Catholic and evangelical exegesis of 
Scripture. Many evangelicals have read the writing on the wall, and multiple sincere 
efforts at renewing evangelicalism have recently occurred. However, most of these 
attempts do not strike deeply enough. They often critique evangelical handling of 
Scripture since the Enlightenment, but their critiques should go back to the Reformation 
for a thorough prescriptive resolution.1 The long term abandonment of the Catholic 
Church and subsequent suspicion of nearly any ecclesiology must be reconsidered.  
The term “post-critical” has various meanings to different people. This 
dissertation uses it as a way to retrieve positive meaning from an object which has been 
legitimately critiqued. While maintaining scrutiny of a particular object, it seeks to be 
self-critical, thus correcting harmful, exaggerated denunciations. It seeks progressive 
continuity; it neither wishes to reconstitute essentials nor return to a pristine beginning. 
                                                          
1 As an example, in The Divine Authenticity of Scripture: Retrieving an Evangelical Heritage (Downers 
Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2007), A. T. B. McGowan distinguishes between different evangelical views of 
Scripture and their historic trajectories. However, in his proposal of an “older and better way” (123) to 
defend a high view of Scripture in the modern world, McGowan merely takes his readers back to Reformed 
theologians of recent centuries, such as Herman Bavinck. As a result, his work does not significantly 
engage the relationship between ecclesiology and hermeneutics. 
354 
Without discounting genuine differences between Catholic and Protestant theologies, this 
thesis warns against excessive dismissal, stemming from historic polemics, of the 
Catholic Church’s pneumatic participation2 in biblical exegesis. Such a sweeping, 
negative dismissal appears contrary to the Scriptures evangelicals claim to uphold, opens 
the door to a dismissal of nearly all ecclesiology, fosters a demystified understanding of a 
revelatory text, fails to prevent communal factions, and leads to shallow exegetical 
results. Unfortunately, such excesses are not uncommon in evangelical circles. 
Contours of Post-Critical Reassessment 
In its call for a theoretical shift in evangelical hermeneutics, this chapter pauses to 
provide illustration of what a positive post-critical assessment might look like. Over the 
last century, reappraisal within various branches of human knowledge chastened many 
disciplines by critiquing the assumed validity of dominant explanatory models. After 
critical research had advanced within distinct fields of study, many began to accept 
certain presumptions non-critically, resulting in closed-mindedness toward other 
beneficial methods of thought.  
This section will briefly examine, merely as illustrations, specific arguments of 
two post-critical authors from distinct fields: chemist and philosopher of science Michael 
Polanyi (1891–1976) and philosopher Paul Ricoeur (1913–2005). Polanyi and Ricoeur 
are put forward to prepare for consideration later of analogs for evangelical exegetes. It is 
hoped that these analogs will help evangelicals discern possible contours of a post-critical 
understanding relative to ecclesiology and exegesis. It is necessary to give some time to 
                                                          
2 Ephesians 4:11–13. 
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these two authors’ works in order to adequately gain a glimpse of possible forms a 
constructive, post-critical assessment might exhibit. Polanyi and Ricoeur’s usefulness to 
this dissertation does not lie in their specific conclusions, whether philosophical, 
religious, scientific, or social. Neither will their epistemologies necessarily be offered as 
worthy of adoption today; they wrote decades ago when many other post-critical views 
were being developed, many of which operated within opposing epistemologies. Instead, 
Polanyi and Ricoeur are used in this work as illustrations of people who detected narrow 
modes of thinking which, although once developed around reasonable criticisms, now 
threatened legitimate advancement of their particular fields. They critiqued latent 
assumptions which they traced back to earlier thought. Polanyi and Ricoeur represent a 
larger constructive post-critical movement within Western thinking, and are helpful 
illustrations of what can positively occur as the result of paradigmatic shifts.  
As mentioned, this dissertation seeks to address assumptions adopted in the first 
years of the Reformation. The claim here is that American evangelicalism has negligently 
operated under long-standing anti-ecclesiastical assumptions, and needs a more thorough 
self-critique. Polanyi and Ricoeur help provide the general shape for such an evaluation. 
Michael Polanyi 
Michael Polanyi’s effort at a post-critical philosophy of science is valuable to this 
dissertation because he is a recent example, in a field other than theology, of a call to 
critique assumed authoritative structures for interpreting data. Polanyi attempted to 
reevaluate the nature of knowing within his field of expertise, arriving at the goal of a 
fuller knowledge of the object under study and a beneficial social result. Polanyi is best 
known and revered by scientists today for his work as a chemist, being one of the 
356 
founders of the modern field of chemical dynamics.3 However, he also gained attention 
through his works on philosophical science, focusing on an “enquiry into the nature and 
justification of scientific knowledge.”4 In an analogous manner, this dissertation is calling 
for evangelicals to critique their own authoritative paradigms for biblical hermeneutics.   
Polanyi diagnosed what he considered destructive consequences of dominant 
presumptions, and sought to reassess the reductive conception of knowing within his 
respective field. In his thinking, positivistic and exclusively inductive interpretations of 
real living objects tragically reduced those objects, leading to misinterpretations and even 
destructive conclusions “beyond the domain of science.”5 Polanyi argued that the modern 
“conception of knowing” amongst scientists needed modification6 because the 
unquestioned assumptions behind it created potentially harmful social and political 
fallout.7 Polanyi admitted that his “reconsideration of scientific knowledge” possibly bore 
few if any implications for the “exact sciences,”8 such as in his own field of chemistry. 
However, a “false idea” of science threatened a “destructive influence” over other fields 
directly associated with society, such as “biology, psychology, and sociology.”9  
                                                          
3 Mary Jo Nye, Michael Polanyi and His Generation: Origins of the Social Construction of Science 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 113.  
4 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-critical Philosophy (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1962), preface, vii. 
5 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, preface, vii. 
6 Ibid.  
7 In addition to Nye, cf. Sam Addison, “Michael Polanyi,” n.p.; n.d. 
http://www.giffordlectures.org/lecturers/michael-polanyi. This is the written biography on Polanyi in the 
Gifford Lectures biographical page.  
8 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, preface, vii. 
9 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, preface, vii. 
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In addition, the very scientists who endorsed a severe rebuke of non-empirical 
methods of research were themselves inadequately self-critical. They were unaware that 
the active assumptions behind their methodologies often countered the actual process of 
several significant scientific discoveries in modern history. Polanyi sought to make room 
and mutual respect for varied methods of science; he did not seek to return to what some 
perceived to be a pre-modern scientific outlook.  
Polanyi’s Critique 
Atomic determinism, a philosophy Polanyi also called the “Laplacean fallacy”10 
after the French mathematician Pierre-Simon Laplace, was dominant in the scientific 
community and regrettably became “a guide to human affairs.” Scientific investigation in 
a Laplacean world limited itself to matters that were measureable and discoverable 
through “strictly objective knowledge.”11 Subsequently, this philosophy influenced 
political action by leading to decisions solely based on externally observable factors, such 
as wealth. Politics, therefore, were considered to be necessarily shaped by force, 
motivated by greed and fear, with morality no longer seen as a guide but only a 
delusion.12 To Polanyi, the prevailing philosophy of deterministic science had contributed 
to the political idea that supreme good could be reduced to “material welfare.” If the 
trend continued, “all cultural activities” would be forced to “subserve the power of the 
State in transforming society for the achievement of welfare.” In such a development, the 
value of science would be reduced to its “utility for strengthening public power and 
                                                          
10 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 141. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid.  
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improving the standard of living.”13 In the end, according to Polanyi, such a philosophic 
movement within society, guided by “scientific severity,” would prevent potentially 
beneficial scientific exploration if a discovery was considered a threat to a purely 
material conception of human welfare. If science were dogmatically reduced to only 
analyzing external realities, it would suppress potentially legitimate discoveries and 
threaten “the position of science itself.”14 For Polanyi, therefore, the modern danger 
confronting scientific progress was no longer religious antagonism towards science. 
Rather, it was sourced “in the very acceptance” of a “reductive programme” of 
unquestioned ideas by practicing scientists.15  
According to Polanyi, the “delusion” of Laplace and others was the substitution of 
“knowledge of all experience for a knowledge of all atomic data.”16 In other words, an 
analysis of data was being equated with an analysis of life. Purely empirical studies may 
be helpful at analyzing rocks, but proved incapable at discerning the “increasingly 
complex function of higher animals.”17 “Facts about living things are more highly 
personal than the facts of the inanimate world.”18 As necessary as empirical research was, 
its tools were insufficient to comprehensively analyze higher animal, especially human, 
existence. A scientist who “ascends the evolutionary ladder”19 of beings must constantly 
                                                          
13 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 142.  
14 Ibid. 
15 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 141. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1983), 51. 
18 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 347.  
19 Ibid. 
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employ new tools of research appropriate to the level of reality under investigation. 
Unfortunately, few admitted it, resulting in a merely materialistic understanding of 
humanity replete with dangerous social and political consequences.  
Polanyi criticized the exclusive reliance on empirical evidence to interpret reality, 
resulting in a lack of “self-doubt” among his colleagues. Ever since the nineteenth-
century positivism of Auguste Comte, bullish “belief in science stood supreme as the 
only belief that remained practically unchallenged;”20 skepticism, such as Hume’s, was 
now discarded in light of “objective truth,” and intuition excluded as an unreliable 
medium. Polanyi perceived that the dominant scientific consensus was already moving 
within the “absurd”21 philosophical trend of accentuating purely objective analyses of the 
world. Hard-core “empiricism, inductivism, and logical positivism”22 continued 
unchecked, and caused a “mechanistic conception of the world” to emerge.23 This 
development disallowed scientists from going “beyond” strict empiricism to affirm 
anything that “cannot be tested by experience.”24 Further, it separated science from the 
arts, religion, metaphysics, and ideology.25  
For Polanyi, objectivism had falsified a conception of truth by exalting what 
could be empirically proved while disparaging what could not be objectively proved. 
                                                          
20 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 238. 
21 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 3. 
22 Nye, Michael Polanyi and His Generation , 223. 
23 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 8. 
24 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 9. 
25 Nye, Michael Polanyi and His Generation, 223.  
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Such closed-mindedness was unscientific, inconsistent with the history of scientific 
discovery, and had blinded many in his generation to the need for self-criticism.26 It was 
incongruous with scientific history to think that doubt was the sole “solvent for error.”27 
In fact, Polanyi decried the prevalent “doctrine of doubt” towards non-empirical claims 
as a detrimental “prejudice” commonly “taken for granted” among intellectuals, but 
which undermined true scientific progress. For Polanyi, groundless doubt was a 
“corollary of objectivism.” It assumed that all components of belief needed to be 
uprooted in order for facts to be “completely determined” by objective knowledge.28 
Opposing this assumption, Polanyi argued that the human mind had wider 
cognitive powers than an objectivist conception of knowledge allowed.29 “True 
innovations” in science, the kind “by which the whole framework of science is 
reformed,”30 often involved a type of belief. The power to believe was a “pre-eminent 
force of change in science” which led the genius of Columbus across the Atlantic, 
enabled Newton to cast his ideas into a “concrete and binding form,” and enabled 
mathematician Max von Laue to discover the diffraction of X-rays by crystals.31 
Scientific faith had led to numerous discoveries in the areas of “heliocentric system, of 
genes, of quanta, of radioactivity or of relativity.”32  
                                                          
26 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 238. 
27 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 279. 
28 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 269. 
29 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 249. 
30 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 276–277. 
31 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 277.  
32 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 276. 
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In his writings, Polanyi expanded his focus beyond science to religion, and argued 
that scientific doubt had cast excessive suspicion upon religious claims. The closed-
mindedness of the empiricists failed to supply a second, renewed meaning to the religious 
symbols they critiqued.33 Those who justified scientific doubt failed to understand the 
role of belief in their own academic discoveries. However, they enlarged their ignorance 
by discounting religious claims out of hand; they refused to consider the role that faith 
played in religious discoveries. A scientist cannot observe God any more than “truth or 
beauty can be observed;” God is not a “fact,” as a “thing” to be apprehended.34 Yet, faith 
in God provided opportunity to discover him anew. Polanyi reprimanded contemporary 
skepticism toward religious claims and stated that “an era of great religious discoveries 
may lie before us.”35  
Polanyi identified the root of the “massive modern absurdity” of restricting 
scientific theory to observable facts as an unnecessary separation between objective and 
subjective aspects of knowing; it was a fundamental separation between mathematical 
knowledge and empirical knowledge.36 Theoretical or mathematical knowledge, as 
distinct from experimental analysis, had always been needed in science to guide the 
interpretation of empirical data. The two were distinct but could not be separated. “Into 
every act of knowing there enters a passionate contribution of the person knowing what is 
                                                          
33 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 286. 
34 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 279. 
35 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 285. 
36 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 9.  
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being known, and that this coefficient is no mere imperfection but a vital component of 
his knowledge.”37 
Personal Knowledge 
In order to critique the exclusive reliance on empirical knowledge in modern 
science, Polanyi sought to re-open inquiry into the performance of human knowing. He 
concluded that humans function with two distinct but related types of knowledge, and 
that modern scientific endeavors neglected one of those aspects. The first type of 
knowledge was explicit, articulated, and formal. This type of knowledge was gained by 
propositional instruction. It was bound by rules of empiricism, was partial in its focus, 
codified and able to be written down,38 and linked to objectivity.39 Polanyi dubbed the 
second type of human knowledge as tacit.40 For Polanyi, tacit knowledge was neither 
formalized nor articulated; rather, it was implicit awareness of a whole. It was intuitive 
and passionate, learned in the structure of a master-apprentice relationship, and was 
linked to subjectivity. Polanyi admitted to using “the findings of Gestalt psychology” to 
develop his argument.41 “Sensations are not simply raw experiences, but the interaction 
                                                          
37 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, preface, viii.  
38 Cf. Ted Hedesstrom and Edgar A. Whitley, “What Is Meant by Tacit Knowledge? Towards a Better 
Understanding of the Shape of Actions,” AIS Electronic Library (AISel), (2000), 
http://aisel.aisnet.org/ecis2000/29/. The article is part of the Year 2000 European Conference on 
Information Systems (ECIS).  
39 Nye, Michael Polanyi and His Generation, introduction, xix.  
40 The definition of tacit knowledge varies among different authors, with some contradictions among 
authors regarding its precise definition. Hedesstrom and Whitley lay out some of the distinct 
understandings in “What Is Meant by Tacit Knowledge? Towards a Better Understanding of the Shape of 
Actions.” 
41 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, preface, vii. Gestalt psychology holds that the whole is greater than the 
parts; the human mind considers a complete object prior to analyzing its portions.  
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of experience with a pre-formed cognitive structure.” Experience therefore requires an a 
priori structure in order to be properly interpreted.42 To Polanyi, no sharp distinction 
existed between explicit and tacit knowledge. Therefore, modern science had crippled its 
own capabilities for genuine progress by its self-imposed limitations. Polanyi put forward 
the idea of Personal Knowledge to describe the unity of objective and subjective aspects 
of knowing, particularly relative to science.43 “It seems reasonable to describe this fusion 
of the personal and the objective as Personal Knowledge.”44 He claimed that all scientific 
knowledge involved subjective scrutiny united to empirical analyses.  
For Polanyi, complete knowledge of an object necessarily involved both explicit 
and tacit knowledge. However, he argued that the first type of knowledge could not exist 
without the second. Just as one could not understand particulars without first referencing 
their whole, tacit knowledge provided the basis for explicit knowledge. Polanyi used 
multiple everyday illustrations to make this point. Prior to a biologist dissecting an 
animal’s parts, he must first appreciate it as an animal;45 he must assume the organic 
relations of the many body parts prior to being able to explain them. One learns to ride a 
bicycle by observing others, and not by reading propositional statements in an instruction 
manual on how to keep one’s balance or the complex muscular activity required. “Rules 
of art can be useful, but they do not determine the practice of art.” Rules can guide only if 
                                                          
42 Paul Pojman, “Ernst Mach,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2011, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/ernst-mach/. 
43 Mary J. Nye, “Michael Polanyi and the Social Construction of Science,” Tradition & Discovery: The 
Polanyi Society Periodical 39, no. 1 (2012-2013): 12, 
http://polanyisociety.org/tad%20web%20archive/index-archive.html. 
44 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, preface, viii. 
45 Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, 51. 
364 
they are integrated with “practical knowledge.”46 “Even a geographical map fully 
embodies in itself a set of strict rules for finding one’s way through a region of otherwise 
unchartered experience.”47 Polanyi cited Copernicus as an example of a scientist who 
ventured beyond his experience of the “sun, the moon, the stars rising daily in the east to 
travel across the sky towards their setting in the west” to transform human knowledge of 
the universe. Copernicus utilized “abstract theory” of an “imaginary solar standpoint” to 
help revolutionize the Ptolemaic “picture of the solar system.”48 Conversely, “by 
concentrating attention on his fingers, a pianist can temporarily paralyze his 
movement.”49 To Polanyi’s mind, modern science suffered from a self-imposed paralysis, 
and had lost its artistic rhythm. Although this narrowness of thought had little bearing on 
the analysis of “crystals,” such materialistic assumptions could prove deadly as one 
moved to an analysis of “sentience,” “intelligence,” and “emotional relations” of 
persons.50  
Critique of Polanyi 
Reactions to Polanyi’s conclusions are varied. Thomas Kuhn, for example, is well 
known for his description of Polanyi’s “brilliantly developed” theme of tacit 
knowledge.51 Many scientists resonated with Polanyi’s critique of dominant narrow-
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mindedness in scientific circles, and some were favorable towards the religious tone of 
his works. Others, notably Austrian Karl Popper, found Polanyi’s works “unpersuasive,” 
even “contemptuous.”52 Philosophers, particularly, were not impressed with Polanyi’s 
arguments for Personal Knowledge.53 Due to the fact that Polanyi had no master-
apprentice relationship in sociology or philosophy, he was often regarded as an outsider 
in those fields, except when he brought his scientific expertise to bear on a question.54 
Polanyi continues to draw interest, notably among some religious thinkers, including 
philosopher Charles Taylor.55 
Paul Ricoeur 
Philosopher Paul Ricoeur is valuable to this dissertation because he provides 
another modern example, in a field other than theology, of post-critical analysis. Ricoeur 
acknowledged the benefit of a hermeneutics of suspicion towards ancient symbols. 
However, he deemed suspicion to be insufficient for full analysis of an object, and 
cautioned against its unbridled excesses. He argued for the need to go beyond criticism 
and reconsider the original symbol. Ricoeur noticed the modern tendency to dismiss 
symbols entirely during critique, and he called for critical empathy towards the 
scrutinized symbols in order to better comprehend them. In an analogous manner, this 
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dissertation is calling for critical empathy for the Catholic Church from an evangelical 
perspective. 
Critique of False Consciousness 
Ricoeur examined the “aftermath”56 of the hermeneutics of suspicion, and sought 
to critique its excesses. He analyzed three critical thinkers, whom he called the three 
“masters of suspicion:”57 Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Sigmund Freud. The effect 
of their works had brought Western culture to an “irreversible” point which demanded 
conversation.58 Ricoeur used the phrase false consciousness, an expression actually 
employed by Marx, to identify a common link between the three men. Each author 
identified distinct fabricated appearances in society related to his particular field of study, 
and attempted to dismantle those false exteriors.59 For Ricoeur, none of these authors was 
exclusively negative. Each affirmed a positive end of negating false appearances in the 
human consciousness.  
For Ricoeur, Marx exposed what he considered the illusion of the economic world 
as a reflection of class struggle. Marx’s “method of destruction” was valuable for religion 
because it exposed the “economic motivation” behind some religious expressions; it 
discerned the relationship between ideology and the phenomena of domination.60 Marx 
capably showed how theological ideology had authorized domination by religious 
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authorities and the forced submission of the faithful. Demystification of religion, 
according to Marx, would liberate humanity to focus on the “biology of reproduction and 
an economy of production.” It would enable humanity to become transparent; humanity’s 
speech would be equal to its actions, and its actions equal to its being.61 For Ricoeur, 
Nietzsche unmasked human achievement as a will to power. He contributed a “great 
deciphering” of the strong and weak human will “behind the masked signs” of 
intentions.62 Nietzsche’s nihilistic conclusion regarding God’s death nonetheless allowed 
for humanity to be reborn, and focus on the “after-man, the superman.”63 For Ricoeur, 
Freud uncovered various hidden neurotic and psychiatric motivations behind human 
actions.64 He searched out the “genealogy of desire” which generated culture, and he 
exercised his critique through psychiatry.65 If humanity would expose the myth of its own 
consciousness as rooted in “infantile desire,” Freud saw the possibility of passing “from 
the pleasure principle to the reality principle.”66 According to Ricoeur, these three 
masters affirmed a shared type of eschatology; their iconoclastic critique allowed for 
modern humanity to enter the future by facing reality without the religious masks of fear, 
domination, and hate.67  
                                                          
61 Ricoeur, “The Critique of Religion,” in The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, 217.  
62 Ricoeur, “The Critique of Religion,” in The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, 216.  
63 Ricoeur, “The Critique of Religion,” in The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, 218.  
64 Ricoeur, “The Critique of Religion,” in The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, 214.  
65 Ricoeur, “The Critique of Religion,” in The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, 216–217.  
66 Ricoeur, “The Critique of Religion,” in The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, 218.  
67 Ricoeur, “The Critique of Religion,” in The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, 219.  
368 
Ricoeur saw similarities among the authors. A “negative form of 
demystification,” an exercise of suspicion, a “totally new and different” form of doubt 
was emerging throughout society and was evident in each author. However, unlike 
Descartes’ doubt, which leaned on the “fortress of consciousness,” these authors doubted 
the reliability of consciousness itself. Descartes was doubtful of things, but not suspicious 
of his own cognizance.68 For Ricoeur, any type of religious faith in the modern world 
needed to “pass through” “so great and respectable a critique.”69 However, modern 
religious faith also needed to extend beyond the critique. 
Advancing Beyond Critique  
 While Ricoeur acknowledged the value of the prevalent hermeneutics of 
suspicion, he critiqued it as insufficient.70 Religious symbols, while being rightly 
critiqued, still offered significance for the modern world. Ancient myths and symbols 
reflected genuine human consciousness;71 they conveyed the “archaic meanings 
belonging to the infancy of mankind,” the beginning of meanings “contained in 
language.”72 For example, old myths of guilt, chaos, blinding, or Fall gave rise to literary 
symbols of wandering, captivity, and deviation. Although these denoted original human 
self-understanding, and referred back to hierophanies, they also could benefit modern 
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humanity by helping “anticipate our spiritual” future.73 Symbols allowed humanity to 
develop a healthy future in continuity with its primordial awareness; they reproduced 
humanity’s situation in the world.74 After repeating our “childhood in all our senses,” 
they could help “explore our adult life;”75 they gave rise to new “thought.”76  
 For Ricoeur, modern epistemologies were biased and did not permit religious 
symbols to provide meaning.77 Intellectual prejudice prevented modern humanity from 
gaining “self-knowledge through the long route of the interpretations of texts, 
monuments, and cultural forms.”78 Although demystification identified false 
consciousness of externals, it did not provide a necessary “internal critique” of the 
content of religious proclamation;79 it neglected the restorative possibilities in the very 
symbols which were critiqued.80 For example, Freud’s narrow, restricted interpretation of 
the meaning of religious symbols had “permanently fixed meaning,” which prevented 
“deciphering” of fresh meaning.81 Reductionism had closed more paths than it opened.82 
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As a result, “we can never encounter anything” in symbols but “residues.”83 The three 
“masters” opposed a phenomenology of the sacred, and “any hermeneutics understood as 
the recollection of meaning” and “the reminiscence of being.”84 Their explanation of 
reality “reduces by explaining through causes,” whether psychological, political, 
economic, or others.85 Ricoeur appreciated “contemporary criticism” for its “desire and 
endeavor for objectivity.”86 However, the positivistic idea of “historical objectivity” was 
an “incomplete objectivity.”87  
Ricoeur called for a restoration of “signifying language, a language of being and 
existence,” in order to provide a relevant cultural expression of Christianity in the age of 
suspicion.88 A post-critical effort was needed to go beyond the “school of suspicion;”89 
“great syntheses” between objective facts and subjective humanity needed to occur.  
Positivism, for Ricoeur, could not transcend the level of a document; it could only 
critique the externals of its literary object.90 While the critic of ancient symbols certainly 
began with facts, he needed to be wary of a “fetishism of facts.”91 Subjective factors 
influenced objective research, which meant the “historian’s subjectivity” should be 
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studied as well as the events of history. The masters of suspicion tragically excluded such 
subjectivity and merely focused on externals; humanity within history had been lost. 
Their work “omits man,” and yields to the “fascination of a false objectivity.” In their 
surveys of history, there were no longer “men and human values, but only structures, 
forces, and institutions” existed 92 Just as no physics exists without physicists,93 so any 
complete historical analysis of religious symbols needs to include analyses of human 
consciousness. The task of hermeneutics needed to attend to the “structure of existence” 
surrounding a person. In what Ricoeur called a “philosophic anthropology,” 
comprehension of a sacred text involved a “step toward the primitive, the primordial, the 
original.”94 Understanding involved a “precomprehension,” including how one 
understood himself and his world.95 Ricoeur considered such a philosophical critique of 
human existence as “prediscourse.” It did not critique the methods or results of science; 
scientific knowledge had its own proper mode of knowing and interpretation. Rather, it 
was a philosophical critique of how scientific knowledge takes place within the 
comprehension of one’s existence in the world.96 As a result, a “kind of circularity” was 
needed between understanding the text and understanding oneself. Ricoeur acknowledged 
that the idea of a hermeneutical circle was a “sheer scandal” to those taught in the 
“Tradition” of logical empiricism. However, he concluded that such a circle was 
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necessary for interpretation of humanly-generated symbols.97 “The object of history is the 
human subject himself.”98 Therefore, intellectual sympathy was needed. 
Sympathy 
In addition to his critical stance, Ricoeur’s survey of symbols adopted a 
suspended faith, dubbed “sympathy,”99 toward the object under study. His goal was to 
allow the symbol to speak again. For Ricoeur, sympathy denoted a positive “recollection 
of meaning”100 after necessary critique and suspicion,101 which helped attain an “integral 
comprehension”102 of symbols. Sympathy helped transport the critic “into another 
universe of meaning;”103 it provided him with “affinity” which made him 
contemporaneous with the symbol.104 In order to accomplish such sympathy, the historian 
needed to temporarily withdraw from his “customary environment” and project himself 
“hypothetically into another present.”105 He accepted the “suspended and neutralized 
adoption of the beliefs of past men” in order to understand them. He called up their 
“values” in order to relive what they lived. He became “vitally interested” in their ideals, 
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and granted their faith “hypothetically.”106 Ricoeur sought to establish a link between 
uncultivated belief and educated sympathy. “The second naïveté aims to be the post-
critical equivalent of the pre-critical hierophany.”107  
 “Sympathy” had been at the beginning of the work of the critic as a first naïveté; 
as yet “uncultivated,” it initiated the work of research. After the initial engagement, 
reasoned analysis provided a “methodical step”108 of necessary critique. Now, sympathy 
needed to return at the end of the intellectual work of the critic, as a second naïveté of 
“educated” understanding. Unfortunately, the schools of suspicion neglected this third 
step, and would not allow themselves to advance beyond their reasoned analyses to 
achieve renewed meaning. Ricoeur’s idea of “postcritical faith” sought the “restoration of 
meaning,”109 not its destruction. It was rational because it critically interpreted; it did not 
merely accept what was presented to it. Yet, it was a sort of faith in that it sought, 
through its interpretation, a new encounter with the ancient symbol. Ricoeur understood 
his combination of understanding and faith to be a sort of hermeneutical circle,110 which 
was “the contrary of suspicion.”111  
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Ricoeur did not call for a return to pristine origins. A cultural distance, a “problem 
of contemporaneity,”112 existed between the original texts and the contemporary world. 
Certainly, hermeneutics needed to keep a critical distance, and remain true to its own 
standards of what was “physical, historical, true, false, believable, and unbelievable.”113 
The “immediacy of belief” had been “irremediably lost” through modern criticism,114 
which prevented a return to a “primitive naïveté.”115 However, in its suspicious analysis 
of outdated language, hermeneutics could not forget the original questions posed by 
ancient texts. Ricoeur was also careful to say that this “sympathetic effort”116 was “not 
merely an imaginative effort,” but was a “real projection into another human life.”117 
Ricoeur’s historian, through his imagination, acknowledged that he was “part of the same 
humanity” as the objects of his study.118 The aim was “restoring historical distance” 
between the past event and the modern day, and to “achieve the absolute reality of past 
human experience.”119 The epoch in which the symbol was created needed to be viewed 
from an interior vantage point, by a “kind of imagination, a temporal imagination.”120 
True progress in human thought involved going beyond the facts and putting “feeling and 
                                                          
112 Ricoeur, “Language of Faith,” in The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, 223. 
113 Ricoeur, “Language of Faith,” in The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, 224. 
114 Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, 351. 
115 Ibid.  
116 Ricoeur, History and Truth, 28. Cf. Ricoeur, Histoire Et Vérité, 36: “Un effort de sympathie.” 
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imagination” back into rationality.121 History needed to become “animated by a will for 
encounter as much as by a will for explanation.”122 Among additional caveats, Ricoeur 
cautioned against merely projecting one’s subjectivity, replete with one’s own “beliefs 
and prejudices,” onto the texts being read. The “meaning of the text” could not be 
subjected to the power of the interpreting subject. Instead, the reader of a text must allow 
“the work and the world” of the text to “enlarge” his own horizons of self-
understanding.123  
Ricoeur applied his philosophical views to religious belief, specifically, as they 
related to Christianity. He attempted to make room for religious belief in a modern 
critical world by creating a “conjunction of belief and criticism.”124 He thought that in 
order to have a “better understanding” of humanity, as well as humanity’s “bond” to the 
“being of all beings,” symbolic thought needed to be employed. He sought to get beyond 
the impasse of belief and criticism by a third way, a second naïveté. He made a “wager” 
of “betting on the significance of the symbolic world.”125 A field of philosophical 
opportunities could be provided by a sort of “deduction” of religious symbols, a “means 
of detecting and deciphering human reality.”126 For Ricoeur, the modern exegete needed 
to return to the sacred text at the conclusion of his criticism. He must be “both a believer 
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and an atheist;”127 he must both “surrender” before the text, and “question” it.128 The 
Christian exegete is therefore “not his own master.” He must, as a sort of expression of 
faith, place himself under the “Announcement” of the text. He must allow it to speak to 
him on its own terms; he must allow the text to “seize” him. This approach will allow 
him to distinguish between the “false and true scandal in the heart of the text.”129 
Although a particular cultural milieu in which a Scripture was written might be exposed, 
and the false consciousness regarding its temporal situation smashed, the exegete must 
still “place himself under” the text in order for it to speak to him again. It is only in this 
integration of criticism and belief, a hermeneutical circle of “reinterpretation,” that the 
modern person can genuinely believe the Christian kerygma.130  
 For Ricoeur, each generation should address its concerns with both critical 
assessment of and a listening ear to ancient symbols. One could not allow himself to be 
“caught” in the “cultural trap” of the text of the Bible.131 The cultural terms originally 
used to convey the Christian Gospel, whether rooted in Hellenism or Orientalism, needed 
to be identified and rejected by the modern era. However, the cultural vehicle, not the 
symbol itself, needed to be demolished; the symbols were still speaking, and to throw 
them away meant to discard the opportunity to understand modern humanity. By 
allowing the religious symbols of Christianity to communicate again, new possibilities of 
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understanding were opened. “To demythologize is to dissolve the false scandal in order to 
have the true scandal, the original scandal, revealed to all.”132 The death of the old 
allowed for the birth of the new.  
  Ricoeur briefly referred to the first chapters of Genesis as an illustration of the 
importance of this sort of pre-scientific reflection. Ricoeur acknowledged that the account 
of Creation in Genesis could not be squared with modern scientific understanding of the 
universe. Nonetheless, it could not be dismissed simply because it was pre-scientific. It 
was valuable because it belonged to the domain of human pre-understanding;133 it 
provided the “primordial tissue” of humanity’s first questions of “meaning, of being 
created, lost, and saved.”134 Its “progressive portrayal” of humanity could help modern 
man understand his own existence, whether in relation to the cosmos, or in interpreting 
evil. Modern science provided a scientific explanation, but Genesis provided the original 
theatre of human existence.135 In his return to symbols, the modern exegete was equipped 
with both a demystified critique of the text and an awareness of the need to ask of the text 
the basic questions of human existence. 
Criticism of Ricoeur 
 Certainly, some religious observers criticize Ricoeur’s method. Richard Topping, 
for example, while appreciating Ricoeur’s work, argues that Ricoeur’s method is not 
subjected to the gospel. He accuses Ricoeur of submitting the integrity of the Christian 
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interpretive practice to suspicion “in a rudderless correlation” of the two. In the end, 
Topping argues, the text of Scripture is judged by a norm of suspicion that outranks the 
living Church.136 For Topping, Ricoeur fails to make a convincing case that the prevalent 
suspicion merits such compliance. Michael Pahls, also while noting appreciation for 
Ricoeur’s work, comments that the philosopher leads his readers to engage the text, but 
fails to lead them to engage the person of Christ behind the text. A personal encounter 
with Christ is lacking, according to Pahls.137 From the perspective of this dissertation, it 
would be potentially reckless to categorize thinkers within first and second naiveté 
groupings merely because they lived before or after the Enlightenment. As this 
dissertation’s first chapter demonstrated, multiple authors critically approached the 
Scriptures in medieval and ancient times. People have simultaneously read the Scriptures 
both critically and from a faith perspective since the beginning of Christianity. 
Observable Contours of Post-Critical Analyses 
 Evangelical theologians can benefit from analogs of Polanyi’s and Ricoeur’s post-
critical methods. The value of highlighting Polanyi and Ricoeur was to demonstrate the 
broader possibilities of post-critical thought in the modern age without championing their 
particular views. For both men, criticism needed to be restorative, not reductive. As 
Ricoeur articulated, an interpretation of ancient religious objects needed to respect the 
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original symbol or enigma.138 While criticism and rationality could rightfully demystify 
and demythologize, it could excessively reduce or destroy if left unchecked. The analysis 
of Polanyi and Ricoeur provides three contours with which a post-critical evangelical 
hermeneutic needs to be formed.  
 A survey of Polanyi and Ricoeur helps provide direction for evangelicals who 
wish to progress beyond unnecessary degrees of anti-Catholic rhetoric, and seriously 
desire to engage the theological relationship between ecclesiology and exegesis, Church 
and Bible. Following are three contours evident in Polanyi’s and Ricoeur’s works which, 
analogously, can prove valuable for evangelicals.   
Self Criticism 
 One observable contour within Polanyi’s and Ricoeur’s post-critical work is self-
criticism. In their respective fields, they attempted to critique established structures of 
thought for interpreting data. Both were suspicious of exclusively extrinsic and 
positivistic claims of knowing, which they considered dominant during their generation. 
While appreciating advances gained through recent critical developments, they noticed 
many in their fields were blind to the limitations of the leading epistemological models. 
As a result, Polanyi and Ricoeur argued, many in their fields lacked the vision to move 
the respective bodies of knowledge forward. Further, each author expressed concern over 
potential ramifications, social and otherwise, resulting from such short-sightedness. 
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Openness To New Ways Of Knowing 
Another observable contour within Polanyi’s and Ricoeur’s work is openness to 
new ways of knowing. Polanyi and Ricoeur each sought to expand epistemology within 
their respective fields. While affirming the importance of leading methods of analysis, 
they identified limits to those techniques. In addition, they criticized the apparent lack of 
openness to new methods of knowing among their colleagues.  
Polanyi critiqued exclusively empirical analytical methods when applied to 
complex living systems. He disparaged a dismissal of knowledge gained through living 
experience for knowledge of atomic data which was interpreted in a philosophy of 
determinism. This was because it resulted in incomplete understanding of life, especially 
humanity. At times, it resulted in grave social consequences. Polanyi put forward 
“personal knowledge” as a corrective. Personal knowledge included both empirical 
analysis and examination of tacit knowledge. In Polanyi’s mind, modern science, despite 
its great achievements, had crippled its ability to move forward through neglecting the 
foundational role of tacit knowledge. Genuine progress in science would require a unity 
of objective and subjective awareness.  
On one hand, Ricoeur applauded the modern benefit of a critique of false 
consciousness in the appropriation of religious and social symbols, a standard established 
by Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche. It proved helpful at unmasking hidden motivations 
behind the common use of ancient symbols. On the other hand, Ricoeur argued that the 
identification of false consciousness was insufficient in itself. In spite of his recognition 
of benefit in such critique, Ricoeur asserted that it was excessively extrinsic. Modern 
critics of ancient symbols needed to go further than they were willing and attempt to 
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understand the profound relation between the symbol and human consciousness. Ricoeur 
called for reassessment of previously dismissed symbols in order to rediscover their value 
for the modern world. The modern critic needed to get beyond his extrinsic criticism and 
seek to restore meaning to what he previously critiqued. In order to accomplish a 
beneficial “second naiveté,” the critic needed to sympathetically approach the symbol.  
 Continuity 
A third observable contour within Polanyi’s and Ricoeur’s post-critical efforts is 
continuity. For Polanyi, “superior knowledge” within scientific communities was marked 
by mutual respect and acceptance of scientists with diverse methods.139 This respect 
needed to traverse generations.140 Superior knowledge included regard for one’s 
“intellectual ancestry;” esteem was due for the total of what a culture’s classics had 
uttered and its great people had done.141 Lack of regard for continuity in the scientific 
community demonstrated a misunderstanding of the nature of scientific knowledge and 
resulted in the loss of credible models of understanding. While rejecting pre-critical 
mythical interpretations of the physical world, Polanyi’s scientist nonetheless needed to 
                                                          
139 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 374–375. 
140 Polanyi’s emphasis on continuity does not imply an unwillingness to toss away incorrect paradigms for 
new, more accurate models. Paradigm shifts (a term Thomas Kuhn popularized) are part of scientific 
discovery. As a scientist, Polanyi wasn’t tied to the past. However, here he is resisting unwarranted 
removal of credit-worthy “tacit” ways of knowing by strict determinists.  
141 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 375–376. In this author’s view, Braaten advocates a negative, and 
unnecessary, path of paradigmatic shift in ecclesiology. Citing Kuhn, Braaten suggests that necessary 
paradigmatic shifts “comes about over a lot of dead bodies.” Unlike Polanyi, Braaten sees the need for 
modern ecclesiology to severe its connections with “old” paradigms of “hierarchical relations. Braaten, 
Mother Church, 70–71, 83. To this author, Braaten misses a golden opportunity to express the possibility of 
continuity in Christian paradigmatic shifts.  
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remember the pre-scientific basis of all science. Plants, for example, were not discovered 
initially by a botanist,142 nor were stars viewed first by an astronomer.   
Ricoeur’s attempt to advance beyond critique of false consciousness included a 
return to ancient symbols. For Ricoeur, the ancient naiveté should not be restored, but the 
same symbols ought to be revisited. Symbols could be positively utilized to communicate 
a recollection of meaning to the contemporary world. However, severe critique had 
muted them, and confined them with permanent, fixed meaning. For Ricoeur, a 
phenomenology of the sacred required a degree of continuity. 
Summary 
A review of Polanyi and Ricoeur helps provide possible contours for a post-
critical reassessment of evangelical exegesis. Positive and beneficial attempts have been 
made recently by evangelicals to renew their movement. Some of these are listed below. 
However, without consciously shaping their efforts within the contours of self-criticism, 
openness to new ways of knowing, which are not really new, and continuity, the long-
term effectiveness of these efforts is questionable. As Ricoeur said in a different context, 
the positive goal must be to “return to the sacred text at the conclusion” of “criticism.”143  
Renewing Evangelicalism 
Various attempts have recently been made by evangelicals to refurbish their 
hermeneutics, and move past some of the historical problems with the movement’s 
exegesis of Scripture. Some efforts exhibit budding ecclesiologies, and are moving in 
                                                          
142 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 139.  
143 Ricoeur, “The Critique of Religion,” in The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, 222.  
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directions similar to this dissertation.144 Other attempts appear to prolong the neglect of 
ecclesiology, and move in the direction of repristination, or maintenance of what was 
considered originally correct in Protestantism. Others don’t seem to care.  
Following are select illustrations of attempts by evangelicals to improve the 
quality of biblical interpretation in the modern world. The categorization of Biblical 
Literalism, Protestant Ressourcement, and Communal Hermeneutic is intended to provide 
basic reference points; they are not neat, mutually exclusive descriptors. Legitimate 
argument can be made to increase the number of categories, or create hybrid markers. 
Further, certain of the authors represented are prolific; some of their views have naturally 
progressed over time. It is not the intention of this work to pigeon-hole any author into an 
inescapable mold. The purpose of presenting a review of these various works is to 
demonstrate active, broad movements within evangelical theology.  
Biblical Literalism 
 A large number of evangelicals have sought to bring renewal, or at least maintain 
stability, by restating the importance of the literal text of Scripture. However, their 
emphasis on the text as they read it has prevented them from critiquing themselves very 
deeply. Most evangelicals145 consider the literal text of Scripture as divinely inspired. 
However, Biblicists emphasize inspiration of the literal text to such a degree that the 
                                                          
144 Cf. Charles W. Colson and Richard John. Neuhaus, Your Word Is Truth: A Project of Evangelicals and 
Catholics Together (Grand Rapids, MI: W. B.  Eerdmans, 2002). The direction of Evangelicals and 
Catholics Together was a start at serious dialogue, but much more needs to be accomplished for Christ’s 
prayer (John 17:20–21) to be realized. Only few evangelical works seriously analyze Catholic thought, 
rather than talk past it. 
145 Including this author. 
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necessary ecclesial environment of the text is forgotten.146 In addition, Biblicists often 
limit revelation to extrinsic propositions. 
Fundamentalism 
Fundamentalism,147 as an American phenomenon,148 increasingly grew beyond 
the Presbyterian split, appealing to those in all denominations who desired to hold onto 
the traditional faith in the face of modernity. The movement became increasingly 
sectarian after the battles over the Bible during the 1920s, and has consistently placed the 
inerrancy of the biblical text as the first affirmation in their lists of doctrinal confessions. 
Some fundamentalists essentially went underground for decades, removed themselves 
from fellowship with other Christian communities, and shielded themselves from 
“general changes in American life.” One of the perennial features of fundamentalism was 
a common “anti-intellectualism.”149 One author likened the legacy of the movement to 
severe treatment for a cancer patient. Fundamentalists selected a harsh remedy for what 
                                                          
146 There are many forms of literalism which will not be distinguished at length in this work. The object at 
this point is to identify the hermeneutical focus which is primarily, sometimes exclusively, on the text of 
Scripture as it plainly reads. Briefly, some literalists employ more ecclesiology or Tradition than others, 
and some differ on the meaning and extent of inspiration of the sacred text. For example, cf. Geisler’s 
presentation and critique of multiple evangelical scholars who hold distinct views of inspiration and 
inerrancy. In the book, Geisler devotes eight entire chapters to critiquing other evangelical views than his 
own. Norman L. Geisler and William C. Roach, Defending Inerrancy: Affirming the Accuracy of Scripture 
for a New Generation (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2011). 
147 Fundamentalists are viewed together with evangelicals in this work due to their common historical roots, 
and their current appreciation for the plain text of Scripture. It is understood that the two broad movements 
are currently distinct from each other at several key points and can justifiably be placed in separate 
categories in other studies. Fundamentalists generally do not view themselves as evangelicals. Evangelical 
Donald A Carson considers Fundamentalists as evangelicals, despite their separatist habits, due to their 
allegiance to the “evangel.” Donald A. Carson, “Evangelicals, Ecumenism, and the Church,” in Evangelical 
Affirmations, ed. Kenneth S. Kantzer and Carl F. H. Henry, (Grand Rapids, MI: Academic Books, 1990), 
352.  
148 Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture, 221.  
149 Noll, Scandal, 114–115. 
385 
they considered the drastic disease of modernism. They survived the treatment, but were 
“horribly disfigured” by the cure.150  
After the embarrassing Scopes Trial and the breakup of Princeton Seminary, 
fundamentalism faded from “reputed centers of American life.”151 The movement’s 
attention turned away from denominational boards or schools of higher learning, and 
focused on the development of local pastors and independent congregations. Very many 
ministry organizations were formed, including radio stations, mission agencies, and Bible 
colleges; seminaries such as Dallas Theological Seminary152 and Bob Jones University, 
were formed during this time. The movement increased its numbers among “ordinary 
people” and took three basic forms. First, some individual fundamentalists remained in 
larger mixed denominations that likewise welcomed more liberal thinkers. Second, 
fundamentalist tendencies grew rapidly in non-traditional Christian societies, such as 
Pentecostal and Holiness movements. Third, the more extreme fundamentalists separated 
and created independent denominations.153 Since the 1960s, only the latter of the three 
forms of the movement continued to wear the badge “Fundamentalist.”154 Today, this 
third group is still marked by their separatist tendencies.155 The other two groupings have 
                                                          
150 Noll, Scandal, 145. 
151 Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture, 193. 
152 The mention of Dallas or other schools is historical. It is not necessarily suggesting that those schools 
have fully remained in their original molds. 
153 Including Chicago’s own Independent Fundamentalist Churches of America (IFCA), founded following 
the onset of the Great Depression in 1929. The group consists of roughly 1,000 congregations in America 
and nearly 3,000 additional congregations in 26 other countries. Cf. their website at http://www.ifca.org/.  
154 Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture, 194–195. 
155 Cf., for example, the ninth affirmation of the IFCA’s Articles of Biblical Faith is simply entitled 
“Separation.” In 2:B of their Statement of Faith, they warn against any “effort to promote the Gospel by 
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consistently attempted to reenter society in a more culturally respectable manner, often 
accepting the title “Evangelical.” Since the 1940s, scholarly attempts have been made by 
evangelicals to reverse the separatist tendencies of fundamentalism while retaining the 
integrity of traditional confession of biblical faith. These movements are varied in their 
emphases, but all seem to recognize the intellectual and social problems of sectarianism. 
One such movement is Neo-Evangelicalism.156 
Neo-Evangelicalism 
 Harold Ockenga (1905–1985) played a pivotal role in the attempt to reunite the 
estranged parties involved in the 1929 Princeton split and revive Princeton theology for a 
new generation. Ockenga enrolled at Princeton in 1927, but left with Machen for 
Westminster during the 1929 split. Throughout his life, Ockenga was instrumental in the 
founding of Fuller Seminary, Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary, The National 
Association of Evangelicals, and the influential magazine Christianity Today. Ockenga 
sympathized with the fundamentalists’ positions regarding the historicity and authority of 
Scripture, the miraculous life of Christ, and other orthodox doctrines. However, he was 
opposed to their separatist tendencies. Ockenga labored for a “new era of Christian 
influence and effectiveness.” He considered a “new evangelical” one who, “while 
believing in Traditional orthodoxy, also valued scholarship and took an active concern 
                                                          
bringing fundamentalists into an unequal yoke with theological liberals and/or Roman Catholics and other 
divergent groups.” Cf. their website at http://www.ifca.org/. 
156 The IFCA also condemns Neo-Evangelicals, and claims they are “characterized by an attempt to 
accommodate biblical Christianity and make it acceptable to the modern mind.” Cf. 2:D in their Statement 
of Faith. Website: http://www.ifca.org/. 
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for society.”157 After decades of sectarianism, many agreed with Ockenga that “the 
intellectualist boundaries of fundamentalism were too narrow.” Ockenga and others 
formed allegiances and sought to intellectually engage modern science and critical 
research, while maintaining orthodox doctrinal standards.  
 It is noteworthy for this dissertation that Ockenga and Neo-Evangelicals sought 
renewal without a robust ecclesiology; his view of a non-authoritative Church reinforced 
his high view of Scripture, which made him consistent with his predecessors at Princeton. 
For Ockenga, the Church was comprised of those born of the Spirit, spiritually-quickened 
individuals united to Jesus Christ. The Church receives its purity from its adherence to 
the Bible. Apostolic succession refers to doctrine, not a historically continuous 
episcopate. The Spirit, who anointed the first apostles, imparts apostolicity to the Church. 
Neo-Evangelicalism is trans-denominational by nature; it intentionally has no central 
institution or denomination. Its members cohere by doctrinal affirmation, which is 
directly drawn from Scripture.158  
Ockenga and the new evangelicals sought to deal with supposed inconsistencies 
in the biblical text more effectively than their fundamentalist predecessors through 
emphasizing scholarly methods of grammatical and historical research practiced in the 
academy. Ockenga’s efforts were seen in his attempts to openly engage evolution, higher 
criticism, and various aspects of liberal theology. He did not want to shun modernity 
while holding to a literalist hermeneutic.   
                                                          
157 Mark A. Noll, Between Faith and Criticism: Evangelicals, Scholarship, and the Bible in America (San 
Francisco: Harper & Row, 1986), 94.  
158 For a brief overview of some of Ockenga’s doctrinal views, cf. Harold J. Ockenga, “Our Evangelical 
Faith.” The Evangelical Christian Library. http://www.ccel.us/faith.html#IT. 
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The creation of Fuller Seminary in Pasedena, California in 1947 occurred as a 
result of the new evangelicalism. In time,159 however, some of these new evangelicals 
caused a “civil war.”160 The doctrine of inerrancy in its popular form had been inherited 
from Princeton and was the core of conservative theology. Yet, some at Fuller began 
challenging the doctrine and reopening discussion on biblical inspiration. During the 
ongoing debates, the Bible was kept as the locus of divine revelation, but consensus was 
not achieved on what that meant. Subsequently, it was determined that some issues were 
tangential, not germane, such as the form of biblical inspiration and the meaning of 
inerrancy were not worth ecclesial separation. After the immediate conflict, most sides 
within the debates over new evangelicalism attempted to maintain a high view of 
Scripture while emphasizing the need for personal faith. However, the term “inerrant” 
was frequently replaced with the less complicated “inspired,”161 a move still bemoaned 
by some.162 The Scripture remained the Christian’s one and only authoritative standard; 
human intellect, feelings, or organized Churches needed to be subject to the Bible.  
Biblicists, both evangelical and Neo-Evangelicals, frequently emphasize the 
extrinsic nature of revelation. The “gospel” is generally something “proclaimed,” an 
external idea in which people believe and place “confidence.”163 The “material principle” 
                                                          
159 The controversy over inerrancy especially arose after Okenga’s tenure at Fuller ended. Ockenga served 
as President 1947–1954, then 1960–1963. Cf. the school’s website: www.fuller.edu. 
160 George M. Marsden, Reforming Fundamentalism: Fuller Seminary and the New Evangelicalism (Grand 
Rapids, MI: W. B.  Eerdmans, 1987), 279.  
161 Marsden, Reforming Fundamentalism, 279. 
162 Cf. Carson, “Evangelicals, Ecumenism, and the Church,” in Evangelical Affirmations, eds. Kenneth S. 
Kantzer and Carl F. H.  Henry, 351. Also available at http://www.ccel.us/EV.ch9.html.  
163 Carson, “Evangelicals, Ecumenism, and the Church,” 348. 
389 
of the gospel is a message that is “understood,”164 while the “formal principle is the 
“truth, authority, and finality of the Bible,”165 the “authority of Scripture.”166 The 
message of “justification by faith alone” is the kerygmatic center of our proclamation and 
common witness;”167 the “biblical doctrine of justification” is the “center of the visible 
Church.”168 The center of the literalists’ faith is an idea that is outside of them. In the 
Bible alone, some argue, God’s most important truths are conveyed in “clarity”169 
through “propositional statements.”170 God “used language as a means of revelation,”171 
making the text of the Bible the material foundation of faith. For many with this 
emphasis, Scripture should primarily be interpreted “according to its literal, or normal, 
sense”172 by “grammatico-historical exegesis.”173 Biblical truth therefore becomes “both 
                                                          
164 Carson, “Evangelicals, Ecumenism, and the Church,” 349. 
165 Ibid. 
166 Carson, “Evangelicals, Ecumenism, and the Church,” 372. 
167 Timothy George, “Toward an Evangelical Ecclesiology,” in Catholics and Evangelicals: Do They Share 
a Common Future? ed. Thomas P. Rausch, 130. 
168 George, “Toward an Evangelical Ecclesiology,” in Catholics and Evangelicals, 131. 
169 ICBI 2:23. The Council was formed in 1978 as the “largest, broadest, group of evangelical protestant 
scholars that ever came together to create a common, theological document in the 20th century.” The 
Council disbanded in 1988 after successfully creating three major works: The Chicago Statement on 
Biblical Inerrancy (ICBI 1, 1978); The Chicago Statement on Biblical Hermeneutics (ICBI 2, 1982); The 
Chicago Statement on Biblical Application (ICBI 3, 1986). Although the ICBI does not speak the opinions 
of all evangelicals, they represent a theological core of convictions well known and influential within most 
evangelical circles. Cf. Jay Grimstead, “How the International Council on Biblical Inerrancy Began,” 
Coalition on Revival, section goes here, http://www.reformation.net/Pages/ICBI_Background.htm. 
170 ICBI 2:6.  
171 ICBI 1:4.  
172 ICBI 2:15.  
173 ICBI 1:18.  
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objective and absolute;”174 the meaning of each passage is “single, definite, and 
fixed,”175and can be sufficiently ascertained through inductive methods. 
Other literalists are less interested in objective historical and grammatical 
analyses of the text of Scripture, and place emphasis on personal, private interpretation. A 
fresh word from God privately illumines the meaning of a biblical text and often provides 
immediate, personal application. In this approach to Scripture, one’s personal, private 
communication with God is stressed. Most of these approaches are distantly connected 
with the Holiness movement, and presently manifest themselves in revivalist, 
charismatic, or positive confession contexts. A primary indictment is that these groups 
merely use Scripture as a springboard to get at their inner selves.176  
Summary 
 Viewed positively, biblical literalism keeps the Scriptures as a standard of divine 
revelation. In their conviction that the Scriptures are “perfect,”177 Biblicists exhibit 
consistency with historic Christianity’s emphasis that the Bible is the written Word of 
God. However, the ability to posit an inspired text is weakened when the same 
evangelical theologians neglect ecclesiology. Hermeneutical methods become hazardous 
                                                          
174 ICBI 2:6.  
175 ICBI 2:7.  
176 This work will not analyze this approach in depth, but mentions it for the sake of future study. Some of 
the work associated with “word and faith” charismatics or John Wimber and the Vineyard Church 
emphasize personal, private illumination of sacred texts. It is not denied here that God can choose to 
communicate privately to individuals. Instead, the danger of this approach is when people seek private, 
personal guiding “words” to direct the minutiae of their lives. An excessive reliance on private illumination 
conflicts with the idea that Christ has given teachers to guide his people. For an evangelical critique of this 
movement, cf. D. R. McConnell, A Different Gospel: Biblical and Historical Insights into the Word of 
Faith Movement (Peabody, MA: Hendrikson, 1995). 
177 Psalms 19:7. 
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when they exclusively focus on extrinsic texts which presume to exist outside of a living, 
authoritative Church. Despite the positive fact that Scripture is highly regarded in such an 
approach, this view often neglects biblical passages which speak of the Church. Its high 
stress on biblical authority misses the fundamental role of Churchly faith in biblical 
interpretation. It unwittingly risks making the Church superfluous. Such exclusivity 
contradicts the very spirit of the biblical text and diminishes a supernatural element of 
Christian faith. On one hand, biblical statements are indeed plain and easily readable, and 
history and grammar are vital to interpreting holy Writ well. It is positive to affirm that 
“the Person and work of Jesus Christ are the central focus of the entire Bible.”178 On the 
other hand, it is unclear how such a Christocentric claim for the entire text of the Bible 
can be made without a teaching Church. Can inductive study alone accomplish such a 
conclusion? 179 Can there even be a New Testament without a teaching apostolic ministry 
providing an authoritative, allegorical faith-reading of the Old?180 Only a few 
evangelicals might support an exclusively inductive approach to Scripture. However, 
masses are stuck in that indefensible position because they will not acknowledge 
confidence in pneumatically181 placed “teachers”182 to explain the Scriptures. 
                                                          
178 ICBI 2:3. Also, cf. John 5:39 and Luke 24:27. 
179 Cf. 2 Peter 3:16. 
180 As mentioned in chapter one of this work, cf. Matthew 2:15’s reading of Hosea 11:1, “Out of Egypt 
have I called my Son,” as fulfilled in the infancy of Jesus. Purely inductive analysis of the passage in Hosea 
could not come to Matthew’s conclusion. Or, consider the multiple uses of apparently disparate Old 
Testament texts brought together into a single Christian focus in Hebrews 1. Ultimately, a Christocentric 
lens provided by an apostolic believing community is needed to make such interpretations. Faith in a living 
and present Christ is required to “hear” the Scriptures correctly.  
181 1 Corinthians 12:4–11. 
182 Ephesians 4:11. 
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As an example of such asymmetrical exegetical method, Norman Geisler cites 
several passages from Church Fathers which support his idea of biblical infallibility, but 
he ignores the ecclesiastical context from which those authors spoke. He extracts multiple 
Patristic statements, but neglects what many of the speakers, including oft-despised 
Origen, taught about the regula fidei.183 Such oversight is also evident in the three 
Chicago Statements on inerrancy, hermeneutics, and biblical application.184 On one hand, 
Christ “established his Church on earth and rules it by his Word and Spirit;” the same 
Holy Spirit who “bears witness”185 to the Scriptures also empowers “faithfulness in 
confession” within the Church.186 However, this Church is apparently not to be trusted. In 
a protective posture, the modern exegete must not allow “Church creed, councils, or 
declarations” to exercise too much sway in his thinking.187 Although the Holy Spirit 
“enables believers to appropriate and apply the Scriptures,”188 such elucidation is 
seemingly reserved for private moments; while the individual can read Scripture well, the 
corporate Body appears incapable. The individual is expected to trust, without misgiving, 
an inspired book written by flawed people, but then exercise suspicion towards the 
company of people whom the same Bible says was organized by the identical Spirit. The 
                                                          
183 Norman L. Geisler, Systematic Theology, vol. 1 (Minneapolis, MN: Bethany House, 2002), 282–284. 
Geisler’s negligence is consistent with his teaching that the Church is universally invisible, and only visible 
on a local level. Norman L. Geisler, Systematic Theology, vol. 4 (Minneapolis, MN: Bethany House, 2005), 
18, 51.  
184 ICBI 1, 2, and 3.  
185 ICBI 1:17.  
186 ICBI 3:3.  
187 ICBI 1:2.  
188 ICBI 2:5.  
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call here is to give greater attention to seeing the Bible and the Church in their unity; it is 
not intended to give a particular ecclesial body hegemonic authority over Scripture. 
The over-emphasis on the “message” of the gospel risks neglecting the Person of 
Christ present in his Church. The gospel is a person to be engaged, not simply an idea to 
be believed; the kerygma is the real Jesus, not just an understanding about him. He is 
living and present in his people; the Church is where he, the gospel itself, is found. By 
stressing the extrinsic quality of revelation, Biblicists, similar to Catholic manualists, risk 
losing perspective of the intrinsic aspect of human faith and knowing. The personal 
nature of revelation is forgotten, resulting in an impersonal, and private, exegesis. 
Biblicism has frequently led to treatment of the Bible as if it were naked; it has 
resulted in multiple manipulations and engendered a hermeneutical separation between 
faith and exegesis. When left to itself, this approach fails to bring consensus on biblical 
interpretation,189 and not uncommonly increases discord among evangelicals. Amazingly, 
Geisler claims190 that evangelicalism exhibits more unity than Catholicism because of its 
across-the-board sole reliance on Scripture. Further, without admitting the failings of 
exclusive reliance on the text itself, Carson nonetheless expresses hope that 
evangelicalism can “understand itself” and “resist fragmentation.”191 However, neither 
                                                          
189 Cf. Geisler, Systematic Theology, vol. 4, 92. Geisler admits a noteworthy point regarding perspicuity. He 
concedes that some truths in Scripture are difficult to understand and challenging to interpret; although the 
entire text is perspicuous, only the central teachings of the faith are clear. However, Geisler fails to 
satisfactorily demonstrate how one can determine what is central. Without a universal Church, how can an 
individual decide which passage is plainest and which is difficult? When a conflict arises, how is the best 
reading determined? Cf. 2 Peter 3:16 and Ephesians 4:11.  
190 Geisler, Systematic Theology, vol. 4, 92–93. Geisler’s claim is especially odd considering he has 
personally been, for decades, at the head of the charge to oust other evangelical scholars from academic 
fellowships and employment posts due to their nuanced doctrinal differences with him. 
191 Carson, “Evangelicals, Ecumenism, and the Church,” 381.  
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theologian supports his overly-optimistic statement, nor thoroughly deals with historic 
fragmentation among those who claimed sole reliance on a putatively perspicuous text.  
From the perspective of this dissertation, one danger of contemporary Biblicism is 
its lack of self-criticism. For example, Donald Carson defensively explains that one valid 
reason evangelicals do not develop robust ecclesiology is that “most organizations or 
societies that focus inordinate attention on their own intrinsic nature and internal structure 
are contaminated with too much introversion and are already sporting signs of decay and 
death.”192 Timothy George acknowledges the need for evangelicals to respond to the 
modern challenge to “set forth a clear, compelling ecclesiology in the light of new 
conversations and developing relations with their Roman Catholic brothers and 
sisters.”193 However, George, drawing on Carson, partially defends the lack of interest in 
ecclesiology among evangelicals due to the report that those movements which have 
traditionally engaged in such “navel-gazing” concurrently exhibit “spiritual 
decadence.”194 George lists three common objections from evangelical scholars 
explaining why evangelicalism has yet to develop a rigorous ecclesiology.195 First, they 
have been preoccupied with other “theological themes,” such as “biblical revelation, 
religious epistemology, and apologetics.”196 Second, evangelicals have been “committed” 
                                                          
192 Carson, “Evangelicals, Ecumenism, and the Church,” 354.  
193 George, “Toward an Evangelical Ecclesiology,” 122–123.  
194 George,” Toward an Evangelical Ecclesiology,” in Catholics and Evangelicals, 123–124. George’s 
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to “evangelism, missions, and Church planting;” therefore, “reflective ecclesiology” has 
not been a priority. Third, evangelicalism is considered too diverse to develop “one 
single, or central, evangelical ecclesiology.”197 For George, the universal Church is a 
“heavenly and eschatological reality, not an earthly institution to be governed and 
grasped by mere mortals.”198 It is visible in “the elect of all the ages,”199 and as early 
Reformers said, it can be seen in “local visible congregations”200 where the Word, the 
gospel of justification by faith in particular,201 is rightly preached.202 “The invisible or 
universal Church emerges into visibility in the form of local congregations gathered 
around the faithful preaching of the Word of God.”203 Those who believe, whether 
Catholic or otherwise, are joined together by their faith. George cautions against speaking 
of the Church as a “continuation of the Incarnation” because of the potential of idolatry; 
Christians must avoid the temptation to put the Church in the place of God.204 In regards 
to biblical interpretation, George argues that Scripture should not be interpreted in a 
vacuum; sola scriptura should not equal nuda scriptura.205 For George, the Scripture 
must be the “divine touchstone” to which all “teachings, interpretations, and Traditions of 
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the Church” must be subjected.206 However, the contemporary exegete cannot “ignore the 
rich exegetical Tradition of the early Christian writers whose wisdom and insight is 
vastly superior to the latest word from today’s guilded scholars.”207  
Both Carson and George are insufficiently self-critical. It is helpful that George 
calls for ecclesial reflection. In doing this, he distinguishes himself from most 
contemporary evangelicals. However, his uncritical use of Reformation ecclesiology does 
not advance the conversation too much. Both he and Carson merely repeat long-standing 
convictions; the result is they speak over their “brothers and sisters” in the Catholic 
Church and in other confessing Christian groups. George, Carson, and other literalists 
need to go further to consider their own shortcomings. Their insights are needed, but they 
must unpack their operative assumptions about revelation, ecclesiology, exegesis, and the 
Catholic Church. While affirming the integrity of Scripture, Biblicists need to be open to 
new ways of knowing, which are actually not new. Otherwise, the claim “this is the time 
for evangelicalism to understand itself, to resist fragmentation, to return to basics”208 is 
utopian. 
Evangelical Ressourcement 
 The internal polemics over the Bible have exhausted many within evangelicalism, 
and the dead end reality of liberal activism is no less attractive. Consequently, other 
evangelicals have recently sought to revitalize the movement by retrieving theological, 
exegetical, historical, and spiritual resources from pre-Reformation Christianity. They 
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have acknowledged the bankrupt state of the evangelical mind in America,209 and traced 
part of the cause to an unnecessary dismissal of Tradition which leads to sole reliance on 
a naked biblical text. They fear that very “little of the Church’s future is being informed 
by the Christian past.” “Amnesia” has set in; not only do evangelicals forget their “loved 
ones and friends,” but they are unable to summon their own identity.210  
Thomas Oden 
While still building the Christian faith on the Bible, Thomas Oden, the General 
Editor of Intervarsity Press’s Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture series, seeks to 
retrieve classic Christian documents as a method of renewal. He blames the lack of 
“consensuality” between Christian generations on modern theological chauvinism.211 
Oden claims that a negative characteristic of modern theologians is the diminution of pre-
modern resources. In addition, quality materials from the past, when used, are essentially 
re-translated into contemporary vernacular.212 Oden represents a larger movement within 
evangelicalism which seeks to give ancient Christianity a voice in the modern world by 
retrieving pre-Reformation literature. Oden’s strategies for Protestant resourcing of 
Tradition are to largely bypass modernity and medieval Christianity, and directly recover 
Patristic sources; the texts of “classic Christian teaching” which need to be retrieved were 
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primarily formed in the first five centuries of the “common era.”213 In calling for a rebirth 
of orthodoxy, he lays great emphasis on a textual retrieval.214 Specifically, literary texts, 
methods, and documented pastoral wisdom need to be retrieved in order to satisfy the 
“hunger for roots,” which remains an “unrelieved tragedy” in the modern “worshipping 
community.”215 Oden claims that “Judaism and Christianity both ground themselves in 
biblical history”216 which means that “both Jews and Christians are people of the book, 
students of holy writ.” Therefore, “classic Christianity is most reliably defined by the 
New Testament itself.”217 “For Jews this means rabbinic and midrashic teaching; for 
Christians it means the doctrine taught during the period of ancient ecumenical 
Christianity.”218  
Oden calls for a distinct “new ecumenism.” He contrasts his ecumenism with 
what he considers the failed ecumenism of the twentieth century. Oden claims his 
ecumenism is grounded in the ancient, and is not suspicious of the past; it is critical of 
failed modern ideas while not allowing itself to be uncritically accommodating to 
modernity; it is oriented towards classic Christianity and ecumenical councils, not 
towards the Enlightenment; it claims to be realistic, not utopian.219  
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To this reader, Oden represents a welcomed wake-up call to examine pre-
Reformation Christianity. However, his emphasis on textual retrieval seems to exclude 
the ecclesial context in which his chosen documents were authored. In several ways, 
Oden’s resourcing of ancient Tradition could risk pristine retrieval.220 By referring to 
Christians as people of the book, Oden seems to restrict revelation to the text of the Bible. 
He appears to think a simple restating of the words of the Fathers is sufficient to renew 
Christianity. He does not mention the need to return to the main trunk of the living 
mystery of Christian faith present in a living Church. Oden calls for a “new ecumenism,” 
where contemporary Christians rediscover their unity with “ancient and contemporary 
believers.”221 However, his “unity” is primarily comprised of an invisible “personal 
trust.” It places little value on a structured, historic body of believers. In addition, Oden 
risks not engaging modernity. Disgusted with particular dead ends of the modern world, 
he often appears to leap over recent history and the middle ages to the ancient Church. To 
this reader, Oden demonstrates a need for more robust ecclesiology, where an ongoing 
living voice of Christ is heard. For Oden, the Fathers had superior voices because they 
spoke the consensual convictions of all Christians everywhere. However, he does not 
seem to consider that those voices were superior because they fulfilled sacramental roles 
as teachers. He criticizes modern theologians for borrowing ideas from the modern world, 
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but does not seem troubled that Patristic authors, whom he cites, borrowed from their 
modern world. 
Daniel Williams 
Baker Academic recently published a series of books entitled Evangelical 
Ressourcement. One of the leading contributors, Daniel H. Williams, makes the argument 
that Patristics again need to be part of the Protestant identity.  
Williams’ work is largely corrective, and several of his criticisms of modern 
evangelicalism resonate with this thesis; he demonstrates the far distance evangelicalism 
needs to travel. Williams does not seek an “overthrow of Protestant identity,” or simple 
“ecumenism.” Neither does he think that the Bible alone will address the maladies of 
modern evangelicalism. Instead, he argues that too much has been thrown away in the 
name of Reformation; modern evangelicals are inconsistent with the Reformers in that 
they have cut themselves off from Traditional Patristic sources.222 He argues that 
appropriation of Patristic sources can renew evangelical vitality. He hopes evangelical 
Ressourcement will help “correct the excesses”223 of unbridled Protestantism. One of the 
“excesses” Williams addresses is “rampant individualism” in biblical reading. To him, 
the Bible is too often seen as the believer’s Bible, not the Church’s Bible. He argues that 
the early Reformers did not imagine reading the Scripture outside of the Church or 
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interpreting Scripture without Tradition as an authoritative guide.224 The Bible “will fall 
prey to faulty interpretations” if it “functions in isolation.”225  
Using Church Fathers, such as Tertullian and Irenaeus, Williams argues that the 
ideal structure of authority in the interpretation of Scripture was found in a symbiotic 
relationship between Scripture, Tradition, and the living Church. These three realities 
inherently complemented each other, and afforded the necessary matrix to concretely 
locate truth.226 Williams seeks to stress the catholicity of the Christian faith without 
diluting evangelical distinctions.227 Evangelical paranoia over the mention of Tradition, 
as if it were foreign to inspired Scripture, needs to be amended. It is a false dichotomy 
because the two cannot be separated.228  
For Williams, Tradition needs to be distinguished from traditions. The Apostolic 
Tradition involved a basic understanding of God and salvation in Jesus Christ. These 
central tenets were distinguishable from peripheral customs of local communities, such as 
found in Tertullian’s triple immersion.229 In the early centuries of the Church, the rule of 
faith was not seen as something extrinsic and added to the faith. Instead, it was an 
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expression of the very life of the Church and the contents of Scripture.230 Tradition is the 
Church’s communal memory and it governs Christian understanding as an authoritative 
guide. “As such, the Tradition is the various incarnations of the Christian faith.”231  
For Williams, Tradition is complex, but not confined to a system; it is a vision 
and life, not a static method. As such, it is subject to “emendation;”232 it is necessarily 
articulated more clearly over the span of generations. Church Tradition furnished 
building blocks that later generations, including the Reformation, necessarily drew upon. 
Tradition is older than any denomination; therefore, it is the fundamental source of the 
interpretation of holy Writ.233 It is only when Scripture is read through the lens of 
Tradition that a spiritual interpretation of the text is possible.234 The Bible must be read in 
light of “the consensus of the Fathers” if modern theology hopes to “accurately” 
represent the message of Scripture.  
For Williams, contemporary evangelicals err when they set Church Tradition 
against Scripture because the two have always been “comprehended in reciprocal 
terms.”235 The principle of sola scriptura was never intended to be nuda scriptura.236 
Williams, claiming to follow John Wesley, interprets sola to mean “primarily,” not 
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“exclusively.”237 “Anyone” can figure out the literal or historic meaning of the text, but 
the full purport of Scripture is only gained through the body of Tradition.238 For 
Williams, the Church was the framework within which the symbiotic relationship 
between Scripture and Tradition occurred. For Irenaeus, apostolicity referred to the 
historical lineage of current bishops; they were able to trace their lineage back to the 
apostles. Irenaeus would never have settled for a “spiritual-only” succession of bishops 
because that would fall into his enemies’ traps. It was the Gnostics who stressed mere 
“spiritual transmission of truth.”239 For Williams, the true Church has handed Scripture 
and Tradition down to the present generation. The Church, therefore, must be more than 
the judge between right and wrong thinking. It is also the provider, and therefore, 
guardian, of those truths.240  
Williams and other Protestant Ressourcement theologians helpfully introduce 
their readers to Patristic sources. By doing this, they provide access to a degree of 
evangelical renewal. However, they do not seem to highlight the name of the living 
librarian of those resources. How can Protestants meaningfully utilize Patristic resources 
without theologically facing the living Catholic Church, in whose life stream those texts 
were written? Can a Protestant grasp the spirit of Patristic texts and creeds without 
sympathetically reading them from within a Catholic setting? 
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Reformed Catholicity 
Several attempts have been made recently to stimulate evangelical renewal by 
incorporating ecclesiology into Reformed theology.241 Sometimes termed “Reformed 
Catholicity,” many of these efforts are motivated by an apparent desire to affirm 
traditional dogmatic confessions, perform their work with astute scholarship, and 
genuinely retrieve deep resources within Calvin and other early Reformed authors. Some, 
such as Littlejohn, have focused on retrieving Mercersburg’s Reformed theologians. 
However, many of these retrievals stop short of where they need to go. As mentioned in 
the opening of this dissertation, this author’s growing concern is that some evangelicals 
are satisfied with “reformed and evangelical retrieval,”242 a “creative unfolding of the 
Reformed tradition,”243 or a ruled reading of “Holy Scripture on the basis of Reformed 
theological and ecclesiological principles.”244 The problem is these curative attempts 
somewhat misdiagnose the problem. Any effort at Protestant, Reformed, or evangelical 
Ressourcement will be flawed from the beginning. This is because the theologian’s effort 
to return Scripture to its ecclesial Sitz im Leben necessarily includes critical empathy for 
the living Catholic Church. The historical and theological significance of the Catholic 
Church for biblical exegesis is too important to ignore. Similarly, recent attempts to 
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retrieve creeds245 and other ancient Christian traditions are admirable, but also fall short. 
They retrieve documents, but walk past the living librarian of those creeds and traditions. 
While maintaining critical distance, the evangelical theologian must attempt, as much as 
is possible, to understand the relation between Church and Bible from inside a Catholic 
perspective.  
Summary 
 In some ways, this dissertation can be classified as an attempt at Evangelical 
Ressourcement. The combination of scholarly efforts and traditional dogmatic confession 
within works of Evangelical Ressourcement resonates with some of the concerns of this 
author. However, the lack of critical empathy with the living Catholic Church is a 
recurring disappointment. One cannot arrive at the fullness of Christian faith by Bible 
alone, consensuality between Christian generations, charismatic experience, ecumenical 
creeds, or John Calvin. True Ressourcement includes renewed “sympathy” for what has 
been critiqued.  
Communal Hermeneutic 
Communal hermeneutics is used in this dissertation to distinguish several246 
efforts to incorporate community, especially ecclesiology, into evangelical theology. 
Many of these endeavors currently influence developments within evangelical exegesis of 
Scripture. Some of the emphases within these models resonate with this dissertation 
because they seek to create new hermeneutical standards with an ecclesial form. They 
                                                          
245 Trueman, The Creedal Imperative.  
246 They are several in number and variation. This dissertation will only provide a cursory description of 
some of the more influential trends within the movement. 
406 
have sought to move away from both an overemphasis on an extrinsic analysis of the 
biblical text and an overly-subjective, individual hermeneutic. Despite appreciation for 
some of these efforts, they need to go further; some need to change direction.  
The broader philosophical movement within which these evangelicals operate is 
often called “postliberal.”247 Representatives of this movement frequently react against 
“homogenizing tendencies” which assume uniformity. They distance themselves from 
“traditional Enlightenment appeal” to universal rationality, and they challenge the liberal 
assumption that an “immediate religious experience” is common to all humanity. Instead, 
they emphasize the significance of gaining knowledge “through the values, experiences, 
and language” of particular communities. The community, not the individual, frequently 
becomes the locus of observation. In this approach, analysis of communal narrative is 
vital to properly interpreting the experiences and values of a culture.248 According to 
several authors, one value of this approach is the status given to voices from smaller 
communities. 
This dissertation uses the label “Communal Hermeneutic,” in an attempt to 
include diverse representatives in this growing movement within evangelicalism. 
Concern for theological orthodoxy and personal faith has led various participants to 
reconsider the relevance of ecclesiology in biblical exegesis. Communal hermeneutics 
developed partially as an attempt to get beyond the polemics between conservative and 
liberal theologians within evangelicalism, both of which were considered overly 
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individualistic. Some of the deficiencies they identify in prevalent hermeneutic constructs 
include a disinterest in the structures of human consciousness, an inadequate explanation 
of human action, not accounting for the historical development of communal traditions, 
and insufficiently recognizing the importance of story-telling relative to human 
epistemology. Many specifically wish to “provide alternatives” to “foundationalists” “or 
other scientific epistemologies.” Within evangelicalism, communal hermeneutists have 
reacted against both the systematics of Geisler and similar thinkers represented by the 
Chicago statements as well as classic liberal suppositions of universal experience.249 
Often called “narrative theologians,” they contend that all thought and experience is 
“historically and socially” mediated on a communal level; universal claims within the 
Christian Tradition need to be deconstructed before being applied to a particular people 
group. The multiple layers of meaning in the Bible logically require “ambiguity” in one’s 
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hermeneutics.250 In their efforts to prevent the arrogance of dogmatic propositions, 
postliberal thinkers frequently place narrative theology above systematics; the biblical 
text is best understood within communal dialogue, not from hierarchical declarations. 
Some evangelicals within this broader movement have sought to maintain what they 
consider to be classic theological confession.251  
Generally, the evangelical postliberal movement does not allow the individual 
exegete or ordained clergy to have the final word in biblical interpretation. Instead, “the 
Bible is to be interpreted by the people, for the people.”252 An “authoritative community,” 
where “conversation allows life to flow while living amongst one another” is the safest 
setting for interpreting Scripture. This democratic approach to biblical interpretation is 
one of the reasons that Jesus’ parables are preferred over Pauline didactics within 
communal hermeneutics. The parables allow for interactive readership, “forcing the 
reader into a radical reader-response role,”253 where theological truth is primarily 
discovered through narrative.254 
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Stanley Hauerwas 
For Stanley Hauerwas, narrative theology is vital to interpreting the biblical text. 
Biblical “literature is meant to be read as a story with a beginning and a progression.”255 
The Scriptures were formed as a long narrative of loosely connected “subplots.”256 They 
are a truthful257 story of peoples’ encounters with God. Over time, biblical subplots 
created the framework for interpreting new encounters with God; what had “already been 
created by previous acts, remembered in the Tradition”258 provided parameters for the 
community to decipher its own world. Specific biblical narratives, and the characters 
portrayed in them, were intelligible only as they participated in the broader narrative 
framework, subsequently guiding the conversations in the modern world.259 
For Hauerwas, the narrative of Jesus particularly forms the Christian community; 
“the Church is the organized form of Jesus’ story.”260 Jesus provides a contrasting view 
of what it means to live in the world; he breaks down the “arbitrary and false boundaries 
between people.”261 The “particularity of Jesus’ story” is therefore the basis of the 
“universality of the Church.”262 By “Church” Hauerwas is not referring to a particular 
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denomination;263 he does not think the ideal Church currently exists. However, 
authoritative communities do exist with traditions rooted in Christian faith and Scriptures. 
The Church can be considered “an international society” in that “we have a story that 
teaches us to regard the other as a fellow member of God’s kingdom.”264 “We have a 
common experience” of being trained as true disciples. “In contrast to all other societies,” 
the “Christian community is formed by a story that enables its members to trust the 
otherness of the other as the very sign of the forgiving character of God’s Kingdom.”265 
For Hauerwas, Scripture is dependent on the Church; it could not exist or have 
authority without the ecclesial community.266 The “formation of the biblical “texts,” as 
well as the entire “canon,” are the result of the “courage of a community to constantly 
remember and reinterpret its past.”267 The Scriptures are a testimony of a community that 
“knows its life depends on faithful remembering of God’s care.”268  
For Hauerwas, the contemporary authority of the Scriptures comes from their 
ability to nurture and transform modern communities of faith.269 They do not gain their 
authority because of the “unsupportable claims” regarding their unity270 or supposed 
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inerrant nature.271 The idea of “revelation” or “revealed morality” is actually a 
“problem.”272 Instead, Scripture is meant to enable a community’s “journey from where it 
is to where it ought to be.”273 The Bible therefore “functions as an authority for 
Christians” in that it “helps us remember the stories of God for the continual guidance for 
our community and individual lives.”274 It necessarily helps the “Church to be a 
community sufficiently truthful so that our conversations with one another and God can 
continue across generations.”275 Scripture and Tradition are meant to guide the 
conversation, not control it. Although interpretations of the modern world are made 
within the framework of Tradition, new understandings are constantly needed; “constant 
adjustment” is necessary “if the current community is to stay in continuity with 
Tradition.” In this sense, “justified discontinuity is not unjustified.”276 “The narratives of 
Scripture were not meant to describe our world,” but were intended to “change” it.277 The 
authority of the Bible is not intended to “serve as a final court of appeals for theological 
disputes.”278 In the modern day, the Scripture provides authoritative “frames of 
reference,” not final commands, within which new experiences gain meaning and “make 
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sense.”279 In Scripture itself, “at crucial periods in the life of Israel and the Church,” 
“questions about how to remember the stories were not just questions about fact or 
accuracy, but about what kind of community we must be to be faithful.”280  
 For Hauerwas, theology is rootless without a believing community. Hauerwas 
censures those who use Scripture to “reduce faith in Jesus to formulas.”281 Classical 
Protestantism circumvented the “conversational process, in favor of its insistence on the 
perspicuity and objectivity of the words of Scripture.”282 Hauerwas is similarly critical of 
historicists who separate the Jesus of history from the Christ of faith.283 The demand for 
historical accuracy misses the point of how people should “follow” Jesus;284 the 
truthfulness of a story “requires our lives to be changed.”285 For Hauerwas, this means 
knowing how to live;286 community is essential to such knowledge, and it is the Church 
which, through its Traditions, provides the “conditions” needed to interpret “what is 
going on in our lives.”287  
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The Bible, for Hauerwas, therefore is not an authority because it “sets a standard 
of orthodoxy,” but because the “traditions of Scripture provides the means for our 
community to find new life.”288 Contemporary theology must be conscious of the Bible’s 
communal context.289 Hauerwas complains that many theologians are insufficiently 
familiar with the biblical texts; many “know the current theories about the development 
of the text better than the text itself.” The text is not taken seriously enough 290 when the 
“religious” or “narrative” settings in which the texts were published are neglected.291  
For Hauerwas, critical analyses of the text and its history are essential to 
hermeneutics, but ultimately incomplete without narrative. Christian narrative creates a 
new world for the community and individual, which Biblicists and historicists cannot 
accomplish. To be relevant, the story of Jesus cannot be anything less than a social 
interpretation of his life.292 “There is no way to speak of Jesus’ story without its forming 
our own.”293 “To be a disciple means to share Christ’s story, to participate in the reality 
of God’s rule.”294 Specifically, the disciple learns about Christian rules when he practices 
loving one’s enemies, being forgiven and showing forgiveness, serving as Christ served, 
and being freed from the fear of death.295 The Christian, then, learns what discipleship is 
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by living the life. This “knowledge” of the Scriptures transcends doctrinal facts or 
historical particulars.296  
Hauerwas’s identification of the disjointedness between the communal nature of 
revelation and extrinsic hermeneutical models is beneficial. While carefully affirming the 
need for biblical, grammatical, and historical studies, he argues that those efforts are 
shortsighted without an analysis of the community’s role in creating and sustaining 
Scripture. Further, he argues that communal Traditions are the seedbed for all 
authoritative texts; the Bible is essentially dependent on the Church. A microscopic 
analysis of a particular text of Scripture will ultimately be distorted if it is not conveyed 
in its narrative setting. Hauerwas also demonstrates a willingness to dialogue and learn 
from others on these issues, thus demonstrating a healthy sense of community in his 
approach.  
However, much of what he conveys seems to diminish, even if unintentionally, 
the sacramental aspect of the community and its Traditions. While highlighting the role 
of communal narrative in the human development of the sacred text, Hauerwas allows the 
sound of Scripture as a divine Word to fade into the background. He points out the 
dangers of overemphasizing the unity of the biblical texts, and suggests that an 
uncultivated idea of revelation can be problematic. Yet, while it is true that traditions 
sometimes conflict over how best to interpret biblical texts, Hauerwas seems to reduce 
God’s word for his people to a whisper. The question also arises to what degree 
Hauerwas’ “community” is an ecclesial society. It is understood that his community is 
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comprised of human persons centered on Jesus’ narrative, a story-formed community; 
but, to what extent is it a pneumatically organized society? And, from where does that 
narrative generate? Hauerwas rightly criticized those who separated the biblical text from 
its narrative context, but might the context of the Catholic Church, replete with hierarchy, 
deserve more attention? Certainly, no one author can pursue all necessary paths of 
discussion. To his credit, Hauerwas is a leading Protestant voice in dialogue with 
Catholics;297 however, it would be beneficial to further probe the pneumatic importance 
of that particular community.  
Miroslav Volf 
 Miroslav Volf is another theologian sensitive to the rampant individualism within 
Protestant theology. While he writes to a broad audience, he has specifically influenced 
evangelical streams of thought. Volf historically situates “all” current “Christianity”298 in 
a “congregationalizing”299 moment; “a global transformation” has been occurring for the 
last half century.300 Specifically, Volf sees Christianity as “shedding its European forms 
of enculturation and is becoming a genuine global religion with its varied forms of 
enculturation.”301 Volf labels congregations within this rapidly developing phenomenon 
as “Free Churches.” These congregations are noticeable by their “flexibility with respect 
                                                          
297 Cf. his essay “The Importance of Being Catholic: Unsolicited Advice from a Protestant Bystander,” in 
Hauerwas, In Good Company, 91–108. 
298 Miroslav Volf, After Our Likeness: The Church as the Image of the Trinity (Grand Rapids, MI: W. B. 
Eerdmans, 1998), 13. 
299 Volf, After Our Likeness, 12. 
300 Volf, After Our Likeness, 11. 
301 Volf, After Our Likeness, 12. 
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to filling leadership roles.”302 Volf sets up the “congregationalism” of the Free Church 
model as positive, and contrary to a “hierarchical structure,” such as is evident in the 
Catholic Church.303 The Free Churches in particular promote “differentiation of societies, 
the privatization of decision, and generalization of values, and inclusion.”304 
Volf critiques the ecclesiologies of Catholic Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger305 and 
Orthodox Metropolitan John Zizioulas and roots his complaints in their Trinitarian 
theologies; their ecclesiologies resemble their distinct monarchial or hierarchical 
understandings of the Trinity.306 Volf considers both Ratzinger’s and Zizioulas’ 
theologies as “reformulations of premodern Traditions,” while his own are “postmodern” 
and “prophetic.”307  
For Volf, Ratzinger’s theology emphasizes “the perspective of the whole”308 to a 
fault. The idea of the “one” dominates all understandings of the Trinity.309 A pure relation 
exists between Father, Son, and Spirit, which, according to Volf, results in a loss in 
emphasis in their “specific personal selfhood.” Volf argues that “for this reason, 
trinitarian unity is also not a differentiated unity of persons, standing in these 
                                                          
302 Volf, After Our Likeness, 12.  
303 Volf, After Our Likeness, 12–13. 
304 Volf, After Our Likeness, 13.  
305 As of Volf’s writing, Ratzinger was not yet Benedict XVI. This section will maintain Volf’s use of 
“Ratzinger.” 
306 Cf. John W. Seward, “The Shape of the Church: Congregational and Trinitarian.” Religion-online. 
http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=290.  
307 Volf, After Our Likeness, 23. 
308 Volf, After Our Likeness, 72. 
309 Volf, After Our Likeness, 71. 
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relations.”310 For Volf, this dominance of the pure unity of the one in Trinity has 
significant ecclesiastical repercussions. “A monistic structure for the Church emerges 
from this.”311 The one divine substance corresponds to the one Church, and together with 
Christ, “constitutes one subject” capable of action.312 Therefore, when Christ acts, God 
acts. In Ratzinger, Volf claims, this divine unity of action is transferred to the pope as the 
head of the one universal Church and bishops as heads of local Churches.313 It therefore 
demands a hierarchical structure. Just as the one substance of God is “over Christ,” so the 
unity of the Church is established by one pope “over” the bishops and bishops “over” 
individual members.314 Pure Trinitarian relations, when transferred to the Church, 
relativize the individual persons and congregations. For Volf, this results in a loss of the 
“notion of the rights of persons;” the individual nowhere stands on his own, and his only 
recourse is the “goodwill of the hierarchs themselves.”315 
Volf does not criticize Zizioulas for giving priority to the oneness of God, but to 
the divine Father in particular. According to Volf, the headship of the Father takes too 
much precedence in Zizioulas’ theology. “The unity of God is grounded not in the one 
divine substance,” as with Ratzinger, “but rather in the person of the Father, which is why 
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the one substance of God does not enjoy ontological priority over the persons.”316 God’s 
personal “mode of existence,” as Father, constitutes the divine substance. 317 Zizoulas 
notes the “revolutionary nature” of “development” in Greek thought caused by early 
Christian theologians, specifically the Cappadocians:318 “prosopon” became identified 
with “hypostasis.” The upshot of this was that “person was no longer an adjunct to 
being.” The individual entity could now trace his being “to being,” to the person.319 In 
Trinitarian theology, this meant that “God’s being coincided with God’s personhood.”320 
God the Father was now not only the source of the Son and Spirit, but the “personal” 
cause.321 Zizioulas himself argued that “the one God is not the one substance but the 
Father, who is the ‘cause’ both of the generation of the Son and of the procession of the 
Spirit.”322 “God ‘exists’ on account of a person, the Father, and not on account of a 
substance.”323 To Volf, Zizioulas’ trinitarian theology negatively affected his 
ecclesiology. 
                                                          
316 Volf, After Our Likeness, 201. Although his work is distinct from Volf’s, Braaten claims to identify an 
undeveloped “point of contact between Lutheran and Orthodox ecclesiology.” Braaten advocates a form of 
“communion-ecclesiology” which “lays stress on the ontological priority of the local church.” Braaten, 
Mother Church, 7–8. 
317 Volf, After Our Likeness, 201. 
318 John D. Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church (Crestwood, NY: St. 
Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1985), 39.  
319 Zizioulas, Being as Communion, 39. Volf cites this quote as page 36f (Volf, After Our Likeness, 76). 
320 Volf, After Our Likeness, 76. 
321 Volf, After Our Likeness, 76. 
322 Zizioulas, Being as Communion, 41.  
323 Zizioulas, Being as Communion, 42.  
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For Zizioulas, the “bishop represents Christ to the congregation and 
simultaneously embodies in himself the whole congregation.” Volf’s concern with 
Zizioulas’ view is that even though the bishop stands in community with the people, the 
relationship is actually one of “asymmetrical bipolarity.”324 The bishop acts, and the 
congregation receives. In the end, for Volf, this is simply another form of episcopal 
hierarchy. 
Volf argues that the Trinity should be looked at as a social trinity, similar to the 
views of Jürgen Moltman and Wolfhart Pannenberg.325 Under his subheading 
“Perichoretic personhood,”326 Volf argues that the Trinity needs to be understood “in 
their mutual giving and receiving,” as not only “interdependent, but also mutually 
internal.”327 In every divine person, “the other persons also indwell.” Any distinctions 
“are precisely the presupposition of that interiority.”328 The catholicity of the divine 
persons emerges from their interiority. 
Volf argues, from his perspective of the Trinity, that the Church should not be 
viewed as a “single subject, but rather a communion of interdependent subjects.”329 One 
communion is not the cause of the rest. In addition, salvation needs to be understood as 
                                                          
324 Volf, After Our Likeness, 224. 
325 Volf, After Our Likeness, 198. Volf is giving emphasis to seeing the trinity in relation.  
326 Volf, After Our Likeness, 208–210. Perichoresis is a term which generally emphasizes the internal 
relations of the persons of the Christian Trinity. It allows the individuality of each divine person to be 
maintained, but places emphasis on the shared life of the three. McGrath reports that the etymology of the 
term suggests “mutual interpenetration.” With this emphasis, the Trinity is viewed as a “community of 
Being” (McGrath, Christian Theology, 241). 
327 Volf, After Our Likeness, 208. Italics are Volf’s. 
328 Volf, After Our Likeness, 209. 
329 Volf, After Our Likeness, 224. 
420 
mediated through “all” members of the Church, not just through “office-holders.” Finally, 
the Church is pneumatically constituted through the “communal confession in which 
Christians speak the word of God to one another;” they are not constituted “so much by 
way of the institution of office.”330 Volf’s internally penetrating ecclesiology means that 
the entire Church exists in each individual congregation. The Church is fundamentally a 
“polycentric community;” therefore, it “cannot be episcopocentric.”331 Volf is careful to 
cite numerous biblical passages to support his claim that Church life should be modeled 
as “polycentric-participative,” in a “Free Church fashion.”332 He sees the entire Christian 
world slowly but noticeably moving away from hierarchical models to “participative 
models of Church configuration.”333 
 Volf is to be commended for his intense efforts at “ecumenical dialogue”334 with 
major Catholic and Orthodox ecclesiologies. He has traveled much further down the road 
in this regard than most evangelicals. Volf also is to be admired for attempting to salvage 
the idea of “Church.” Even as a Protestant, he does not quickly toss the biblical term. He 
realizes the importance of constructing a meaningful ecclesiology in the modern world. 
Unfortunately, even though Volf wrote After Our Likeness nearly twenty years ago, only 
a few evangelicals have followed in his wake to penetrate what ecclesiology means for 
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the contemporary evangelical. It is hoped that this dissertation will generate further 
considerations. 
 Despite compliments for Volf’s work, several criticisms should be noted. First, 
the accuracy of some of Volf’s assumptions needs to be checked. His categorization of 
Ratzinger’s and Zizioulas’ theologies as “reformulations of premodern Traditions,”335 
assuming they lack a prophetic voice like his own, is problematic. Beyond any hubris, his 
use of “premodern” possibly betrays his own optimistic assumptions regarding what 
really occurred in the Enlightenment, and negative assumptions about what preceded it. 
He seems to assume that the frozen stem of a Church living in divine mystery thankfully 
withered and died in the sixteenth century, only to be revived in the spring of the “free 
Church” ecclesiology of Baptist John Smyth in the early seventeenth century.336 With his 
presumed discontinuity, Volf fails to show how “the word of Christ remains present in 
history.”337 Are the true prophets now only in the free churches? Volf’s dismissal of 
outdated hierarchy is reminiscent of Braaten’s wrong perception that the Catholic Church 
went through a “revolution” at the Second Vatican Council.338 He seems to 
misunderstand continuity. Volf claims that Christianity is finally becoming a “global 
religion” thanks to free Churches with “their own varied forms of enculturation.”339 
However, just as John Paul II’s Sollicitudo rei socialis and Centesimus Annus reminded 
                                                          
335 Volf, After Our Likeness, 23.  
336 Ibid. 
337 Benedict XVI, God's Word: Scripture, Tradition, Office, ed. Peter Hünermann and Thomas Söding, 
trans. Henry Taylor (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2008), 41. 
338 Cf. Braaten, Mother Church, 73. 
339 Volf, After Our Likeness, 12.  
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certain critics that the Catholic Church has always had an option for the poor, it appears 
that Volf needs a reminder that Christianity has perpetually striven to be a global faith.340 
Volf also unnecessarily sets hierarchy and congregation against each other after asserting 
Trinity as an interpenetrating community of beings. The purpose of this dissertation is not 
to argue for a particular type of ecclesiology; however, it seems plausible that a 
hierarchical model of ecclesiology could function with congregational ideas. Volf’s 
emphasis that the whole is present in the particular, that the universal Church is present in 
each congregation, is theologically insightful. However, could not the divine Father, 
whom Jesus said is “greater than I,”341 also be essentially equal with the Son? Does 
hierarchy necessarily have to oppress a congregational voice? Ratzinger actually makes a 
fair distinction between traditions and Tradition.342 Volf does not adequately consider the 
depth of the Second Vatican Council’s idea of “collegial union” between particular 
churches and the universal Church. Much of the unity he longs for between the particular 
and universal has already been suggested in Catholic documents.343 
 
 
                                                          
340 This is evident already in Athanasius’ works. Cf. Athanasius of Alexandria, On the Incarnation, trans. P. 
Lawson (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press), 47–53:84–92. Athanasius’ argument of the 
Logos’ dominance over paganism is presented as Creation being conformed to the will of the Creator. 
Christ is not an invading foreign deity, but is reclaiming his own. Athanasius’ presentation of Incarnation 
suggests the idea of global salvation.  
341 John 14:28. Often considered to be greater in function, not essentially greater. 
342 Benedict XVI, God's Word, 41–44. Volf’s critique of Ratzinger is certainly not new to Catholic 
audiences. While Cardinal, Ratzinger conducted an ongoing similar debate with Walter Cardinal Kasper. 
Philip Blosser, “The Kasper-Ratzinger Debate &The State of the Church,” New Oxford Review (April 
2002), http://www.newoxfordreview.org/article.jsp?did=0402-blosser. 
343 LG, 23. “This collegial union is apparent also [in] the mutual relations of the individual bishops with 
particular churches and with the universal Church.”  
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Popular and Influential 
Certain evangelicals who operate within a communal hermeneutic paradigm 
might be considered more popular than academic. However, their influence is significant 
and warrants mention at this point.  
Several within the emergent Church intentionally deconstruct dogmatic claims in 
order to produce a fresh, relevant explication of Scripture. For example, Brian McLaren 
often uses Christian motifs to provoke conversation on social and political dilemmas in 
society. In the process, McLaren frequently evacuates theological concepts, such as 
eternal life, Kingdom of God, and salvation of significant spiritual dimensions in favor of 
almost exclusively social and political application. On one hand, McLaren calls for Jesus 
to be considered the “revelation of God’s character.”344 On the other hand, he clearly 
restricts how one can look at Jesus for that purpose; he primarily projects a political and 
social Jesus. McLaren makes little allowance for the Church, modern or ancient, to 
instruct him on a full-orbed image of Jesus which might include McLaren’s temporal, 
narrative concerns. His call for an understanding of biblical terms which includes present 
day injustices is obviously attractive to some; however, his conclusions seem to misfire 
because he seeks to understand biblical concepts strictly within his own narrow outlook. 
He does not consider that ecclesiology broadens, not restricts, one’s thinking. In the end, 
he dismisses the ecclesial structure in which the original ideas of Jesus were first 
communicated.345  
                                                          
344 Brian D. McLaren, A New Kind of Christianity: Ten Questions That Are Transforming the Faith (New 
York: HarperOne, 2010), 128.  
345Also cf. Brian D. McLaren, The Secret Message of Jesus: Uncovering the Truth That Could Change 
Everything (Nashville: W Pub., 2006). 
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Distinct from McLaren, others who might be located within the broader 
communal hermeneutic spectrum seem to appreciate rigorous grammatical efforts and 
traditional faith conclusions; however, their use of religious language is still generally 
based on local social dialogue. As examples, evangelicals Rick Brown and John Travis346 
utilize insight into particular Muslim communities to guide their evangelization.347 
Brown favors Bible translations for Muslims which replace the term “Son of God” with 
less offensive terms, such as Beloved of God or Messiah. Brown claims that the Nicene 
fathers and their heirs might have been “theologically correct,” but were “exegetically 
wrong” to assert that the title Son of God contains clear reference to Jesus’ deity.348 
Based on his conclusions, Brown posits local missional advantages to cease using the 
term Son of God in Bible translations. Brown does not seem to make the connection 
between exegesis and ecclesial faith. How could the Fathers be exegetically wrong if they 
were theologically correct? John Travis justifies replacing the biblical term Christian with 
Messianic Muslim due to the perceived resonance the term Christian has among 
Muslims. The social dynamics of certain Muslim communities helps lead him to his 
conclusions. In addition, Travis encourages new “followers of Isa” to be free to appear as 
Muslims as they worship in Messianic mosques, as long as each individual believer 
“really feels called of God” to do so. How much each private Messianic mosque affirms 
                                                          
346 A pseudonym.  
347 Although Brown and Travis may not identify themselves within a postliberal camp, their exegetical 
practices seem to place them there. Cf. Rick Brown, “The Son of God: Understanding the Messianic Titles 
of Jesus,” International Journal of Frontier Missions 17, no. 1 (2000): 41–52; and John Travis (pseudo.), 
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about Islam will corporately be “determined” as each group studies the “Bible together 
and are guided by the Holy Spirit.”349 As noble as Travis’ efforts are, he does not see the 
need for theological language and practices to be in tune with the universal Church. He 
makes enormous theological decisions based on local, parochial sensitivities. As 
representatives of a large evangelical movement of missiologists related to the “Insider 
Movement,” Brown and Travis seek to get at the “original” meaning of biblical terms in a 
manner that can relevantly be presented to the modern Muslim world. Their cultural 
sensitivity and grammatical abilities are valuable; however, they demonstrate little 
concern over ecclesiastical input on how best to use theological language. They express 
little confidence in the Spirit’s ability to universally lead Christ’s followers “into all 
truth”350 while determining the best use of sacred terms. Their eagerness to alter 
universally traditional terms for particular communities seems to suggest an arbitrary 
quality to religious language. It diminishes a providential understanding of language 
incarnated at the “fullness of time.”351 They primarily use local sociological and 
grammatical tools when addressing issues of universal significance. In the end, they risk 
inserting their own preferences. On the surface, this might seem innocuous; but, this 
particular issue has caused intense disunion among evangelicals over the last two 
decades.352 
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Evangelical thinkers who engage in communal hermeneutics express a healthy 
desire to move away from the individualistic, subjective reading of Scripture which has 
often plagued American evangelical Christianity. However, it appears their authoritative 
communities are little more than larger individual entities. The private subject has been 
replaced with a small assembly or local focus group. They have no mechanism for 
universal determinations on the meaning of Scripture even if it were determined 
necessary. Over time, this lack of a universal foundation in their theological epistemology 
might further hamper evangelicalism’s ability to maintain orthodox confession and 
Christian unity.  
Often, evangelical demystification of Christian faith is unintentional, and it 
sometimes occurs at the hands of those who consider their work to be a retrieval of the 
original message of Jesus. For example, Alan Hirsch is an innovative and influential 
evangelical leader in the missional Church movement. However, his attempt to discover 
the “formula that unlocks the secrets of the ecclesial universe”353 sets an “organic image 
of Church” over against “any mechanistic and institutional” conception.354 Hirsch claims 
the “organic” model was Jesus’ original intention. He suggests that Church life should 
follow God’s original “pattern of life” evident throughout the universe; the Church 
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should seek a more “life-oriented approach to mission, ministry, and community.”355 The 
marks of biological living systems, according to Hirsch, should be reflected in Church 
life; they include innate intelligence, interconnectedness, change, and adaptation.356 
However, Hirsch seems to overlook that living systems throughout the world are 
hierarchically organized; biological life is replete with well-defined structure. Although 
Hirsch admits that “Christian mission” starts with Jesus and is “defined by him,”357 he 
seems to forget that it was Jesus who established an ordered society; the Spirit was sent 
by Jesus to operate within the infant Church, giving the Church a clearly delineated 
structure from the outset. As with many evangelicals, Hirsch appears to have difficulty 
imagining the equal necessity of flesh and spirit in incarnational Church life.  
Summary  
Those engaging in communal hermeneutics are to be commended for attempting 
to find a healthy place for both the individual and community through active 
“ecclesiastical” constructions. Their efforts demonstrate that they perceive the Scripture 
to be fresh and relevant for the modern world, and that the Bible is a communal book. 
However, some of the “postmodern”358 reflections need to extend their critique beyond 
the Enlightenment. As they hopefully attempt to discover the One who is ever present in 
the Church, they need to construct models which emphasize continuity within Christian 
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Tradition. In some sense, the object should be to search out an already ever present 
Beauty in the Church, analogous to what Augustine called ancient and new. 
Conclusion 
While some evangelical theological trends offer restrained hope, many do not. In 
the end, evangelicals often fall prey to the modernism they claim to resist. They employ 
many imaginative ways of interpreting the Scriptures, but never really move away from 
some form of individualism. Although the theological range and academic competence of 
evangelicals is varied, a latent assumption that universal ecclesiology is unnecessary to 
modern biblical interpretation is still noticeable in many groups. Further, some who see 
the need for ecclesiology in biblical exegesis wrongly think it can be achieved without 
directly engaging the Catholic Church. Those presumptions need to be revisited. 
The common postulations behind evangelical interpretation of Scripture need to 
be reevaluated. The movement brings considerable good into Christ’s Church, but its 
weak ecclesiology spoils much of the fruit. Some evangelicals are not dismissive of 
ecclesiology. However, while acknowledging Jesus’ promise that the Spirit will lead his 
followers into truth,359 most of them have not yet understood that the structured Church, 
both historic and contemporary, is the means by which the Spirit leads. Efforts to 
“affirm,” “hope,” and “search together” have yet to determine that a formal ecclesial 
context is where the Scriptures are to be read and explained.360 It would be naïve to 
                                                          
359 John 16:13. 
360 “Evangelicals and Catholics Together: The Christian Mission in the Third Millennium,” First Things 
(May 1994), http://www.firstthings.com/article/1994/05/evangelicals--catholics-together-the-christian-
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suggest that severe polemics occur less frequently in Catholicism. However, ecclesiology 
enables the Catholic Church to establish universal parameters for theological polemics, 
maintain the mystical element of faith in dogmatic confession, and keep viable unity 
among its people. Evangelicalism lacks such a mechanism.  
The final chapter of this dissertation will seek to highlight practical ways 
evangelicals can dialogue with the Catholic Church in biblical exegesis. For the purpose 
of the unity of the faith, evangelicals should seek to develop exegetical methods which 
are essentially ecclesial. As Andrew Louth wrote, if one cannot trust the Church, then he 
has lost Jesus.361 Unless critical reassessment occurs, the progress evangelicals think they 
are making will be self-deception. As with Sisyphus, the large boulder will keep rolling 
back down the hill. 
                                                          
Catholic soteriology as “salvation by works.” Although important distinctions between different Protestant 
and Catholic soteriologies do exist, Catholic salvation is clearly presented as a work of Christ’s grace. Real 
differences exist between Catholics and evangelicals. However, the continuation of pseudo disputes, such 
as MacArthur’s, only hampers mutual development. Also, cf. the 1999 joint declaration on justification of 
the Catholic Church and the Lutheran World Federation. “Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of 
Justification,” The Holy See, 1999, 
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CHAPTER SIX 
READING SCRIPTURE IN LIGHT OF ECCLESIOLOGY AND THE CATHOLIC 
CHURCH 
Introduction 
In the face of what appears an insurmountable summit, this dissertation attempts 
to go further towards renewing evangelicalism than is found in other recent expeditions. 
However, it can only hope to make a couple of steps in the right direction. Although this 
chapter begins with a negative tone, it will attempt to generate positive movement by 
applying effective contours of a post-critical assessment to evangelical hermeneutics. 
From there, it will consider unavoidable ecclesiastical implications drawn from 
characteristics of Christian revelation. It will end with practical suggestions for 
evangelicals to engage the contemporary Catholic Church in biblical exegesis. In order to 
readjust evangelical reading of Scripture, one must return the Bible to its original context 
within Christian Tradition. Such an effort will broaden evangelical thinking and actually 
confirm some key evangelical convictions.  
Realistic Impossibility 
Despite the need for formal ecclesiology in the practice of evangelical exegesis, 
this dissertation negatively concludes that it is not possible to fully articulate a 
theological hermeneutic for evangelicals that adequately incorporates ecclesiology. Nor is 
it possible, in this present day, to develop a hermeneutic which extensively participates 
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with the Catholic Church. Both are needed but highly unlikely. The historic and 
theological separations between evangelicals and the Catholic Church are too severe. 
One of the reasons for this dilemma is that evangelicalism is organized around 
ideological agreement, with no necessary historic reality or ecclesiastical structure.1 As a 
result of centuries of fragmentation, it is not formally possible for a single evangelical 
voice to speak for the entire movement. Another reason is perceived irreconcilable 
differences between Catholics and evangelicals. Differences between theological 
declarations of the Catholic Church and entrenched positions of evangelicals appear to be 
currently irresoluble.2 Although this dissertation is focused on changes that need to occur 
within evangelicalism, it does not deny that change needs to occur within the Catholic 
Church in order for a greater unity to be realized.3 Modern evangelicals may not agree 
with Luther’s claim that “today, the Roman pontiff” is the “fount and source of all 
                                                          
1 For example, the National Association of Evangelicals is comprised of “more than 45,000 local Churches 
from 40 different denominations.” It is a large organization of millions of people, self-identified as those 
“who take the Bible seriously and believe in Jesus Christ as Savior and Lord” (www.nae.net). 
2 As mentioned in the previous chapter, some of these contentions include the Catholic concept of perpetual 
indefectibility of the Catholic Church and papal infallibility, and certain Marian dogmas. Some non-
Catholics, including Eastern Orthodox and some Anglicans, hold to the doctrine of an indefectible Church 
within apostolic succession. However, their understandings of indefectibility are distinct from Roman 
Catholic views. Some hold that at least one branch of apostolic Christianity will remain true to the gospel at 
all times; however, they argue that it is erroneous to claim that a single branch and its bishop are 
perpetually indefectible. Others, including evangelicals, hold to more of an eschatological indefectibility. In 
other words, the Church may go through epochs of error, but eventually it will be “holy and blameless” 
(Ephesians 5:27) by the power of Christ. In addition, the supreme juridical authority of the Church at Rome 
would not be accepted by evangelicals, just as it is not by other Protestants and the Eastern Orthodox 
Churches. While many respect the Catholic Church’s jurisdiction over its own See in Rome, roughly half of 
the worldwide Christian Church is not Catholic and does not regard Rome’s authority properly extending to 
the universal Church. The point here is these are examples of what appear to be irreconcilable differences 
between the Catholic Church and evangelicals. 
3 The pope is put forward as a symbol of Christian unity. Therefore, a heavy responsibility is on him to 
effect universal Christian unity. Recent Pontiffs have acknowledged this responsibility. 
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superstition;”4 however, most would agree with Luther that more than abuses need to be 
addressed. Most evangelicals think the Catholic “system” itself needs attention.5  
Despite these apparently intractable variances, Christ’s prayer for his followers to 
be “perfectly one” still resonates.6 The Apostle’s command to “make every effort” 
toward unity and peace is still obligatory. Upward progress toward divine unity must be 
attempted by evangelicals if they think they have the Spirit and adhere to Scripture. They 
must attempt to integrate ecclesiology with hermeneutics; they need to reacquaint 
themselves with theological ways of knowing that have been sadly neglected. In addition, 
they must directly engage the contemporary Catholic Church during the process of 
biblical exegesis. Positive advances can occur, even if full unity is not presently a 
realistic possibility. By evangelicals’ own standards, interpreting Scripture accurately and 
effectively is imperative. Scripture remains a significant influence in world Christianity. 
Possibly more people are reading Scripture than ever before, and many desire that God 
might meaningfully speak to their moral and social situations through the Bible.7 The 
present moment requires a critical reassessment of hermeneutics.  
                                                          
4 Luther, “The Pagan Servitude of the Church,” in Dillenberger, 309.  
5 Luther, “The Pagan Servitude of the Church,” in Dillenberger, 310. 
6 John 17:23. The verb τετελειωμένοι (having been ripened, matured, perfected) is a perfect passive; it 
speaks of a lasting work of God in his people. It gives hope that despite any present insurmountable gulf, 
unity will be finally realized by divine action.  
7 Increased reading of Scripture is due to a number of factors, including population growth, literacy 
advancement, and translation of Scripture into multiple languages which previously had no Bible. 
However, some have suggested that a great hunger for God’s Word is increasingly evident in the modern 
world. Cf. Synod of Bishops, “The Word Of God In The Life And Mission Of The Church: Lineamenta,” 
The Holy See, 2007, 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/synod/documents/rc_synod_doc_20070427_lineamenta-xii-
assembly_en.html.  
In answering the question, “Why a Synod on the Word of God?,” cf. Introduction, 2: “In an 
increasing number of ways, people today are displaying a great need to listen to God and speak with him. 
At present, Christians are eagerly seeking the Word of God as the source of life and as a means of 
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Applicable Contours 
The previous chapter considered three positive contours of post-critical analyses: 
self-criticism, openness to new ways of knowing, and continuity. Prior to exploring 
positive characteristics of Christian revelation and practical engagement with the Catholic 
Church, this section will attempt to apply these contours in order to reassess evangelical 
hermeneutics. 
Self-Criticism and Mistaken Understandings  
Evangelical theologians need to critique their own dominant authoritative 
structures for understanding Scripture, and reassess how stable those constructions are 
without a rigorous ecclesiology. Although several hermeneutical models within 
evangelicalism are not formally ecclesial, most of their traditionally orthodox confessions 
are unconsciously reliant upon ecclesiology.8 While appreciating benefits of Protestant 
                                                          
encountering the Lord in a personal manner.” In addition, cf. Introduction, 4. The Synod claimed that since 
the Second Vatican Council, “With regard to the Word of God, many positive things have clearly taken 
place in the People of God: for example, biblical renewal in the liturgy, theology and catechesis; the 
distribution and practice of the Bible by the biblical apostolate and efforts of communities and ecclesial 
movements; and the increased use of the instruments of today’s communication media.” Also, Chapter 
1:14, “Today, the People of God are increasingly showing a hunger and thirst for the Word of God (cf. 
8:11, 12).” Finally, chapter 1:15 calls it a “rare opportunity” that “many of the Church’s members, 
individually and in groups, are intensely studying the Word of God in the Bible.”  
8 “Unconsciously” because much of the official “what we believe” sections of evangelical theology 
unknowingly draw upon ancient, formal ecclesiastical declarations. A widespread assumption within 
evangelicalism is that their doctrinal confessions are purely drawn from Scripture. However, much of their 
language is found in traditional formulations, some that preceded the Reformation. These symbols of faith 
certainly resonated with Scripture, but they were more than elucidations of biblical proof texts; they were 
the expressed consciousness of a living, hierarchical Church—and their key terms were not always found in 
the Scriptures. The use of homoousian at Nicea is an obvious example. Cf. Lewis Ayres, Nicea and its 
Legacy: An Approach to Fourth Century Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 
218–220. Ayres argues that Basil appealed to the Church’s “liturgical practice and ‘unwritten’ Tradition” in 
order to articulate his pneumatology. Candidates for baptism received their confessional “phraseology” 
from Tradition. Ayres argues that Basil’s “appeal to Tradition” is related to his understanding of 
contemplation (Θωρία) in the theologian. The contemplation of the Spirit in the theologian gives him the 
ability to read the depth of Mosaic Law beyond the literal ‘Jewish’ meaning apparent in the text. Some of 
the most important articulation of doctrines within Christianity, such as the Spirit’s divinity, “gradually 
unfolded in the Church,” but would not have been possible without “the inner dynamics of the 
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biblical scholarship and not withdrawing legitimate contentions with Catholicism,9 
evangelicals need to be aware of where they themselves have gone too far. Extreme 
Biblicism, heavily dependent on technical scholarship of a static text, risks forgetting the 
exegetical need for living Tradition.10 It risks over emphasizing the extrinsic quality of 
revelation, and neglecting the human subject who is prepared to receive the gospel. The 
recent communal effort to move away from extreme individualism and extrinsicism 
should be applauded, but it needs to admit how short it falls. One needs to inquire what 
“one Body and one Spirit”11 means when local groups can determine which biblical 
language to preserve, and which to toss. The idea held by some that the Church can be 
reduced to a purely invisible reality when Scripture calls it a Body,12 specifically the 
                                                          
contemplation of God” in the Christian theologian. In Basil, a far different methodology is operative than 
the extrinsic, grammatical emphasis in Geisler.  
Geisler lays out an “appropriate” evangelical “theological methodology” in nine sequential steps. 
In his scheme, inductive analysis of the text is the first step and practical theology is the final step. The first 
seven steps consist of highly individualistic analyses on the part of the exegete. It is not until the sixth step 
that the individual interpreter finally articulates a “fully orbed doctrine.” It is not until the eighth step that 
he leaves his private study to gain a “view of orthodox teachings of the Church Fathers.” However, the 
consideration of Church Fathers is primarily extrinsic and intellectual. Does the modern evangelical come 
to the same doctrinal “understanding” as did his forbears? Do their conclusions match? Geisler’s long-
awaited eighth point says nothing beyond an extrinsic comparison of notes. No guiding Spirit of truth 
operating in Christ’s body throughout time is mentioned. No communal engagement with the Spirit of the 
text is referenced. Norman L. Geisler, Systematic Theology: In One Volume (Minneapolis, MN: Bethany 
House, 2011), 159–164.  
9 Again, this paper is not focused on Catholic-Protestant polemics. However, examples of ongoing debates 
include papal infallibility and related Catholic understanding of the indefectibility of the Church, 
Eucharistic Presence, and the Assumption of Mary. It needs to be noted that Protestants themselves do not 
always agree on these issues.  
10 Paradosis. Cf. 1 Corinthians 11:2; 2 Thessalonians 2:15; 3:6. Certainly, false Tradition can make 
Scripture impotent (Matthew 15:13; Mark 7:13); however, the danger of false Tradition hardly eliminates 
the need for genuine apostolic Tradition.  
11 Ephesians 4:4. 
12 Colossians 1:18. 
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body of one who was seen, heard, and handled, needs to be challenged.13 Biblical 
passages which suggest that evil will not prevail over the Church,14 an enduring presence 
of Christ is in that Church,15 and an ever acting Spirit is visibly assembling all aspects of 
that Church16 need to be reexamined prior to concluding that the Catholic Church is 
apostate.17  
On one hand, evangelicals need to challenge the reasoning behind their prevalent 
hermeneutical assumptions. Do the ongoing assumptions square with the very text that is 
being interpreted? On the other hand, the quality of exegetical fruit needs examination. 
The critical conversation needs to honestly address fragmentation of Christian unity. How 
have operative assumptions in exegesis hampered unity, whether in Luther’s day or the 
modern era? In addition to perennial fractures of unity, evangelicals need to examine the 
historic relation between demystification of Church and demystification of the biblical 
text. Might some of the liberalism in biblical interpretation which evangelicals decry be 
their own fault?  
In addition, evangelicalism needs to give an honest second look at the Catholic 
Church. Without dismissing their genuine disagreements with Catholic theology, 
evangelicals need to clear up several myths they have held about Catholic theology. 
                                                          
13 1 John 1:1–3. 
14 Matthew 16:18. 
15 Matthew 28:20. 
16 1 Corinthians 12, Ephesians 4. 
17 Certainly, Catholics need to be self-critical of their own misplaced criticisms of Protestants. However, 
that is not the focus of this dissertation. 
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Otherwise, intelligent conversation will never be possible. Following are some of the 
more predominant misconceptions about Catholic theology.  
One myth evangelicals often believe is that the Catholic Church thinks Tradition 
can trump Scripture. From a Catholic perspective, this misunderstands what is meant by 
Tradition. For the Catholic, Tradition and Scripture are not opposed; rather, they are both 
holy, forming “one sacred deposit of the Word of God.” Catholics point out that Church 
preexisted Scripture and Tradition. Christ entrusted the Church with the Bible and oral 
Traditions. Written and unwritten Tradition therefore flow from a single divine source, 
and cannot contradict each other.18 Evangelicals hold analogous convictions about the 
various books of the Bible; ultimately, the texts are distinct, but have a single divine 
source and cannot contradict one another. This confidence is ultimately based on God, 
and the Spirit’s ability to preserve his truth. For the Catholic, it is not possible to suggest 
Scripture can exist without Tradition. Scripture itself is a traditional interpretation of 
revelation. The New Testament texts were the apostles’ interpretation of the life and oral 
teachings of Jesus, and the Old Testament was seen through the lens provided by Jesus, a 
lens Jesus himself manufactured for them on the road to Emmaus. In fact, there would be 
no Scripture without Tradition. For the Catholic, the two voices of revelation are seen in 
their unity. The “soul of sacred theology” is the “study of the sacred page.”19 Considering 
Christ’s admonition of Tradition potentially nullifying Scripture,20 evangelicals have 
                                                          
18 Cf. DV, 10. 
19 DV, 24. 
20 Mark 7:13. 
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reason for caution. However, they are incorrect when they claim Catholics think 
Tradition is superior to Scripture. 
Another assumed myth is that the Catholic Church has superficial regard for the 
text of the Bible due to its high view of Tradition. Only sola scriptura Protestants, the 
argument goes, maintain the integrity of God’s word. Contrary to these suppositions, the 
evidence suggests the centrality of Scripture within Catholicism.  
Protestant scholarly emphasis on the text of Scripture has immeasurably 
benefitted centuries of biblical studies. Further, evangelicals have stressed personal 
appropriation of sacred Scripture. However, evangelicals need to overcome the 
assumption that Scripture is secondary in Catholic life and devotion. Liturgical worship 
in a communal setting is as devout as a private reading of the Bible. For the Catholic, 
“Sacred Scripture is of the greatest importance in the celebration of the liturgy.” This is 
because “it is from the Scriptures that actions and signs derive their meaning.”21 The 
simple fact is that the majority of words spoken at a Catholic Mass are taken directly 
from Scripture. For liturgical worship to achieve its purpose, a “warm and living love for 
Scripture” is required. Joseph Fitzmyer claimed that many individual Catholics since the 
Reformation made the Bible a “Protestant Book” and tended to “shy away”22 from it. 
This might be true for some Catholics, but overall it can be disputed by the fact that 
Catholic liturgy is replete with Scripture. Even if dissenting Catholic scholars disparage 
the reliability of the text of Scripture, the Church formally considers it “infallible.”23 
                                                          
21 Benedict XVI. Verbum Domini, 52. 
22 Fitzmyer, Interpretation of Scripture, 1. 
23 Leo XIII, Providentissimus Deus, 3, 17, 20.  
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“Immunity from error” extends to all the text of the Bible;24 the systematic index to Peter 
Hünermann’s 43rd edition of the Denzinger’s Enchiridion repeatedly employs the word 
“inerrancy,”25 reflecting the language of the underlying documents describing the 
Catholic view of Scripture. The Second Vatican Council argues that the written text is 
“without error” with respect to the truths it conveys pertaining to “our salvation.”26 These 
recent declarations of the Catholic Church are presented as consistent with its historic 
statements.27 
Another myth which needs to be dispelled is that the Catholic Church thinks it has 
the authority to create new dogmas. Part of this misunderstanding is related to 
miscomprehending the Catholic view of Tradition. Church Tradition, for the Catholic, is 
sourced in Christ himself; Tradition was “once for all delivered”28 to the Church.29 
Deeper understandings and elucidations of the Tradition may develop, but those do not 
                                                          
24 Pius XII, Humani generis, 22. 
25 Denzinger and Hünermann, “Sacred Scripture,” A3bb, 1194. 
26 DV, 3:11, Denzinger, 4215: 923. Although several evangelicals contend that the text of Scripture is 
without error in all items it addresses, not just those pertaining to salvation, the goal here is to dispel the 
myth that Catholics have flippant regard for the text of Scripture and primarily cling to Tradition apart from 
the Bible. Also, evangelicals themselves do not agree on the extent and meaning of inerrancy. 
27 Several of the quotations just mentioned are from Vatican II. However, this does not need to suggest a 
new and innovative Catholicism was invented in the 1960s. Benedict XVI, in 2005, cautioned against a 
“hermeneutic of discontinuity and rupture,” resulting from “compromises” which misrepresent the “true 
spirit of the Council.” Cf. Benedict XVI, “Address Of His Holiness Benedict XVI To The Roman Curia 
Offering Them His Christmas Greetings,” The Holy See, http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-
xvi/en/speeches/2005/december/documents/hf_ben_xvi_spe_20051222_roman-curia.html. 
It is striking to this author how many contemporary Catholics who emphasize discontinuity at 
Vatican II almost appear to desire to become Protestant. They have possibly underestimated continuity as 
one of the essential aspects of Catholicism. Cf. Hauerwas, Community of Character, 95. Here, Hauerwas 
blames Catholics for trying to be Protestants. In doing so, they have failed in their witness to make 
Protestants desire to be like Catholics.  
28 Jude 3.  
29 Cf. DV, 2, 7–10. 
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constitute new creations. Vatican I was very clear that the pope does not have authority to 
“make known some new doctrine.”30 Catholic documents often reference 2 Timothy 
1:13–14, where the epistle emphasizes retaining and “guarding” the deposit of faith. For 
the Catholic, the gospel is a person, Jesus Christ, who predates a scripted New Testament. 
The Catholic Church considers itself as securing, not inventing, that gospel.31 
Evangelicals may argue that some doctrines were indeed invented by Rome, but they are 
incorrect to accuse the Catholic Church of claiming such prerogative.32 
A popular myth among evangelicals is that papal infallibility was arbitrarily 
designed purely for political reasons. Although evangelicals may disagree with the 
doctrine, they need to understand its source. The Catholic understands papal infallibility 
as rooted in the indefectibility of the Church, which is sourced in confidence in the Spirit, 
who is promised in Scripture. Papal infallibility is only understood by the Catholic in the 
context of a living Church established and guided by Christ. God dwells in the visible 
Church, making it “faithful” and “anointed,”33 the “pillar and buttress of the truth.”34 For 
the Catholic, the Church is “indestructible”35 due to God’s power and Christ’s promise.36 
Owing to the presence of Christ, not human will, the “entire body” “cannot err in matters 
                                                          
30 Vatican I, 4:4, 6. EWTN. https://www.ewtn.com/library/councils/v1.htm#2.  
31 LG, 25. 
32 Also Cf. LG, 25 and CCC, 857.  
33 LG, 12.  
34 1 Timothy 3:15. 
35 CCC, 869. 
36 Matthew 16:18. 
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of belief.”37 For the Catholic, infallible teaching is limited. The pope can only speak 
infallibly on issues of faith and morals;38 his infallibility does not extend to issues of 
discipline, which might include his selection of bishops or cardinals, or judicial 
proceedings.39 The Catholic Church places clear limits on the pope. When speaking ex 
cathedra, he cannot “disclose a new doctrine.”40 He can only elucidate teaching that has 
been present in the Church since the time of Christ, and only on matters pertaining to 
faith and morals.  
It’s important for evangelicals to try to understand the importance of a visible 
Church in Catholic thinking. For Catholics, the “visible assembly” and “spiritual 
community” are not “two realities.” Instead, they “form one complex reality which 
coalesces from a divine and human element.”41 The doctrine of papal infallibility is based 
on this presence of Christ in the Church. The authority of human leadership within the 
                                                          
37 LG, 12. 
38 Vatican I, Pastor aeternus, 4; Denzinger, 3070:615; 3074:616; and “The Charism of Infallibility,” 3dd, 
(The Infallibility of the Pope), 1294. 
39 An illustration of this is John Paul II’s admission in 1979 of the sufferings caused by “people and 
organizations of the Church” (translated by this author from the French de la part d’hommes et 
d’organismes de l’Eglise at John Paul II, “Discours De Jean-Paul Ii À L'académie Pontificale Des Sciences 
En Commémoration De La Naissance D’albert Einstein,” The Holy See, November 10, 1979, 
http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/fr/speeches/1979/november/documents/hf_jp-
ii_spe_19791110_einstein.html). Note, however, that John Paul II did not suggest the Catholic Church 
erred in its teaching, but its people and organization erred in discipline. For a perspective on the Galileo 
affair which counters popular assumptions regarding the Church’s position on Galileo’s science, cf. 
Christopher Graney, “A True Demonstration: Bellarmine and the Stars as Evidence Against the Earth’s 
Motion in the Early Seventeenth Century,” Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture 14, no. 3 
(Summer 2011): 69–85; Peter Hodgson, “Galileo the Scientist,” Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and 
Culture 6, no. 3 (Summer 2003): 13–40; and Peter Hodgson, “Galileo the Theologian,” Logos: A Journal of 
Catholic Thought and Culture 8, no. 1 (Winter 2005): 28–51. 
40 Vatican I, 4:4, 6. EWTN. https://www.ewtn.com/library/councils/v1.htm#2.  
41 LG, 8.  
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“apostolic”42 Church is not arbitrary. The apostles, who are the “lasting foundation”43 of 
God’s kingdom,44 ordained their replacements; the modern bishops, as successors, are in 
the place of the apostles. The contemporary bishops are “endowed with the authority of 
Christ” to teach “the faith” and to illustrate it “by the light of the Holy Spirit.”45 Their 
placement in ministry is ordained by the Spirit, and their ministry will be exercised 
without interruption throughout time.46  
Certainly, evangelicals, as this author, can challenge the merits of deducing the 
full doctrine of papal infallibility from particular promises of Christ, but it appears 
incorrect to accuse the Catholic Church of arbitrariness. The doctrine developed within 
the broader implications over the indefectibility of the Church. Evangelicals might 
reasonably argue, as this author does, against a perpetually indefectible Church replete 
with continual inerrant teaching. And, they may argue with this author against the 
validity of claiming that such authority should be given to the singular office of the 
Bishop of Rome. Even evangelicals who see the doctrine as a logical possibility may 
judiciously argue that it is not a logical necessity. Regardless, those who debate need to 
realize that the doctrine was articulated from an ongoing pastoral concern to guard the 
apostolic faith once given. It was not arbitrarily legislated. 
 
                                                          
42 Quoted in LG, 8 as a reference to the Nicene Creed.  
43 CCC, 869.  
44 Revelation 21:14. 
45 LG, 25.  
46 CCC, 862. 
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Openness to Ecclesial Ways of Knowing  
Evangelicals need to give the Catholic Church a second look accompanied with 
openness to ecclesial ways of theological knowing. In short, they need to get beyond their 
critique, some of which evangelicals consider valid, and revisit ecclesiology in general 
and the Catholic Church specifically as valid sources of theological knowledge. Most 
evangelicals appear closed to considering this option. Nearly all evangelical 
hermeneutical models provide benefits, but they are ultimately incomplete without formal 
ecclesiology and appreciation for catholicity. 
 Evangelicals are not called by this reader to dismantle their legitimate concerns 
regarding ecclesiological abuse. Nor are they expected to overlook legitimate differences 
they have with Catholic theology. However, they are invited to reconsider what they have 
excessively critiqued, and critique what they have naively assumed. Much of this is 
attitudinal; evangelicals must nurture willingness within themselves. However, it also 
involves literary review of prevalent Christian thought patterns prior to the Reformation. 
Evangelicals need to understand responsibly the axiomatic relationship between 
ecclesiology and Scripture. They are asked to reexamine their hermeneutical models, and 
consider churchly ways of gaining theological insight. Possibly, a cure for some of their 
ills can be discovered in the symbols they rejected so long ago. A second naiveté appears 
to be in order.  
 The call to reconsider the role of ecclesiology in exegesis of Scripture is in fact 
not new. It is as old as Christianity. “He cannot possess the garment of Christ who parts 
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and divides the Church of Christ.”47 Were the Christian Scriptures ever understood 
without a living Church? Can a spiritual interpretation of Scripture, what Steinmetz 
called the “medieval theory of levels of meaning in the biblical text,”48 occur without a 
living rule of faith? Further, if “God is still speaking,”49 then might the Catholic Church 
have something to say? Evangelicals express openness to listening to God’s voice in 
various modes; however, they frequently close their minds to formal ecclesiastical 
options. Evangelicals need to open themselves to the pastoral voices of ecclesiology and 
the relevance of the Catholic Church in biblical exegesis. Many simply appear unwilling 
to hearken to the ecclesial manger where Christ’s voice was first heard.50  
Continuity and the Petrine Ministry  
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, no clear path for Catholic and 
evangelical reconciliation is apparent. The purpose of this dissertation is only to mark out 
a few next steps. However, evangelicals can certainly help the process by attempting to 
understand the Petrine ministry and apostolic succession with “sympathy.”  
                                                          
47 Cyprian, On the Unity of the Church (ANF 5:7:423).  
48 David C. Steinmetz, “The Superiority of Pre-Critical Exegesis,” Biblical Theology Bulletin: A Journal of 
Bible and Theology (August 1, 1986): 91, 
http://ttj.sagepub.com/content/37/1/27.short?rss=1&ssource=mfc. 
49 The well-known slogan for the United Church of Christ. Cf. www.ucc.org.  
50 Martin Luther, “Of the Birth of Jesus, and of the Angel Song of Praise at his Birth,” in Sermons on 
Gospel Texts for Advent, Christmas, and Epiphany, trans. John Nicholas Lenker, ed. Eugene F. A. Klug, 
vol. 1, Sermons by Martin Luther (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2000), 49–50:146–147, 
http://www.martinluthersermons.com/Luther_Lenker_Vol_1.pdf. Cf. Peter J. Leithart, “Allegory: A Test,” 
First Things, (November 29, 2004), http://www.firstthings.com/blogs/leithart/2004/11/allegory-a-test. Even 
Luther, almost a year after being excommunicated, still recognized that Bethlehem’s “treasure” lay in a 
manger, and that is where the beasts of the world would find him. “What is the manger but the 
congregations of Christians in the Churches?” Luther’s point is admittedly Christocentric preaching; a 
manger (Church) without Christ is useless. Although his point here is not necessarily the need for an 
ecclesial manger, his assumption regarding a relation between ecclesiology and exegesis is obvious. Christ 
is found in the manger. This assumption has generally been lost in evangelicalism. 
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Continuity is indispensable for a religion that claims descent from apostolic faith, 
especially if that faith is based on God acting in history. This means that evangelicals 
must equally draw on theologians who preceded the Reformation and are outside their 
own evangelical circles if they wish to claim confidence in the “one Spirit” who guides 
the “one body.”51 It is essential for evangelicals to dialogue with other denominations and 
across generations. Most evangelical theologies correctly see the importance of 
continuity in Christian faith;52 many confidently claim it for themselves. Germane to this 
dissertation, the setting for biblical reading and theological development must 
continuously be in the formal company of God’s people. In regards to the Catholic 
Church, it means that evangelicals must deal with the Petrine ministry. While engaging 
the idea of Petrine ministry, the evangelical should start with two considerations. 
First, some sort of hierarchy is needed for every living organism. The biological 
world is replete with living hierarchy, which demonstrates God’s design for healthy life. 
The communal nature of Christian faith has always assumed a communal hermeneutic, 
and Christian communities have always had some form of teaching authority.53 There is 
no apparent justification to discard those assumptions. Individual believers, especially 
leaders, were expected to “stand firm and hold” to the “traditions you were taught,” 
“either by our spoken word or by our letter.”54 The apostles’ teaching was part of the 
                                                          
51 Ephesians 4:4–5. 
52 Cf. Carson, “Evangelicals, Ecumenism, and the Church,” 352–354.  
53 There have been multiple forms of teaching authority used throughout Christian history, even among 
those who disdain all external, human forms of authority. Even those who claim to only “follow Christ” (1 
Corinthians 1:12) nonetheless set themselves up as authoritative oracles. Who, then, determines what 
following Christ looks like? Who determines the interpretation of the Bible, or what the Spirit says? 
54 2 Thessalonians 2:15. Cf. 1 Corinthians 11:2. 
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believers’ devotional practice in Jerusalem,55and adherence to certain written and 
unwritten “traditions” was the basis of fellowship in Thessalonica.56 The first 
missionaries were formally sent by a pneumatically inspired “Church.”57 As their work 
spread, the correctness of their efforts was judged by the hierarchy established by 
Christ.58 These practices were consistent with Christ’s promise to be “with you (all) 
always”59 and “guide you (all) into all truth” by the Spirit.60 Jesus claimed that he would 
ever be present with his people,61 specifically invoking the idea that Hell would not 
prevail against the Church62 as it engaged in its activity of authoritative “teaching.”63 This 
challenges the notion of discontinuity between generations, and the need for a revolution 
which discards hierarchy. In a tone reminiscent of Matthew, the first letter to Timothy 
links the modern day teaching of the Church with the original testimony of Jesus, and 
                                                          
55 Acts 2:42. 
56 2 Thessalonians 3:6. 
57 Acts 13:1–3. 
58 Acts 15, Jerusalem Council. 
59 Matthew 28:19. υ͑μῶν, “you all;” second person plural, genitive. Cf. the footnote below. 
60 John 16:13. υ͑μa͂ς, “you all;” second person plural, accusative. Grammatically, the plural “you” in 
Matthew and John (previous footnote) could possibly refer to each individual; i.e., “I will be with each of 
you,” or, “The Spirit will guide each of you into all truth.” However, the context helps furnish the most 
accurate translation. Christ is speaking to his disciples gathered together, those for whom he insisted on and 
prayed for unity. It appears the best translation is to understand the plural “you” as referencing a single 
body. Christ promised to be with his followers as a whole, and the Spirit would guide the whole Church. 
Certainly, he is present with each individual and the Spirit guides individuals; however, the emphasis in 
these passages appears to be on Christ’s blessings on the company of his followers. A single group of 
disciples appears to be his focus. 
61 Matthew 28:20. 
62 Matthew 16:18.  
63 Matthew 28:20. 
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with the final appearing of the “Sovereign.”64 In an image of unbroken testimony, Christ 
first declared the gospel, and he will ultimately preserve the faith in his Church until the 
end of the age.65 How does Christ preserve his word over time? It is through ordained 
leadership; they are the ones who safeguard the “deposit entrusted”66 in the interim. 
Certainly, an apparent large-scale apostasy will come at the hands of “some,”67 but they 
are not identified. Further, apostasy will not be universal. Yet, it is the official ministers 
who are depended upon to “keep the commandment unstained”68 in the face of apostasy. 
Even the Protestant reader, who thinks the highest ordained teachers of the Church can 
err, can see in this passage that the correction of error still comes from authoritative 
ordained leadership.69 Confidence in Christ must translate to some confidence in 
hierarchy because Christ is the one who pneumatically ordains his leaders. This author 
does not suggest Matthew’s Church or Timothy’s guardians are necessarily promised 
infallibility. Apostate teaching will occur, and these passages do not say it cannot occur at 
the highest levels of the hierarchy. However, none of these passages advocate dismissal 
of the paradigm of authoritative ordained leadership. While these sacred passages do not 
explicitly delineate how modern ecclesiastical structures must be tangibly related to 
                                                          
64 1 Timothy 6:13–15. 
65 1 Timothy 6:20. 
66 1 Timothy 6:20. 
67 1 Timothy 4:1. 
68 1 Timothy 6:14. 
69 Catholics do think individual bishops, priests, and others can err. However, the ratification of a council 
by Peter’s successor is what provides guardianship to the deposit of faith. Despite this biblical text, all 
evangelicals do not think ordained clergy is necessarily the remedy for error in the Church. However, this 
disagreement only further demonstrates the lack of unity within Protestantism. 
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historic Christianity, they do suggest an important degree of continuity. Errant teaching is 
ultimately corrected by authority within an ecclesiastical structure. Any responsible 
evangelical hermeneutic must be shaped with this assumption.  
Second, as already illustrated in this dissertation, the general idea of apostolic 
succession has biblical roots. The doctrine contains an essential ingredient often missing 
in evangelical theology: continuity. After the apostles died, the early Christians certainly 
saw its value. Clement, shortly after the late first century, communicated the importance 
of apostolic succession of real persons,70 and Irenaeus relied on it for his second-century 
apologetics.71 Further, the teaching of apostolic succession is important currently for 
more than the Catholic Church. Both the Orthodox Churches and the Anglican 
Communion maintain distinct, but positive, understandings of apostolic succession. The 
fact is that evangelical and Reformed theologians who deny any sort of ministerial 
apostolic succession, or limit it to right thinking, are in a minority. The contemporary 
Catholic Church is only being consistent with itself in affirming the need for 
succession.72 While several evangelicals unfortunately care little about the doctrine, they 
need to reconsider it from a posture of critical empathy. Evangelicals will surely disagree 
                                                          
70 Cf. Clement of Alexandria, epistula Clementis ad Corinthios, in The First Epistle of Clement to the 
Corinthians,(ANF, 9:42:241–242). “Real persons” is inserted here because many Protestants have 
restricted apostolic succession to simply believing what the apostles taught. However, this view does not 
seem to be what early Fathers had in mind. To this reader, the view of successive right thinking almost 
appears to be docetic, and leads to anarchy. It evidences a loss of understanding Christian sacramentality. 
Ultimately, it neglects implications of the Incarnation. The idea of Christ being present in the Church 
means he is present in the people, not just their ideas. 
71 Irenaeus, Against Heresies, Chapter 3 (ANF, 1:3:, 415–416). Of course, that is this reader’s interpretation 
of the Fathers because it appears to be the most credible interpretation of the patristic texts in question. 
Others may disagree.  
72 DV, 7. 
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with details of different elucidations of apostolic succession, especially the Catholic 
teaching; but, they need to understand the essential importance of some form of apostolic 
succession in transmitting the gospel. Apostolic succession involves more than ordaining 
clergy or providing doctrinal assent; it is the living means by which the gospel will 
continue in the earth until Christ returns. Through apostolic succession, Catholics give 
themselves better opportunity to read Scripture in continuity and historical connection 
with the apostles, even if the particular Catholic theory contains errors. Apostolic 
succession gives Catholics a better opportunity to read Scripture in its fullness. To this 
author, evangelicals should affirm the sovereign and providential work of Christ in the 
Catholic Church without assenting to all the particulars of Catholic dogma. While 
evangelicals do not hold to infallibility or the exclusivity of the Catholic apostolic line,73 
they need to apprehend the value of historic connection to the apostles and Christ. 
Through apostolic succession, the Catholic Church provides the evangelical with 
tangible, historical connection to the apostles. The doctrine of apostolic succession is 
another example of the need for evangelicals to give higher regard for the continuous 
work of the one Holy Spirit in the universal Church. Without this regard, Christian 
theology will be spineless, or slip into some form of Docetism.74  
Due to the importance of continuity in Christian theology, evangelicals should 
seek to exercise critical empathy for the Petrine ministry. Otherwise they will not be 
sufficiently engaging the Catholic Church. As mentioned previously, evangelicals should 
                                                          
73 Cf. Matthew 23:2–3 and Luke 3:8. While trying to avoid becoming anarchists, Christians also want to 
avoid becoming Pharisees.  
74 Cf. Braaten and Jensen, Catholicity of the Reformation, 62; and Braaten, Mother Church, 5, 34. 
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first be clear regarding what the Catholic Church claims for the pope, and what it does 
not claim. Evangelicals need to seek to avoid distorted accounts of Catholic teaching.  
On one hand, the Catholic Church reasonably argues from Scripture that Christ 
made Peter the clear leader of the early Church, and that a degree of deference to Peter’s 
successors is evident in some of the earliest Christian literature. Further, the Catholic 
Church appears to accurately portray the perceived significance of apostolic succession 
throughout Church history; bishops, following the apostles, were entrusted to guard the 
deposit of faith. These premises are evident in the New Testament and throughout 
Christian history, even if they do not warrant later Catholic developments regarding the 
Petrine ministry. On the other hand, most evangelicals would argue that Catholic 
theology unjustifiably expands the meaning of select biblical texts.75 Evangelicals often 
point to the extent of authority which Catholics give to the Petrine ministry as an 
example. To this author, the sacred passages which speak of Peter’s primacy neither 
appear to guarantee Petrine infallibility at all times on matters of faith and morals, nor 
suggest that a Christian congregation should not be called a real “church” if it does not 
enjoy communion with the pope as one of its “internal constitutive principles.”76 Instead, 
Peter is often presented in Scripture as an elder brother who is fallible in all points, and 
                                                          
75 Of course, some evangelicals make the same claim against their evangelical opponents on various other 
topics. 
76 Cf. Congregation For The Doctrine Of The Faith, “Responses to Some Questions Regarding Certain 
Aspects of the Doctrine on the Church,” The Holy See, June 29, 2007, 4, 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20070629_respons
a-quaestiones_en.html.  
Cf. Congregation For The Doctrine Of The Faith, “Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on 
Some Aspects of the Church Understood as Communion,” The Holy See, May 28, 1992. 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_28051992_commu
nionis-notio_en.html. Cf. Luke 9:49-50. 
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perennially needs correction and restoration. Nonetheless, these critiques do not give 
warrant for evangelicals to jettison the Catholic hierarchy. Nor do they justify a 
postmodern ontological preference for particularities, coupled with contempt for 
universals, as seen in some communal hermeneutics, as well as more extreme feminist 
and liberation theologies. To this author, evangelicals should be more reasonable in their 
critique of Catholic ecclesiology. Evangelicals are not bound by the teachings of the 
Magisterium, but they need to listen to them as they would an elder brother. They can 
maintain their criticisms of the Catholic Church’s doctrine of the Petrine ministry, and 
still respect the pope as one of the Spirit’s divine appointees. Such respect is first 
attitudinal. Without advocating infallibility, evangelicals need to trust that the Lord Who 
promised to never leave His Church may indeed speak through the pope and bishops. 
Otherwise, they have neglected the Bible’s clear teaching that the Trinity organizes the 
Church and operates within it.77 However, respect also involves critical listening and 
research. Minimally, the evangelical theologian should be familiar with the 
Magisterium’s most prominent teachings, and relevant papal encyclicals. Although this 
effort to respect without necessary submission will not satisfy many, it certainly 
challenges evangelicals to reconsider their own stubborn premises. Possibly, that is the 
first necessary step. Evangelicals need to interpret Scripture in continuity by affirming 
the convictions that Christian history is not arbitrary, and ecclesial structures of authority, 
even when understood incorrectly, are gifts from God.  
 
                                                          
77 1 Corinthians 12:1–3. 
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Summary 
 Evangelicals need to re-examine their own criticisms critically. This will help 
them understand obligatory contours their own hermeneutics must exhibit. It will help 
them detect distorted, mythical assumptions about Catholic theology. It will open them to 
retrieving forgotten but necessary exegetical assumptions. Evangelicals must honestly 
attempt empathy from a critical distance. They can neither dismiss their historic 
criticisms levied against Roman Catholicism, nor forget the real dangers of ecclesiastical 
abuse, whether Catholic or Protestant. However, they need to advance beyond the 
criticism and readdress the foundational relationship between Church and Scripture. With 
faith in the Spirit, they need to attempt to emerge on the other side of criticism, and help 
themselves by rediscovering living value still resident in those structures they thought 
were condemned.  
Ecclesial Characteristics of Revelation 
Ecclesial exegesis of Scripture appears to be compulsory when one examines 
certain characteristics of Christian revelation. The context in which Christian revelation 
arrives, its central focus, its soteriological effect, and its paradoxical quality all suggest 
the need to read the Bible in living ecclesiastical Tradition. 
The following analyses of particular characteristics of Christian revelation will 
heavily draw on the text of Scripture, partly because it is speaking from an evangelical 
location to an evangelical audience. However, it will also significantly utilize recent 
Catholic theologians and formal documents. The object is to demonstrate the necessity of 
interpreting the Scriptures, as an evangelical, with assistance from the Catholic Church in 
a way that fruitfully broadens an understanding of the sacred text. Evangelicals should 
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discover numerous formal Catholic statements that are congruent and edifying to 
evangelical faith. 
Ecclesial Setting of Revelation 
Evangelicals generally confess belief in the inspiration of the biblical text. 
However, they cannot neglect the ecclesial matrix in which the Spirit produced the text. 
Jesus left a Church, not a scripted word, at his departure. The New Testament was 
produced after Christ’s life on earth by those to whom the word was “once for all 
delivered.”78 The Spirit was promised after Christ’s departure to “guide” Christ’s 
followers “into all the truth.”79 This promise is commonly understood as preauthorization 
for the writings of the New Testament. However, it is a mistake to forget the inspired 
womb that birthed the sacred text. The Church, as the cradle of the New Testament, was 
the necessary recipient of revelation, and was later considered the proper pneumatic 
location of biblical interpretation. From the earliest records, the work of the gospel, 
including interpretation of the Scriptures, involved human leadership presumed to be 
explicitly endorsed. Christ progressively develops his “whole body”80 through distinct 
persons to whom he enabled to do the work of ministry.81 The New Testament itself is an 
ecclesial theology.82 The four Gospels are not simply unbiased, objective reports of 
historic events. Instead, the faith-filled authors had distinct motives for why they included 
                                                          
78 Jude 3. 
79 John 16:13. 
80 Ephesians 4:16. 
81 Ephesians 4:11ff; Matthew 28:20; Luke 22:32. 
82 Benedict XVI, God’s Word, 62–63. 
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what they wrote, and why they positioned it differently from each other in their 
respective texts.83 This observation does not need to challenge the historicity or 
inspiration of the Gospels. Rather, it is put forward to demonstrate that the New 
Testament itself was written to already existing Churches with a measure of doctrine 
already in place.  
In the New Testament, the term “Church” is often used to reference a particular 
congregation,84 or the plural “churches” is used when referencing distinct 
congregations.85 However, a single universal “body” remains in the background of these 
uses. Christ’s use of the singular,86 the recurring cry for unity throughout the New 
Testament, Paul’s insistence on “one body,”87 the gathering of a council,88 and the 
monogamous bride imagery89 all suggests that the ideal was a universal Church in which 
each particular congregation had its identity.90 “You are the body of Christ and 
individually members of it.”91 Given the ecclesiastical context of the authoring of the 
                                                          
83 Cf. Matthew’s “Blessed are the poor in spirit” (5:3) with Luke’s “Blessed are you who are poor” (6:20), 
or Matthew’s Sermon on the Mount neatly contained in chapters 5–7 and Luke’s parallel spreading out of 
Christ’s teaching throughout his Gospel, interspersing the teachings with other various narratives. The 
Evangelists clearly appear to have had motives behind the construction of their narratives. 
84 e.g., Philemon 1:2. 
85 e.g., Acts 15:41. 
86 Matthew 16:18. 
87 Ephesians 4:4. 
88 Acts 15. 
89 Ephesians 5:25–27. Cf. Revelation 21:2. 
90 Cf. Paul’s advocacy for the suffering “saints” in Jerusalem in 1 Corinthians 16:1–4. Paul “directed” 
Churches he personally started in Galatia and Corinth to financially support the Church in Jerusalem, which 
he did not start. An assumed unity is operative in the background. 
91 1 Corinthians 12:27. 
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New Testament and the later ecclesial validation of canonical texts, it is consistent to 
argue that hermeneutics was ideally formed by a community aware of the “universal 
dimension” of Christian faith.92  
As mentioned, John Nevin saw this when he argued that the Bible needed to be 
interpreted within the “orbit of the creed,” from within the communion of the Church. 
“The Bible, to be a true word of Christ, must be ruled by the life of the Church.”93 For 
Nevin, the Apostles’ Creed was a “common rule of faith, or canon of truth, which the 
Universal Church held from the beginning.”94 Its universal acceptance showed it to be a 
symbol of the comprehensive faith of Christ’s followers. Benedict XVI observed that the 
“practice of the Church, and of medieval theology which followed it” demonstrated that 
the “creed” served as the “hermeneutic key to the Scriptures.”95 Although Nevin and 
Benedict XVI obviously have different understandings of Tradition and the formal role of 
creeds, and may differ further from contemporary evangelicals, they both recognize that 
an ecclesiastically-generated hermeneutic was needed to convey a unified Scripture. The 
Church served as the indispensable setting for biblical interpretation. 
                                                          
92 Cf. Benedict XVI’s statements to the Bishops in Switzerland: “On the other hand, they (the Bishops) 
must open the local Churches to the universal dimension. Given the difficulties the Orthodox encounter 
with the Autocephalous Churches as well as the problems of our Protestant friends in the face of the 
disintegration of the regional Churches, we realize the great significance of universality and the importance 
of the Church being open to totality, to become in universality a Church which is truly one.” (Benedict 
XVI, “Address Of His Holiness Benedict XVI to the Bishops of Switzerland, Tuesday, 7 November 2006,” 
The Holy See, http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/speeches/2006/november/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_spe_20061107_swiss-bishops.html.) 
93 Nevin, “Apostles Creed,” 340.  
94 Nevin, “New Liturgy,” 34.  
95 Benedict XVI, God’s Word, 61. 
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For evangelicals, the contemporary upshot of this is that the Scriptures should be 
“read within the living community of the Church”96 which produced them. The Scripture 
is the supreme rule of faith, and it “cannot be broken.”97 However, neither should it be 
read in a vacuum; evangelicals must attempt to read the Bible with Catholics in the full 
pneumatic life-flow in which it was generated. This involves a regard for the symbiotic 
relationship between Scripture, Tradition, and the modern, living Church. Again, this 
dissertation can point to the goal but is incapable of mapping the journey. Apparent 
irreconcilable differences exist between evangelicals and other Christians, especially the 
Catholic Church, which makes it impossible to satisfactorily identify a universal 
governing body of interpreters. Nonetheless, evangelicals must make their move; they 
must give greater effort to reading Holy Scripture within divinely-given environs. They 
must intentionally engage visible, ecclesiastical bodies, including the Catholic Church. 
Otherwise, they will potentially disrespect the Spirit who inspired the text and risk 
dishonoring the Lord’s body.98 
Christocentric Focus of Revelation 
Christology in some form was the explicit approach behind various exegetical 
methods99 throughout Church history and in the New Testament.100 It is put forward in 
                                                          
96 Benedict XVI, Bishops of Switzerland.  
97 John 10:35. 
98 Cf. 1 Corinthians 11:27–28. Although this passage is in a different context, the general warning applies. 
99 Again, cf. Möhler’s distinction between vision and method in Unity, Addendum 7:293–295. 
100 As mentioned, Matthew 2:15’s use of Hosea 11:1, as well as multiple other New Testament passages, 
are dependent upon the Christ event for their interpretations of Old Testament passages. Inductive or 
communal exegetical methods would not be able to achieve similar conclusions.  
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the present work as the necessary overarching guide for Christian hermeneutics which 
can successfully function with diverse exegetical models. However, it is also argued that 
a Christocentric interpretation of Scripture implies an ecclesiastical warrant.  
 From the earliest known perspectives of Christians, the conviction that Jesus is 
the center of Scripture seems prevalent.101 The harmony of revelation was sourced in the 
person of Christ, pointed to him, and was fulfilled in him.102 After Jesus announced, “The 
time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand,”103 it began to become evident that 
more than the fulfillment of a prophecy was occurring; the prophecy itself had stepped 
forward.104 “He was foreknown before the foundation of the world;”105 his origins were 
traced to “ancient days;”106 he preceded Abraham;107 he “followed” the children the Israel 
through the wilderness;108 he spoke “in” the prophets;109he was the living temple of 
God;110 he provided unity to the universe;111 he was the source of everything and the final 
                                                          
101 John 5:39. 
102 Matthew 5:17. 
103 Mark 1:15. 
104 Cf. John 5:39. 
105 1 Peter 1:20. 
106 Micah 5:2. 
107 John 8:58. 
108 1 Corinthians 10:1–5. 
109 1 Peter 1:11. 
110 John 2:18–22. 
111 Colossians 1:17. 
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destination of it all.112 He was sent to “the lost sheep of the house of Israel,”113 but also 
came as “a light for revelation”114 to all humanity. Just as “he stood up to read,”115 so the 
text needs the one who “fulfilled”116 it to rise before it is understood. Only in the light of 
his paschal mystery and resurrection can the Old Testament “Scripture” and New 
Testament “word that Jesus had spoken” be clearly grasped.117 It was after he “interpreted 
to them in all the Scriptures the things concerning himself”118 that it all began to become 
clear. It was when he “opened” their eyes that “they recognized him,”119 and their 
“minds” could “understand the Scriptures.”120 Philip expressed the human desire to see 
God, and Jesus pointed to himself.121 “In the days of his flesh”122 Jesus revealed God to 
the world. “No one ever spoke like this man,”123and “never since the world began”124 did 
anyone do what he did. God fully dwelled in him.125Attempts to gain the life of the 
                                                          
112 Colossians 1:16–22. 
113 Matthew 15:24. 
114 Luke 2:32, referencing Isaiah 42:6; and Acts 13:47, referencing 49:6 and possibly Isaiah 45:22. 
115 Luke 4:16. 
116 Luke 4:21. 
117 John 2:22.  
118 Luke 24:27. 
119 Luke 24:31–32. 
120 Luke 24:45. 
121 John 14:8–9. 
122 Hebrews 5:7. 
123 John 7:46. 
124 John 9:32. 
125 Colossians 2:9. 
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Kingdom without going through Christ could be likened to someone attempting to enter a 
feast without complying with the conditions of the invitation,126 attempting to enter a 
building without a “door,”127 or trying to open a door without “the key.”128  
The ancient presumption of Christological unity in the Scriptures is significant for 
evangelicals who hope to interpret the Scriptures in continuity with their progenitors. On 
one hand, a Christocentric vision claims to be a “theological fact”129 which suggests a 
“criterion” for judging the “truthfulness” of any theological dogma; it presumes all 
biblical interpretation must exhibit an “orientation to Christ himself.”130 The text of the 
Bible is more than gramma; it is also pneuma. Grammatical analyses without 
Christocentric spiritual interpretation leads to fundamentalism and “kills.”131 In a 
Christocentric hermeneutic, the writings within this “one Scripture” can only be properly 
understood “if they are read in the analogia fidei as a oneness in which there is progress 
towards Christ, and inversely, in which Christ draws all history to himself; and if, 
moreover, all this is brought to life in the Church’s faith.”132 “If it leads us away from 
                                                          
126 Matthew 22:1–14. 
127 John 10:7–9. 
128 Luke 11:52. 
129 Benedict XVI, Bishops of Switzerland. 
130 Benedict XVI, Verbum Domini, 14. 
131 2 Corinthians 3:6. Also cf. Benedict XVI, God’s Word, 54. 
132 Benedict XVI, Bishops of Switzerland. Cf. CCC, 129. Note 107 of paragraph 129 of the Catechism 
quotes Augustine in his questionum in heptateuchum, 2:73, where Augustine claims the New Testament is 
hidden in the Old Testament, and the new “opens” the Old. The Latin text is found at 
http://www.augustinus.it/latino/questioni_ettateuco/index2.htm. The 2:73 passage reads, Loquere tu nobis, 
et non loquatur ad nos Deus, ne quando moriamur. Multum et solide significatur, ad Vetus Testamentum 
timorem potius pertinere, sicut ad Novum dilectionem: quamquam et in Vetere Novum lateat, et in Novo 
Vetus pateat. Quomodo autem tali populo tribuatur videre vocem Dei, si hoc accipiendum est intellegere, 
cum sibi loqui Deum timeant ne moriantur, non satis elucet. 
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him, then it certainly does not come from the Holy Spirit, who guides us more deeply into 
the Gospel, and not away from it.”133 Considering that the Paschal mystery gives 
Scripture its “deepest fulfillment,” and furnishes history with its “inner logic” and “true 
meaning,”134 then all biblical interpretation must be viewed in the light of Christ’s 
Passion and resurrection. Otherwise, the proper unity of the text is being neglected. 
 On the other hand, the Scriptures must not be interpreted in a pneumatic vacuum. 
Christocentric hermeneutics cannot be allowed to curtail other approaches to interpreting 
the gramma of the biblical text. “A proper exegesis of the text” certainly “must be based 
on the historical-critical method,” as well as “enriched by other approaches.”135 
Historical-grammatical analyses begin the process of investigating the objective literal 
meaning of each separate passage. In addition, the dating of the particular manuscripts, 
authorship, identities of original recipients, form analyses, and redaction histories are 
critical elements of the initial exegetical process. Further, more subjective, communal 
interpretations of the texts can furnish applicable insights which are not always 
immediately detected in the texts. These might include some forms of reader-response 
readings or an understanding of the real lived experiences of contemporary readers of the 
sacred texts. However, without a governing Christocentric lens, all of these important 
disciplines are incomplete and incapable of judging the full meaning of the Scriptures; 
their particular emphases will prevent them from unifying and forming a full 
understanding of the Scriptures, resulting in theology being reduced to either a restricted 
                                                          
133 Benedict XVI, Verbum Domini, 14. 
134 Benedict XVI, Verbum Domini, 12. 
135 Synod of Bishops, Instrumentum Laboris, 21. Cf. DV, 12, 25. 
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scientific endeavor or yet another form of anthropology. It is only Christ himself who 
provides the interpretive spiritual sense and full-orbed meaning to the Bible. This 
governing Christocentric hermeneutic is not merely imaginative, nor should it be 
confused with private intellectual conjecture.136 Instead, the spiritual, or Christological, 
sense of Scripture is sourced in the literal text itself, the Paschal mystery, and the 
contemporary life in the Spirit of the Church.137  
  Evangelicals should realize that Christocentric hermeneutics implies the biblical 
text is to be read in the authorized community of his people. If Christ is the focus of 
Scripture, then Scripture must be read in his presence; he must be the one who interprets 
the text. The “body of Christ”138 is his real presence on earth, and remains the center of 
all revelatory activity. Although the Church is assembled by the Spirit, it is not 
haphazardly referred to as Christ’s “body.”139 Here, the Chalcedonian Creed helps 
ecclesiology. The Church shares in the humanity of Christ as much as it does his divinity. 
“We come to the true conception of the Church through a true and sound Christology (as 
in the Creed), and in no other way.”140 Analogous to the Incarnation, the Church is 
understood as visible, structured, and the physical dwelling in which God lives;141 it is a 
                                                          
136 Cf. Synod of Bishops, Instrumentum Laboris, 22b.  
137 Cf. Synod of Bishops, Instrumentum Laboris, 22b. 
138 1 Corinthians 11:27. 
139 Colossians 1:24. 
140 John Williamson Nevin, “Wilberforce on the Incarnation,” in John Williamson Nevin, Philip Schaf, and 
Daniel Gans, The Incarnate Word: Selected Writings on Christology, ed. William B. Evans and W. B. 
Littlejohn, vol. 4, Mercersburg Theology Study Series (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2014), 86.  
141 1 Timothy 3:15. ζῶντος.  
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divinely organized142 community where Jesus is actually encountered.143 By his Spirit, 
Christ is “in the midst”144 of his Churches, bringing the “good work” he began to 
“completion”145 by divinely working his salvation in them.146 He accomplishes this 
through real historical people, who both authored the sacred text and authoritatively 
interpret it.  
Evangelicals need ecclesiology to conduct the symphonic unity Christ brings to 
revelation. Revelation, like a “hymn with many voices,”147 is “polyphonic.”148 And in 
Scripture, the “many heralds”149 of revelation are frequently called “word of God” in 
their particularity. Scripture itself instructs its reader to give an ear to nature in order to 
hear the word of God. In creation, the “knowledge” of God, including “his attributes” and 
“divine nature,” had been “shown” in a “plain”150 manner. Paul was merely restating long 
held assumptions. The deuterocanonical Book of Wisdom had earlier said that through 
                                                          
142 John 15:16, Acts 2:47; Romans 12:3–8; 1 Corinthians 12:4–11; Ephesians 4:1–16; Colossians 1:22; 1 
Peter 2:9. 
143 Matthew 18:20; Matthew 28:20. Although the immediate context of Matthew 18 is discipline of 
members, the assumption that Christ is present with his people is not restricted to moments of discipline. 
Cf. the relationship between Hebrews 13:7 and 13:8. Christ is constant, as exemplified in “your leaders.”  
144 Revelation 1:13. 
145 Phillipians 1:6. 
146 Philippians 2:13. 
147 Synod of Bishops, Instrumentum Laboris, 9. 
148 Cf. Benedict XVI, Verbum Domini, 7,16.  
149 Synod of Bishops, Instrumentum Laboris, 9. 
150 Romans 1:19–20. The term translated “plain” Φανερόν (phaneron) emphasizes an outward obvious 
manifestation; it suggests physical evidence. Paul’s repeated use of the term (Φανερῷ) in Romans 2:28 is 
translated “outwardly.”  
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“the greatness and beauty of created things their original author, by analogy, is seen.”151 
And the Psalmist said all the cosmos reverberates with “speech” that “reveals 
knowledge” about God and his “glory.”152 Within creation, it is humanity that best 
displays God;153 Paul argued that the knowledge of God’s law is in everyone’s 
conscience, even those without divinely written texts.154 The messages of apostles,155 
prophets,156 evangelists,157 and various believers158 are all referred to as the word of God, 
and certainly the written text of Scripture is repeatedly called the word of God.159  
Christocentric hermeneutics brings these several words of God into unity by 
understanding them as “analogically”160 mediating a single voice; in reality, there is only 
one Word. There has always been a single source to the various manifestations of 
revelation: “God” “has spoken to us by his Son.161 Although God lately spoke through his 
                                                          
151 Wisdom 13:5. 
152 Psalm 19:1–3. 
153 Genesis 1:26–27; Genesis 9:6. 
154 Romans 2:15. 
155 Acts 13:5. 
156 The phrases “This is what the Lord says,” “The Lord spoke to Moses,” “The word of the Lord came to 
Ezekiel,” etc. appears up to two thousand times in the Old Testament. 
157 2 Timothy 4:2, 5. Note Paul calling Timothy to do the work of an “evangelist” in verse 5. 
158 Acts 8:4. 
159 Cf. Exodus 24:7; 34:27; Deuteronomy 31:9; 2 Kings 22:8; Nehemiah 8:1–3; Jeremiah 30:2; Luke 24:44; 
2 Peter 3:14–16; Revelation 22:18–19. Many synonyms are used which obviously connect the word of God 
with the written text of Scripture; e.g., Law, Ordinances, testimonies, commandments, precepts, statutes. 
Cf. Psalm 119, where all but four verses of one hundred seventy six appear to refer to God’s word as 
written. Throughout the Old Testament statements which say something similar to, “And God said to 
Moses,” “And God spoke to the prophet, saying,” “Hear the Word of the LORD,” or the older translation, 
“Thus saith the Lord,” and similar, occur almost two thousand times. 
160 Benedict XVI, Verbum Domini, 7. 
161 Hebrews 1:1–2. 
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Son “in these last days,”162 he had always communicated through him, “through whom he 
created the world.”163 The symphony has always been in harmony. The concord 
connecting various words of God is the “person of Jesus Christ, the eternal Son of the 
Father, made man.”164 For, “the complete Word of God which was in the beginning with 
God is not a multitude of Words, for it is not words. It is a single word.”165  
The Spirit enables the Church to order harmoniously polyphonic revelation 
around Christ as its center. Ideally, exegetes immerse themselves in the word of God by 
fully participating in the body of Christ prior to interpreting the Scriptures. The Church’s 
fecund womb was the source of the New Testament and its contemporary gatherings 
remain the location of charismatic speech. Just as all ecstatic prophecies are to be judged 
in the Church,166 so the Scripture is to be interpreted within her living Tradition. The 
analogy of faith167 refers to the Church’s faith, not one’s private revelation or the 
narrative musings of a small group. “Christ is not dead,” but alive; “it is precisely in his 
Church” that he is found “living and present.”168  
                                                          
162 Hebrews 1:2. 
163 Hebrews 1:3. 
164 Benedict XVI, Verbum Domini, 7. 
165 Origen, Commentary on the Gospel of John, Book V, 5, p. 163. Cf. the use of Origen’s passage in 
Synod of Bishops, Instrumentum Laboris, 11.  
166 Cf. 1 Corinthians 14:26–33. 
167 Romans 12:6. κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τῆς πίστεως.  
168 Benedict XVI, God’s Word, 58. Evangelicals often express concern over identifying the Church with the 
Incarnate Christ. The fear is that the Church will replace Christ or become another deity, resulting in 
idolatry. Cf. George, “Toward an Evangelical Ecclesiology,” in Catholics and Evangelicals, 127. However, 
the frequent evangelical concern against idolatry of the Church does not justify neglect of the sacramental 
presence of Christ in his people. Nor does it sanction a Gnostic-like spiritualization of Christianity, which 
supposes to be a religion based on God present in human flesh. The underestimation of the sacramental 
nature of the Church is as deadly as idolatry; both paths lead to distortion. 
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Soteriological Effect of Revelation 
Revelation is a personal disclosure of God which consequently has a 
soteriological effect on its recipients. Considering that Christian salvation involves 
participation in the hypostatic union of Christ’s divine and human natures, it follows that 
interpretation of salvific revelation needs to occur in the divine-human ecclesial Body of 
Christ, which includes visible, historical structures which he established. 
  Christian revelation keeps a tight balance between conveying facts to be 
understood and a person to be encountered.169 Notwithstanding its dogmatic element, 
Christian revelation transcends “propositional statements.”170 The endgame has always 
been personal “knowledge of him.”171 “Revelation in the Bible is an encounter between 
God and people.”172 “In the sacred books, the Father who is in heaven meets His children 
with great love and speaks with them.”173 The reader of Scripture is informed about God, 
and then transformed by the engagement; God engages the recipient in discourse and 
“becomes known through the dialogue” he has “with us.”174  
God’s “initiative” in revelation “is utterly gratuitous, moving from God to men 
and women in order to bring them to salvation.”175 God’s personal disclosure is a 
                                                          
169 DV, 6 
170 ICBI 2:6. 
171 Ephesians 1:17. 
172 Synod of Bishops, Instrumentum Laboris, 23. 
173 DV, 21 
174 Benedict XVI, Verbum Domini, 6.  
175 John Paul II, Fides et ratio, The Holy See, http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-
ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_14091998_fides-et-ratio.html.7.  
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“dialogue”176 of love, and he is revealed face to face177 as “love”178 through Jesus Christ. 
The Lord speaks to his people as “friends,” those to whom he has “made known” all that 
he heard from the Father.179 Out of “love”180 Christ emptied himself in humility with the 
intention to serve others.181 Christ loved before it was mutual.182 He chose his followers; 
they did not select him.183 However, the “novelty” of the transforming “dialogue”184 does 
not preclude free will. The revealing God causes a “radical transformation” within those 
who are “sincerely open.”185 In faith, people become united to the God who “loved”186 
them.  
Christian salvation involves participation in the God who personally reveals 
himself. It is more than changing one’s mind, or providing doctrinal assent. Christian 
faith and confession187 involves “actual participation” in Christ’s real “life and power.”188 
                                                          
176 Benedict XVI, Verbum Domini, 6. 
177 2 Corinthians 4:6. 
178 1 John 4:8,16. 
179 John 15:14–15. Cf. DV, 2. 
180 Philippians 2:2. 
181 Philippians 2: 7: Άλλά έαυτòν έκένωσεν: But he emptied himself / made himself nothing (kenosis); 
μορφήν δούλου λαβών: taking the form of a servant.  
182 Cf. 1 John 4:10 and Romans 5:8. 
183 John 15:16. 
184 Benedict XVI, Verbum Domini, 6.  
185 Benedict XVI, Verbum Domini, 50. 
186 John 3:16. 
187 Romans 10:10. 
188 Nevin, “Wilberforce on the Incarnation,” 77. 
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On one hand, Christ certainly saves by his divine nature. The forgiveness of sins is an 
authority which “God alone”189 possesses, and the original Creator was needed to re-
create his creatures.190 Through Christ’s “divine power” and “promises” people can 
become “partakers of the divine nature” and be saved from the “corruption that is in the 
world.”191 Classic Protestantism reminds that soteriology includes a declarative, forensic 
aspect.192 On the other hand, evangelical theologies cannot forget the sharing of Christ’s 
humanity in salvation. He shared in the humanity of others in order to deliver them from 
their deepest fear.193 
Christ’s “eternal salvation194 was revealed during “the days of his flesh”195 
“through suffering.”196 God “shows” “his love for us” in Christ’s physical death “for 
us.”197 The latent assumption that Christ primarily saves by his deity, or simply by some 
distant eternal decree, denies the importance of the Incarnation. “For you know the grace 
of our Lord Jesus Christ, that though he was rich, yet for your sake he became poor, so 
                                                          
189 Luke 5:21. 
190 Cf. 2 Corinthians 5:17; John 1:3; Colossians 1:16. 
191 2 Peter 1:3–4. 
192 Cf. Romans 2:12–13; 3:21–22; 5:1; 8:1. 
193 Cf. Hebrews 2:14–15. 
194 Hebrews 5:9. 
195 Hebrews 5:7. 
196 Hebrews 2:10. 
197 Romans 5:8. 
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that you by his poverty might become rich.”198 Divine “reconciliation”199 comes through 
sharing the poverty of Christ’s humanity. It follows on God becoming united with 
“flesh.”200 The dilemma was that people, “bowed down” with evil, could not “lift up their 
heads towards the truth.”201 In response, Christ identified with peoples’ sinfulness in 
order that they might partake in his righteousness.202 The Creed says he “came down” 
“for our salvation;”203 the apostolic witness204 is that “life” was “made manifest” for the 
purpose of “fellowship.”205 “We do not merely believe in an idea; Christianity is not a 
philosophy but an event that God brought about in this world, a story that he pieced 
together in a real way and forms with us as history.”206 It was through his physical 
“blood” that people were brought near to God, and it was through his “flesh” on “the 
cross” that God’s people were united to each other.207 The “Church of God” was 
“obtained with his own blood.”208  
                                                          
198 2 Corinthians 8:9. 
199 2 Corinthians 5:18–21. 
200 John 1:14. 
201 Athanasius of Alexandria, On the Incarnation, trans. P. Lawson, 3:12: 39–40.  
202 2 Corinthians 5:21. 
203 τὸν δι’ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν. Nicene Creed. Taken from 
http://www.earlyChurchtexts.com/public/creed_of_nicaea_325.htm.  
204 1 John 1:2–3. 
205 Twice used in 1 John 1:2: έφανϵρώθη—made to appear, manifested. 
206 Benedict XVI, Bishops of Switzerland. 
207 Ephesians 2:13–16. 
208 Acts 20:28. 
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Christian salvation involves real participation in Christ’s humanity; it involves 
more than distant divine decrees. However, Christ’s humanity is more than his physical 
body; it includes his mind and will. Evangelicals differ among themselves on the specific 
roles of physical elements of their faith, such as Baptism and Holy Communion, in 
relation to salvation. However, none of them can dismiss the fact that matter matters. Or, 
they will have forgotten the Incarnation and Cross. Despite the various ways evangelicals 
interpret sacraments, the physically participatory aspect of salvation cannot be forgotten 
when one hears, “Whoever feeds on my flesh and drinks my blood has eternal life,”209 or 
“we were buried therefore with him by baptism,”210 and “we have been united with 
him.”211 Otherwise, they will slip into some form of Docetism.  
Evangelicals should strive to interpret Scripture ecclesiastically because the 
Church is intrinsic to God’s revelation and salvation in Christ. In the Church is where 
people hear the saving word, participate in the sacraments, experience human fellowship, 
and offer communal prayers.212 The Church, Christ’s Body, is where the Savior is 
directly encountered. Faith must certainly have a personal component,213 but it is 
communal in its constitution. In Christ, “revelation is a communion of love”214 given to a 
society. Jesus, the fount of God’s revelation215 in whose “face” the glory of God 
                                                          
209 John 6:54. 
210 Romans 6:4. 
211 Romans 6:5. 
212 Acts 2:42. 
213 Romans 10:11–13. 
214 Synod of Bishops, Instrumentum Laboris, 24. 
215 Hebrews 1:1–2. 
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shines,216 “spoke openly to the world.”217 His revelation issued from a “mountain,”218 not 
from within a cave. His death was in a public place, and his resurrection was attested to 
by “many proofs,”219 including an empty tomb located in an easily accessible 
“garden.”220 He showed “himself alive” “to them,”221 to those whose “eyes” and ears”222 
were open. An understanding of the living Christ requires faith, but it is a shared faith.223 
From the beginning, the community “lifted up their eyes”224 to see Jesus as God’s Son; 
individuals whose “eyes were opened” immediately reported to those “gathered 
together.”225 Although personal faith is required of a Christian, revelation was never a 
private matter of “someone’s own interpretation”226 because “none of these things” were 
“done in a corner.”227 Even the most private revelations were confirmed by the group.228 
                                                          
216 2 Corinthians 4:6. 
217 John 18:19. 
218 Matthew 5:1. Matthew appears to make a reference to Moses receiving the commandments on a 
mountain. 
219 Acts 1:3. 
220 John 19:41. 
221 Acts 1:3. 
222 Matthew 13:16. 
223 1 Corinthians 15:5–8. 
224 Matthew 17:8. 
225 Luke 24:31, 33. 
226 2 Peter 1:20. 
227 Acts 26:26. 
228 For example, cf. Jesus’ admonition to Mary in John 20:17, Paul’s confirmation by the apostles in 
Galatians 2:1–10, the need for prophets to be judged in 1 Corinthians 14:29, and Cornelius’ instruction to 
go to Peter in Acts 10. 
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It was the Father’s “good pleasure” to personally give his gift to the “flock.”229 One 
cannot insist on having access to God “independently of any such special economy.”230  
Hermeneutics must be sensitive to this salvific context. Evangelicals cannot locate 
themselves outside of this tangible participation in the life of Christ in his Church if they 
hope to expound Scripture well. Church life, including liturgy, reading of Scripture, 
worship, preaching, baptism, and sharing in Christ’s sufferings are not merely “externally 
edifying but rather an inner immersion in the presence of the Word.”231 When his 
disciples are gathered together and he stands “among them,”232 then their minds are able 
“to understand the Scriptures.”233 As Ignatius of Antioch said, “Where Jesus Christ is, 
there is the catholic Church.”234  
Paradoxical Quality of Revelation 
Attempts to interpret the “many heralds” of revelation often reveal tension in 
theology. At times, Christian truth is paradoxical; one truth might appear opposite 
another truth. Or, multiple revelatory voices might seem to clamor against others. 
Without an ecclesial interpreter of revelation, it is difficult to keep a full view of divine 
revelation.  
                                                          
229 Luke 12:32. 
230 Nevin, “Wilberforce on the Incarnation,” 77. 
231 Cf. Synod of Bishops, Instrumentum Laboris, 21; and Benedict XVI, Bishops of Switzerland. 
232 Luke 24:36. 
233 Luke 24:45. 
234 Ignatius of Antioch, “Letter to Smyrnaeans,” in Richardson, 8:2:115. The immediate passage reads, 
“Where the bishop is present, there let the congregation gather, just as where Jesus Christ is, there is the 
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 A contemporary call for an ecclesial reading of Scripture is consistent with the 
paradoxical quality of revelation. Christian revelation puts forward dogmatic truths which 
can appear to contradict each other, but must be held in tension in faith. When “one truth 
upsets us, another truth balances it.” However, the “second truth does not restrict the first, 
but only places it in the proper perspective.”235 Paradox suggests an ongoing “search or 
wait for synthesis”236 between what, at times, appears contradictory. It is the “reverse” of 
synthesis and has “more charm than dialectics.”237 Paradox is “more realist and more 
modest, less tense and less hurried” than dialectics.238 It is a “wonderful tapestry but it 
cannot yet be comprised entirely within our range of vision.”239 It specifies “things” more 
than how to speak of them.240 It recognizes that the full synthesis between truths either 
hasn’t been realized or is steeped in mystery.  
Ecclesiology is an element of Christian faith that needs to be kept in paradox, or 
its truth will be lost. As argued in the first chapter of this work, the dismissal of 
ecclesiology has often opened the door for removing other dogmatic claims. On one 
hand, Christian dogma241 can be very clear; it results as an ordinary element of the 
                                                          
235 de Lubac, Paradoxes of Faith, 11. 
236 de Lubac, Paradoxes of Faith, 9. 
237 Ibid.  
238 Ibid.  
239 Ibid.  
240 de Lubac, Paradoxes of Faith, 10.  
241 In this dissertation, a close distinction between dogma and doctrine exists. Dogma is a subset of 
doctrine. Doctrine is considered any of several teachings of Christianity. However, dogma is used to 
reference those doctrines which are binding as a result of their close relation to revelation; adherence to 
them is obligatory. Note how the term δόγμα is used in Luke 2:1: “A decree (δόγμα) went out from Caesar 
Augustus.” Or, consider Paul’s use of the term in Ephesians 2:15 in relation to Mosaic Law: “The law of 
commandments expressed in ordinances (δόγμασιν).” In Acts 16:4, the binding decisions of the apostles 
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revelatory dialogue between God and his people. God seeks to “make known to us the 
mystery of his will,” his “purpose,” “plan,”242 and what he is “about to do”243 in the earth; 
articles of faith do matter. “Through divine revelation” God conveys “eternal decisions of 
his will.”244 “The word of God draws each of us into a conversation with the Lord: the 
God who speaks teaches us how to speak to him.”245 Out of love and fidelity his people 
continue the personal dialogue by articulating what has been unveiled. It is only in a 
docile “attitude” of “prayer,” as an “act of faith,” that any dogmatics can occur.246 As an 
example, Jesus showed that ancient monotheism, and the correct identification of the sole 
deity, still mattered; he chided a woman who did “not know” what she believed, and then 
informed her that “we worship what we know, for salvation is from the Jews.”247 Jesus’ 
recitation of the Shema demonstrates the ordinariness of dogmatic confession.248 The 
Church “gathered together to consider”249 Scripture250 in the light of “what signs and 
                                                          
were called δόγματα. A repeated emphasis on binding obligation occurs with the term dogma, as opposed 
to a more general sense of teaching in the term ‘doctrine.’ Although this distinction is not airtight, it marks 
the distinct understanding of dogma and doctrine in this paper. Cf. “Dogma” in New Advent, 
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05089a.htm.; and CCC, 88. 
242 Ephesians 1:9–10. 
243 Genesis 18:17. 
244 DV, 6. 
245 Benedict XVI, Verbum Domini, 24. 
246 Karl Barth, The Word of God vol. 1 of Church Dogmatics, trans. and ed. Geoffrey William Bromiley, 
(Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2010), 1:1:23.  
247 John 4:22. The Shema (Deuteronomy 6:4) is an example of the importance of dogma in Judaism prior to 
the advent of Christianity.  
248 Mark 12:29–30 and John 17:3. Cf. Paul’s affirmation of monotheism in 1 Corinthians 8:4. To this day, 
many Jewish families continue to affirm the importance of dogma by placing the Shema on their doorposts.  
249 Acts 15:6. 
250 Acts 15:15–17. 
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wonders God had done.”251 The churches welcomed the council’s authoritative, dogmatic 
conclusions.252 The conveyance of these decisions “strengthened” many churches, and 
helped increase their “numbers.”253 Unlike some Enlightenment assumptions, dogma was 
not “the one real hindrance to a proper understanding” of the Scriptures.254 Instead, as 
part of divine dialogue, the ‘hermeneutic key’ of faith allowed the Bible “to be itself.”255 
Certain teachings of the early Church held “first importance,”256 as can be seen in the fact 
that some were memorized as hymns.257 The dogma of Christ’s uniqueness in human 
salvation remained significant,258 and demonstrated the appropriateness of affirming 
certain claims which restricted other views. A denial of Jesus as Son equaled a denial of 
God and earned the label of “liar’ and “antichrist.”259  
                                                          
251 Acts 15:12. 
252 Acts 16:4. τὰ δόγματα τὰ κεκριμένα. 
253 Acts 16:5. 
254 Benedict XVI, God’s Word, 91. Today, biblical exegesis prior to the Enlightenment is frequently termed 
“pre-critical.” However, such a broad label is not necessarily accurate. As argued in the first chapter of this 
dissertation, a critical understanding of the text of the Bible has regularly been sought using the best tools 
available. 
255 Benedict XVI, Biblical Interpretation in Crisis: The Ratzinger Conference on Bible and Church. ed. 
Richard John Neuhaus (Grand Rapids: W. B.  Eerdmans, 1989), 126.  
256 1 Corinthians 15:3–5. 
257 Cf. Philippians 2:6–11, 1 Timothy 3:16, and 2 Timothy 2:11–13.  
258 Note Jesus’ proximity to God in the monotheistic passages of John 14:6–10, John 17:3, and Matthew 
11:27, and in the apostolic declaration of Acts 4:12. 
259 1 John 2:22–23. Braaten warns against the “lurking” temptation within the ecumenical movement to 
“transcend or circumvent” confessional issues. According to Braaten, “dimensions of faith” in the gospel 
cannot be suppressed, or the question of truth dismissed in ecumenical dialogue. “Anticonfessional” and 
“anticreedal” Christian communities do not provide any real help to dialogue because a nonconfessional 
Christianity has “never existed.” Braaten, Mother Church, 33. 
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On the other hand, dogma and Church teachings are paradoxical. Specific to this 
work, it is understandably difficult for some to accept the suggestion of reading Holy 
Scripture in the context of “one, holy, catholic, apostolic Church” when such a 
congregation does not appear to exist for them. Paradoxical tension is present in 
ecclesiology when what Scripture or early creeds claimed is not realized. For example, 
while Christianity is possibly growing at a faster rate than at any time in its history, much 
of the growth is occurring among those who do not regard ecclesial structure or “central 
authority” as necessary; many of these are either evangelicals or historically influenced 
by evangelicals.260 In addition, it is not difficult to contrast moral standards with the real 
lives of leaders in churches. The degrading behavior of some Church leaders throughout 
history, and in contemporary Church life, seems to contradict the idea of a “royal 
priesthood, a holy nation.”261 How can Christ be present in such arrogant, evil people? 
Often, those who thankfully appear to be committed to living holy lives nonetheless 
continue to fight among themselves over which Church is the true one. How can the 
claim of “one body and one Spirit”262 stand? Generally, people from all sides of “serious 
dissensions” in the Church, whether in historical or contemporary times, are to 
                                                          
260 Pentecostal and Charismatic movements are historically traced to nineteenth-century holiness 
movements and evangelicalism. In the last 100 years, Pentecostal and Charismatic Christianity has grown 
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worldwide. Some estimate 27% of world Christianity is Pentecostal or charismatic. The majority of the 
growth is occurring outside of mainline denominations. For example, cf. Pew Research Center, 
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“blame.”263 Division in the Church was not unheard of in the “beginnings of this one and 
only Church of God.”264 Yet, the apostolic vision remains in the Scripture evangelicals 
claim to trust. The plan remains to bring “all” to “unity” in full maturity through a 
structured, hierarchical Church;265 there is no second strategy. While rightly decrying 
abuses, evangelicals harm themselves when they dismiss, or even neglect, paradoxical 
ecclesiology.  
In addition to realizing the paradoxical nature of revelation in relation to the 
Church, it is also beneficial to remember that healthy tensions exists in nearly all vital 
aspects of Christian faith. Ecclesiology is not the only sphere of Christianity where 
polyphonic voices need to be kept in tension. C. S. Lewis complained that it was assumed 
in many modern systems of thought that the vocabulary and some emotions of “historic” 
Christianity could be retained, while the “essential doctrines” should be quietly 
dropped.266 To many who are “educated and enlightened,” “historic Christianity is 
something so barbarous that no modern man can really believe it.”267 The claim of an 
ancient god being born, dying, and resurrecting is all considered mythical to the 
enlightened mind. However, Lewis argued, despite the disdain for Traditional dogma, no 
one can really let go of it and “cut the umbilical cord.”268 For Lewis, this was because the 
                                                          
263 UR, 3.  
264 UR, 3. Also, Cf. Mark 9:33–34; 1 Corinthians 3:3–4; Philippians 4:2–3. 
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266 C. S. Lewis, “Myth Became Fact,” in God in the Dock (Grand Rapids, MI: W. B.  Eerdmans, 1970), 63. 
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mythical aspect of Christian faith is actually the “vital and nourishing element in the 
whole concern.” It is the myth that abides and “gives life.”269 Lewis was not suggesting 
that the “historic doctrines of Christianity are merely mythical.”270 Instead, Lewis came to 
realize that the old myths and stories of human “legend” and imagination” actually 
occurred in history. “Without ceasing to be myth,” they really happened in the person of 
Jesus Christ, “at a particular date, in a particular place, followed by definable historical 
circumstances.”271 In Christ, truth was integrated with the human imagination, and myth 
became fact. For Lewis, if Christians either gutted the faith of its dogmatic tensions or 
watered down the old stories into moral lessons, then the truth of the faith would die. The 
mystical quality in the “marriage of heaven and earth”272 would be lost. Tensions 
perceived in Christian faith must be maintained in the journey from exegesis to theology. 
Otherwise, only a restricted, even distorted, vision will occur. To this reader, the over-
arching problem with American liberal exegesis was that it attempted to interpret 
Scripture outside of an ecclesial setting. In doing this, it limited its resources. The 
fullness of the world of the text was neglected.  
“Faith seeking understanding” is the proper response to theological paradox or 
other theological tensions. The Christian theologian is to patiently accept the tension, and 
vigorously work towards synthesis with an attitude of docility. The one who is impatient 
with paradox will push one side or the other, and end up destroying the truth. “Does it not 
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happen that some theologians and some men of the Church change into stone the bread of 
truth which it is their mission to distribute?”273 Church history is replete with failed 
attempts to undo the paradoxical tension in Christian revelation.274  
Faith, as a reception of God’s revealed love, “is oftentimes expressed in Sacred 
Scripture in terms of covenant.”275 The loving marriage between a man and woman is a 
commonly repeated analogy of sacred covenant.276 Faith is also obligatory,277 with 
obedience directed to a person. This means it is more than assenting to facts about God. 
Both Vatican Councils taught that faith “is to be given to God who reveals, an obedience 
by which man commits his whole self freely to God, offering the full submission of 
intellect and will to God who reveals.”278 Faith in the person of God suggests he himself 
is “the source of the credibility of what he reveals.”279 The facts presented in revelation 
are believed because God is the “guarantor of that truth.”280 Faith is indeed a “gracious 
                                                          
273 De Lubac, Paradoxes of Faith, 22. 
274 In classic debates, some attempted this through Modalism or other forms of rejecting the Trinity, while 
others affirmed Jesus’ deity, but claimed his humanity was an illusion. From the Reformation itself onward, 
many have grown, many have grown impatient with the apparent conflict between sovereignty and free 
will, and advocated one pole to such a degree that the other end was turned into an illusion. Nineteenth-
century debates between Supernaturalists and Naturists exhibited varying responses to paradoxical tensions 
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275 Synod of Bishops, Instrumentum Laboris, 24. 
276 Cf. Ephesians 5:32, Genesis 1:27–28, and Hosea 2:8 and 6:7. 
277 Romans 1:5 and 16:26. The Holy See’s website version of DV, 1:5 mistakenly cites Romans 13:26; 
however, the correct passage citation is Romans 16:26.  
278 This quote is from DV, 5. It is drawn from “On Faith,” Vatican 1:3:3. ”Since human beings are totally 
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are obliged to yield to God the revealer full submission of intellect and will by faith.”  
279 John Paul II, Fides et ratio, 13. 
280 John Paul II, Fides et ratio, 13. 
478 
address of God to man;” it ultimately “rests” on God’s grace. However, it is too 
restrictive to prevent faith from concomitantly being “a determination of human 
action.”281 Human freedom is required in faith, allowing “individuals to give consummate 
expression to their own freedom.”282  
In this context, evangelicals must strive to integrate ecclesiology with their 
reading of Scripture. If they claim to love God, believe in his Bible, and trust in his Spirit, 
then they must acknowledge that the Church is part of the New Testament revelation. 
Despite the obvious paradoxical tension, they must patiently persevere in docility before 
God’s word.  
In regards to biblical exegesis, an “adequate”283 hermeneutic of Christian 
revelation calls for Christians to “believe” in the Church.284 No single interpretive 
method can be complete if it excludes “any possibility that God might enter into our lives 
and speak to us in human words.”285 Faith broadens “the scope of reason,”286 and utilizes 
other important tools which help interpret revelation. Proper hermeneutic faith “never 
degenerates into fideism,” but it works in harmony with other interpretive methods.287 
Modern theology must avoid the “temptations” of neglecting ecclesiology and never 
achieving a “comprehensive exegesis which enables the exegete, together with the whole 
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Church, to arrive at the full sense of the texts.”288 Through ecclesial faith, the various 
scriptural texts are seen in their unity; the “individual texts of the Bible” are read “in the 
context of the whole.”289 An analogy to illustrate the role of ecclesial faith in 
hermeneutics can be found in the science of binocular vision. Wholesome single vision, 
which exists in most mammals, is the benefit of binocular eyesight.290 Single vision 
occurs when each eye perceives the same object at a slightly different angle, creating 
depth perception; two distinct angled views are fused together to create a single three-
dimensional image in the mind. The fullness of the object is ascertained in a unified view. 
Stereopsis, the “most precise kind of depth perception,” is a major benefit of having two 
healthy eyes in the same head. In addition, binocular vision in mammals broadens their 
field of view and helps compensate for natural blind spots.291 Ecclesial faith provides 
hermeneutics with binocular vision. It gives a distinct perception of revelation, and helps 
prevent the full image from being partially apprehended in a single dimension of 
knowing. Fideism and unbridled skepticism are alike dismissed because they each would 
inhibit full exegesis of revelation due to only providing a limited, single angle. “Faith 
alone makes it possible to penetrate the mystery in a way that allows us to understand it 
coherently.”292  
                                                          
288 John Paul II, Fides et ratio, 55.  
289 Benedict XVI, Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan to the Transfiguration trans. Adrian 
J. Walker (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2008), xix. Benedict uses the phrase “Canonical exegesis,” a term 
apparently coined by Brevard Childs.  
290 Cf. Rahul Bhola, “Binocular Vision,” University of Iowa Healthcare: Eye Rounds, January 23, 2006, 
http://webeye.ophth.uiowa.edu/eyeforum/tutorials/bhola-binocularvision.htm. 
291 Cf. Bhola, “Binocular Vision.”  
292 John Paul II, Fides et ratio, 13.  
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God often reveals himself in paradox and is found in what looks least like him, 
even his opposite. Yet, he expects human fidelity in response. Augustine found similar 
philosophical “truth” in Christianity as he did in the Platonists’ ideas, but he was 
shocked, and then moved by the humility of God in the lowly flesh of Christ. “None of 
this is in the Platonist books.”293 Martin Luther found ultimate antithesis in the cross. 
God’s “human nature, weakness, foolishness” are seen in the cross. Further, it is only the 
one who sees the “humility and shame” of God displayed on the cross that “deserves to 
be called a theologian.”294 On one hand, the perspicuity of Scripture was obvious to 
Luther, with some “straightforward affirmations” being neither “obscure” nor 
“ambiguous.”295 However, at other times, Luther realized that “God hides himself, and 
wills to be unknown to us.”296 Yet, even in the dark times, the believer should “have no 
concern.”297 As John Paul II reminded, “It should nonetheless be kept in mind that 
Revelation remains charged with mystery.”298  
While this dissertation is a theology rather than a biblical study, and is focused on 
the philosophy behind hermeneutics rather than the sequential activities of a specific 
exegetical method, it is important to briefly insert here the need for critical exegetical 
                                                          
293 Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 7:21:27:131.  
294 Martin Luther, “Heidelberg Disputation,” in “Proofs of the Theses,” 20 
http://bookofconcord.org/heidelberg.php 
295 Cf. Luther, “The Bondage of the Will,” in Dillenberger, 174. 
296 Cf. Luther, “The Bondage of the Will,” in Dillenberger, 190.  
297 Cf. Luther, “The Bondage of the Will,” in Dillenberger, 190. Cf. “Faith in God and Church Order: The 
Catholic Case of Martin Luther,” given by David Tracy at The Lonergan Institute as part of The Church in 
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method. As Legaspi pointed out, the Bible functions as both confessional Scripture and 
academic text. The theologian’s goal is to integrate those two realities. This dissertation 
naturally risks deemphasizing the need to analyze the Bible as human literature due to its 
intense focus on ecclesial interpretation. Biblical studies cannot naively afford to interpret 
the Bible simply as it reads; fideism and hyper-literalism are not helpful. Rather, while 
affirming the faith that Scripture is God’s written word, it is vital to attempt to understand 
the world of the text, including the authorship, dating, redactions, antiquated world 
views, and genre of each biblical document. The accent of faith in this dissertation does 
not intend to diminish the importance of such critical biblical studies. However, this too 
becomes a theological point of importance for evangelicals. If the Bible is God’s written 
word, and the writings are also humanly generated, then it is of the utmost importance 
that Scripture be subjected to a full literary analysis. For example, if an individual refuses 
to accept the possibility that God may have selected non-historical literary genres for 
some portions of Scripture, then he has disrespected the written word. If an individual 
insists that every portion of Scripture, including poetic and prehistorical sections, be 
forced to fit into the genre of a contemporary newspaper, then he has disrespected the 
God behind the Bible. Alternatively, biblical studies are insufficient to interpret the 
Scripture without the eye of faith, provided by historical apostolic witness. If the 
individual biblical scholar attempts to authoritatively determine the full meaning of the 
text without reference to the ongoing faith behind the text, then he will jeopardize 
flattening the text, and missing its literary intent. The sensitivity of interpreting 
ambiguities in the sacred text is precisely why Scripture must be interpreted in the faith 
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of a living Church which is immersed in the life stream of historical Christianity. 
Binocular vision is needed for hermeneutics of Scripture. 
 Evangelicals need to accept the paradox of ecclesial hermeneutics without trying 
to artificially remove the tension. While the corruption of leaders and systems seems 
apparent in all Christian denominations, ecclesiology, as an intrinsic element of Christian 
revelation, is essential to biblical interpretation. The New Testament clearly teaches that 
God is in his people. The Spirit of Christ is promised to lead his people “into all the 
truth.”299 Instead of trying to remove the tension of this claim, even to the degree of 
dismissing historic dogma, evangelicals need to patiently strive in faith to find the 
synthesis of the paradox. Unfortunately, when it comes to such patient faith, “we do not 
want a mysterious God.”300  
Practically Engaging Catholicism 
After considering the ecclesiastical characteristics of revelation, evangelicals need 
to return to a face-to-face encounter with the Catholic Church. With clear critical 
empathy, they need to engage the Catholic Church during the hermeneutic process. 
Evangelicals do not need to surrender what might be considered legitimate contentions, 
but they need to open themselves to their own misunderstandings and attempt to 
positively listen to and learn from Catholics while interpreting Scripture. This is 
consistent with the Scriptures evangelicals claim to uphold. While this work concludes 
that a full, positive interface is not possible in this generation due to “blame” on both 
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sides, it offers practical reasons why attempts are needed, and suggests practical next 
steps of engagement. 
Contextualizing the Discussion 
 Without some ecclesiastical form, how can anyone meaningfully discuss 
theological problems?301 Evangelicals need a formal context in which the deepest matters 
of faith and morals can be discussed. The Catholic Church provides an important part of 
that setting. Formal Catholic conversations on a multiplicity of topics can be traced back 
to early days of Christianity. The Catholic Church provides a legitimate context for 
conversation. 
The Catholic Church has benefited everyone by working through their own 
problems, even if imperfectly. Certainly, some Catholic theologians stray and get trapped 
in a particular generation’s zeitgeist, but the Catholic Church over all demonstrates 
resilience. This is because of its formal ecclesial structure with its inherent ability to 
correct itself. Catholicism has a way of critically opposing modernism, and ultimately 
transforming it with the Gospel. Evangelicals will want to avoid final judgments of the 
Catholic Church based on snapshot images from a particular generation. Instead, they 
will benefit themselves by considering the panoramic view of Catholic thought as they 
work through many of their own modern social and moral dilemmas. When it comes to 
engaging modernity, evangelicals may find they have more in common with Catholics 
than they realized.  
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Keeping Focus on the Text 
 Evangelicals desire to stay focused on the text of Scripture. However, over time, 
that is difficult without an ecclesiastical form. The Catholic Church provides a perennial 
structure that ironically helps evangelicals return from distractions to a direct engagement 
with the Scriptures. The Catholic Church’s theology, recently in the works of Benedict 
XVI, emphasizes a holistic or “canonical” reading of Scripture, much of which should 
resonate with evangelical thinking.302 The biblical text is attempted to be read in its 
presumed unity in the faith of the Church, historic and contemporary, while integrating 
various tools and methods of interpretation. It allows the text to speak for itself in its 
fullness. Further, while integrating various exegetical tools, it prevents dominance of the 
text by a particular scientific method, a literal fundamentalism, or a local narrative 
community. 
 Greater attention to the text of Scripture assists in the verbalization of dogma. 
Teaching the Scriptures rightly is one of the most important duties of Catholic bishops.303 
The evangelical exegete is referred directly to the text of Scripture when he examines 
various Catholic teachings. This helps realign his focus. 
Maintaining Mystery 
 The Catholic Church perceives itself as historically maintaining the mystery of 
God “manifested in the flesh”304 through its very existence. Through their ecclesiology, 
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they have attempted to keep the salvific mystery of the Incarnation at the forefront. 
Christ, who is in heaven with the “Father,” is “continually active in the world” in order 
that people might be “partakers of his glorious life.”305 Catholic ecclesiology has 
continuously integrated the idea of the ongoing divine presence of the Logos in the 
visible, tangible form of God’s people, thus making the Church the “universal sacrament” 
of salvation.306 By articulating this, they have touched the nerve of a fundamental flaw in 
much of modern Christianity.  
 While evangelicals and other Christians disagree with several specific conclusions 
of Catholic ecclesiology, they must regard the need of keeping the mystery of God 
“manifested in the flesh” at the forefront. Since the Reformation, Christian communities 
have gradually deemphasized a sacramental Church that mediates the divine mystery. 
Diminishing mystery manifests itself in many ways in Church life, theology, and morals. 
The broad neglect of ecclesiology and specific anti-Catholic bias is at the root of the 
problem. The contemporary Catholic Church is needed by evangelicals as a tangible 
reminder of the importance of mystery in normal Christian life, including life in the 
Church. 
 The Catholic Church also helps evangelicals open themselves to the universal 
dimension of Christianity. Christianity has a historical basis in Jesus Christ. This 
historical foundation should not be forfeited to an ahistorical theology. The Church at 
Rome is one of only a few other churches which can claim to trace its historical origins 
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486 
back to the actual apostles. Although this may appear to carry no theological weight for 
some evangelicals, the historical importance is significant. The Catholic Church offers a 
long and broad view of the history of Christian thought; it connects the contemporary 
person with the founding, formative Tradition of the Christian faith.  
 However, the historical significance of the Catholic Church does translate into 
theological significance. The belief in one God guiding history to an Eschaton means that 
each moment matters. It is the responsibility of each generation of Christians to see the 
inner connection they have to historic manifestations of Christianity; confidence in the 
Spirit is needed to properly interpret this history.307 Even those who think that the true 
Church is only an eschatological reality admit the importance of history by default. God 
is leading somewhere!308 This highlights one of the dangers of a sterile reading of 
Scripture: the full revelation of God, who shows himself throughout history and in his 
Church, is truncated. Dispensationalist eschatology often exhibits this flaw. In it, the 
Church Age is sometimes reduced to an apostate period with no real value in reading the 
perspicuous Bible.309 The Catholic Church helps evangelicals by providing a broader 
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perspective on Providential time and history. Evangelicals often consider themselves 
justified pointing out moral and theological faults in the Catholic ecclesial structure, as 
well as noting an unwillingness by Catholics to admit those flaws; however, evangelicals 
hurt themselves if they condemn the entire edifice.  
Practical Steps of Engagement 
 Following are a few practical suggestions for evangelicals to engage the Catholic 
Church in the process of biblical interpretation. None of these are revolutionary or 
contrary to evangelical convictions. However, due to polemics, they are often neglected. 
Trust in God’s Providence 
 As people who believe in the inspiration of the Bible and its claim of the active 
Holy Spirit, evangelicals need to respect the providential formation of the Catholic 
Church. Divine organization within a visible Church structure is a biblical idea. This does 
not necessarily translate to an indefectible Church, or that the pope is infallible at any 
moment, or that he should be the supreme authority in the worldwide Church. Nor does it 
mean that those who refuse to submit to the Catholic Church are necessarily 
“deficient.”310 Nonetheless, it does mean that God’s providential establishment of 
authority needs to be respected.311 Minimally, the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the 
Catholic Church to oversee its own flock needs to be appreciated as a gift from God to 
his people.  
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 Churches, in general, need to be understood as visible expressions of God’s love; 
they are not meant to be impositions on human freedom. In the Christian Churches, the 
“chief Shepherd”312 cares for his flock through the people to whom he has given 
“oversight.”313 In addition, Christ evangelistically brings his light into a dark world 
through his organized people.314 Evangelicals can appreciate the moving of the Spirit in 
the Catholic Church without agreeing with their fully-developed ecclesiology. 
Dialogue with Family 
 Catholics are brothers and sisters in the Christian faith. Hence, familial 
conversation needs to occur. Dialogue is a practical way for evangelicals to interface with 
the Catholic Church. Dialogue can include personal contact, debate, and sharing of 
literature. Contemporary Catholic theologians have written on all the hot topics over 
which evangelicals are concerned.315 They, too, have dealt with modernity and the Bible. 
Evangelicals will benefit by engaging contemporary Catholics through listening and 
debate. In the process, they will often encounter thoughtful people who genuinely care 
about their Christian faith. The different perspectives of Catholics can open evangelicals 
to new views which resonate with evangelical faith. Catholic theological literature is one 
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of the greatest treasures available to evangelicals, but such wealth is rarely utilized into 
evangelical literary works. In addition, a Catholic education can provide a healthy 
broadening of one’s evangelical perspective. 
 Dialogue with the Catholic Church is also beneficial because it opens its vast 
library. The literary wealth of historic Catholic assets can be found in many locations, 
including creeds, councils, sermons, polemics, and histories. Protestant Ressourcement, 
including a specific effort to retrieve ancient creeds, must still utilize Catholic resources. 
Evangelicals who cut themselves off from Catholic sources make it difficult to gain a 
comprehensive understanding of the Christian faith.  
 The development of dogma is a benefit of dialogue with the Catholic Church. As 
mentioned earlier, many evangelical “What We Believe” declarations are retooled 
ecclesiastical statements, many of which predated the Reformation. Dialogue is healthy, 
but it is also considered fashionable. Agnostic idolatry is a danger with dialogue. When 
caught in the enticing trap, some are devoted to the conversation but disdain conclusions. 
The Apostolic description of “always learning and never able to arrive at a knowledge of 
the truth”316 is a recurring temptation. Yet, the Catholic Church can help an evangelical at 
this point. Dialogue with other Christians, such as Catholics, who utilize dogmatics can 
help the evangelical determine which doctrines are binding, and which can be let go.  
Reading Scripture in the Context of Mystery 
 Critical empathy calls for an imaginative projection of oneself into the other in 
order to understand the other. Without losing one’s own identity, the evangelical must 
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seek to understand Catholicism from the inside. Assuming that the Spirit is operative in 
the Catholic Church, this can be attempted in uncomplicated manners.  
 Evangelicals can listen together with Catholics to the word of God. Through the 
Holy Scripture, Christ is speaking to his Church. Evangelicals can sit silently with 
Catholics before the Scripture, or exegete it with them. These efforts can also include 
public worship with a common lectionary, following a liturgical calendar, or a more 
personal and meditative “divine” reading (lectio divina). It also involves communal 
prayer. Just as evangelicals should avoid reading the Bible in a sterile vacuum, they 
should not always pray alone. 
 These are only elementary suggestions, but they might be groundbreaking to some 
evangelicals. Worship is not just vertical and heavenward. It is also how God’s people 
stay connected, learn from each other, and prepare for a new day. “And let us consider 
how to stir up one another to love and good works, not neglecting to meet together, as in 
the habit of some, but encouraging one another, and all the more as you see the Day 
drawing near.”317 
Conclusion 
 Evangelical theology must attempt what is “not possible,” and positively apply 
effective post-critical methods of critiquing its own hermeneutical models and 
misunderstandings of the Catholic Church. Near the heart of this effort must be a 
relocation of the Bible in its original ecclesial context. The result of this will be a 
necessary attempt to interface with the Catholic Church. Despite the dim hopes of 
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accomplishing much in this generation, these aggressive steps must be undertaken out of 
obedience to the Scriptures evangelicals claim to uphold, and the Lord they confess to 
love.   
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CONCLUSION 
 The old spiritual assures its listener, “There is a Balm in Gilead, to make the 
wounded whole.” For the evangelical, Christ is that Balm. Evangelicals desire to bring 
Christ to the world through conveying the gospel. The point of this dissertation is to 
remind evangelicals that Christ is found among His people. Therefore, any responsible 
interpretation of his words must occur among His people. 
 Evangelicals have a wonderful opportunity to mature in their faith by developing 
a more stable hermeneutic. From the beginning of Christianity, an axiomatic relationship 
was assumed between Church and Scripture. Despite severe polemics, and even schisms, 
this assumption was maintained. Through the various developments of Biblicism, formal 
ecclesiology was cordoned off, in some hermeneutical models, from the work of 
exegesis. History shows that exegesis of Scripture outside of formal ecclesiology is 
imbalanced. It habitually results in theological conclusions which presume to alter 
immutable dogma. Equally harmful, it is incapable of preventing fragmentation of 
Christian unity. Polemics are a natural part of any healthy discussion. However, without 
an ecclesial home for those discussions to occur, people often forget they are family.  
 This brings evangelicals to face the Catholic Church. Although differences appear 
practically irresolvable, the apostolic directive to be “eager to maintain the unity of the 
Spirit in the bond of peace”1 remains in effect. Without discounting doctrinal differences 
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between evangelicals and Catholics, this dissertation has attempted to elucidate that the 
Catholic Church, due to its ecclesiology, has superior capabilities to honestly engage 
modernity. It has the ability that all Christianity should have through the Incarnation: in 
its engagement with modernity, it can incorporate and ultimately transform what it 
encounters. Although the effect of engaging the world might create a sense of instability 
for a season, ecclesiology functions as a counterbalance. Evangelicals need more than a 
general ecclesiology; they need the Catholic Church if they hope to have equilibrium in 
their exegetical efforts. Similar to David Steinmetz’s comments regarding recent 
Protestant interest in Thomas Aquinas, evangelicals need to “put an end to their own self-
imposed impoverishment.” If they sincerely trust in Scripture and Christ’s promise of the 
Holy Spirit, then they should acknowledge the contemporary need for the Catholic 
Church. It is a hermeneutical “development long overdue.”2  
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